I know, I know, I’ve said this is a nonpolitical blog more times than I can count or that my readers (however many there are, which is what the blogpost is about) can stand with equanimity.

But WordPress’ accounting for my subscribers puts me in mind of the unending claims about political elections, the particulars of which I am sure my readers have heard and read ad nauseum, and Bureau of Labor Statistics employment numbers revisions (ditto).

Two (count ’em, two) days ago the number stood at 368. Yesterday it was 338. Ostensibly, thirty (count ’em, thirty) of the subscribers to this my blog left en masse. I trust they gave the lamb the Exodus 12:8-10 treatment.

Today the number bounced back to 364. 

I have to laugh.

Justin Joseph Moore, T. C. Memo. 2026-85, filed 9/15/26, is another CDP from an NFTL over an IA. Judge Emin (“Eminent”) Toro conducted a trial to see if JJ had raised underlying liability at the CDP, thus triggering de novo review at Tax Court. Result is that merely stating that one doesn’t know if IRS’ balances due are correct is not sufficient; one must produce some evidence to challenge IRS’ records.

True, JJ had problems working out with IRS his correct balances due on his late-filed returns, which stalled the refinancing of his commercial real estate until the interest rate escalation put paid to his plans. And Medicaid fraudster tenants didn’t help. But the refinancing proceeds were going into the real estate and not to IRS, so the liens won’t be lifted. Every lien lift I’ve ever seen went the same way; IRS goes first.

Anyway, lien stays.

But the headline first written hereinabove at the head hereof (as my already contemplatIng their second Grey Goose Gibson colleagues would say) shows itself in a footnote.

“Finally, we note that Mr. Moore’s Opening Brief, which appears to have been drafted with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI), contains some troubling citation errors, including citations of pages that do not exist and citations of cases that do not support the propositions for which they are cited. For example, Mr. Moore’s Opening Brief cites page 1260 of Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006), but that case ends on page 1256 of the federal reporter. Additionally, the Opening Brief cites Mesa Oil for the proposition that “[t]he balancing test under § 6330(c)(3)(C) requires reasoned analysis reflecting meaningful consideration of relevant evidence.” Pet’r’s Br. 51. But Mesa Oil, 467 F.3d at 1256, does not discuss section 6330(c)(3)(C); instead, it analyzes the collateral order doctrine and dismisses an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Moore is reminded that, although the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure do not prohibit parties from using AI tools to help with preparing their cases, each party remains responsible for ensuring the accuracy of information submitted to the Court. See, e.g., Clinco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-16, at *6–8.” Order, at p. 10, footnote 3.

For the Clinco story, see my blogpost “The Phantom Citation,” 2/9/26.

That is the question for Judge Nega in Family Office Foundation, Inc, Docket No. 10779-23X, filed 9/15/26. This is a DJ reviewing IRS’ retroactive revocation under Rule 217. The Faily claims this is a recordruler, so no Branerton needed.

Family claims Section 7428 limits review to Administrative Record, and since no disupute about contents thereof, no need for any discovery. Family also claims no legal basis for Rule 217.

No, says Judge Nega. 

“There is a sound legal basis for Rule 217. That basis is section 7428. Congress directed that the Tax Court should take a leading role in developing the procedural rules used by courts with jurisdiction over cases arising under section 7428. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 285 (“’suggest[ing] that the district courts give special weight to Tax Court precedents developed in this area’). In fact, Congress chose the effective date of section 7428 in part to give this Court ‘an opportunity to establish any necessary rules and otherwise make administrative preparations.’ S. Rep. No. 94-938(I), at 590. Congress expected we would leverage our then-recent experience with section 7476 to promulgate rules tailored to the needs of section 7428, and for other courts to follow that example. S. Rep. No. 94-938(I), at 588 (1976). Rule 217 is the product of that direction. See Declaratory Judgments—Retirement Plans, Section 367 Exchanges, Exempt Organizations, Rule 217, 68 T.C. 1031, 1047–51 (1977). From the beginning, the Rule has drawn a sharp distinction between rejections and revocations.” Order, at p. 3.

Initial IRS qualification review is limited to applicant’s say-so. IRS doesn’t investigate what applicant says, only that they said the right stuff. But revocation is another story and is most often based on what applicant did (or didn’t do), not only what they said maybe years before. Plenty of fact questions here.

So discovery is in order. And Family can fight about what’s in the Administrative Record afterward.