No, nothing about tariffs or international trade negotiation from me: this blog remains nonpolitical. My political views are expressed elsewhere. What interests me today is Judge Nega’s further explication of Section 6103(h)(4)(C) transactionality in Family Office Foundation, Inc., Docket No. 10779-23X, filed 2/23/26.

At issue is the relationship of FOF to certain persons or entities denominated as Strangers and Nonparties, and Promoter, the latter being the subject of a permanent injunction for organizing phony charitable contributions of overvalued assets to Promoter-created 501(c)(3)s, where contributor retained control of said assets. FOF wants a Rule 103 protective order.  Judge Nega goes for a redacted administrative record.

“Petitioner claims that the administrative records contains [sic] references to individuals that are ‘unrelated’ to this case and seeks to have the record sealed to protect the privacy of those individuals (and entities). As an alternative to sealing the entire record, petitioner requests that they be allowed to submit an unredacted record under seal to the Court and redact another copy of the record for public access.” Order, at p. 2.

IRS’ counsel agrees that the relationships of some of the referenced are too attenuated to fall within Section 6103(h)(4)(C)’s transactionality net, so those can be redacted from the public view. So that takes care of Section 6103(h)(4)(C).

But the protective order?

“In order to rebut the presumptive public right to free access to the facts, a party must come forth with appropriate facts to support claims of harm that would occur as a consequence of disclosure. 

“Historically, parties have met their burden to show claims of harm sufficient to seal records where patents, trade secrets or confidential information are involved. Id. at 921. A showing that the information would harm a party’s reputation is generally not sufficient to overcome the strong common law presumption in favor of access to court records.

“In this case, petitioner has not asserted any claims of harm beyond annoyance or embarrassment. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to rebut the presumptive public right of free access to the Court and we will not issue a protective order. SeeWillie Nelson Music Co., 85 T.C. at 925 (‘[M]erely asserting annoyance and embarrassment is wholly insufficient to demonstrate good cause.”). All of petitioner’s claims that the information of “Strangers” and “Nonparties” is confidential tax return information was only of any relevance to a section 6103 analysis of whether that tax return information may be disclosed in this proceeding—not to the analysis of whether an unusual Rule 103 protective order is warranted.” Order, at pp. 4-5. (Citations omitted, but get them; this is where most would-be sealers come unglued).

And before my ultra-sophisticated readers jump in with FRE 404(b) objections, incidentally upbraiding me for not mentioning same, Judge Nega got the point.

“Of course, as petitioner emphasizes, the fact that Promoter conducted many illegal transactions does not necessarily have anything to do with whether petitioner’s transactions complied with all relevant laws and does not control the tax implications of petitioner’s transactions.” Order, at p. 2.

Taishoff says watch the fallout from the SCEs, as those enmeshed therein bring on similar motions from blown-up Dixieland Boondockeries.

No, I’m not pitching a new cable TV reality show, although I’ll wager it could be a scream. No, here’s Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves scrapping a stip of facts on the eve of trial based on alleged facts not brought out at discovery. It’s Rule 91(e) on steroids; because IRS claims one (count it, one) sentence out of 40 ( count ’em, 40) paragraphs doesn’t tell the whole story, the whole new stip must be ready by next Friday, while trial starts Monday.

The case is Brown Bridge Newton 53, LLC, Brown Bridge 53 Manager, LLC, Tax Matters Partner,Docket No. 21274-21, filed 2/20/26.

The now-discarded stip said 53 got the property from a trust. IRS says it got other documents showing that one Jeff Grant (not my former boss, Baptist preacher, and self-help guru) got the property from the trust and conveyed it to 53.

So IRS asked 53 to elucidate, which they didn’t. IRS then asks to be relieved, to which 53 says IRS showed no grounds for relief.

Judge Tag Greaves says oh yes, IRS did.

“We have broad discretion in determining when justice requires that a stipulation be set aside. We have previously held that justice requires setting aside a stipulation when the evidence is contrary to the stipulation. Justice requires that we strike the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts and relieve respondent of this stipulation under Rule 91(e). The evidence set forth by respondent casts doubt as to whether [53] “acquired” the property from the … Trust, or whether the transaction should be viewed as a contribution from Jeff Grant. At the time that the parties stipulated to paragraph 40, respondent did not have in his possession the recently obtained evidence from third parties. Petitioners do not allege any prejudice resulting from striking this stipulation. As such, it would be unjust to hold respondent to a stipulation based on incomplete evidence. Instead, we will allow the parties to present their competing theories of the transaction at trial. Therefore, we will grant respondent relief from the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts. However, we will hold respondent to the second sentence of paragraph 40, which stipulates to the recorded deed.” Order, at p. 3. (Citations and name omitted).

Taishoff says why toss the whole thing for one sentence? Deem the sentence “impertinent,” use a Rule 52 Motion to Strike, and go on with the trial.

“The thing everybody knows cannot be proved too often.”

I can’t find the source just now, but I think it was Shaw’s music criticism. If any reader can help me, please comment below.

Howbeit, Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins sets the parties right by giving them a chance to think over their claim that their settlement agreement moots their deficiency case in Estate of Kevin N. Kalkhoven, Deceased, Kimberly Kalkhoven, Executor, Docket No. 31338-21, filed 2/20/26.

“… the parties filed a Motion to Dismiss on Ground of Mootness (Doc. 37). In the motion, the parties state that they have entered into a closing agreement, and that ‘there remains no dispute between the parties.’ … the Court issued an Order (Doc. 39) holding the Motion to Dismiss on Ground of Mootness in abeyance and directing the parties to file a status report.” Order, at p. 1.

Yes, Section 7121(b) means what it says. Absent fraud or malfeasance, closing agreements are final and courts have nothing more to say.

Except.

Section 7459(d) also means what it says. Dismissing a petition otherwise than for want of jurisdiction means entering decision in the amount stated in the SND.

Whereupon, the parties confabulate and “(I)n the Status Report, the parties state that they ‘have agreed that the Court should deny the joint Motion to Dismiss and that a decision consistent with the Closing Agreement should be entered into this case.'” Order, at p. 1.

They also ask for 45 (count ’em, 45) days to submit the proposed stiped decision, and get it.

A Taishoff “Well Played” to Judge Jenkins.

Taishoff says I thought maybe the petitioner was self-represented, and maybe the IRS had the rookies on this case. A quick docket search proved me wrong. The petitioner was represented by as heavy a bunch hitters (hi, Judge Holmes) as can be found. The IRS team is hardly less illustrious.

The leader of the petitioner’s team has expressed what I wish I had been. “I have the good fortune to lead a group of tax lawyers who not only enjoy mastering the intricacies of the tax code, but who also communicate in plain English and look for practical ways to help clients achieve their objectives.”

Let all practitioners say “Amen!”

And remember, a good practitioner is always learning.