IRS finds that they can’t get rid of STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel so fast, as she retains jurisdiction in Thomas Shands, Docket No. 14483-23W, filed 11/10/26, at least through the remand she orders.

The administrative record hasn’t yet been filed (after all, the case is only three (count ’em, three) years old). IRS’ counsel, all three of them, say they are “unable to address petitioner’s allegations in this case based upon the existing administrative record and a remand may obviate the need for formal discovery by petitioner.” Order, at p. 3.

Of course, the remand saves the need for a petitioner’s motion to enlarge the administrative record by including relevant documents, the only substitute for discovery in a record-ruler.

Petitioner’s discovery demands are barred pending the post-remand supplemental determination.

To address petitioner’s claim that this is a stall, let the parties report in six months where they’ve gotten.

I note that STJ Publius Siegel avoids dealing with IRS’ claim that petitioner’s trusty attorney showed petitioner a document erroneously included in the truncated admin record that said trusty attorney promised would not be so shown, which trusty attorney denies.  I’m surprised, as I know trusty attorney’s firm, although not any of the attorneys on this case. Still, this shows the perils of claw backs; unringing bells can be hazardous to your case.

Taishoff says tactically a petitioner wants a quick remand; delay helps only a defendant, which is IRS. Relinquishment only means a motion to designate a judge later on, when petitioner runs out of patience. Better to keep with the judge you’ve got.

No, Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way isn’t embarking on a hunt for furbearers. Third-party subpoenads are grousing about IRS’ proposal to unseal a bunch exhibits (hi, Judge Holmes) that Judge Way had sealed in a pretrial Rule 130 protective order.

This is discovery kerfuffle no. 5 in the ongoing saga of Marc Worrall & Sue J. Worrall, et al., Docket No. 14793-22, filed 11/9/26.

Without deciding that what is contained in the documents he keeps sealed is in fact worthy of confidentiality, hence sealing, Judge Way finds that “(T)he fact that portions of some of these Exhibits were discussed during the trial does not, by itself, justify unsealing those Exhibits in their entirety. Some such Exhibits consist of spreadsheets containing many tabs of data that were not discussed during the trial.” Order, at p. 3. So letting a paw or two out of the bag doesn’t release the cat.

So the parties (and nonparties) can make separate motions to seal or unseal each document.

To begin with, I do not know the facts and circumstances that led to the trusty attorney for Linda S. Bienstock, Docket No. 11167-26S, filed 11/6/26, being admonished by Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda that said trusty attorney “will not be associated with this case until an entry of appearance is filed in accordance with Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.” Order, at p. 1.

A brief DAWSON search reveals said trusty attorney has been admitted to the Tax Court Bar for fifty (count ’em, fifty) years. A search of Our Fair State’s Office of Court Administration website shows said trusty attorney to be a member of a well-known firm located on a Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America adjacent to the Minor Outlying Island whereon I am writing these lines.

I cannot think the nonfiling of the Form 7 is thus a rookie error. More likely it is a case of “beat the clock,” the last-minute efiling as the Section 6213(a) 90-day window expired. As the petition was filed 11/2/26, I would expect that said trusty attorney, having beaten the clock, thought he could take a breath and prepare and file the proper documentation later this week, having put out whatever other fires he had burning on Monday.

Tax Court procedure relies so heavily upon public orders that a phonecall or an email from one of Chief Clerk Jeane’s minions to said trusty attorney, along the lines of “hey, guy, file an EoA, OK?” is out of the question.

Taishoff asks whether scarce judicial resources cannot better be employed.