In my young day, flippers would try to stall closing to shop the deal to other buyers. If they got a better offer, they’d try to gazumph their counterparty. Please pardon obscure technical term.

The most recent stall in the SCE line is going viral. Just a couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes) we saw the trusty attorneys in Yacht Creek try the move; hold off entry of decision (EoD) on the stip they signed so that they could shop the deal to IRS Office of Conservation Easements (OCE).

Well, the trusty attorneys for Centurion Georgia, LLC, Jon Guven, Tax Matters Partner Docket No. 18139-23, filed 10/26/26, are at the same game. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones adheres to the quaint notion that a deal is a deal; if you thus stipulate, you thus capitulate.

Judge CD Jones did hold off EoD to make sure the Section 248(b) nonparticipants had been served, but the time for them to object was past when the stall was invoked.

“Although Rule 248(b)(4) permits the Court to defer entry of decision after the objection period has expired, the question remains whether petitioner has identified circumstances warranting further delay. In determining whether to hold respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance, the Court exercises its discretion to manage its docket, weighing “competing interests and maintaining an even balance.” See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). The existence of that discretion, however, does not itself justify holding the Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance. Petitioner must therefore identify sufficient reasons for the requested delay. The Court’s earlier decision to refrain from acting on respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision, see Doc. 108, does not resolve whether further abeyance is appropriate in the light of the grounds now advanced. The Court considers those grounds below.

“Petitioner emphasizes that it accepted respondent’s settlement offer under a shorter deadline than that generally announced for the settlement initiative. But petitioner does not explain why the shorter deadline provides a basis for delaying entry of decision after it accepted the offer. Neither does the subsequent announcement of the OCE alter that conclusion. IRS News Release IR-2026-95 (Aug. 19, 2026) withdraws deadlines for outstanding offers but provides that prior elections remain effective and will be processed according to their terms. Thus, the announcement does not indicate that accepted settlements should be deferred or reopened. In any event, the withdrawal of IRS settlement deadlines does not require the Court to postpone disposition of this case.” Order, at p. 3.

The Centurions’ claim of irreparable harm founders on their assertion that no new terms are contemplated. Their offer to report every thirty (count ’em, thirty) days is no reason to hold up EoD. Taishoff says their claim that reporting would allow Judge CD Jones to monitor their negotiations means more work for the Judge; guys, the aim of the exercise is to make it easy for the judge to give you what you want and get rid of you and your case.

Taishoff also says that the Centurions still have a CDP to buy time; they can try to shop the deal then, although the odds are really bad.

The lead case in a five-way agreement to be bound was taken off the trial calendar based on a signed settlement letter between IRS and TMP of the lead petitioner. IRS moved to enter decision based thereon, but wanted it held until the Rule 248(b) 60-day window for nonparticipating partners to weigh in had run. Before that clock had run out, TMP moved to hold the EoD in abeyance pending TMP talking to IRS’ Office of Conservation Easements (OCE), or alternatively objecting to EoD.

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins won’t have it.

“Petitioner’s change of heart does not retroactively void the agreement on which respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision under Rule 248(b)(1)(B) was predicated, and the Court may enter decision in this case under Rule 248(b)(4). Notwithstanding petitioner’s reply protestations, petitioner’s motion does seek unilaterally to renegotiate its settlement with respondent through the proposed discussions with the OCE. The Court has held that ‘prior representations to the Court about the status of the settlement’ preclude attempts to invalidate a settlement. And the Court has granted motions for entry of decision based on settlements that taxpayers have subsequently sought to repudiate, rejecting the notion that the fact that a settlement was not filed as a stipulation precluded its enforcement. The Court has looked with particular disfavor upon attempts to renege on settlements after a trial in the case had been cancelled on the basis of the settlement. Although trial was not scheduled in this case, trial in a case to which this case was stipulated to be bound was cancelled, on the understanding that all of the related cases would be settled pursuant to the settlement initiative referenced in the settlement letter in this case. Petitioner may not now withdraw the agreement on which basis a trial was cancelled and respondent filed the Motion for Entry of Decision.” Yacht Creek LLC, Yacht Creek Investments LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 504-23, filed 10/23/26, at pp. 2-3. (Citations omitted).

