I need your help. No, I’m not asking for money.

The aim of this blog is to cover United States Tax Court in a different way from the trade press (e.g., Tax Notes, Accounting Today, Forbes) and the blogosphere. I’m aiming for a short  (around 500 words) daily summary of orders, opinions and decisions, written for the busy practitioner (Circular 230, Section 7525 type).

I was an EA for 10 (count ’em, 10) years and an attorney at law for 58 years. Now in retirement, I’m a part-time journalist because I can’t stop.

I’m writing to try to stay sane and to give back to the profession and calling I love. And maybe help some of you help a client, or a pro bono at a calendar call or LITC.

But I need feedback. Is this blog helping? What’s wrong? What needs changing? Too much editorializing? Not enough detail? Needs more (or less) quotation from the order or opinion? Daily format too much for your overflowing inbox?

Please comment below. I promise to read and consider all responses.

Thanks.

Lucas Calhoun, Docket No. 4554-25L, filed 4/17/26, should have been at least considered for a referral to a LITC by Appeals. When Lucas claimed he was disabled and would need help either from his father or his son, sending a couple 2848s (hi, Judge Holmes) really doesn’t answer the problem. 

Of course, the IRM contains no such instruction; IRM 8.6.1.5.3.2 (09-25-2019) places the burden on the taxpayer to request representation and to select and qualify the representative. So I’m not saying the SO did anything wrong; he followed the book, and so did STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden in affirming the SO sustentation of the NITL.

But when a petitioner claims “I Lucas Calhoun was in a car accident in 2018. I was a passenger in a Honda Accord that struck another vehicle head on at 50 mph. We have had a supervisor from the IRS tell us I am not collectible. Also I have a voicemail from Biran at the IRS stating that he spoke to his supervisor and we would not be held liable. To not worry. That was on 6/14/24. Please do not levy the property my dad has my son & I staying at. Please send forms for forgiveness”, Order, at p. 2, maybe so might could be that a nonlawyer nonpractitioner might not be enough.

No one shows up for Lucas, so STJ Di gives IRS summary J.

Maybe so might could be referral to a LITC could save the day. But the SO shouldn’t have to judge this without some cover from high command. Maybe a revision to the IRM? Gives no rights to taxpayers greater than they would otherwise have.

Kelby Daniel Reyes Barrios, T. C. Memo. 2026-32, filed 4/16/26, says he didn’t get the 1099-NEC from his employer until after he filed his return. Too bad, says Ch J Patrick J (“Scholar Pat”) Urda.

That doesn’t mean you don’t owe tax. Third-party information, unchallenged, is sufficient connectivity between income and taxpayer. Especially is that so when you got the money.

“The failure to receive tax information forms, however, does not excuse a taxpayer from his obligation to report income. See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-112, 2010 WL 2011013, at *8; Du Poux v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-448, 1994 WL 479018, at *1 (‘[F]ailure to receive tax documents does not excuse taxpayers from the duty to report income.’).” T. C. Memo. 2026-32, at p. 4.

Summary J to IRS.

Jonathan D. Sawyer, T. C. Memo. 2026-33, filed 4/16/26, tried to keep the family printing business afloat. He borrowed against his life insurance policy and used the premium loan feature to keep the insurance in force, borrowing against cash surrender value until exhausted.

JD never assigned the policy to the family business, although he credibly testifies he told his manager to do so. The manager testifies he doesn’t remember any such order.

Unhappily, Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland sticks JD with the policy and the COD income when the insurance company cancels the policy to satisfy the loans.

But JD’s trusty attorneys’ investment interest deduction argument scores a point with Judge Tex Copeland. Even though the business’ records were destroyed when the business folded, JD’s and manager’s testimony is credible. And because keeping the business afloat would earn dividends on JD’s stock in the business, to the extent the business generated income to JD, the interest on the cash surrender value loan was deductible.

“Mr. Sawyer’s investment in [business] was to keep the business afloat, ultimately earning income that would lead to dividends. Consequently, the [business] stock was property held for investment, and the underlying interest paid to support that investment was investment interest. As investment interest, it is likewise subject to the limitations of section 163(d)(1), which provides that ‘[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as a deduction under this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.’

“Thus, as to the $40,107 interest on the $80,000 Policy Loan that was satisfied in [year at issue] with an offset to Mr. Sawyer’s cash surrender value, it was investment interest subject to the limitations of section 163(d)(1) and will only be deductible to the extent of net investment income for the [year at issue].” T. C. Memo. 2026-33, at pp. 10-11.

