Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh has perused and passed what reads like the title first set forth hereinabove at the head hereof, as my expensive colleagues would say. Although on the retired list, I am still technically a member of the NYS Bar; see 22NYCRR§118.1(g). You’ll find the memo clips (and they repays reading) in William Stockton & Jessie Lovelace, Docket No. 3202-25, filed 7/31/26.

First, deficiencies in the mailing of the SND and proof thereof. “… petitioners attempted to identify infirmities in the Certified Mail List; they failed to do so. Some of petitioners’ alleged flaws (e.g., the identity of the initials appearing on the Certified Mailing List, the listing of the relevant tax year, and the letters’ purported weight) are contradicted by the record. Others, such as the absence of a formal U.S. Postal Service Form 3877, are present but do not negate the validity of the Notices of Deficiency. See Bobbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-272, 2005 WL 3157919, at *2–3.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

Next, the left-out Rep.

“Petitioners also note that the IRS failed to mail copies of the Notices of Deficiency to petitioners’ representatives, despite their submission of Forms 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative… requesting that courtesy copies be sent. A notice of deficiency is valid if it is mailed directly to the taxpayer at the taxpayer’s last known address, even though a copy is not sent to the taxpayer’s representative as requested. McDonald v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 750, 752–53 (1981); Allen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 113, 117 (1957). Sending copies of the statutory notice to representatives named on a Form 2848 is a courtesy to the taxpayer, not an obligation of the IRS, and is not among the mailing requirements in section 6212. See Bond v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-240, 2007 WL 2389081, at *3.” Order, at p. 2.

Next, the Boechler gambit, which has become routine. Bill & Jessie are Golsenized to 5 Cir, whose last encounter with the Section 6213(a) 90-day petition cutoff was Rochelle back in 2002. But Jim Rochelle was only half as late as Bill & Jessie (143 days compared to 286), and Judge Vazquez’s excellent opinion carried the day. See my blogpost “Excellent and Concurred,” 6/5/26. Judge C-Doug Pugh: “We are bound by Rochelle unless and until the Fifth Circuit revisits the issue, and it is not our place to overturn its holding.” Order, at p. 3. And that 5 Cir might reconsider Rochelle, Bill & Jessie cite no active appeal, so there is no reason to stall this case.

But I must give Bill’s & Jessie’s trusty attorneys, who state online that they are “Texas grown, nationally known,” a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.” Congress might amend Section 6213(a), so the case should wait until they do. Judge C-Dough Pugh is almost douce with her reply: “The possibility that Congress may (or may not) amend section 6213 does not warrant an indefinite delay in this case.” Order, at p. 4.

Taishoff says, chaps, you’d do better to play the Joshua 10:12-13 gambit than to expect Congress…but this is a non-political blog.

It’s an old pro’s mantra: “Whatever arguments you got, raise ’em at the CDP; use ’em or lose ’em.” Sidney L. Matthew, P.A., Docket No. 416-23L, filed 7/30/26, furnishes yet another example.

First, even a sole-shareholder corporation is a legal entity separate from sole shareholder. Sid mixes them up, but Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way keeps the distinction clear. Shareholder Sid claims he transferred his principal residence, so its worth shouldn’t have been included in the worth of the PA’s receivable for the loan the PA made to Sid. But he does that post-petition after asserting at the CDP that he tried to get a mortgage to pay the taxes at issue. Judge Way is perplexed in a footnote.

“Petitioner provided documentation to Appeals showing that Mr. Matthew had attempted to secure a loan on his personal residence. But petitioner is now asserting that Mr. Matthew no longer owned that residence at the time of the CDP hearing. These directly inconsistent statements are hard to reconcile.” Order, at p. 4, footnote 3.

Except.

Taishoff says the two statements are inconsistent only if chronology is compressed. Maybe Sid should have said at the CDP that, after failing to secure a mortgage and being financially pressed, he thereafter sold at a ruinous loss just to pay for rent and groceries. If such were the case (and it’s not inconceivable in a depressed market; Sid petitioned from FL (Order, at p. 1), a locale notorious for real estate booms and busts), it might tip the scales.

Except.

First, it has to be true. And provably true. Next, it must be raised at the CDP. Tax Court CDP review is strictly record-rule. As I’ve said many times before, record-rule is the contrapositive of the old Yellow Pages slogan. The old Yellow Pages claimed “If it’s out there, it’s in here.” At a Tax Court CDP, if it’s not in there, it’s not out there.

I have often written of Mr. Jeane’s flailing datestampers and hardlaboring clerks, taking arms against a sea of paper and electrons, mostly pro se generated and fatally flawed. I sympathize; I really do. Those who understand the limitations of “the small court” are few. Most petitioners fall for the Congressional promise of a “play before you pay” free-kick forum, which in practice has more restrictions than the Strait of Hormuz, and blame you.

But Mr. Jeane, save some fellow-feeling for the poor blogger. You unload a couple massive opinions (hi, Judge Holmes) on a single day at 3 p.m. Eastern. The poor blogger has to juggle and jive to plow through them and put up blogposts with enough detail, yet not so long as to look like a law review article that a busy practitioner hasn’t time to read. And I must do this at speed so my European and African readers haven’t already gone to bed by the time I post. Then the next day there’s nothing but mine-run orders: “pay the sixty Georges,” “amend to state something with which we can deal,” “straighten out the caption or document title” (nobody gets these right), and boilerplate jurisdictional essays like Richard James Steeno & Kimberly Ann Steeno, Docket No. 15316-25S, filed 7/29/26.

I know the parties are hanging breathless on the fate of their motion, order, or decision. But would holding off a day, or stringing out a bunch Sum. Op.s, Memos., or even a full-dress T. C., even one day, so I have something of substance to blog the day after the deluge, spoil some vast eternal plan?