See my blogpost “Remain Quietly at Home,” 6/19/23.

Unfortunately my nearest and dearest 14-year-old lives 1600 miles away, so I am unable to explain Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins’ order in GO Risk Management, Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 6/18/26. When it comes to such matters as ‘proprietary source code,’ “proprietary software architecture,’ ‘internal systems,’ or ‘raw simulation output data,'” Order, at p. 1, I must defer either to software engineers with advanced degrees or teenagers who were born with smartphones in their hands. I know none of the former.

This is the usual discovery joust in what appears to be another microcaptive dodge, wherein Judge Cracklin’ Jenkins manages to avoid both parties’ attempts to win their case at discovery.

Respondent first, with a subpoena that petitioner’s expert, whom I’ll call Mr. T., wants to quash..

“Mr. T’s response explains that he maintains and consults his proprietary databases in the anonymized format provided to respondent and does not consult the underlying documents, which consist of confidential nonparty documents. He explains that the discrepancies in the number of entries noted by respondent result from filtering of the produced database that he describes and that respondent could likewise filter to reach the same results. Mr. T also indicates that he does not retain or consider raw simulation data but that the outputs he obtained and considered could be generated using the inputs he describes with the database of information that he used and produced to respondent. Given respondent’s acknowledgements about the productions received from Mr. T and Mr. T’s explanations of how those relate to respondent’s request, the Court will not, at this juncture, order Mr. T to produce any further documents pursuant to the subpoena.” Order, at p. 2.

Now for petitioner’s move.

“In the Motion to Compel Discovery, petitioners request that respondent be compelled ‘to supplement the expert reports served in this matter pursuant to Tax Court Rule 143(g) and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and to produce the materials relied upon by Respondent’s experts in a reasonably usable and accessible format.’ The motion argues that respondent’s experts’ reports do not identify with reasonable specificity the materials supporting their opinions. It also argues that respondent’s production of documents considered by the experts does not provide reasonably usable access thereto, referring to an index provided by respondent. The response to the motion indicates that when the documents considered by respondent’s experts were first produced on April 10, 2026, prior to the April 13, 2026, deadline set pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order as modified by the order (Lead Case Doc. 163), dated March 20, 2026, they were produced on a hard drive, given that petitioners had not specified a format for production of electronically stored information. The response indicates that respondent re-produced the documents in a different manner requested by petitioners in May, that respondent has offered to reproduce them in another manner requested by petitioners if petitioners bear the costs of doing so, and that, given Rule 72(b)(3), respondent should not be required to reproduce them. The response also argues that the expert reports satisfy the requirements of Rule 143(g) by describing the facts and data considered, which do not require the point-by-point citations that it claims petitioners seek. Given the contents of respondent’s expert reports and the production that petitioners concede respondent has provided, this Court agrees with respondent that petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought by their motion.” Order, at p. 2.

Once again, the immortal words of Tom Hobbes in Ch. VIII of Leviathan come to mind: “When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so?”

That trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Fightin’ Jim, for Collette Branch, T. C. Memo. 2026-51, filed 6/17/26, can sing out loud and strong to the tune of  Broadway’s Own, George M., whose self-made inexactitude echoes down the ages from the great Learned Hand of 2 Cir to Judge Goeke.

Collette ran programs and services for the mentally and physically disabled of the Big Easy, and her recordkeeping matched. No fewer than twice does Judge Goeke deride her bookkeeping as “a mishmash of expenses.” T. C. Memo. 2026-51, at p. 35. But Judge Goeke goes on, overturning IRS’ numerous attempts to weasel out of concessions and stiped facts and Collette’s inventive doubledipping and obfuscatory testimony.

Finally unscrambling, so far as judicial acumen and patient, unrewarded toil are able, this overcooked frittata, he relegates the parties to a Rule 155 beancount for the ages.

The trusty attorney for Jon B. Novak, T. C. Memo. 2026-52, filed 6/127/26, gets a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class” for her run-the-checklist attack on the filing of the NFTL, but Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins heaves the IRM at her, taking down her petition.

The date when the NFTL was prepared is irrelevant. While the RO may tell the taxpayer that s/he is considering rejection of the CA, s/he may not tell taxpayer that the CA will be rejected until the CDP is concluded. And Jon got all the breaks. 

