I’ve been chronicling Tax Court’s fighting retreat from Boechler in deficiency cases, sticking to Sanders and Hallmark Rsch. Collective even as 2 Cir. crumbles to Buller, 3 Cir caves first with Culp, and 6 Cir collapses with Oquendo. Of course, the Supremes gave cert. den. to Culp, so anyone lifting their eyes to those hills will find that from thence cometh no salvation.

Now Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda, with the determination of the famed Australian militiamen defending the Kokoda Track, scheduling all those defeats yet stoutly refusing to retreat an inch, sends off Francene Elizabeth Stewart, Docket No. 15421-25, filed 2/13/25, for being a day late and more than a dollar short. Her petition was due by 6:00 EST, 11/10/25, but wasn’t efiled until 9:30 p.m. EST, 11/11/25.

“In her Objection to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction… petitioner argues that “the delay in filing was caused by extraordinary circumstances during a federal government shutdown, which created confusion regarding filing obligations,’ and that the principles of the Court’s opinion in Guralnik v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 230 (2016), should apply in this case. We disagree. As petitioner herself concedes in her Objection, the Clerk’s Office remained open for eFiling and paper filing during the federal government shutdown that occurred from October 1, 2025, through November 12, 2025. And the Court’s records show that our electronic filing and case management system, DAWSON (Docket Access Within a Secure Online Network)—which petitioner used to file the Petition in this case—was operational at all relevant times. Because the Clerk’s Office was accessible throughout the federal government shutdown, Guralnik has no application here.” Order, at p. 2.

For the story of Felix Guralnik, see my blogpost “Neither Equity Nor Designation,” 6/2/16. Note Guralnik was a pre-Boechler CDP NOD case, which Boechler would clearly have saved. 

Since Francene is Golsenized to 11 Cir, Ch J Scholar Pat points to Pugsley to support the jurisdictional bar in Section 6213(a), but Taishoff says see my blogpost “‘Justified’? – I’ll Say!” 12/5/25. The reference in Pugsley to Section 6213(a) was a throwaway, without any discussion of claims-processing-vs-jurisdiction, decided years before Boechler. While the last thing I ever want to do is stir up litigation, someone should take a trip to 11 Cir from a Tax Court deficiency jurisdictional shoot-down (with sympathetic facts, of course) and see what 11 Cir does with Pugsley now.

Anyway, fairness and equity are off the table. If you’re on the wrong side of a State line.

“Petitioner also argues that ‘equity and fairness warrant treating the petition as timely filed.’ To the extent this is an argument that the filing deadline set forth in section 6213(a) for deficiency cases is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling, we also disagree.” Order, at p. 2.

Beveled Edge Insurance Company, Inc., et al., Docket No. 19821-16, filed 2/12/26, is lead petitioner in 14 (count ’em, 14) microcaptive deficiency cases. The owners of this corporate squadron want summary J that the micros, organized under the laws of KY, are separate entities for tax purposes. They cite Moline Props., 319 U.S. 436 (1943).

OK, says Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern, but that’s only half the question here. Corporations are separate entities when they satisfy the statutory minimum requirements to become an insurance company under its State of incorporation. That that is especially so when the corporation is not a wholly-owned subsidiary of the insured.

“… respondent does not dispute that [the Corps] were validly formed under Kentucky law. Respondent objects to the Motion on the grounds that there remain genuine disputes as to whether the three corporations satisfy the conditions for—and avoid the exceptions from—application of the general rule of Moline Properties (that separate entities will be respected for tax purposes). Respondent points out that petitioners exclusive list of material facts fails to address the business purposes or continuing business activities of the three corporations, nor does it aver facts to conclude that the corporate forms should not be disregarded because sham or unreal. See Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39.

“Respondent is correct. Petitioners have failed to address facts that are material if we are to rule that the [each of the Corps]’ respective status as separate state-law entities is to be disregarded for federal tax purposes. For that reason, we will deny the Motion.” Order, at p.6. (Footnote omitted).

Here’s the missing footnote: “In passing, we observe that we do not see the purpose of respondent’s objection that [two of the Corps] be considered separate entities for federal tax purposes. Respondent has determined deficiencies in each’s income tax for [year at issue], which determinations would seem in jeopardy if the entity status of the corporations were disregarded for federal tax purposes.” Order, at p. 6, footnote 5.

A corporation can be separate and have a separate deficiency, but if it is a sham the deficiency will rebound on the owners.

The old cliché of the shoemaker’s children going shoeless should be retired on account of age. But when a tax preparer gets chopped for fraud like Jack Goodwill-Oikerhe, T. C. Memo. 2026-18, filed 2/11/26, maybe it’s the clients who are the real targets.

Judge Nega’s 37 (count ’em, 37) pages of prose tell the story, so I won’t cut-and-paste or paraphrase, except for his peroration. 

“Petitioner is a well-educated businessman and an experienced tax return preparer, and yet he significantly overstated the deductions to which he was entitled on his and [Sub S]’s returns for each of the years in issue. During the examination, he required RA C to summon his bank records, failed to provide promised documents and meetings, and ultimately provided RA C with only minimal documentation to support the claimed deductions. And during trial petitioner provided the Court with no documentation or other corroborating evidence at all with respect to his testimony.

“Petitioner also made implausible and inconsistent statements throughout the course of the examination and trial, as repeatedly demonstrated throughout our analysis of the disputed deductions…, including statements surrounding his employee business expenses that were refuted. And we have found incredible his assertions that whatever books and records he did maintain were destroyed in a flood or absconded with by RA C.” T. C. Memo. 2026-18, at p. 36. (Name and citations omitted).

I wonder how many of the 700 returns that Jack prepared for his cash-paying customers, and how many thereof he signed as preparer, over a three-year span (see T. C. Memo. 2026-18, at p. 5) were of the same quality as the returns he prepared for himself and his Sub S. IRS might want to get a list from Jack, and audit a few those returns (hi, Judge Holmes).