No, not a new Texas poker sensation to separate you from your money. This is Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh’s advice to Gerald A. Beacom and Jean A. Beacom, GT. C. Memo. 2026-65, filed 8/11/26. The kerfuffle concerns an AMIT carryforward Gerald was taking that stretched back to 1999 or maybe sometime through 2005, he couldn’t recollect exactly; “understandably, given the passage of time)” says Judge C-Doug Pugh. T. C. Memo. 2025-65, at p. 2.

But that doesn’t help Gerald, even though he says he lost his old records in a flood.

“Petitioners defend their lack of documentation by claiming that IRS guidance requires taxpayers to retain prior year returns for a maximum of seven years. Internal Revenue Serv., Publication 17: Your Federal Income Tax 17–18 (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p17–2021.pdf (prescribing various periods for retaining records, including seven years for losses from worthless securities and bad debt deductions); see § 6511(b). They misread that guidance. It requires taxpayers to retain documentation supporting the items reported on a return for seven years. Petitioners should have maintained records supporting their claimed AMT credit for seven years from the date of the return on which they applied the credit, not seven years from the date of the return when they first paid the AMT. That is, petitioners were required to retain, as evidence of their eligibility for the AMT credit in tax year 2021, records (such as their prior returns) documenting the source of the AMT credit (and its prior utilization, if any) for seven years from 2021, not seven years from 1999 or 2000.” T. C. Memo. 2026-65, at p. 6. The flood took place years before 2021 (year at issue).

Oh, Boss Hoss, what sins are committed in thy name! Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins finds that what we thought was “settled law” was undone as the Boss Hoss leaves the stable after 2 Cir picked the issue preclusion lock.

And where better to encounter this latest resurgence of The Jersey Boys’ Greatest Hit, the Chai-Graev double, than in Annamalai Annamalai & Parvathi Sivanadiyan, Docket No. 2398-23L, filed 8/11/26, the latest episode in this eleven (count ’em, eleven) year blogfeast?

Ever since Warner Ent., Inc., we thought issue preclusion barred any Boss Hossery defense to a chop where liability had been litigated, deficiency and chops assessed, and decision was final. See my blogpost “How Now?” 8/22/22.

Seemed to touch all the bases: same parties and privies (that’s nonparties bound by participating parties), could have been raised and litigated at trial or in motion papers, no supervening change in law.

Except.

Boss Hossery has separate statutory requirements which an AO at Appeals has to fulfill at a CDP, whatever happened on a trial or summary J. So said 2 Cir in Besicorp. v. Com’r, No. 23-296 (6/29/26). 

“Most salient here, the Appeals Officer must also ‘obtain verification from the Secretary [of the Treasury] that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.’ Id. § 6330(c)(1). Only after satisfyingthese requirements and considering the arguments and evidence presented by the Service and the taxpayer may the Appeals Officer issue a ‘Notice of Determination’ upholding or rejecting the lien or proposed levy.” Besicorp, at p. 9. Whatever the parties pled or proved at trial or motion, the AO must find Boss Hossery de novo. 

Judge Cracklin’ Jenkins finds the record (this is obviously a CDP review) fails to show that Boss Hossery was raised or considered either in the order and decision or at the CDP from whose NOD Annamalai petitions. All the AO did when she found no Section 6761(b) sign-off in the file was get a memo from counsel that the order and decision precluded Boss Hossery. And in her and counsel’s defense, pre-Besicorp that was the law.

OK, so how now, this latest silt-stir?

“Given the state of the Administrative Record and the absence of any argument by respondent about the verification requirement, this Court does not conclude that the Second AO did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the levy with respect to the section 6663 penalty for the 2007 tax year despite not verifying compliance with section 6751(b). Unlike the Second Circuit…, however, this Court does not conclude that the Second AO’s failure to verify approval permits a conclusion that no approval was obtained. Accordingly, the Court will remand this case to Appeals for further review to determine whether the verification requirement can be met with respect to the 2007 tax year. If Appeals is not able to verify approval of the 2007 section 6663 penalty, respondent may fully address the import of that failure at that juncture.” Order, at p. 21. (Citation omitted).

This is Remand No. 2 in this case.

I can but again quote myself when I blogged Senior Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele) Holmes’ dissent in my blogpost “Stir, Baby, Stir – That Silt,” 12/20/17.

“Oh brother, says Judge Holmes, you tried to bring peace, but like a much more exalted Authority you have brought not peace, but a sword. Section 6751(b) is a statutory one-off, a hapax legomenon as that classicist Judge Lauber and that Master of Tohubohu Judge Holmes put it. It’s intended to keep lower-level RAs and Examination types from bludgeoning settlements out of terrified taxpayers by threatening chops.

“But it doesn’t work.”

Except, that is, to stall once more a twenty (count ‘;em twenty) year old Tax Court case.

I can think of few, if any, tactics that yield so much for so small an investment of time and effort. Before issue is joined, one should have as complete a picture of one’s client’s case as this imperfect world affords, and at least an inkling of the adversary’s likely lines of attack. Under Our Fair State’s Civil Practice Law & Rules, a statutory time limit for such motions is fixed, subject to judicial shortening. Rule 121(b) is broader, of course. Both hinge upon joinder (petition and answer served and filed).

As I’ve often said, summary J gives you discovery of what the judge thinks. It’s well to know if the lion will bite when you stick your little finger in its mouth, rather than your head.

Diversified Solutions Risk Management Inc, et al., Docket No. 16438-23, filed 8/10/26 is an attempt to reargue denied partial summary J, so it looks like wasted motion.

Except.

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins definitively shuts down two (count ’em, two) legal arguments, substantive due process (trying to collect same deficiencies from two commonly owned entities) and separable transaction, but leaves a third (common ownership) untouched because insufficiently explained in the motion. So here’s a blueprint for one’s post-trial memo; what to preserve for appeal and what to stress.

Finally, economic substance and economic reality must be left for trial. With trial coming up in a month, here is where to spend that precious trial prep.

I’ll always be a fan of summary J.