“The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) instructs IRS employees that although the intention to recommend rejection of an installment agreement should be communicated to a taxpayer, actual rejection of agreements must not be conveyed before independent administrative review. IRM 5.14.1.4(11) (Mar. 31, 2023).7 It also instructs that enforcement action may not be taken while installment agreements are pending. Id. However, it also specifically provides that NFTLs generally should be filed in connection with installment agreements to ensure the government’s interest is protected. See IRM 5.14.1.4.3(1)(a) (Dec. 23, 2022); see also IRM 5.14.1.4.3(2) (noting that NFTLs may be filed while installment agreements are pending and during the rejection process); IRM 5.12.2.6(1) (Oct. 14, 2013) (providing that an NFTL should generally be filed if the aggregate unpaid balance of assessments is $10,000 or more). It instructs that taxpayers should be advised in advance about the plan to file an NFTL and given an opportunity to make full payment. IRM 5.14.1.4.3(1)(b). The RO followed the protocol set forth in the IRM by conveying the intent to reject the installment agreement before the rejection was actually effected, as well as by indicating that an NFTL would be filed and providing petitioner an opportunity to fully pay his liabilities before that. It is generally not an abuse of discretion to follow IRM guidelines. Cf. Mission Organic Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner, Nos. 6937-23L, et al., 165 T.C., slip op. at 10 (Dec. 16, 2025). Petitioner had an opportunity to avoid the NFTL filing by fully paying the liabilities, and he had the opportunity to dispute the NFTL filing after the fact through the CDP process. He also had the opportunity to request withdrawal of the NFTL, potentially invoking section 6323(j)(1)(C), given his claim that the NFTL impeded his ability to liquidate assets to pay his liabilities. See IRM 5.12.9.4 (Sep. 6, 2019); see also Form 12277, Application for Withdrawal of Filed Form 668(Y), Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Accordingly, petitioner’s rights were not nm violated.” T. C. Memo. 2026-52, at pp. 10-11.

For the Mission Organic’s story, see my blogpost “Expensive Pottery,” 12/16/25.

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler is the judge for the job in Adrian D. Smith and Nancy W. Smith, et al., T. C. Memo. 2026-50, filed 6/16/26, as he unveils the tax treatment of these various Mideastern research projects of these world-famous architects.

Key points: Loss of potential profits on premature termination do not render research unfunded; payment for work to date is sufficient. Merely meeting commonly-agreed standards is insufficient; detailed specifications, itemized criteria, and. numerous checkpoints (like 1,000 pages of specifications) which must be met are necessary for unfunded Section 41’s ultra-guided largesse. Pre-Loper Bright cases deferring to Chevron are still good law, and Judge Speedy Weiler follows them. The architects do get the lower Reg. Section 1.41-4A(d)(3) substantially retained rights to the research credits in four (count ’em, four) of the six (count ’em, six) exemplars.

The independent investor test for reasonableness of compensation to researchers is the test under Section 174, even though a carryover from Section 162 learning. Here, however, the record is too scanty for Judge Speedy Weiler to do the numbers. Taishoff says, settle this out guys, talk among yourselves.

Contract drafting is the key. Specialists should read and heed, especially when amending or terminating. And choice-of-law clauses only work when contract terms are ambiguous, so be prepared to show chosen law definitely impacts the written contract (and if chosen law does, why the contract wasn’t drafted accordingly).

A Taishoff “Good Job” to the Smith-Gill trusty attorneys for rescuing as much of this desert storm as they did.

Rule 161 reconsiderations are rare beasts, but when both petitioner and respondent (IRS) agree the judge got it wrong, even so strong-minded a jurist as ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS= The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan gives heed. 

Ex-Ch J TBS tossed Robert S. Koenigsberger & Dilek I. Koenigsberger, Docket No. 12537-10, filed 6/16/26 (no misprint, this case is antique) back in November, 2023, when they sought overpayment relief for the enhanced Section 6662 accuracy chop they claim they paid, because the Ks still owed tax, interest and penalties. Turns out the Ks were in one of those depreciated currency partnership dodges, but a partner other than the TMP settled out for a 10% Section 6662(a) chop back in 2009.

Now the Ks want to settle out the whole deficiency and the 10% chop just like the former partners did, just a wee bit late.

“After the Court issued its Order, petitioners made an additional payment for [year at issue]. The parties also stipulated that petitioners have paid the entire amount of tax, penalty, and interest that would be due if respondent’s determinations in the notice of deficiency and notice of computational adjustment are sustained. Additionally, petitioners submitted a refund claim in response to the notice of computational adjustment.” Order, at p. 2.

Obviously, this is under the now-defunct TEFRA régime. Chops were partnership items, hence affected items as to partners, so couldn’t be litigated at partner level, even if included in a SND. No Section 6512(b) overpayment jurisdiction unless compliance is had with Reg. Section 301.6611-1(b) , namely, “the entire tax liability (including any interest, addition to tax, or additional amount is satisfied.” Order, at p. 3.

Well, it has, belatedly.

But aren’t Rule 161s post-trial? Generally (love that word) but see Bedrosian, 144 T. C. 10, and my blogpost “Mox Nix,” 3/17/15.

Changed circumstances, so ex-Ch J TBS tosses the former toss and leaves the parties to clean up.

And a Taishoff “Good Job” to the Ks trusty attorneys for getting the client to pony up what has to be a heavy-duty amount and getting IRS to agree.

I’ve quoted Rudy Kipling’s advice to the infantry before now, but it was pointed at developing facts. Now it’s pointed at getting those facts into the administrative record. Even in non-record rule cases, treat the record as your sole chance to make your case.

That’s Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes’ advice to Richard A. Garber, Docket No. 11630-25W, filed 6/15/26.

