No, I’m not pitching a new cable TV reality show, although I’ll wager it could be a scream. No, here’s Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves scrapping a stip of facts on the eve of trial based on alleged facts not brought out at discovery. It’s Rule 91(e) on steroids; because IRS claims one (count it, one) sentence out of 40 ( count ’em, 40) paragraphs doesn’t tell the whole story, the whole new stip must be ready by next Friday, while trial starts Monday.

The case is Brown Bridge Newton 53, LLC, Brown Bridge 53 Manager, LLC, Tax Matters Partner,Docket No. 21274-21, filed 2/20/26.

The now-discarded stip said 53 got the property from a trust. IRS says it got other documents showing that one Jeff Grant (not my former boss, Baptist preacher, and self-help guru) got the property from the trust and conveyed it to 53.

So IRS asked 53 to elucidate, which they didn’t. IRS then asks to be relieved, to which 53 says IRS showed no grounds for relief.

Judge Tag Greaves says oh yes, IRS did.

“We have broad discretion in determining when justice requires that a stipulation be set aside. We have previously held that justice requires setting aside a stipulation when the evidence is contrary to the stipulation. Justice requires that we strike the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts and relieve respondent of this stipulation under Rule 91(e). The evidence set forth by respondent casts doubt as to whether [53] “acquired” the property from the … Trust, or whether the transaction should be viewed as a contribution from Jeff Grant. At the time that the parties stipulated to paragraph 40, respondent did not have in his possession the recently obtained evidence from third parties. Petitioners do not allege any prejudice resulting from striking this stipulation. As such, it would be unjust to hold respondent to a stipulation based on incomplete evidence. Instead, we will allow the parties to present their competing theories of the transaction at trial. Therefore, we will grant respondent relief from the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts. However, we will hold respondent to the second sentence of paragraph 40, which stipulates to the recorded deed.” Order, at p. 3. (Citations and name omitted).

Taishoff says why toss the whole thing for one sentence? Deem the sentence “impertinent,” use a Rule 52 Motion to Strike, and go on with the trial.

“The thing everybody knows cannot be proved too often.”

I can’t find the source just now, but I think it was Shaw’s music criticism. If any reader can help me, please comment below.

Howbeit, Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins sets the parties right by giving them a chance to think over their claim that their settlement agreement moots their deficiency case in Estate of Kevin N. Kalkhoven, Deceased, Kimberly Kalkhoven, Executor, Docket No. 31338-21, filed 2/20/26.

“… the parties filed a Motion to Dismiss on Ground of Mootness (Doc. 37). In the motion, the parties state that they have entered into a closing agreement, and that ‘there remains no dispute between the parties.’ … the Court issued an Order (Doc. 39) holding the Motion to Dismiss on Ground of Mootness in abeyance and directing the parties to file a status report.” Order, at p. 1.

Yes, Section 7121(b) means what it says. Absent fraud or malfeasance, closing agreements are final and courts have nothing more to say.

Except.

Section 7459(d) also means what it says. Dismissing a petition otherwise than for want of jurisdiction means entering decision in the amount stated in the SND.

Whereupon, the parties confabulate and “(I)n the Status Report, the parties state that they ‘have agreed that the Court should deny the joint Motion to Dismiss and that a decision consistent with the Closing Agreement should be entered into this case.'” Order, at p. 1.

They also ask for 45 (count ’em, 45) days to submit the proposed stiped decision, and get it.

A Taishoff “Well Played” to Judge Jenkins.

Taishoff says I thought maybe the petitioner was self-represented, and maybe the IRS had the rookies on this case. A quick docket search proved me wrong. The petitioner was represented by as heavy a bunch hitters (hi, Judge Holmes) as can be found. The IRS team is hardly less illustrious.

The leader of the petitioner’s team has expressed what I wish I had been. “I have the good fortune to lead a group of tax lawyers who not only enjoy mastering the intricacies of the tax code, but who also communicate in plain English and look for practical ways to help clients achieve their objectives.”

Let all practitioners say “Amen!”

And remember, a good practitioner is always learning.

“I didn’t have time to write a short one.” This celebrated sentence from Mark Twain doesn’t fit Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber’s 66 (count ’em, 66) page epic stitching up North Donald LA Property, LLC, North Donald LA Investors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo. 2026-19, filed 2/19/26.

For while he does the standard blow-by-blow ringside call of this off-the-shelf Dixieland Boondockery, he gives us the takeaway up front.

“On its Federal income tax return for [year at issue], North Donald claimed for this donation a charitable contribution deduction of $115,391,000. It asserted that the ‘before value’ of the farmland—its value before being encumbered by the easement—was $439,492 per acre. It thus took the position that the land had appreciated by more than 14,000% in 21 months.” T. C. Memo. 2026-19, at pp. 1-2.

“We conclude here, as we did in J L Minerals, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-93, at *3, that the valuation of the conservation easement ‘was an outrageous overstatement,’ wholly untethered from reality. Employing the comparable sales method, as backstopped by the price actually paid to acquire the property… we find that its ‘before value’ was $2,975 per acre and that its ‘after value’ was $2,300 per acre. The delta between these figures—the reduction in value attributable to the easement—is $675 per acre. The value of the easement—and hence the allowable charitable contribution deduction—is thus $175,824 ($675 × 260.48 = $175,824).

“North Donald claimed $1,157,469 of ‘other deductions’ on its [year at issue] return. This sum included a $1,055,000 ‘consulting fee’ paid to the promoter that marketed the conservation easement to investors and $50,000 paid to a law firm that served as a ‘material advisor’ to the SCE transaction. We find that these expenses constituted nondeductible syndication costs and that the rest of the ‘other deductions’ must also be disallowed.” T. C. Memo. 2026-19, at p. 2.

For the J L Minerals backstory, see my blogpost “Blunging Farblundgeit,” 10/8/24.

IRS’ asserted Section 6663 fraud chops fail, as the deal was fully disclosed on the return. But the Donalds do get hit for the 40% gross valuation misstatement chop.