Attorney-at-Law

Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

REGISTERED OR CERTIFIED

In Uncategorized on 09/03/2026 at 15:09

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler sorts it out, and IRS’ proof falls short in Dania Wales, T. C. Memo. 2026-82, filed 9/3/26. IRS wants to toss Dania’s innocent spousery petition because she filed her Form 8857 too late after CCISO issued a Final Notice of Determination (FND), arguing no jurisdiction.

No doubt there was a FND or that it was mailed to Dania’s last known address, unclaimed, and ultimately returned to CCISO.

Except.

All IRS can established is that it was sent first class presorted. And neither the famous USPS online tracking number nor certification from a USPS paralegal can help.

“We acknowledge that respondent has furnished a USPS Tracking Plus Statement that includes the tracking history for the Final Determination Notice’s specific tracking number, as well as a separate certification by a USPS paralegal regarding the accuracy of the Tracking Plus Statement. The USPS Tracking Plus Statement, however, fails to indicate whether the contents of the letter were sent by certified or registered mail. Further, the tracking number itself does not indicate that it was sent via certified or registered mail. Finally, the certification respondent offers from the USPS paralegal fails to state whether the Final Determination Notice was sent by certified or registered mail.

“This type of documentary evidence falls short of what we have accepted in the past to show proper mailing in situations where the Commissioner does not present a Form 3877.” T. C. Memo. 2026-82, at p. 6.

Section 6015(e)(1)(A) sets forth the relevant time and mailing constraints.

Tax Court has jurisdiction.

A Taishoff “Good Job” to Dania’s trusty attorneys Chris, Brian, and Jason.

BANK ACCOUNT DECONSTRUCTION

In Uncategorized on 09/02/2026 at 18:23

Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes disrespects not a single partitive genitive, but tramples, upends, and deconstructs both IRS’ bank account reconstructions and petitioner’s implausible testimony and uncooperative behavior, in Hank Risan, et al., T. C. Memo. 2026-78, filed 9/2/26.

Hank is a self-styled Renaissance man indicted for fraud. T. C. 2026-78, at p. 4, footnote 5. But IRS doesn’t allege fraud here. IRS has troubles enough, with computational fumbles at exam and an unsupported alter ego argument. Unreported income allegations are washed away. And while Mark’s testimony draws a large bill on credulity, his trusty attorney points out enough to let BoP sink a lot of IRS’ case.

What will be left for the Rule 155 beancount to sort and what the final deficiency will be is a real head-spinner.

TWO FRIVOLITES

In Uncategorized on 09/02/2026 at 16:53

I take an expansive view of the Rule of Completeness to note a pair of $2500 Section 6673 chops.

Judge Vasquez spares us the details of Myrna Marin, T.C. Memo. 2026-79, filed 9/2/26, but holds she frivoled $2500 worth, the usual unreported-income-protester-jive case.

OTOH, John W. Sprouse, T. C. Memo. 2026-80, of even date therewith (as my high-priced colleagues would say), gets his Section 6673 $2500 chop for excessive delay, stalling while claiming to try finding counsel. Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves also finds JW “lacked candor with the Court.” T. C. Memo. 2026-80, at p. 9.

I’m not surprised JW, who worked for Deloitte Consulting LLP, couldn’t find counsel. “… petitioner filed a document titled ‘Notice of Discovery Demand.’ Among other things, the document requested that respondent produce the birth certificates for ‘the clerk of court, the judge, and any of the DOJ staff employees.’ The document also requested materials that petitioner contended would establish that certain government actions constituted ‘aggravated identity theft.'” T. C. Memo. 2026-80, at p. 3. There’s more, but you get the picture.

STANDARD EQUIPMENT

In Uncategorized on 09/02/2026 at 16:21

Judge Emin “Eminent”) Toro reminds AirBnB, Inc. & Subsidiaries, 167 T. C. 9, filed 9/2/26, that legal experts called judges are standard equipment for Tax Court trials, and these legal experts are good at disregarding legal conclusions from nonlawyers (Taishoff says they’re not bad at disregarding legal conclusions from lawyers, too). 