Note that the TMP said it “has no interest in trying the case and ‘does not repudiate the basis for the settlement it reached with Respondent.’ It further states: ‘The entry of the proposed decision submitted with Respondent’s Motion, over objection, remains preferable to restoration of this case to the trial calendar.’” Order, at p. 2.

Taishoff says all TMP wants to do is renegotiate the deal, or buy time before the partner-level computational adjustments hit the investors in this dodge (and the lawsuits start), or both.

No go.

I won’t be so bold as to assert that Judge David Gustafson reads this my blog. I doubt if he remembers that we met at the Tax Court Judicial Conference in Chicago eight (count ’em, eight) years ago. But he has taken up, with his usual diligence and obliging nature, the role of the Administrative Judge Tax Court ought to have.

Here’s a quote from my blogpost “Scrapbook 10/30/23. “Maybe the Ch J might adopt our State court procedure, whereby an administrative judge cracks the whip, requiring explanations why antiques are still in the shop, and bestirring the dilatory to stop dancing in the backfield, and move the football or eat the football.”

Judge Gustafson faces Robert Hersch & Katherine Hersch, Docket No. 13895-25, filed 10/23/26, head-on. “When the Tax Court ‘cuts’ a new trial calendar, it is appropriate for the assigned judge to look at the oldest cases on the calendar and to attempt to ensure that they are not allowed simply to languish. This case is one of the older cases on the calendar for the Tax Court’s upcoming session in Dallas beginning March 8, 2027. It concerns tax year 2019, for which the IRS issued a notice of deficiency more than three years ago on September 28, 2023 (Doc. 1, Ex. A).” Order, at p. 1.

After a trudge through the nearly-impenetrable procedural morass, Judge Gustafson observes that holding this case for eventual consolidation with a couple related cases (hi, Judge Holmes) involving later years won’t work because Section 6663 fraud chops in the relateds but not here.

So he directs the parties to stipulate whatever they can.

“It seems that this earliest case has had full consideration by Appeals, is unlikely to settle, and has had more than adequate time to be developed for trial. We would not expect to continue this case upon the vague ‘anticipat[ion]’ of a motion to consolidate, and we would not summarily grant any motion to consolidate but would evaluate it in light of the concerns expressed above.” Order, at p. 2.

Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda doesn’t have to run the withering gauntlet of criticism that the late Judge Richard Posner of 7 Cir unleashed on poor Judge Wherry for “lame attempts at humor.” And I’m not saying Ch J Scholar Pat’s jibes are lame. But as a target for sarcastic laughter, Lontrac Enterprises, LLC, Lontrac Investors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo;. 2026-108, filed 10/22/26, bids fair.

It’s copybook Dixieland Boondockery, mining variation. The Lontracs have a piece of TN where a river runs through it and a scenic railway crosses it, which they had on the market for $2.9 million for five (count ’em, five) years without a nibble. Suddenly, a bunch of dodgefloggers decide that the rock the railroad dug up a century ago (metagraywacke) is worth millions, and syndicate the Section 170 SCE for $74 million in writeoffs, promising highrollers three-for-one.

Of course, one of petitioners’ experts takes the Fifth. No adverse inference, but his report gets tossed.

The valuation skirmish is a nonevent. The property produced no income, so DCF is pure speculation. And there’s plenty of comparables.

“We have found that the easement here was worth $500,000 on… the date of grant. The value reported on Lontrac’s return, i.e., $74,507,000, was 14,901% of the value we have determined. The valuation misstatement was, to put it mildly, ‘gross.’” T. C. Memo. 2026-108, at pp. 44-45. (Footnote omitted).

Koner disposes of Boss Hossery. No assessment has yet been made because Section 6213(a) automatic stay, so if RA and supe are still around, signoff can be obtained.

I’ll conclude with Ch J Scholar Pat’s summary.

“This case stands apart only for the sheer audacity of the numbers involved—the partnership here claimed a deduction of $74.5 million for an easement (i.e., a restriction on use) on property that had been sitting on the market for years, failing to find a buyer willing to pay $2.9 million. The stratospheric number was based on the claim that the property was suddenly very valuable as a mine although the rocks underlying the purported mining strategy were visible to the naked eye and the area was well mapped by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Of course, the idea of mining was chimerical, simply a way to get at a wholly unmerited tax deduction.” T. C. Memo. 2026-108, at pp.1-2.

Some may think the cognomina I assign Tax Court judges are mere caprice. I assure you, that is not the case. In proof whereof, I offer Judge Jeffrey S. (“Schwer”) Arbeit’s order in Christopher Aubuchon, Docket No. 15097-24, filed 10/22/26.