Richard wants to supplement (not complete, as Charles Jeane’s hardlaboring clerks rename Richard’s motion) the record with a deposition not yet taken of a former agent (RA? SA?). This former agent might know something about what IRS collected from Target by way of fines or forfeitures. And there’s a press release from the US attorney for NDNY that Richard wants in.

Problem is, Richard hasn’t got the right stuff. Speculation about what the former agent might know, and no firm connection between press release and what use IRS made of Richard’s information aren’t enough.

“Someone who wants to add evidence to the administrative record in the form of a deposition has to make a ’significant showing’ that the requested deposition would reveal material in the IRS’s possession ‘indicative of bad faith or an incomplete record.’” Prescott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-121 at *6 (internal citations omitted).” Order, at pp. 1-2.

For Tom Prescott’s story, see my blogpost “Three on a Match,” 11/19/25.

But IRS did collected some money from Target. So Judge Holmes directs Richard “to review the administrative record, and then try to link the information that he provided to what was collected.”  Order, at p. 2. 

Credit is due constant reader Bob Kamman, Esq., for pointing out a seemingly innocuous request by Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda in Capitol Places II Owner, LLC, Historic Preservation Fund 2014 LLC, A Partner Other Than the Tax Matters Partner, Docket No.  16536-23, filed 6/12/26.

Unhappily, the DAWSON Genius Baristas have posted this order in a format wherefrom I cannot cut-and-paste, but possibly their reason in this case is made clear in the text.

Could someone have tinkered with the language of a Supreme Court opinion? Check out a trusted version of 464 US 386, at p. 391. Then compare with Order, at p. 1.

The refrain of the Mexican folksong first quoted at the head hereof may be the answer.

Two (count ’em, two) entries for the scrapbook today, one a recurring tale and one where a word of instruction is better than a slammed door.

I’m sure all my readers join me in wishing John R. Dee, Docket No. 12649-16 W, filed 6/12/26, a speedy return to good health. John was here two (count ’em, two) years ago; see my blogpost “Watching Fewer Sunsets in Ogden,” 8/14/24. Now John is protesting an IRS status report, apparently filed while John was sick. STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden recharacterizes John’s filings and tells IRS to reply to John’s motion to supplement the administrative record. Taishoff says it is unbelievable that ten (count ’em, ten) years after the petition was filed, there should be any question about what comprises the administrative record. Jarndyce v. Jarndyce has nothing on these guys.

Robert Grafton, Docket No. 18878-24, filed 6/12/26, thinks he prevailed when IRS folded pre-trial, so he refuses to sign a stiped decision. He claims the stip as drafted lets IRS off the hook for Section 7430 admins and legals and wants discovery. Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda blows that off. How he does it is what I question. 

“As stated in respondent’s response to petitioner’s Motion, respondent has conceded the determinations made in the notice of deficiency on which this case is based. It thus appears that petitioner’s discovery request would pertain only to litigation costs and to potential actions brought outside of this Court, and would not be ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending case,’ i.e., to the determinations made in the notice of deficiency.” Order, at pp. 1-2. (Citing Rule 70(b)(1)).

OK, but since Robert is pro se, how about a hint that if he wants Section 7430 relief, maybe so might could be he should check out the statute and Rule 231(a)(2)(C)?

I’ve often questioned why Tax Court Rules prohibit omnibus motions and multiplex EoAs. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones provides an answer in Staven A. Stover & Cynthia Stover, Docket No. 6836-24L, filed 6/11/26. Staven & Cynthia fire off a salvo under the heading of “Answer”: a Motion to Remand, a Motion to Supplement the Admin Record, a Reply to Respondent’s Answer, and a Cover Letter to Appeals.

There’s “omnibus” and then there’s “buckshot.”

Judge CD Jones is not having any of it.

“The Court has repeatedly advised petitioners that compound filings are improper; they do not conform to the Court’s Rules (see Docs. 30, 45). Petitioners must file motions directly with the Court in the manner prescribed by the Court’s Rules, which are available on the Court’s website. If petitioners wish to re-file the documents mentioned above, then petitioners must file each document separately in accordance with the Court’s Rules. Accordingly, the Court will strike petitioners’ Answer (Doc. 46).” Order, at p. 1.

Deer-in-the-headlights pro ses should check out the “Guidance for Petitioners” link on the Tax Court website, and e-mail the DAWSON Genius Baristas support crew (although Taishoff says don’t expect much).

Finally, Staven & Cynthia might try a LITC; that’s their best bet. 

Another compound that needs breaking is the term “Power of Attorney.” Judge James S (“Big Jim”) Halpern, confronted in Edward H. Fitzelle & Jane E. Croes,  Docket No. 13476-25L, filed 6/11/26 with Form 2848, designates an individual as a Power of Attorney; Form 2848 does not. Form 2848 designates a “Representative.” Form 2848 is a Power of Attorney, hence either a piece of paper or a concatenation of electrons. Forms of power of attorney other than Form 2848 designate an “Agent” or “Attorney-in-Fact.” Sometimes the last named is abbreviated as “AiF”. But all such forms are just that: forms. Why not just call a Representative a Rep, to distinguish that person from a Partnership Representative, or P-Rep?