But failure to prove allocation between insurance and investment features in premium payments prevents JD for getting investment income interest treatment for the premium loans.

JD also escapes Section 6651(a)(2) failure-to-pay add-on.

“There is ample evidence that Mr. Sawyer had neither the assets nor the income to pay his [year at issue] tax. Nor is his inability to pay attributable to a lack of ordinary business care. Mr. Sawyer’s wages were foreseeable, and he paid the tax thereupon; conversely, the cancellation of a life insurance policy he had thought transferred and the magnitude of the constructive income therefrom were not reasonably foreseeable. Mr. Sawyer’s financial difficulties did not arise because of negligence or lavish spending. Nor could Mr. Sawyer realistically borrow to satisfy the tax liability, given his financial history, default on the loan for which his home was collateral, and the lack of other assets. Accordingly, reasonable cause existed with respect to the failure to pay.” T. C. Memo.2026-33, at p. 13.

A Taishoff “Good Job” to JD’s trusty attorneys.

Rather than showing “a substantial ground for difference of opinion” on “a controlling question of law,” Judge Jeffrey S. (“Schwer”) Arbeit finds that Blair A. Battersby, et al., Docket No. 1356-23, filed 4/16/26, IRS’ counsel, and he all agree on what Section 1377(a)(2) says and means. The Battersbys only are arguing about how the statute applies to the stock swaps more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “Afecionados,” 4/2/26.

In short, whether there was a redemption, or a sale or gift, as between the Battersbys and their grantor(s) or grantor’s predecessor-in-interest, is not a matter that fits either 28 USC 1292(b) or 26 USC 7482(a)(2)(A). The CCA would have to scan the record, and they might as well do that after trial, as the caselaw says.

“As is clear from the Order [Doc. 116] and the parties’ own filings, the Court and the parties share the same understanding of section 1377(a)(2). There is simply no dispute of law, let alone the required ‘controlling question of law.’ See § 7482(a)(2)(A); Rule 193. We did not reject petitioners’ legal analysis; rather petitioners failed to raise any genuine dispute of material fact. Our Order is unambiguous and does not include a controlling question of law sufficient to satisfy the first requirement in section 7482(a)(2)(A) and Rule 193.” Order, at p. 3.

There’s plenty of somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent for those contemplating interlocutory Tax Court appeals. Download it for your memos of law files.

No, I do not mean an actual descendant of petitioner Henry G. Pugsley, whose appeal from a Section 6213(a) Tax Court toss of his petition was treated for a time as 11 Cir’s final word on Boechler, P. C. jurisdiction-vs-claim-processing dichotomy, until Allen. See my blogposts “Justified? – I’ll Say,” 12/5/25, and “11 Cir Has Spoken,” 2/11/26.

So as of this writing, the score in Boechler, P. C., v. Hallmark Rsch. Collective stands at three (Culp, Oquendo, and Buller) to one (Allen). 2 Cir, 3 Cir, and 6 Cir vs 11 Cir.

Unfortunately for Katharine Tarver and Pierre Tarver, Docket No. 6794-25, filed 4/15/26 (it’s That Day again), they’re Golsenized to 5 Cir.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones claims 5 Cir also has spoken, and the Tarvers are auf’d.

“This case is presumptively appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See § 7482(b)(1)(A). The Fifth Circuit has also held that the deficiency deadline is jurisdictional. See Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002); Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988). While the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have reached a different conclusion, contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024), we apply the precedent of the Fifth Circuit in this case, which has held that the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional, see Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970); see also Sanders, 161 T.C. at 119–20 (examining the Culp decision and continuing to treat the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable outside the Third Circuit). Accordingly, the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional and petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling in the instant case.” Order, at p. 4.

Taishoff says both cases cited by Judge CD Jones as 5 Cir’s definitive conclusion were decided a mere 34 (count ’em, 34) years before Boechler, P. C., in Keado and a mere 20 (count ’em, 20) years before in the case of Rochelle. Keado is mostly concerned with duplicate SNDs and the Anti-Injunction Act in USDC; never considers equitable tolling. Rochelle was 143 days late with his petition, the Tarvers a couple hours (hi, Judge Holmes) late. And Rochelle got exactly one (count it, one) paragraph of an opinion, never mentioning claim processing vs. jurisdiction.

 Would these cases survive a post-Boechler, P. C. assault launched on behalf of the Tarvers? Comment below; I read all comments.

Edited to add 4/16/26: IRS agreed to grant the Tarvers administratively all the relief they could have gotten with their proffered stiped decision. Hence there’s no ground for appeal. Oh well; wait till next time.

