In my young day, flippers would try to stall closing to shop the deal to other buyers. If they got a better offer, they’d try to gazumph their counterparty. Please pardon obscure technical term.

The most recent stall in the SCE line is going viral. Just a couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes) we saw the trusty attorneys in Yacht Creek try the move; hold off entry of decision (EoD) on the stip they signed so that they could shop the deal to IRS Office of Conservation Easements (OCE).

Well, the trusty attorneys for Centurion Georgia, LLC, Jon Guven, Tax Matters Partner Docket No. 18139-23, filed 10/26/26, are at the same game. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones adheres to the quaint notion that a deal is a deal; if you thus stipulate, you thus capitulate.

Judge CD Jones did hold off EoD to make sure the Section 248(b) nonparticipants had been served, but the time for them to object was past when the stall was invoked.

“Although Rule 248(b)(4) permits the Court to defer entry of decision after the objection period has expired, the question remains whether petitioner has identified circumstances warranting further delay. In determining whether to hold respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance, the Court exercises its discretion to manage its docket, weighing “competing interests and maintaining an even balance.” See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). The existence of that discretion, however, does not itself justify holding the Motion for Entry of Decision in abeyance. Petitioner must therefore identify sufficient reasons for the requested delay. The Court’s earlier decision to refrain from acting on respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision, see Doc. 108, does not resolve whether further abeyance is appropriate in the light of the grounds now advanced. The Court considers those grounds below.

“Petitioner emphasizes that it accepted respondent’s settlement offer under a shorter deadline than that generally announced for the settlement initiative. But petitioner does not explain why the shorter deadline provides a basis for delaying entry of decision after it accepted the offer. Neither does the subsequent announcement of the OCE alter that conclusion. IRS News Release IR-2026-95 (Aug. 19, 2026) withdraws deadlines for outstanding offers but provides that prior elections remain effective and will be processed according to their terms. Thus, the announcement does not indicate that accepted settlements should be deferred or reopened. In any event, the withdrawal of IRS settlement deadlines does not require the Court to postpone disposition of this case.” Order, at p. 3.

The Centurions’ claim of irreparable harm founders on their assertion that no new terms are contemplated. Their offer to report every thirty (count ’em, thirty) days is no reason to hold up EoD. Taishoff says their claim that reporting would allow Judge CD Jones to monitor their negotiations means more work for the Judge; guys, the aim of the exercise is to make it easy for the judge to give you what you want and get rid of you and your case.

Taishoff also says that the Centurions still have a CDP to buy time; they can try to shop the deal then, although the odds are really bad.

The lead case in a five-way agreement to be bound was taken off the trial calendar based on a signed settlement letter between IRS and TMP of the lead petitioner. IRS moved to enter decision based thereon, but wanted it held until the Rule 248(b) 60-day window for nonparticipating partners to weigh in had run. Before that clock had run out, TMP moved to hold the EoD in abeyance pending TMP talking to IRS’ Office of Conservation Easements (OCE), or alternatively objecting to EoD.

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins won’t have it.

“Petitioner’s change of heart does not retroactively void the agreement on which respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision under Rule 248(b)(1)(B) was predicated, and the Court may enter decision in this case under Rule 248(b)(4). Notwithstanding petitioner’s reply protestations, petitioner’s motion does seek unilaterally to renegotiate its settlement with respondent through the proposed discussions with the OCE. The Court has held that ‘prior representations to the Court about the status of the settlement’ preclude attempts to invalidate a settlement. And the Court has granted motions for entry of decision based on settlements that taxpayers have subsequently sought to repudiate, rejecting the notion that the fact that a settlement was not filed as a stipulation precluded its enforcement. The Court has looked with particular disfavor upon attempts to renege on settlements after a trial in the case had been cancelled on the basis of the settlement. Although trial was not scheduled in this case, trial in a case to which this case was stipulated to be bound was cancelled, on the understanding that all of the related cases would be settled pursuant to the settlement initiative referenced in the settlement letter in this case. Petitioner may not now withdraw the agreement on which basis a trial was cancelled and respondent filed the Motion for Entry of Decision.” Yacht Creek LLC, Yacht Creek Investments LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 504-23, filed 10/23/26, at pp. 2-3. (Citations omitted).

Note that the TMP said it “has no interest in trying the case and ‘does not repudiate the basis for the settlement it reached with Respondent.’ It further states: ‘The entry of the proposed decision submitted with Respondent’s Motion, over objection, remains preferable to restoration of this case to the trial calendar.’” Order, at p. 2.

Taishoff says all TMP wants to do is renegotiate the deal, or buy time before the partner-level computational adjustments hit the investors in this dodge (and the lawsuits start), or both.

No go.

I won’t be so bold as to assert that Judge David Gustafson reads this my blog. I doubt if he remembers that we met at the Tax Court Judicial Conference in Chicago eight (count ’em, eight) years ago. But he has taken up, with his usual diligence and obliging nature, the role of the Administrative Judge Tax Court ought to have.

Here’s a quote from my blogpost “Scrapbook 10/30/23. “Maybe the Ch J might adopt our State court procedure, whereby an administrative judge cracks the whip, requiring explanations why antiques are still in the shop, and bestirring the dilatory to stop dancing in the backfield, and move the football or eat the football.”

Judge Gustafson faces Robert Hersch & Katherine Hersch, Docket No. 13895-25, filed 10/23/26, head-on. “When the Tax Court ‘cuts’ a new trial calendar, it is appropriate for the assigned judge to look at the oldest cases on the calendar and to attempt to ensure that they are not allowed simply to languish. This case is one of the older cases on the calendar for the Tax Court’s upcoming session in Dallas beginning March 8, 2027. It concerns tax year 2019, for which the IRS issued a notice of deficiency more than three years ago on September 28, 2023 (Doc. 1, Ex. A).” Order, at p. 1.

After a trudge through the nearly-impenetrable procedural morass, Judge Gustafson observes that holding this case for eventual consolidation with a couple related cases (hi, Judge Holmes) involving later years won’t work because Section 6663 fraud chops in the relateds but not here.

So he directs the parties to stipulate whatever they can.

“It seems that this earliest case has had full consideration by Appeals, is unlikely to settle, and has had more than adequate time to be developed for trial. We would not expect to continue this case upon the vague ‘anticipat[ion]’ of a motion to consolidate, and we would not summarily grant any motion to consolidate but would evaluate it in light of the concerns expressed above.” Order, at p. 2.