Candidates for Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda’s proposed hardy perennial Slaughter of the Innocents (see Proposed Rule 200(a)(3)(A)(ii), 5/26/26) will benefit from perusing Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes’ apportioning of Section 6015 by awarding complete relief to Amal H. Sleiman, without a single disrespected partitive genitive.

The case is Amal H. Sleiman, Petitioner and Chad Y. Sleiman, Intervenor, Docket No. 19155-24, filed 6/22/26 (Happy Palindrome Day!).

Turns out Chad is a bad lad, dishing out physical and mental abuse to Amal and minor offspring and loading up the marital domicile with 20 (count ’em, 20) guns, which Amal discovered when the ceiling collapsed. Transcript, at p. 11.

Though you cannot quote off-the-benchers, Judge Holmes unpacks both Section 6015(b) and Rev. Proc. 2013-34. Family practitioners should delve deep into the Rev. Proc., which Taishoff says will survive a Loper Bright attack, although none is raised here. Section 6015(e)(7) again provides cover for sworn testimony on the trial, as Appeals can take none, hence newly available. 

Also, the separation agreement between Amal and Chad gets in, though why that was unavailable at Exam, which concluded in the same month as the sep agreement was signed, and hence not in the admin record, is nowhere stated, Transcript, at p. 16. However, it does appear that Chad was pro se here as he tried on cross to beat up Amal to the point that Judge Holmes had to tell him to “shut up.” Transcript, at p.12.

I note the divorce proceedings between the Sleimans was hotly contested for eight (count ’em, eight) years, with legal fees to match, Transcript at pp. 14-15. With conceded tax due of $86K, I’m surprised neither side sought counsel here. 

See my blogpost “Remain Quietly at Home,” 6/19/23.

Unfortunately my nearest and dearest 14-year-old lives 1600 miles away, so I am unable to explain Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins’ order in GO Risk Management, Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 6/18/26. When it comes to such matters as ‘proprietary source code,’ “proprietary software architecture,’ ‘internal systems,’ or ‘raw simulation output data,'” Order, at p. 1, I must defer either to software engineers with advanced degrees or teenagers who were born with smartphones in their hands. I know none of the former.

This is the usual discovery joust in what appears to be another microcaptive dodge, wherein Judge Cracklin’ Jenkins manages to avoid both parties’ attempts to win their case at discovery.

Respondent first, with a subpoena that petitioner’s expert, whom I’ll call Mr. T., wants to quash..

“Mr. T’s response explains that he maintains and consults his proprietary databases in the anonymized format provided to respondent and does not consult the underlying documents, which consist of confidential nonparty documents. He explains that the discrepancies in the number of entries noted by respondent result from filtering of the produced database that he describes and that respondent could likewise filter to reach the same results. Mr. T also indicates that he does not retain or consider raw simulation data but that the outputs he obtained and considered could be generated using the inputs he describes with the database of information that he used and produced to respondent. Given respondent’s acknowledgements about the productions received from Mr. T and Mr. T’s explanations of how those relate to respondent’s request, the Court will not, at this juncture, order Mr. T to produce any further documents pursuant to the subpoena.” Order, at p. 2.

Now for petitioner’s move.

“In the Motion to Compel Discovery, petitioners request that respondent be compelled ‘to supplement the expert reports served in this matter pursuant to Tax Court Rule 143(g) and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and to produce the materials relied upon by Respondent’s experts in a reasonably usable and accessible format.’ The motion argues that respondent’s experts’ reports do not identify with reasonable specificity the materials supporting their opinions. It also argues that respondent’s production of documents considered by the experts does not provide reasonably usable access thereto, referring to an index provided by respondent. The response to the motion indicates that when the documents considered by respondent’s experts were first produced on April 10, 2026, prior to the April 13, 2026, deadline set pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order as modified by the order (Lead Case Doc. 163), dated March 20, 2026, they were produced on a hard drive, given that petitioners had not specified a format for production of electronically stored information. The response indicates that respondent re-produced the documents in a different manner requested by petitioners in May, that respondent has offered to reproduce them in another manner requested by petitioners if petitioners bear the costs of doing so, and that, given Rule 72(b)(3), respondent should not be required to reproduce them. The response also argues that the expert reports satisfy the requirements of Rule 143(g) by describing the facts and data considered, which do not require the point-by-point citations that it claims petitioners seek. Given the contents of respondent’s expert reports and the production that petitioners concede respondent has provided, this Court agrees with respondent that petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought by their motion.” Order, at p. 2.

Once again, the immortal words of Tom Hobbes in Ch. VIII of Leviathan come to mind: “When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so?”