STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden explores the OIC equivalent of the whistleblower rejection-or-denial dichotomy (for which see my blogpost “Rejection and Denial” 3/16/20) in Donald M. Zorn & Cynthia A. Zorn, Docket No. 15833-23L, filed 8/3/26.

TAS told the Zorns their OIC had been rejected, but their IRS account transcript showed “481 Offer in Compromise rejected or returned.” Order, at p. 4. IRS also claimed the Zorns hadn’t filed a return for one of the years at issue; they claim they did, but Cynthia couldn’t sign it because she was ill. 

If COIC returns an OIC, it means the offer was processable, but stuff is missing or incomplete. Rejected is the COIC version of NYC’s “fuggedaboutit.” If rejected, one can resubmit or go to Appeals and petition an adverse NOD.

The Zorns were paying as if the OIC had been accepted, and if it was rejected they should have a hearing at Appeals. Rejection is separate from any COIC determination, hence a hearing. If returned, the Zorns are required to be told the reason, but they get no hearing on why it was returned.

The admin record as supplemented and with materials supplied in an IRS status report looks like a frittata Fiorentino, so STJ Di sends it back to Appeals to unscramble.

Was the OIC “(1) rejected, as stated in the Taxpayer Advocate Service letter, and if so whether the Appeals Officer made an independent final determination, and whether petitioners should be permitted to submit a revised OIC; or (2) returned and whether the subsequent filing of the 2016 tax return required the Appeals Officer to send it back to COIC to reconsider if the offer should have been returned.” Order, at p. 4.

If I may double up on metaphor and describe an impossible play, Gradi Jacques Muyembi Kayembe & Melkam Muyembi, Docket No. 16438-25S, filed 8/3/26, both beat the throw and slid in under the tag.

I am sure Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda was far too engrossed in study in his youth to play much baseball, but I can imagine him as umpire, crouched over third base as Gradi & Mel slide in, then leaping up and stretching out both arms with palms downward and yelling “Safe!” as Frank (“Busy”) Bisignano races from the dugout bellowing in protest.

But Gradi & Mel actually used  FedEx 2 Day, a PDS enrolled in the “blessed communion, fellowship divine,” more particularly bounded and described in I.R.S. Notice 2016-30, 2016-18 I.R.B. 676. Hence Section 7502(a) mailed-is-filed saves Gradi & Mel.

Moreover, the SND they’re petitioning gave a petition due date seven (count ’em, seven) days after date of mailing, so Gradi & Mel get the seven on top of 90-from-mailing.

However, as the late-night Telehucksters say “But wait! There’s more!”

“The 90th day after August 29, 2025 [mailing plus 7], was November 27, 2025, Thanksgiving Day, a legal holiday. The face of the notice of deficiency stated that the last day to file a petition in Tax Court was Friday, November 28, 2025, the following day. However, on that day the Court was administratively closed. The period within which to file a petition was thus tolled by I.R.C. section 7451(b), which provides that when a filing location is inaccessible on the date a petition is due, the period for filing a petition is tolled for the number of days within the period of inaccessibility plus 14 days. See Sall v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 325, 327–28 (2023). Adding the one day of inaccessibility to the 14-day tolling period required by I.R.C. section 7451(b)(1) extended the petition deadline by 15 days, to December 13, 2025. As December 13, 2025, was a Saturday, the petition deadline was further extended to the following Monday, December 15, 2025.

“The Petition was received and filed by the Court on December 16, 2025. The shipping label on the envelope containing the Petition shows that it was shipped on December 13, 2025, by FedEx 2 Day, and scheduled to be delivered on December 16, 2025. FedEx electronic database tracking information is consistent in showing December 13, 2025, as the ship date and FedEx 2 Day as the service.” Order, at p. 2.

For Madiodio Sall’s story, see my blogpost “Take Two,” 11/30/23.

Gradi & Mel can dust off their uniforms and hug the base.

Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh has perused and passed what reads like the title first set forth hereinabove at the head hereof, as my expensive colleagues would say. Although on the retired list, I am still technically a member of the NYS Bar; see 22NYCRR§118.1(g). You’ll find the memo clips (and they repays reading) in William Stockton & Jessie Lovelace, Docket No. 3202-25, filed 7/31/26.

First, deficiencies in the mailing of the SND and proof thereof. “… petitioners attempted to identify infirmities in the Certified Mail List; they failed to do so. Some of petitioners’ alleged flaws (e.g., the identity of the initials appearing on the Certified Mailing List, the listing of the relevant tax year, and the letters’ purported weight) are contradicted by the record. Others, such as the absence of a formal U.S. Postal Service Form 3877, are present but do not negate the validity of the Notices of Deficiency. See Bobbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-272, 2005 WL 3157919, at *2–3.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

Next, the left-out Rep.

“Petitioners also note that the IRS failed to mail copies of the Notices of Deficiency to petitioners’ representatives, despite their submission of Forms 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative… requesting that courtesy copies be sent. A notice of deficiency is valid if it is mailed directly to the taxpayer at the taxpayer’s last known address, even though a copy is not sent to the taxpayer’s representative as requested. McDonald v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 750, 752–53 (1981); Allen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 113, 117 (1957). Sending copies of the statutory notice to representatives named on a Form 2848 is a courtesy to the taxpayer, not an obligation of the IRS, and is not among the mailing requirements in section 6212. See Bond v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-240, 2007 WL 2389081, at *3.” Order, at p. 2.

Next, the Boechler gambit, which has become routine. Bill & Jessie are Golsenized to 5 Cir, whose last encounter with the Section 6213(a) 90-day petition cutoff was Rochelle back in 2002. But Jim Rochelle was only half as late as Bill & Jessie (143 days compared to 286), and Judge Vazquez’s excellent opinion carried the day. See my blogpost “Excellent and Concurred,” 6/5/26. Judge C-Doug Pugh: “We are bound by Rochelle unless and until the Fifth Circuit revisits the issue, and it is not our place to overturn its holding.” Order, at p. 3. And that 5 Cir might reconsider Rochelle, Bill & Jessie cite no active appeal, so there is no reason to stall this case.

But I must give Bill’s & Jessie’s trusty attorneys, who state online that they are “Texas grown, nationally known,” a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.” Congress might amend Section 6213(a), so the case should wait until they do. Judge C-Dough Pugh is almost douce with her reply: “The possibility that Congress may (or may not) amend section 6213 does not warrant an indefinite delay in this case.” Order, at p. 4.

Taishoff says, chaps, you’d do better to play the Joshua 10:12-13 gambit than to expect Congress…but this is a non-political blog.