Attorney-at-Law

“VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR UNCLEAR”

In Uncategorized on 07/20/2026 at 19:24

That’s how IRS answered all but eight (count ’em, eight) of the 128 (count ’em…don’t bother, Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern already did it for ya) admissions sought by the trusty attorneys for Beveled Edge Insurance Company, Inc., et al., T. C. Memo. 2026-57, filed 7/20/26, in their Third Request for Admissions. 

To clear things up, it’s well known that I loved requests for admissions in my practicing law days. It was cheap discovery. But 128 on the third go-round? As Groucho Marx said, “I love my cigar, but I take it out once in a while.” And my watchword has been: “Any lawyer who can’t find an ambiguity should find another way to make a living.” But there’s good-faith deep-diving analyzing and defusing IEDs and knuckleballs, and then there’s obstructionist semantic snivel-drivel.

Judge Big Jim is far too well-bred to suggest IRS counsel is engaging in any base doings, but he does tell them to hew to Rule 90, admit, deny, coordinate with adversary if you’re unclear what they want, and object to form only if you’ve first answered or exhausted all avenues of relief. And break up compound questions, admitting or denying each branch so far as reasonably possible. And don’t quibble about documents; you can admit to a true copy or an original without admitting that it’s either admissible or that its contents are true.

The Beveler’s trusty attorneys want everything deemed admitted and IRS sanctioned, but that’s not happening.

A quick word to Ch J. Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda: I see there’s still a chance to comment on Your Honor’s proposed Rule changes. May I propose an amendment to Rule 33, or even a new rule for motions? Every motion paper must be signed to Rule 33(b) standards. Meritless requests for sanctions should be themselves sanctionable. Even FRCP 11(d) is deficient in this respect.

UP MACDOUGALL ALLEY

In Uncategorized on 07/20/2026 at 16:07

No, Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern is not taking us on a walking tour of Greenwich Village. The latest chapter in this promenade (see my blogposts “No Commuter Tax,” 9/17/24, and “A New Day – Redivivus,” 4/25/25, for the backstories) is the valuation of what Linda and Peter gave Papa Bruce when they cut loose Mama Clotilde’s residuary trust, their third appearance in this my blog, Linda Lewis, Donor, T. C. 2026-58, filed 7/20/26. 

Petitioners’ expert said Papa Bruce would live longer because he was rich. Hence, the Section 7520 life expectancy tables, while a baseline, merited five (count ’em, five) years of extra time for Papa Bruce. Unhappily for petitioners, they don’t do as well as Spain in extra time.

After slicing and dicing IRS’ and petitioners’ experts and dissecting the IRC and regs, Judge Big Jim ascends to such rarefied heights of pure mathematics as to get the parties within a mere $3,249,104 difference by T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 20. 

And all that’s left is Papa Bruce’s life expectancy at communtation.

The Section 7520 tables don’t apply, not because Papa Bruce is rich, but because what Mama Clotilde’s will and trust mean is decided by State law. 

And Mama Clotilde only left Papa Bruce an income interest and a limited power of appointment, not all the goodies she inherited from her daddy. T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 17.

“Respondent claims support for his position from ‘the plain language of section 7520.’ He reminds us that the statute provides that ‘the value of any . . . remainder . . . interest shall be determined’ under the prescribed tables. But respondent quotes the statute selectively. He omits the first five words of the text: ‘For purposes of this title.’ A trustee determining how to divide the assets of the Residuary Trust under section 12.8 of Clotilde’s will upon the trust’s termination would not be making that determination, in the first instance, for purposes of the Code. Instead, the trustee would be determining the beneficiaries’ entitlements to the trust property—a matter of state law.” T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 21.

“We are unpersuaded that, for the purpose of valuing Bruce’s income interest in the Residuary Trust to determine the distribution to which he would have been entitled under section 12.8 of Clotilde’s will upon the termination of the trust … Bruce would have appropriately been treated as five years younger than he actually was. Life expectancy tables, such as those issued by the Social Security Administration, rely on the law of large numbers. The standard tables will inevitably understate the life expectancy of some individuals and overstate that of others. But if the tables are based on an adequate sample size, the inaccuracies in each direction will balance out. The tables will thus provide a reasonable estimate for individuals of a given age. Adjusting the estimates provided by the tables to take into account some, but not all, factors unique to a particular individual would introduce bias and, in our judgment, would be methodologically questionable. Bruce’s income was but one of myriad factors relevant in determining his life expectancy. All else being equal, that one factor might have caused the standard Social Security tables to understate Bruce’s life expectancy. Without considering all factors relevant to Bruce’s life expectancy, however, [petitioners’ expert] could not conclude that all else was equal.” T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at pp. 22-23.

And whatever said expert might have speculated that the gift might have been worth more, IRS’ concession number is substantiated by the record.

LBW

In Uncategorized on 07/20/2026 at 13:33

The most controversial cricket dismissal, which can get you a fierce debate in many a pub or pavilion on soil whereupon the sun now or formerly never set, is a hardy Tax Court perennial.

It features in Gail Etta Moore, Docket No. 323-23, filed 7/20/26.

Gail Etta says she faxed first a disagreement to the CP 2000 gave her for year at issue and then a Form 843 seeking abatement of interest, but IRS says they got neither. Then Gail sent another Form 843, which IRS did get, but then IRS sent Gail Etta a SND, which she timely petitioned.

Gail Etta stiped out the deficiency. Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall finds IRS hadn’t assessed interest up to three (count ’em, three) days before the parties filed the stip.  IRS moves to toss because they can’t assess interest while the petition is pending, and didn’t before, so no jurisdiction. Gail Etta “argues that we have jurisdiction to review her interest abatement claim because respondent did not issue her a notice of final determination within the time prescribed under section 6404(h)(1)(A)(ii).” Order, at p. 2.

“Pursuant to section 6404(h), the Court is authorized, in certain circumstances, to ‘determine whether the Secretary’s failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion.’ However, we do not have jurisdiction pursuant to section 6404(h) unless and until (1) the Secretary has assessed interest and mailed an assessment of interest and (2) the Secretary has mailed his final determination not to abate such interest, or the Secretary has failed to issue a notice of final determination not to abatement interest within 180 days after petitioner filed a request for interest abatement.” Order, at p. 3, followed by copious citation of precedent.

I echo the telehucksters’ nocturnal cry. But wait, there’s more!

“Finally, a Notice of Deficiency cannot be treated as a notice of final determination not to abate interest for purposes of section 6404(h) unless the Commissioner intends it as such.” Order, at p. 3. If the SND expressly excludes any finding relating to interest, or doesn’t mention it at all, it’s not a final determination.

“The Notice of Deficiency does not indicate that respondent gave consideration to whether it was appropriate to abate an assessment of interest in this case. That is unsurprising because respondent has not yet assessed any interest on petitioner’s deficiency for tax year [at issue].” Order, at p. 4.

Though Gail Etta is out lbw, there’s always another day and another match.

“Although we have no jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s dispute as to the interest on the agreed upon deficiency that the IRS has not yet assessed, after the Court enters a decision in this case and the IRS assesses interest on the agreed upon deficiency, petitioner is free to pursue actions against the IRS in accordance with sections 6404(h) and 7481(c).” Order, at p. 4.