Or maybe “Don’t Stipulate, Expostulate” better sums up Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh’s take on the Rule 91(f) motion for OSC to accept proposed facts and evidence launched by Meta Platforms, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16081-25, filed 8/6/25. Said motion was the preliminary bombardment by Meta & Subs before sending its motion to preclude IRS from making periodic adjustments under section 482 for the years at issue in this case over the top.

IRS followed up on Judge C-Doug Pugh’s opinion a year ago, more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “Facebook Faceoff – Draw (Sort Of),” 5/22/25, by bringing in some more years, even while the Rule 155 beancount had not yet concluded.

Judge C-Doug Pugh spends a lot of time finding fault with the Meta & Subs’ edited version of facts and documents. “Selective quotes and summaries are not consistent with the spirit of Rule 91.” Order, at p. 2. But in the meantime and without waiting, Meta & Subs moved to preclude, And IRS responds.

True, 9 Cir (where Meta & Subs are Golsenized) requires citations to the admin record to “pinpoint” what the parties contend, but the Court doesn’t need a stip to figure that out if the parties cite to the record in their preclusion motions.

And they did.

“The parties could and indeed did cite [Judge Pugh’s 2025 opinion] and incorporate documents relevant to their respective legal arguments by attaching them as exhibits to their Preclusion Motions. Because the stated purpose of the proposed stipulation was to facilitate judicial consideration of the Preclusion Motions, and the parties have proceeded without one, petitioner’s Motion effectively is moot.” Order, at p. 3.

And of course the parties can try, or agree, to put in the whole record of the case including the 2025 opinion. Judge C-Doug Pugh won’t require it. And they can even agree to put in documents not part of that record or move to include such as they do not agree. But no summaries; let it all hang out.

Thirteen (count ’em, thirteen) lawyers for Meta & Subs, twelve (count ’em, twelve) for IRS, and this is the result. SMH.

Scott M. Balotin & Ellen M. Balotin, Docket No. 3848-26P, filed 8/6/26, show great promise for more blogfodder even than their prior appearances in this my blog; in proof whereof, see my blogposts “Slamming the Backdoor,” 8/17/23, and “The Eighty Percent,” 2/4/26.

This time they’re pro se, claiming IRS is playing the Matty Dean Vigon cat-and-mouse gambit, denounced by that Obliging Jurist Judge David Gustafson in my blogpost “Crafty – Akin to the Weasel,” 7/24/17, with Section 7345 seriously delinquent tax debt (SDTD) certs to DoS and then decertifying. No SOL on SDTD certs, right?

Yes. Except.

Scott filed a CDP and then petitioned (late, but maybe equitably tolled) a negative NOD.

Judge Goeke: “IRS’s three certifications do not indicate that the IRS will recertify petitioners in violation of section 7345. When a certification is found to be erroneous, the IRS shall reverse the certification and notify the State Department ‘as soon as practicable.’  §7345(c)(2)(D). That occurred in this case. The IRS timely issued the first reversal after petitioners requested the CDP hearing. The IRS recertified Mr. Balotin after the 30-day period for filing a petition for review of the Notice of Determination expired. Then, it reversed the certification less than one month after petitioners’ [sic] filed the untimely petition in the CDP case. The IRS complied with its obligations under section 7345.” Order, at p. 3.

Yes, Ruesch says reversing a SDTD cert to moot a petition and then recertifying is a voluntary cessation no-no, just like successive imposition of Section 6702 chops followed by withdrawal, but only if there is a reasonable expectation that IRS will recertify the taxpayer, and interim relief or events have completely eradicated the effects of the certification.  Scott, unlike Dean Matty Vigon, precipitated the cert withdrawals with his CDP request and subsequent petition. IRS followed the statute. And Scott can petition successive SDTD certs; Dean Matty Vigon was barred by the Section 6330(b)(2) one-CDP-per-year constraint from petitioning successive NFTLs and NITLs.

In another millennium, On the Hill Far Above, when I had a lot fewer wrinkles, a lot less fat, and a lot more hair, I stood smoking a pipe (“How quaint” my native-born Texan granddaughters would say) in a smoke-filled cardroom. In memory I see Jersey Ed, Slater, Barry, and Joel, and one of them slapping his cards on the table and exclaiming “Who dealt this mess?” even if he himself had dealt the bridge hand. It’s been sixty years and more, but I remember.

So I want to give a Taishoff “Good Try, Second Class” to the trusty attorneys for Scott L. Reed and Stacy N. Reed, T. C.  Memo.  2026-64, filed 8/5/26, for rescuing even the Allowed Deductions, Exhibit A, (T. C. Memo. 2026-64, at pp., 41-45) and staving off even a modicum of the unreported income IRS heaped on their clients’ heads. They have to fold the chops, though.

Scott and Stacy (that’s Doc Stacy, the allergist/dermatologist) were a trifle casual with recordkeeping and documenting their multifarious business activities, ranging from real estate consultancy for AR historic preservation (vanishing) tax credits, used wood rescuing, medical clinic, and helping a cousin buy some real estate.

Judge Emin (“Eminent”) Toro expends fifty (count ’em, fifty) pages, including but in nowise limiting the generality of the foregoing (as my expensive colleagues would say) tables showing saved and lost deductions, to unscramble this Farinata Indiana. For a judge with no accounting credentials Judge Eminent Toro well-proves his impressive legal résume.

 And IRS’ counsel were no slouches, either. Though the ice was sometimes thin and the sun at noon above, they pressed on.