I note Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern’s grant of summary J to IRS in Arelia Margarita Taveras, Docket No. 9233-25, filed 4/14/26, for want of anything better coming out of The Glasshouse in the City At War. I’m truly sorry for the petitioner, who threw away a worthwhile career for a compulsion. She does put up a fight, but only two (count ’em, two) of her seven (count ’em, seven) objections to IRS’ summary J motion survive the Ruesch/Garcia jurisdictional limit for passport grabs. And she loses those two.

Strange that the docket number doesn’t add the “P” for Section 7345s.

Arelia is thorough, but the barrier remains. Is there an assessment of a seriously delinquent tax debt? Yes. Validity thereof is to be tested in deficiency or CDP litigation, not passport grabs. She had her chances.

It’s a shame Arelia can no longer exercise her considerable abilities in her chosen profession.

Among his many talents and accomplishments, Judge David Gustafson would have been a great kindergarten teacher, as he exhibits in Carl Lawrence Collins III, Docket No. 2643-17, filed 4/13/26. As the Genius Baristas have published this order in a PDF that does not permit cut-and-paste, I cannot here include Judge David Gustafson’s exact words.

In substance, however, the trial minutes do show petitioner’s evidentiary documents with their “Doc.” numbers, thus making easy the task of the parties in citing to same and Judge Gustafson’s task of referring to them in his opinion.

IRS’ documents are not so listed in the minutes; for whatever reason I’ll not speculate. 

So Judge Gustafson has prepared a two (count ’em, two) page concordance, listing exhibit number, document(s), PDF pages (hopefully in a usable format), PDF pages, and internal numbers for each. This he attaches to his order.

I wouldn’t be surprised if, asked politely, he writes the party’s brief for them.

Abdelhafid Rahmani, Docket No. 4624-24, filed 4/10/26 entered this country in 1995; since 1996, he has been incarcerated, Order, at p. 1. He claims that since he got the $1400 stimulus credit for tax year 2021, IRS conceded that he entitled to same for tax year 2020, so the deficiency for that year is invalid.

Wrong, says Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch. IRS’ failure to challenge a position isn’t a concession.

Likewise, Ab’s challenge to IRS and SSA computer transcripts showing he had no valid TIN for work in The Land of the Free cannot surmount the FRE 803(6)(A) and 902(11) “submitted by someone with knowledge” barrier.  Order, at p. 4.

Ab’s year-at-issue return failed to include the valid identification number mandated by Sections 6428(g)(3)(A) and 6428A(g)(4)(A), which define “valid identification number” as a “social security number (as such term is defined in section 24(h)(7)).” Ab has a number, but it’s not valid for US work. Ab does claim he worked for McDonald’s in 1995, but “(T)his bare allegation alone is not sufficient to show there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Rule 121(d).” Order, at p. 4.

Summary J for IRS sustaining deficiency.

I must say that in whatever slammer Ab has passed the last thirty (count ’em, thirty) years, there is access to a good law library, or perhaps adept jailhouse lawyers. And whatever Ab’s delictions that landed him there, he has diligently applied himself and chosen good advisors.

I’ve lost count of how many times over the last 13 (count ’em, 13) years I’ve praised that Obliging Jurist Judge David Gustafson. From trying cases in the slammer to writing and rewriting papers, and even (I’ve hypothesized) feeding the parking meter at the courthouse and bringing coffee and Krispy Cremes to the trial, I’ve chronicled no more obliging judge than he.

And today Judge David Gustafson again obliges. Carl Lawrence Collins, III, Docket No. 2643-17, filed 4/9/26, must be nearing the end of his nine (count ’em, nine) year trek through Tax Court, as he and IRS try to sort out their several concessions made at trial to avoid wasting time on briefing conceded issues.

Unhappily, as with a certain ceasefire agreement, what the parties agreed isn’t exactly clear. “Our order of March 20, 2026 (Doc. 164) directed the parties to report on such concessions by March 30, 2026. A status report filed that day (Doc. 166) advised that ‘the parties do not anticipate further stipulations or concessions.’ We expected otherwise. The parties’ briefs begin to be due on May 15, 2026. (See Doc. 167.) To facilitate the focused preparation of those briefs, we will order the parties to make the record clear.” Order, at p. 1.

Whereupon Judge David Gustafson expends three-and-one-half (count ’em, three-and-one-half) pages of words and figures setting forth exactly what he extracts the parties to have orally conceded from the trial record. His order directs them to show cause why these, which he schedules, should not be put into the record. Order, at pp. 5-6.

How’s that for obliging?