Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall rebuffs IFRS’ belated attempt to shift from straight individual taxation to the anfractuosities of Subpart F in Richard M. Rund, Docket No. 869-22, filed 10/28/26. As Richard’s trusty attorneys point out, “…this case was investigated and litigated for years as a bank deposit and foreign account reconstruction case and that respondent’s proposed Subpart F allegations introduce materially different factual issues involving foreign corporations and manufacturing activities occurring approximately two decades ago.” Order, at p.1.

True, Richard’s bookkeeping was near to nonexistent. But Richard claims his cancer treatment has debilitated him, his longtime CPA died and workpapers cannot be found, and the years at issue go back more than twenty (count ’em, twenty) years.

Even if IRS raised the Subpart F (foreign corporations) issues two years ago, they didn’t come up with numbers for another year.

IRS now want to amend its answer for a second time, after nearly five (count ’em, five) years since the original SNDs were issued. And there’s $30 million on the table now, five trial continuances already granted, and trial less than three (count ’em, three) weeks away.

And a general throwaway reference to Subpart F in the original SNDs was insufficient to alert Richard’s trusty attorneys to the rabbithole at their feet.

Trusty attorney boasts over thirty (count ’em, thirty) years of experience navigating unique challenges. Good job.

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins directs Angela Stern to file a “protective” Form 8857 Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, with all documentation supporting her claim for relief under I.R.C. § 6015. For the rest, Michael Stern & Angela Stern, Docket No. 11100-23, filed 10/17/2, want either summary J and a one-day trial, or not and a two-day trial. Oh yes, and dismiss Angela for want of jurisdiction, and while you’re at it, Judge, reconsider and cabin the caselaw. There’s more, but that will do for these purposes.

Such a procedural smorgasbord could only have been prepared by The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys. Judge Jenkins kicks the case off the November trial calendar and tells the parties to stipulate whatever they can and work out a scheduling order.

But the “protective” filing and concomitant evidentiary proffer raise the conflict question. Can the present counsel lineup remain? Judge Jenkins orders the “protective” filing after a phonathon, so clearly this wasn’t sought at the outset.

The docket shows the Great Chieftain only made a limited appearance. Does conflict of interest arise from the protective filing, as clearly the petitioners’ interests do not mesh? And how far does the conflict extend? Are separate counsel required henceforward for everything?

In my young day, flippers would try to stall closing to shop the deal to other buyers. If they got a better offer, they’d try to gazumph their counterparty. Please pardon obscure technical term.

The most recent stall in the SCE line is going viral. Just a couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes) we saw the trusty attorneys in Yacht Creek try the move; hold off entry of decision (EoD) on the stip they signed so that they could shop the deal to IRS Office of Conservation Easements (OCE).

Well, the trusty attorneys for Centurion Georgia, LLC, Jon Guven, Tax Matters Partner Docket No. 18139-23, filed 10/26/26, are at the same game. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones adheres to the quaint notion that a deal is a deal; if you thus stipulate, you thus capitulate.

Judge CD Jones did hold off EoD to make sure the Section 248(b) nonparticipants had been served, but the time for them to object was past when the stall was invoked.

“Although Rule 248(b)(4) permits the Court to defer entry of decision after the objection period has expired, the question remains whether petitioner has identified circumstances warranting further delay. In determining whether to hold respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance, the Court exercises its discretion to manage its docket, weighing “competing interests and maintaining an even balance.” See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). The existence of that discretion, however, does not itself justify holding the Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance. Petitioner must therefore identify sufficient reasons for the requested delay. The Court’s earlier decision to refrain from acting on respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision, see Doc. 108, does not resolve whether further abeyance is appropriate in the light of the grounds now advanced. The Court considers those grounds below.

“Petitioner emphasizes that it accepted respondent’s settlement offer under a shorter deadline than that generally announced for the settlement initiative. But petitioner does not explain why the shorter deadline provides a basis for delaying entry of decision after it accepted the offer. Neither does the subsequent announcement of the OCE alter that conclusion. IRS News Release IR-2026-95 (Aug. 19, 2026) withdraws deadlines for outstanding offers but provides that prior elections remain effective and will be processed according to their terms. Thus, the announcement does not indicate that accepted settlements should be deferred or reopened. In any event, the withdrawal of IRS settlement deadlines does not require the Court to postpone disposition of this case.” Order, at p. 3.

The Centurions’ claim of irreparable harm founders on their assertion that no new terms are contemplated. Their offer to report every thirty (count ’em, thirty) days is no reason to hold up EoD. Taishoff says their claim that reporting would allow Judge CD Jones to monitor their negotiations means more work for the Judge; guys, the aim of the exercise is to make it easy for the judge to give you what you want and get rid of you and your case.

Taishoff also says that the Centurions still have a CDP to buy time; they can try to shop the deal then, although the odds are really bad.