It’s been a long time since I beat my tin drum for lawyers to be required to pass the Tax Court admission exam, s/a/k/a The Slaughter of the Innocents. And now I’m a retired lawyer, it can well be objected that it’s none of my business. But it is the nature of the journalist that everything is our business. So I’m using  Eric Deters & Mary Deters, Docket No. 19882-24, filed 7/27/26, to illustrate my pioint yet again, although petitioners are not represented by counsel.

According to Judge Eliabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland, “(T)he record does not clearly state Eric Deters’s relationship with Deters Law, but he was previously a practicing attorney, and the law firm may be associated with that prior occupation.” Order, at p. 3, footnote 3. Hence Eric could formerly, had he so chosen, been automatically admitted to practice in US Tax Court. 

Judge Tex Copeland’s Order is fact-bound and offers no new insights. It does thoroughly canvass Tax Court precedent on “reasonable possibility of recovery” as a criterion for fixing the date of a theft loss, an essential of establishing the deduction. And her opinion details almost every nail in the Section 6751(b) Boss Hoss discovery coffin (which by now is more nail than coffin). 

Moreover, Eric settles his theft lawsuit with a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, under which he receives a very substantial payout, just four (count ’em, four) months before he files the 1040MFJ for the previous year, in which he claims the loss.

AFAIK, this is Eric’s sole appearance in Tax Court, he represented himself, and no longer practices law. So this is not about Eric. It’s about why Tax Court practice isn’t like the litigation we’re all accustomed to. It’s about why a level of competence other than our general level is needed, and should be demonstrated, to protect the public. 

The English Lord Chief Justice Campbell wrote in 1850: “There is nothing so dangerous as for one not of the craft to tamper with our freemasonry.” 

Ferroglobe USA, Inc., and Subsidiaries, Docket No.6259-25, filed 7/24/26, is another Section 41 increased research activities credit case. Here IRS applies the standard counterattack, the Section 41(b)(2)(A)(i) “wages paid or incurred to an employee for qualified services performed by such employee.” IRS says “show which employee, what services, and how much”; the magic phrase is “how much for qualified services.”

The Ferroglobers, like all or almost all employers, never had employees keep timesheets on what they were doing specifically, hence only had gross wages. Hence they replied to IRS’ interrogs (after sidestepping Branerton) with “no timesheets.” Judge Ingenuity Buch holds that to be a Rule 71(b) “not reasonably ascertainable” response. So the Ferroglobers can’t introduce post event, ballpark estimates of who did what and were paid how much for what on the trial.

“According to petitioner, its own records would not allow it to dissect the wages as requested. Therefore, if the Court would prohibit it from introducing at trial any evidence showing such a dissection, it would not be a burden on petitioner. Thus, we will grant the Commissioner’s Motion in that, if petitioner attempts to introduce at trial information showing that this response was incomplete or evasive, we will exclude such information. Petitioner should have no quarrel with this because according to petitioner, it did not maintain records from which to ascertain this information.” Order, at p. 3.

But the Ferroglobers did have some employee wage records, by job title.

“…petitioner’s own response belies, at least in part, its contention that it ‘did not maintain timekeeping records showing exactly which employee worked on each project nor the amount of time those employees spent performing services on each project. Petitioner states that it maintained records by job title. Petitioner further states that some job titles only had one employee. But nowhere in the information provided to the Court did petitioner identify those job titles for which there was only one employee. Providing this information would be at least partially responsive to the Commissioner’s interrogatory. We will order petitioner to supplement its response.” Order, at p. 3.

Taishoff says, is IRS sure it wants that information? BoP is on the Ferroglobers. Anything that proves amount of wages paid for qualified work only substantiates the amount of the credit, or at least opens a Cohan door. Isn’t it better to let the denial of substantiation stand?

Maybe IRS should call time out.

Well, practitioner, you’ve come to the right place, because Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves can give you one prêt à porter if you intone or inscribe the magic language indited by Amy Sanders, Esq., Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary of Avient Corporation and Subsidiaries, Docket No. 2890-25, filed 7/23/26.

And to save y’all the trouble of looking it up and typing, here it is to cut-and-paste at no extra charge.

“Ms. Sanders avers that petitioner maintains stringent protections for confidential information and has undertaken significant efforts to prevent the disclosure of competitive information, trade secrets, and proprietary information. The declaration further states that records relating to the activities of petitioner’s Board of Directors are strictly confidential and are subject to multiple layers of safeguards to prevent disclosure. Finally, the declaration explains that disclosure of petitioner’s board materials, strategic business information, merger and acquisition analyses, financial and market analyses, trade secrets, third-party agreements, and confidential human resources data would provide competitors with a competitive advantage and would cause irreparable harm to petitioner.” Order, at p. 1. 

Judge Tag Greaves, ever mindful of his Senate confirmation promise to “make every effort to balance the need to help these taxpayers understand the court’s rules and procedures with my duty to remain independent and impartial,” gives Amy and the Avients the green light.

“After careful review of the declaration submitted in support of petitioner’s motion, we conclude that petitioner has established good cause for protecting the categories of information identified in the proposed discovery protective order. Petitioner has established through competent declaration testimony that disclosure of its proprietary information could result in competitive and economic harm.” Order, at p. 2. Good job, Amy.

There follows seven (count ’em, seven) pages of a total Rule 103 blitz.