Christopher (“Gentleman Chris”) Aubuchon, s/a/k/a Christopher Aubuchon, Ph. D., now makes his third appearance in this my blog, again displaying his genteel frivolity, against which Judge Schwer Arbeit warned him in terms described in my blogpost “The ‘Quintessential Tax Protester’ Is Back,” 9/16/26.

Gentleman Chris made a Rule 161 reconsideration motion, to which Judge Schwer Arbeit a couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes) ordered IRS to respond. But on reading Gentleman Chris’ papers, Judge Schwer Arbeit lets IRS off, and lays a blast on Gentleman Chris.

“Petitioner asks that we distinguish his frivolous positions ‘from the independently presented evidentiary and procedural issues.’ But this is just artful rhetoric: he makes the same arguments we have already rejected. We won’t explain to him yet again why he is mistaken, and we won’t ask respondent to do so either.

“Another point. In our opinion, we imposed a $5,000 penalty under section 6673(a) for advancing frivolous or groundless positions. Petitioner now asks us to vacate that penalty. We decline to do so. As we have stated twice before, petitioner understands his tax liability. See Aubuchon, T.C. Memo. 2026-87, at *10. Nonetheless he continues to assert frivolous and groundless positions. Let this be his final warning: Next time the penalty will be higher. See Aubuchon, T.C. Memo. 2026-87, at *10 n.7. He is lucky we do not take the opportunity today to increase the amount.” Order, at p. 1.

Schwer means hard, as in “hard work.”

No, not an off-topic essay about existential angst (although who knows how low this my blog may sink before I’m done with it?), this is about V, an attorney subject to State Court discipline. Name omitted, of course; said attorney has already suffered enough.

Too often, Tax Court admittees who get wigged or gigged by other tribunals never tell the Glasshouse Gang. But V did tell Tax Court, asking to be relieved in a pending case because of the State Court suspension order.

Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda does credit V that far, but that wasn’t far enough for Rule 202(b).

“A member of the Bar of this Court is required to report to the Chair of the Court’s Committee on Admissions, Ethics, and Discipline, in writing, of suspension by another Court of whose Bar such attorney is a member no later than 30 days after entry of the order of discipline. Rule 202(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Although [V] did not report her suspension to the Chair, she did report the suspension to the Court, in writing, within, 30 days of her suspension from the practice of law….” Order, at p. 1.

OK, the Rule says what it says. But who is the Chair? You won’t find him or her on the Tax Court website. The website Court directory lists admissions with a telephone number, but seems to restrict its function to “(A)dmissions procedures for practice before the Tax Court and practitioner access for DAWSON.” General questions go to Public Affairs.

So to whom and where does the disciplined practitioner, smarting from the wounds righteously administered, direct the notice to the Chair in writing? Or did Neil Diamond get it right fifty-five (count ’em, fifty-five) years ago?

Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda has bestirred the Genius Baristas and the 18-Fs to new efforts to improve the reach and scope of DAWSON.

Commencing New Year’s Day next, all motions newly filed on or after 1/1/27, plus any briefs or memoranda in support of such motions, that are electronically filed by practitioners who are admitted to practice before the Court will be made available to the public remotely through DAWSON, the Court’s electronic filing and case management system. Oppositions to such motions that are electronically filed by practitioners who are admitted to practice before the Court will likewise be made available to the public remotely through DAWSON. Motions filed before said date will continue to be available through a records request to the copycats or at the public terminal available at the Glasshouse. Although this new feature may be implemented after January 1, 2027, it will be effective with respect to motions filed on or after that date.

Note this applies only to practitioner motions, briefs or memos; pro se stuff will be limited because of Section 6103 gaffes and redaction failures.

Practitioners are admonished to follow Rule 27 and scrub their public filings.

Don’t get me wrong here; I am definitely not saying that Veronica Kyler, Docket No. 782-26L, filed 10/21/26, will win either her innocent spousery claim or her fight about the $500-a-throw chops for want of diligence in ascertaining eligibility for HOH filing status or other tax benefits per Section 6695(g) because of her successful motion to supplement the administrative record.. Kyler is clearly a preparer for whom this is not her first rodeo, which is why IRS put three (count ’em, three) attorneys on this case.

