Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda, whom I must think laments the Congressionally-forged jurisdictional fetters in which he is confined like a latter-day Prometheus, finally expresses same in the measured language which befits the judicial character.

Susan Marie Hansen, Docket No. 910-26, filed 5/15/26, is five-plus years late with her petition from a 2000 SND covering tax years more than thirty (count ’em, thirty) years ago.

When IRS moves to toss for want of jurisdiction, Ch J Scholar Pat reels off the laundry list of jurisdiction-conferring notices and scenarios, none of which Susan Marie Hansen has proffered.

Susan Marie Hansen’s plea is one too often heard from self-representeds.

“Petitioner was served with a copy of respondent’s motion to dismiss and… filed a response in apparent objection. Therein, petitioner did not directly counter the jurisdictional allegations set forth in respondent’s motion and did not establish that petitioner had filed with the Tax Court during the time frame relevant to any statutory notice. Rather, the submission, to the extent even minimally intelligible, seemed to reference hardships being suffered by petitioner and family members and to be a plea for some type of aid. It did not, however, appear to acknowledge the specific jurisdictional parameters in question, nor did it allude to or attach any notices from the IRS that could bear upon the jurisdictional query before the Court.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

Susan Marie Hansen is clearly frustrated, but the Tax Court train left that station years ago.

“Absent a specific statutory grant to the Court to address a particular notice or scenario, the Court has no general jurisdiction to consider and redress complaints simply because they may pertain to taxes.” Order, at p. 4.

See the headline first written at the head hereof (and hi, Judge Holmes).

Taking my cue from E. G. Leutze, whose famous mural in U. S. Congress shows about the only progress in U. S. Congress…but this is a nonpolitical blog. So I shall soberly discuss Clint L. Martin and Jenifer Martin, T. C. Memo. 2026-40, filed 5/14/26, a coupled entry with Cousin Stephen and his spouse Amanda.

Clint and aforesaid family donated 13.3 acres to the striving, thriving municipality of Highland City, UT, which gratefully accepted same “to maintain th[e] property in perpetuity as preserved open space.” T. C. Memo. 2026-40, at p. 2, with all taxes paid through calendar year at issue and all costs of the transfer picked up.

IRS plays the usual avoid-trial summary J gambits: no CWA, no qualified appraisal, and no complete and correct appraisal summary attached to year-at-issue return.

Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh cuts to the cliché: no CWA, no deduction, no need for trial except any reasonable reliance or Boss Hossery defenses for the chops.

There’s no prescribed form for the CWA, except it must contain a description of the property, and an affirmative statement that no goods or services were provided in exchange (merely stating “donation” or “generous gift” is insufficient; Judge C-Doug has the receipts). Substantial compliance doesn’t get it, and Judge C-Doug won’t let Clint’s trusty attorney try to backdoor it in by citing UT law. 

“We need not decide what Utah law would provide because petitioners identify no cases (nor did we find any) applying the affirmative indication test to look outside a deed for a merger clause. And it would be contradictory to read a merger clause into a deed to satisfy a statute that, by its express terms, requires a written acknowledgment.” T. C. 2026-40, at p. 6.  (Emphasis by the Court).

Trusty attorney claims a Joint Letter signed by the Martins and the mayor of Highland City describing the donation, the Form 8283 filed with the year-at-issue return, and the deed, read together, satisfy the statute. Indeed, documents have been read together to satisfy Section 170(f)(8).

But the deed has no merger clause, stating it embodies the entire understanding the parties and can’t be changed or waived without a writing signed by the party against whom change or waiver asserted. 

What it does have is proof that whoever drafted the deed used a dime-store bargain and sale with the infamous “ten ($10.00) dollars and other good and valuable consideration” language that sank poor ol’ Randy Schrimsher. It also proves that same person doesn’t read this my blog. See, e.g., my blogpost “Merger,” 12/19/22.

Suffice it to say that the Joint Letter doesn’t say what the City was going to do with the property to preserve it as open space, nor that that wouldn’t benefit the Martins.

The plain words of the three (count ’em, three) documents don’t satisfy the statute, and no one claims they’re ambiguous. 

Take it from an old Army engineer and long-time dirt lawyer, those dime-store deed forms are unexploded ordnance. 

Cases like Craig Bernier & Lynette Contreni Bernier, Docket No. 2196-26S, filed 5/13/26, are the daily gravel that comes to the Tax Court gold pan. The IRS sends form letters which addressees petition, even though none of same are deemed SNDs by Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda or his colleagues. Hence the petitions are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

So the petitioners are out sixty Georges, and their frustration, acknowledged in the boilerplate order, goes unredressed.

But is there a hidden nugget in the grit at the bottom of the pan?

IRS acknowledges in its filing with Tax Court that no SND was issued as at the date of the order. That acknowledgement also fixes a locus for 3SOL and 6SOL. If at a later date the SOL issue arises, there is the statement and the order embodying it. See FRE 801(d)(2).

Has any reader any experience to share? What do you tell a client in these circumstances?