Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler explores what a Form 872–M, Consent to Extend the Time to Make Partnership Adjustments, does to Section 6235 SOL in Katanga Properties, LLC, R. Brent Evans, Partnership Representative, 167 T. C. 10, filed 9/9/26.

R. Brent, duly appointed PR, oversaw timely filing of 1065 for box-checked Katanga. IRS selected same for exam, so R. Brent and IRS signed said Form 872-M. IRS issued a NOPPA two (count ’em, two) years later. R. Brent let the calendar run out on the 270 days to file a request to modify.  IRS then sent the FPA, which R. Bent now claims blew the 3SOL, wherefore is untimely and invalid.

R. Brent claims the 872-M only extended the time to file NOPPA, not time to request modification nor FPA.

No, says Judge Speedy Weiler.

“Petitioner ignores the plain text of section 6235(a), which provides that ‘no adjustment under this subchapter for any partnership taxable year may be made after the later of.’ Furthermore, the use of ‘or’ between paragraphs (1) and (2), and paragraphs (2) and (3), supports our understanding that the paragraphs are read disjunctively and indicates that the reader must determine the ‘later of’ deadline for which partnership adjustments may be made. Thus, the statutory text furnished by Congress, and our precedent, establish that subsection (a) allows the Commissioner to make adjustments any time before the latest of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). See Mammoth Cave Prop., LLC v. Commissioner, No. 5401-24, 166 T.C., slip op. at 8 (Mar. 9, 2026); JM Assets, LP, 165 T.C. at 11.” 167 T. C. 10, at p. 6

For Mammoth, see my blogpost “A New Day – Redivivus,” 3/9/26; for JM Assets, see my blogpost “A New Day – Redux,” 7/2/25.

When R. Brent tries to drive a syntactical wedge between Sections 6231(b)(2) and 6235(a), Judge Speedy Weiler shuts him down.

“… it is apparent that section 6231(b)(2) acts in conjunction with section 6235(a) and sets forth the requisite minimum timing in which an FPA may be issued. Section 6231(b)(2) subparagraph (A) establishes the 270-day modification period and subparagraph (B) refers to section 6235 for the timing on issuing the FPA. Congress’s use of the word “adjustment” is sufficiently broad as intending to include the process by which the Commissioner makes adjustments, namely first by a NOPPA, followed by an FPA. Accordingly, any agreed-upon extension under section 6235(b) would necessarily extend the limitations period for making adjustments, and any extension must be taken into consideration in determining the latest of the periods found in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).” 167 T. C. 10, at pp. 7-8. (Footnote omitted, but it says that though there’s a statutory 60-day window wherein IRS may issue an FPA, that doesn’t preclude a later issue, provided the limitation period is still open.)

I feared that the BBA regime might deprive me of the great TEFRA blogfodder, despite my much-publicized protestations that I wouldn’t mourn TEFRA. Once again I failed to reckon with the inventiveness of my colleagues. Good try to Katanga’s trusty attorneys.

Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland, acutely aware of the billions the Government had collected from the digital options dodgers and the cottage industry of blowers seeking pieces of said pie, has restated her opinion anent the claim of Jeremy Berenblatt.

For the previous iteration, see my blogpost “On the Beach,” 8/27/26. The latest, Jeremy Berenblatt, T. C. Memo. 2026-75 (CORRECTED), is filed 9/9/26. The foregoing is noted for the record. I have not parsed the corrected version against the previous iteration. Those with a working knowledge of AI will doubtless do so.

I had thought that if a protester-defier raised a single meritorious claim in the blather of protester-defier jive, the protester-defier got the Luke 18:14 treatment and avoided the Section 6673(a) frivolity chop s/he otherwise richly deserved.

Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way didn’t note that Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch applied that principle back a year ago January; see my blogpost “A Small Success,” 1/13/25. Judge Ingenuity Buch spared Karen Lee Shuster the Section 6673(a) treatment because her frivolity, reporting her tax on her return as zero and in fact paying zero, did not breach the Section 6651(a)(2) failure to pay barrier.

Karen Lee is back, of course, this time in a CDP; frivolity is again on the menu. Karen Lee Shuster, Docket No. 6019-24L, filed 9/8/26, has Karen Lee trying to relitigate what she lost in the above-cited.

Judge Way amerces Karen Lee $1K for frivoling.

“Petitioner pursued frivolous arguments in a recent deficiency case before this Court. See Transcript of Bench Opinion, Shuster v. Commissioner, No. 27575-22 (Jan. 13, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-1062, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24745 (6th Cir. 2025). This Court warned petitioner against making such arguments in the future but chose not to issue a penalty at that time.”  Order, at p. 10.

Without wishing to put words in Judge Buch’s wordprocessor, I expect a single meritorious claim was enough to ward off a frivolity chop, lest the threat of penalties chill even a barely meritorious claim.

But I am far from endorsing Karen Lee’s litigation style.

“Petitioner has nevertheless continued to waste this Court’s resources. As in her deficiency case, petitioner has flooded this Court’s docket with specious motions. In her Second Amended Petition, petitioner rehashed, over fifty pages, the same constitutional arguments for which she was recently admonished. In her First and Supplemental Requests for Admission, petitioner filed 139 requests for admission, nearly all of which were frivolous, irrelevant, or both. The list goes on.” Idem.

IRS counsel claim they burned between 25 and 50 hours dealing with that junk.