I’ve often posted about the need for a clear warning to frivolites at an early stage that Section 6673(a) chops are the price of frivolity. Yes, I’ve also said often that judges must be free to run their own divisions (trial parts) without constant second-guessing or undue restriction.

STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel gets it right in Stacy Hutchings, Docket No. 466-26, filed 5/26/26.

Stacy filed a petition, frivoling; when told to amend, she did, frivoling again. IRS moved to toss for failure to state a claim and to give Stacy a Section 6673(a) chop at no extra charge. Stacy responded to said motion and amended, frivoling again.

Motion to toss granted.

“Although we will not impose a penalty at this time, Ms. Hutchings is invited to review I.R.C. section 6673(a): If it appears to the Court that a petitioner’s position in a proceeding before the Court is frivolous or groundless, then the Court can impose a penalty (not to exceed $25,000) on that petitioner. Ms. Hutchings is advised that it appears to the Court that the position she has taken in her submissions are frivolous or groundless. See, e.g., Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498 (2011). Future submissions to the Court advancing a frivolous or groundless position may well result in the imposition of a penalty.” Order, at p. 1.

For the Wnuck story, see my blogpost “One’ll Get You Five,” 5/31/11.

When you go home, tell them of us and say,
For your tomorrow, we gave our today.

I’ve been following the track of that Dixieland Boondockery quartette Habitat Green Investments, LLC, MM Bulldawg Manager, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 14433-17, filed 5/22/26, these last six (count ’em, six) years. 

Finally, the trial is over. Now IRS wants to seal chunks of the docket. Taishoff is at a loss to understand why anyone not a trial or appellate lawyer or judge, who is presumably getting paid to do so, would want to plow through 222 (count ’em, 222) pages of discovery jousting to uncover the identity of the whistleblower who tipped IRS off, when the identity of said blower was revealed in open court, seemingly to the only parties who would have cared.

Nevertheless, Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler has to waste his valuable time I(and my much less valuable time) in coming up with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent to conclude that when the party’s counsel seeking to protect said blower, who neither asked to be protected nor is represented by said counsel, can only come up with conclusory allegations of potential harm to said blower, the public’s right to know outweighs whatever right the blower may have to anonymity.