Attorney-at-Law

KIT MARLOWE, THOU SHOULD’ST BE LIVING AT THIS HOUR

In Uncategorized on 03/18/2026 at 20:45

The mysterious English Elizabethan poet was once charged, but never convicted, with counterfeiting money. He supposedly said that he had as good a right to coin money as Queen Elizabeth I (or II, for that matter, I suppose).

Benjamin A. Rogovy & Carol J. Castellon Miranda,17513-24, filed 3.18/26, bitcoin aficionados, would agree. Howbeit, IRS claims they were hard-forked, and thus owe tax.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch understands these things, which I totally do not, despite having among my nearest and dearest one who can block a chain with the best of them. So I’ll let Judge Ingenuity Buch judge-‘splain.

“Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that can be traded, exchanged into fiat currencies, and used to pay for goods and services. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. Bitcoin exists on a blockchain, which is a public ledger of cryptocurrency transactions. The Bitcoin blockchain is governed by a set of rules and technical standards, and any changes to the protocols governing the blockchain require consensus from the Bitcoin network, which includes all participants interacting on the blockchain.

“Bitcoin is held on the blockchain at a specific address. A participant can send Bitcoin to another address on the blockchain using public and private keys. These keys are alphanumeric codes that serve a similar function to a bank account password (private) and a bank account number (public). Private keys are stored in ‘wallets’ and public keys are shortened into a ‘wallet address’ which is the identifier for specific Bitcoin addresses.” Order, at p. 2.

But Ben’s problems start at the fork. He got some forked bitcoins.

“The blockchain can split in a process called a ‘hard fork.’ A hard fork occurs when the blockchain is copied and a new protocol is adopted for the newly copied blockchain, thus creating a forked blockchain. This forked blockchain is an exact copy of the legacy blockchain at the time of the fork, but future transactions on the forked blockchain will follow the new protocol. A hard fork has no impact on the continued functioning of the legacy blockchain, and it does not alter the holdings of the legacy cryptocurrency. After a hard fork, an individual who has a wallet that controls a cryptocurrency on the legacy blockchain also has a corresponding wallet address and public key for the forked blockchain that represents the newly ‘forked coins.’ The number of forked coins in the forked blockchain wallet corresponds to the number of coins in the legacy wallet. After a hard fork, an individual would need to take additional steps to obtain the forked coins.” Id, as my expensive ex-colleagues would say.

The question is did Ben actually have constructive receipt of the forked coins. IRS claims he had receipt of $9 million worth. Ben claims he didn’t, and wants summary J.

He doesn’t get it. Too many fact questions.

I have eschewed all the obvious puns about the forking process.

ESI DOES IT

In Uncategorized on 03/17/2026 at 11:03

To any who object that I put out too many discovery blogposts, that’s what takes up the greatest number of Tax Court Order pages beyond routine pay-and-amend or tossed-for-lateness. The CLE merchants who peddled “win your case at discovery” the last thirty (count ’em, thirty) or so years have swept the board. Pretrial faceoffs are the game; if the game itself takes place at all, it’s an afterthought.

By way of illustration of the foregoing (as my expensive former colleagues say), here’s Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins unloading eight (count ’em, eight) pages anent document production in GO Management Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 3/17/26, another microcaptivity dodge. 

Most of the Order deals with case-specifics, but there is one general interest point. I’ll let Judge Jenkins judge–‘splain.

“…despite respondent’s request for documents to be produced in their native format, each document produced was produced as a PDF file. Although referenced, respondent’s electronically stored information provided previously in connection with informal discovery requests, and respondent provided them with a follow-up request to provide the documents in accordance with such specifications…. Respondent also states that petitioners at no point raised concerns about the omission of the specifications. The Motion Response states that petitioners provided documents in the format in which they were maintained and, in any event, that respondent’s failure to include the ESI specifications with the Request originally was determinative.

“Respondent did make an ESI specifications request in the Request, and petitioners did not, in the Request Response, raise any specific objections to that request, as instructed in Rule 72(b)(2). Even in the Motion Response, petitioners do not raise substantive objections to the ESI specifications but simply argue that they did produce them in the format in which they were stored, which, as noted in the Reply, is the requirement under Rule 72(b)(3)(B) only if a specific form has not been requested. Furthermore, as respondent also points out in the Reply, it is dubious that all of the items produced, e.g., emails and Microsoft Excel files, were stored in PDF format. Accordingly, the Court will order petitioners to produce ESI according to the ESI specifications referenced in the Request.” Order, at. p. 2.

Scrub the metadata is an obvious desideratum. PDF does that. Taishoff says Judge Jenkins is right to call it “dubious” that documents subject, or potentially subject, to a litigation hold would be stored in PDF only. Once preserved in PDF, an essential element of the original is gone. Spoliation of evidence, maybe so? I do hope none of the aforementioned merchants are making this suggestion.

WHOSO WOULD PETITION, THOUGH HE WERE DEAD

In Uncategorized on 03/16/2026 at 16:01

Gets No Help from Boechler

That’s the bad news from Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy to Arbor Vita Corporation d.b.a. Hemediagnostics, 166 T. C. 5, filed 3/16/26. Heme, a CA Corp, was decorpitated by the CA Franchise Tax Board for failure to pay State taxes. While thus powerless, Heme got a NFTL for failure to pay FUTA and file W-2s sustained by Appeals, so Heme timely petitioned. Heme doesn’t get restored to CA good standing until five (count ’em, five) months after the 30-day claim processing limitation has run. 

IRS claims want of corporate capacity and moves to toss. If this sounds familiar to my longtime readers, you’re right; see my blogpost “Being and Nothingness,” 5/7/13.

Except.

Judge Sport Landy checks CA law and finds while revival gives back corporate powers and allows continuation of litigation, it doesn’t deprive opponent in ongoing litigation of claims or defenses. IOW, revival doesn’t defeat SOL Judge Sport Landy is more elegant in his phraseology. “…if relation back of revival would prejudice or invalidate an opposing party’s defense that accrued because of the suspension of corporate status, regardless of the nature of that defense, then revivor cannot retroactively validate an otherwise procedural act.” 166 T. C. 5, at p. 5.

What about Boechler?

Cases like Hom, referred to in my above-cited blogpost, were deficiency cases, not CDPs. So there is some wiggle room for defunct corporations in CDPs. 

Except.

“…31 days after issuing the Notice of Determination, the Commissioner accrued a statute of limitations defense against any petition filed by Arbor Vita. To retroactively validate Arbor Vita’s Petition at this juncture would prejudice the Commissioner’s defense by effectively nullifying it because Arbor Vita’s Petition would be considered valid and timely filed. Therefore, under California law, we cannot relate Arbor Vita’s corporate revival back to the time it filed its Petition.” 166 T. C. 5, at p. 7. (Citations omitted).

Except.

Doesn’t Boechler take away jurisdictional SOL?

Yes, but here the petition was timely filed. While CA law allows revival to validate a notice of appeal filed while a corporation was defunct, the Supremes have said pore l’il ol’ Tax Court isn’t an appellate court. 

Equitable tolling works to extend the 30-day cutoff for petitions from a CDP NOD. But since the petition was timely filed here, there’s nothing to extend.

Heme’s trusty attorney gets a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.”