It’s such a cliché, but this is one on which I am prepared to wager an ale or two at Jake’s Saloon that you can’t make this stuff up. But let Judge Nega tell the story of Rosie K. Boparai, Docket No. 7789-25, filed 6/30/26.

“Petitioner’s tax return for 2019 was due (after the granting of an extension) on October 15, 2020. Petitioner did not file her 2019 return by that date. 

“On July 17, 2023, petitioner appeared in person at the Sacramento Taxpayer Assistance Center and attempted to hand-deliver her 2019 tax return. Respondent’s employees refused to accept her hand-delivered return without petitioner having first made an appointment for that purpose. That same day, petitioner sent an envelope containing her 2019 return that requested a refund and a check for $10,000 by certified mail to a no-longer-operated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) P.O. Box in San Francisco, California. She included the check despite claiming a refund on the return because she believed that the inclusion of a check would speed up the processing of the return.” Order, at p. 1.

Of course Section 7502 doesn’t help, because the mailpiece was misaddressed.  See Section 7502(a)(2)(B); see also Reg Section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(i). Had Rosie filed properly in 2023, she would have gotten the refund (IRS conceded the deficiency). The 2019 1040 instructions said for overdue returns, use the latest address, and the SF PO Box wasn’t it. 

“Had she consulted the instructions for tax year 2019 with the degree of detail that she claims, she would have seen the directive instructing her to refer to the tax year 2022 instructions to find the proper address for mailing her return.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

PS- IRS finally got Rosie’s return last May.

Two Sum. Ops., but each has a twist.

Gregory A. Rodrigues, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-4, filed 6/29/26, is the usual story of insufficiently-documented Section 274 travel, meals, and entertainment expenses for his real estate operations with his Harvard B-School buddies.  

CSTJ Zachary S. (“High Rise”) Fried: “The trips included travel with petitioner’s business school friends and with Ms. George, with whom petitioner shares a residence and a child. Although petitioner maintains that Ms. George accompanied him in her capacity as his attorney, the record contains no documentary evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and under the circumstances, we reject that assertion.” T. C. Sum. Op. 4, at p. 7. 

Seems the reverse of the usual situation.

He does get a grand or two of business expenses.

Edmund Ha, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, filed 6/29/26, is an even greater traveler, but his fiduciary duty to his clients (he’s a high-priced international broker) prevents him from doing the Section 274 number with his preparer.  This costs him deductions and chops.

But STJ Peter (“HB”) Panuthos bows to Cohan to allow Edmund his home office expense deduction.

“In support petitioner submitted a log, credit card statements, a floor plan of his apartment, and a receipt for eight rental payments at his home address…. 

“Petitioner’s log lists the expense, the amount, and the purpose of each item reported. Petitioner testified credibly as to his business as a real estate agent, and the Court is satisfied that petitioner operated exclusively out of his home, incurred the listed expenses, and that those expenses had a business purpose. Consequently, petitioner has provided sufficient evidence for the Court to rely on the Cohan rule to estimate petitioner’s home office expenses. 

“Accordingly, the Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to a deduction for his home office and related expenses.” T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, at p. 7.

It’s up to the Rule 155 beancount to see how heavily STJ Panuthos bears on Edmund for inexactitude of his own making.

Frantic Frank Wins One

IRS tried to levy on Joseph White, T. C. Memo. 2026-56, filed 6/29/26, for a Restitution-Based Assessment (RBA) north of $1.8 million.

Except.

Joe was (a) making all payments due currently on stiped decision in USDCEDPA which still has a year to run, and (b) Joe is represented by none other than The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys and barbecue king hisself, Frantic Frank Agostino, Esq. 

Joe hadn’t exactly been a model taxpayer. He hadn’t filed for nine (count ’em, nine) years, until his ex-wife’s trusty attorneys made him come clean (or at least try). He bounced a check for a subsequent year’s tax. At Appeals, his OIC was bounced, and his subsequent bankruptcy petition was tossed for bad faith. See T. C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 3-4.

When Joe contested the NITL IRS gave him five (count ’em, five) years later, the SO said RBA has nothing to do with tax owed. True, except the stiped decision in USDCEDPA said IRS would treat the RBA installments as tax paid and wouldn’t try to collect unless Joe defaulted. So Joe petitioned the NOD.

Except.

Of course Frantic Frank tried to wildcard in abatement of interest during COVID, but as he hadn’t raised it at Appeals, Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber calls it foul.

But Frantic Frank gets an RBI, 

“The DOJ settlement permitted petitioner to pay his … tax liabilities in regular monthly installments, with the last payment not due until July 2027. As of May 1, 2025, when Appeals upheld the levy, petitioner’s monthly payments had reduced his remaining balance … to $948,000. By sustaining a levy for $1,101,788, the SO would have allowed the IRS to collect petitioner’s entire remaining balance for those years (and then some) immediately, whereas the DOJ settlement entitled him to pay that balance in installments over the ensuing 27 months. By permitting acceleration of the payments in this way, the SO’s determination was fundamentally inconsistent with the DOJ settlement and with petitioner’s contract rights thereunder. It was therefore an abuse of discretion.” T C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 11-12.

IRS tries the “different liabilities” tack, but is thrown out at first.

“The restitution ordered by the sentencing court, $1.2 million, was identical in amount… to petitioner’s unpaid tax liabilities … as calculated by the attorneys in the criminal case and accepted by the court. The RBAs were concededly ‘distinct’ from the assessments the IRS made when receiving petitioner’s … tax returns: The two sets of assessments were made at different times using different procedures. But the RBAs were not separate from petitioner’s personal income tax liabilities …. They were identical to his personal income tax liabilities for those years, and they simply afforded the IRS a distinct mechanism for collecting those liabilities. The character of the RBAs as a collection mechanism is evident from the fact that any payment petitioner made against the RBAs would be credited toward his personal income tax liabilities ….

“What makes this case different from previous cases we have considered under section 6201(a)(4) is that, six years after the IRS made the RBAs, petitioner and the Government agreed to a different collection mechanism for his … tax liabilities, effected by the settlement of the collection suit. The United States thereby accepted $1.6 million as a compromise of petitioner’s aggregate … income tax liability and gave him the right to pay that liability in monthly installments ending in July 2027. By sustaining in May 2025 a levy issued to collect petitioner’s entire outstanding balance immediately, the SO acted in contravention of the contract DOJ and petitioner had executed.” T. C. 2026-56, at pp. 12-13.

Joe crosses the plate, and credit Frantic Frank with a Run Batted In and another oak leaf to his Taishoff “Good Job.”