Kyler admits she’s late with her Rule 93 motion because she blew the arithmetic, but Judge Morrison allows the late filing, as trial isn’t for another forty days and there are “other circumstances” that outweigh IRS’ objections. Order, at p. 3.

“The only documents attached to the Motion to Complete or Supplement the Administrative Record are (1) an Examining Officer’s Activity Record…; (2) a letter with an illegible date from Revenue Agent D to Kyler requesting a response by February 28, 2020; and (3) a letter from Kyler stating that she did not agree with ‘the finding of Civil Penalties by Revenue Agent D.’ The Motion further requests that the Court order respondent to identify or produce additional documents.” Order, at p. 3. (Name omitted).

IRS says Kyler is trying to relitigate underlying liability, for which she already had a chance at a prior hearing at Appeals. Judge Morrison says the documents are clearly relevant, IRS doesn’t claim they’re phony, and Appeals did consider them.

“Because the Court has not yet resolved whether Kyler had a prior opportunity to contest her underlying liability, it would be premature to exclude evidence from the trial record on the grounds that she is precluded from disputing her underlying liability.” Order, at p. 3.

But her request for IRS to identity or produce additional documents fails because outside the scope of Rule 93.

Note that innocent spousery is involved here (see Order, at p. 2), so there may be a lot more to this case than the narrow issue involved here.

Kyler gets a Taishoff “Good Job.”

Tax Court resolves cases by means of orders, summary opinions (Rules Title XVII Small Tax Cases), memoranda (regular cases), and T. C.s (Tax Court Opinions). The old Tax Court website, now obliterated by DAWSON, used to describe the difference between memoranda and T. C.s thus: “Generally, a Tax Court Opinion is issued in a regular case when the Tax Court believes it involves a sufficiently important legal issue or principle.” “Generally, a Memorandum Opinion is issued in a regular case that does not involve a novel legal issue. A Memorandum Opinion addresses cases where the law is settled or factually driven.”

An order can, and often does, finally dispose of a case. The most common examples are dismissal for want of jurisdiction, want of prosecution, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or Rules Title XII Decision Without Trial.

Off-the-benchers can serve as decisions or orders per Section 7459(b).

Fair enough. But what’s missing from this picture?

Judgments.

Unlike State Courts and most Federal Courts, Tax Court issues no judgments. Section 7459 only permits “reports and decisions.” But I’ve never seen a Tax Court “report” that disposes of a case. Have you?

Motions for “judgment on the pleadings” (Rule 120) and for “summary judgment” (Rule 121) are FRCP transplants, apparently so named because of practitioner familiarity, but no order or opinion granting or denying either is ever labeled a “judgment.”

This is what kind of mischief I get up to on days when there’s no opinion or order worth recording.

Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber explores the geography, physiography, demography, and taxability of Emanuel County, GA. And no, I don’t know where that is, either. Scholar Al says it’s in the southeastern part of GA, halfway between Macon and Savannah.

The Emanuel County website asserts it’s friendly. Judge Scholar Al says the HBU of most of it is “for low-density, single-family residences, with agriculture, recreation, and timber harvesting as complementary uses.” Watson Lake Investments, LLC, Terry J. Heath, Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo. 2026-106, at p. 2.

Needless to say, Terry and Co. see this as ” mixed-use development, supposedly including 66 to 69 single-family lots, 35 to 45 acres of multifamily and senior housing, and numerous commercial and office sites.” Idem, as my expensive colleagues would say. Judge Scholar Al says “(T)hese back-of-the-envelope development schemes were wholly unrealistic in a rural county with a total population of roughly 22,000.” Idem.

There’s captive 501(c)(3), a turnkey promoter, the usual cloud of witnesses, numbers from Heaven (or the other place) and all the makings of a classic Dixieland Boondockery.

But wait, there’s more!

“As shown on the map, a single-runway airstrip lies directly across a local road to the south of the Watson Lake Property. A state prison lies about 500 yards north of the Property, and a low-income housing project lies less than a mile to the east. The 144-acre tract includes a lake and related flood plain, and roughly 25% of the Property is occasionally or frequently flooded.” T. C. Memo. 2026-106, at p. 6.

Why IRS needed five (count ’em, five) lawyers for this is a puzzlement. Deficiencies and chops sustained.

I have noted petitioners’ counsel before in other contexts. This is, he says, his second full trial in Tax Court. I hope he learns from experience.