Likewise Rule 143(g) doesn’t apply to pretrial discovery jousts, such as AirBnB and IRS are having with dueling Rule 103 motions.

“Rule 143 provides evidentiary rules for trials before this Court. It is found in Title XIV of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, titled ‘Trials.’ The Rule itself is titled ‘Evidence,’ and Rule 143(a) explains how ‘[t]rials before the Court will be conducted.’ Moreover, Rule 143(g), by its terms, applies to ‘any party who calls an expert witness.”” 167 T. C. 9, at p. 5. (Footnote omitted, but it says captions of statutes can be used to clear up ambiguity). No trial here, yet.

IRS has two (count ’em, two) declarations it put in supporting its Rule 103 from what sounds like a professional expert. The dispute is about what features of a “clean room” should have for reviewing ultra-secret computer software; don’t confuse this with the clean room used for electronic parts manufacture. See my blogpost “Do Your Homework and Clean Up Your Room,” 4/15/13.

AirBnB can always put inn their own experts’ declarations in support of their motion or in opposition to IRS counsel’s.

And maybe so might could be the declarations AirBnB wants stricken pertain to industry practices, which are OK under Rule 143(g). “The bulk of Mr. Myers’s statements appear to concern his view of standard protective order practices in the expert witness industry, so they might be acceptable without a written report under Rule 143(g)(3) in any event.” 167 T. C. 9, at p. 6, footnote 8.

“The expert witness industry?” Judge Eminent Toro got that right.

CALLING THE CLOCK – PART DEUX

In Uncategorized on 09/01/2026 at 10:12

I can’t count how many times I’ve applied the designation to Judge David Gustafson That Obliging Jurist. All of us practitioners have been before irascible types, seeing newbies shredded and even oldtimers pulped by scorn and sarcasm, where self-defense is worse than silence. Judge David Gustafson is the reverse, a true gentleman.

So there’s got to be a lot to get him to turn to that old poker sanction, and call the clock in Laidlaw’s Harley Davidson Sales, Inc., Docket No. 14616-14L, filed 9/1/26.

Now before all y’all shout as one voice “Didn’t that get finished in 2022?” yes, 9 Cir reversed and remanded in the famous “any time before supe loses supervisory powers” holding. But the case is still unresolved. IRS is willing to drop the liability and the Section 6707A chop, but Laidlaw’s claims they’re owed money and their counsel, the celebrated William J. (“Old Bill”) Wise, Esq., is sick. I’m sure we all wish Old Bill the swiftest recovery. So Laidlaw’s and IRS want more time.

Judge David Gustafson obliges, but calls the clock on this waltz of the decades.

“We will grant that extension, but we do not expect to grant any further extension. While we have immediate sympathy for counsel’s situation, this case and the fourteen cases related to it (filed in 2014-2019) have been long pending; the Commissioner’s concession has been long known; and the Court has a responsibility to bring these cases to conclusion. The pendency of a case is not cost-free to the Court, and the passage of time often makes a case more difficult to resolve, not easier. Moreover, extensions are granted when it is shown that the delay would better enable the presentation of the case, but not when a delay would simply leave the parties in the same circumstance in which they were at the time of the previous deadline, or in worse circumstance. We hope and assume that two more months will restore petitioner’s counsel to health and that he reasonably expects to be able to file his responses by that date; but sometimes the passage of time does not actually promote a party’s ability to conduct a case. If counsel will not be able to do the work necessary to bring these cases to conclusion, then he has the ethical responsibility to his clients and to the Court to cooperate in the retention of new counsel who can do so. We hope and assume that current counsel will be able to bring these cases to conclusion.” Order, at p. 2.

PROTECTING THE TARGET

In Uncategorized on 08/31/2026 at 16:19

Practitioners representing the whistleblowing community may want to take a quick peek at Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda’s order in Santo A. Dileo, Sr., Docket No. 3195-26W, filed 8/31/26.

