Attorney-at-Law

AGREE TO AGREE

In Uncategorized on 04/16/2026 at 12:26

Rather than showing “a substantial ground for difference of opinion” on “a controlling question of law,” Judge Jeffrey S. (“Schwer”) Arbeit finds that Blair A. Battersby, et al., Docket No. 1356-23, filed 4/16/26, IRS’ counsel, and he all agree on what Section 1377(a)(2) says and means. The Battersbys only are arguing about how the statute applies to the stock swaps more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “Afecionados,” 4/2/26.

In short, whether there was a redemption, or a sale or gift, as between the Battersbys and their grantor(s) or grantor’s predecessor-in-interest, is not a matter that fits either 28 USC 1292(b) or 26 USC 7482(a)(2)(A). The CCA would have to scan the record, and they might as well do that after trial, as the caselaw says.

“As is clear from the Order [Doc. 116] and the parties’ own filings, the Court and the parties share the same understanding of section 1377(a)(2). There is simply no dispute of law, let alone the required ‘controlling question of law.’ See § 7482(a)(2)(A); Rule 193. We did not reject petitioners’ legal analysis; rather petitioners failed to raise any genuine dispute of material fact. Our Order is unambiguous and does not include a controlling question of law sufficient to satisfy the first requirement in section 7482(a)(2)(A) and Rule 193.” Order, at p. 3.

There’s plenty of somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent for those contemplating interlocutory Tax Court appeals. Download it for your memos of law files.

PUGSLEY’S CHILD

In Uncategorized on 04/15/2026 at 17:53

No, I do not mean an actual descendant of petitioner Henry G. Pugsley, whose appeal from a Section 6213(a) Tax Court toss of his petition was treated for a time as 11 Cir’s final word on Boechler, P. C. jurisdiction-vs-claim-processing dichotomy, until Allen. See my blogposts “Justified? – I’ll Say,” 12/5/25, and “11 Cir Has Spoken,” 2/11/26.

So as of this writing, the score in Boechler, P. C., v. Hallmark Rsch. Collective stands at three (CulpOquendo, and Buller) to one (Allen). 2 Cir, 3 Cir, and 6 Cir vs 11 Cir.

Unfortunately for Katharine Tarver and Pierre Tarver, Docket No. 6794-25, filed 4/15/26 (it’s That Day again), they’re Golsenized to 5 Cir.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones claims 5 Cir also has spoken, and the Tarvers are auf’d.

“This case is presumptively appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See § 7482(b)(1)(A). The Fifth Circuit has also held that the deficiency deadline is jurisdictional. See Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002); Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988). While the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have reached a different conclusion, contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024), we apply the precedent of the Fifth Circuit in this case, which has held that the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional, see Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970); see also Sanders, 161 T.C. at 119–20 (examining the Culp decision and continuing to treat the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable outside the Third Circuit). Accordingly, the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional and petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling in the instant case.” Order, at p. 4.

Taishoff says both cases cited by Judge CD Jones as 5 Cir’s definitive conclusion were decided a mere 34 (count ’em, 34) years before Boechler, P. C., in Keado and a mere 20 (count ’em, 20) years before in the case of RochelleKeado is mostly concerned with duplicate SNDs and the Anti-Injunction Act in USDC; never considers equitable tolling. Rochelle was 143 days late with his petition, the Tarvers a couple hours (hi, Judge Holmes) late. And Rochelle got exactly one (count it, one) paragraph of an opinion, never mentioning claim processing vs. jurisdiction.

 Would these cases survive a post-Boechler, P. C. assault launched on behalf of the Tarvers? Comment below; I read all comments.

Edited to add 4/16/26: IRS agreed to grant the Tarvers administratively all the relief they could have gotten with their proffered stiped decision. Hence there’s no ground for appeal. Oh well; wait till next time.

THE PASS RUESCH

In Uncategorized on 04/14/2026 at 20:41

I note Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern’s grant of summary J to IRS in Arelia Margarita Taveras, Docket No. 9233-25, filed 4/14/26, for want of anything better coming out of The Glasshouse in the City At War. I’m truly sorry for the petitioner, who threw away a worthwhile career for a compulsion. She does put up a fight, but only two (count ’em, two) of her seven (count ’em, seven) objections to IRS’ summary J motion survive the Ruesch/Garcia jurisdictional limit for passport grabs. And she loses those two.

Strange that the docket number doesn’t add the “P” for Section 7345s.

Arelia is thorough, but the barrier remains. Is there an assessment of a seriously delinquent tax debt? Yes. Validity thereof is to be tested in deficiency or CDP litigation, not passport grabs. She had her chances.

It’s a shame Arelia can no longer exercise her considerable abilities in her chosen profession.