Santo Sr. is pro se, so IRS wants a Rule 103 to cover any Section 6103(h)(4) disclosures they may have to make to Santo Sr. or his counsel.

Ch J Scholar Pat obliges. And here’s a preview of what IRS will accept.

Practitioners may want to drag-and-drop, and tailor appropriately, so when they need to move for a Rule 103, they can lodge something that gets a “GRANTED” stamp.

A HIGH TOUCH IS NOT A SLAM DUNK

In Uncategorized on 08/31/2026 at 16:06

Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland thus grants summary J to IRS, despite the “high touch” designation from the subject matter classifier to the whistleblowing of Jeremy Berenblatt, T. C. Memo. 2026-77, filed 8/31/26.

When Jeremy blew seven (count ’em, seven) years after a couple of IRS CID SAs interviewed him, his Form 211 went to an SMC. “The classifier, considering only Mr. Berenblatt’s submission, determined that his claim potentially rated an H (high touch) designation.” T. C. Memo. 2026-77, at pp. 3-4. (Footnote omitted, but it says high touch means the case warrants assignment to a senior WBO employee and potential coordination with other IRS functions.).

IRS says they knew already about what Jeremy blew, he wasn’t a witness on any trial, what he gave IRS didn’t substantially aid in their billion-dollar recovery; the “but-for” argument isn’t enough, and Jeremy’s claim about how RAs handled form 11369 don’t add anything to what Judge Tex Copeland already found.

And a high touch is not a slam dunk.

“Mr. Berenblatt misunderstands the role of the classifier within the whistleblower regime’s overarching structure. A classifier is an employee of an operating division who functions as a gatekeeper. See IRM 25.2.1.3.1 (Mar. 10, 2023) (‘Classification’s role is only to determine if the information on the Form 211 warrants further review. It is not classification’s responsibility to determine whether a whistleblower is entitled to an award.”). Indeed, if we agreed with Mr. Berenblatt, there would be no need at all for the WBO; classifiers alone would be sufficient. Here, the classifier determined, solely on the basis of Mr. Berenblatt’s Form 211 submission, that Mr. Berenblatt’s claim warranted further review. However, that a claim is not prima facie unviable is not the same as saying that the claim is meritorious.” T. C. Memo. 2026-77, at p. 14.

SLOW PLAY – THE COUNTER

In Uncategorized on 08/28/2026 at 13:24

IRS counsel are notorious devotees of the “Win Your Case at Discovery” gambit. But the trusty attorneys for Chad Burris & Julie Burris, et al., Docket No. 18712-22, filed 8/28/26, have been successfully slow playing IRS’ treasure hunt. For backstory, see my blogpost “Don’t Suppose You Can Depose – Indocumentado,” 4/29/26.

So IRS’ counsel unleash a barrage of motions seeking documents, admissions, and elucidations, which Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh grants in extenso. The wrangling “which has plagued this case” caused Judge C-Doug Pugh to continue the special trial session supposed to start on Monday.

Now said trusty attorneys have ten (count ’em, ten) days to pony up or show good cause at the trial next year why whatever they didn’t hand over should be allowed in.

For those of my readers who have led clean and sober lives, far from track and table, to “slow play” at poker is to bet weakly so as to entice an opponent into overvaluing his/her cards, springing a trap at the last. 

Here, IRS calls. And Judge C-Doug Pugh is waiting.

SMH – ENCORE UNE FOIS

In Uncategorized on 08/27/2026 at 19:02

STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel has a 32 (count ’em, 32) page small-claimer. I’ll let Her Honor judge-‘splain.

“The simplest version of this small tax case Opinion is that petitioners are liable for the deficiencies determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for each of the four years before us because they failed to meet their burden of proof and establish entitlement to any of the deductions claimed. If that were the whole story, however, this Opinion would not be 32 pages long. There is also a fraud penalty at issue for each year, and that requires a few more pages to discuss what petitioners claimed on their tax returns and to make clear how the IRS proved fraud by clear and convincing evidence. But really, this Opinion is long because one of the factors we consider in evaluating fraud is the sophistication of the taxpayer. And Mr. Janangelo is a pretty sophisticated taxpayer; Mr. Janangelo is an auditor at the IRS.” Peter J. Janangelo, Jr. and Mary Ann Janangelo, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-8, at p 2.

Mr. Janangelo is also a CPA and a member of the Bar of Our Fair State.

“Mr. Janangelo was employed full time at the IRS during the years at issue and, at the time of trial, had been for almost 20 years. In his capacity as a revenue agent for the IRS, Mr. Janangelo conducts audits and reviews tax returns. He belongs to the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and has been a union steward.” T. C. Sum. Op.  2026-8, at p.2. (Footnote omitted, but it says he works for IRS, not OCC.) 

I’ll spare you the rest, barring two points for audit.

“Mr. Janangelo argues that he is not required to substantiate any expense under $75, no matter what the category. He cites no authority for this proposition.” T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-8, at pp. 15-16.

Notwithstanding Section 446, requiring cash basis taxpayers to recognize income and expense when paid, ” Mr. Janangelo argued that the IRS should have been more flexible during his audits, explaining that his own audit practice working for the IRS is to allow a deduction, even if claimed for  the wrong year. Mr. Janangelo’s practice as a revenue agent may be to allow such deductions, but the Court’s role is to apply the law as written to the facts put in evidence. The Janangelos find support in neither.” T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-8, at p. 18

I do not recommend either position.

ON THE BEACH

In Uncategorized on 08/27/2026 at 18:12

Jeremy Berenblatt, T. C. Memo. 2026-75, filed 8/27/26, is an unending source of blogfodder. Y’all will recollect Jeremy blew on a digital options dodge seven (count ’em, seven) years after IRS interviewed him. So far no dough for Jeremy, but his trusty attorneys (whom I’ll call the Scotts) are in there pitching, trying to supplement (or maybe complete: the rules overlap) the administrative record, and have Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland take 14 (count ’em, 14) judicial notices.

Problem is Dania Beach. Jeremy and the Scotts, says Judge Tex Copeland, are firmly aground. City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) is the barrier. The three-way test is “1) if the agency ‘deliberately or negligently excluded documents [from consideration] that may have been adverse to its decision,’ (2) if background information was needed ‘to determine whether the agency considered all the relevant factors,’ or (3) if the ‘agency failed to explain administrative action so as to frustrate judicial review.’ City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 590.” T. C. Memo. 2026-75, at pp. 11-12.

Jeremy wants IRS’ notes from his interview. Even if that happened years before his Form 211, maybe they can be included on the “all relevant factors” front. But that’s not a catch-all; it only includes material to explain complex technical issues. IRS was already on the trail of the dodgefloggers. And Jeremy put what he had told the IRS in his Form 211, so the Ogden Sunseteers had the whole story.

Jeremy’s own file wasn’t attached to his Form 211. Anyway, it’s not adverse to the OS decision, doesn’t provide relevant technical background, nor does omission frustrate judicial review.  As for IRS e-mails that he wants, they were created after he petitioned so could never have been considered in evaluating his blow. As for deliberately or negligently excluded, they had to exist when the decision was made.

There’s a lot of argy-bargy about in camera review of grand jury testimony, T. C. Memo. 2026-75, at pp. 16-20, but I leave that to the technicians. F.R. Crim. P. § 6(e)(3)(E)(i) is well outside my wheelhouse.

As for the 14 judicial notices, they also founder on Dania Beach. “As a threshold matter, Mr. Berenblatt does not detail how his requested adjudicative facts fit into the City of Dania Beach framework. Moreover, none of Mr. Berenblatt’s 14 RAFs are facts generally known within the jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination. RAFs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 describe the course of the prosecution of the… promoters and relate to Mr. Berenblatt only obliquely, if at all. They therefore cannot properly be considered adjudicative facts in the first instance. Moreover, to the extent that the RAFs incorporate inferences and speculation, they are not facts at all.” T. C. Memo. 2026-75, at p. 22.