Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes doesn’t disrespect a single partitive genitive in Drake Johnson, Docket No. 10265-25L, filed 10/8/26. What he does, is to cut the usual three-page toss of a petitioned CDP down to a page.

The usual toss order goes into the history of Sections 6320 and 6330, de novo vs abuse of discretion, a procedural history of the case, and the fact that petitioner never submitted a complete Form 433-A or B and backups for the requested CA. Then follows the boilerplate copious citation of precedent.

Judge Holmes does as is first hereinabove written at the head hereof, as my expensive colleagues say.

“The only issue is this rejection of Mr. Johnson’s request for a collection alternative. When the amount of tax liability is not at issue, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. This means that we look to see if the Commissioner’s decision was based on an error of law or rested on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or whether he ruled irrationally. 

“We also review only the reasons given by the IRS in its notice of determination, not new reasons made for the first time on appeal. In other words, we follow Chenery.

“We have to conclude that the Appeals officer didn’t abuse his discretion in rejecting this request because Mr. Johnson did not submit supplemental financial information that the Appeals officer reasonably requested.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted, but they’re the usual ones). 

It’s been three years and more since I last quoted the ancient Japanese proverb: “The word once spoken, not even the Emperor’s horsemen can return” in this my blog. But I used it just the other day, responding to an appeal from a petitioner whose case I’d blogged nearly three (count ’em, three) months ago. He found that his case had brought him notoriety in the trade press and blogosphere before he stumbled upon my humble effort. He’d asked the more prominent tax journalists to temper their previous blasts to the shorn lamb and hoped I would do likewise.

I did, a little, but quoted the above-cited aforementioned wisdom. Or as we Westerners put it, ya can’t unring a bell.

That set me to wondering. How many practitioners put in their Tax Court litigation engagement (or retainer) agreements that all proceedings are public, with the very circumscribed Section 7461, Section 6103, Rule 27, and Rule 345 exceptions? How many such agreements do not state that counsel has no control over what the Court may make public or what the trade press/blogosphere/lurkers/random commentators may say or publish, or the effects thereof? And the clients should consider before the proceeding is commenced that there may be presently unforeseeable effects from the public nature of such a proceeding?

Sometimes the failing of the Emperor’s horsemen can have a worse effect than the hoofprint of the Boss Hoss.

I am sure Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland, Texas CPA for more than thirty-five (count ’em, thirty-five) years and three-time San Antonio Tax Lawyer of the Year, would not consider the documentation submitted on the trial by Andrew B. West, T. C. Memo. 2026-105, filed 10/7/26, an example of the best Texas accounting. Andy B was a TX domiciliary in years at issue and pro se on the trial.

Fortunately, the task of unscrambling the post-trial document dump (mostly ignored except to show what petitioner was contending)  and erratic trial testimony fell to Judge David Gustafson, who was apparently so deeply down this rabbit hole that he called the SND a NOD, confusing me also.

Read for yourself the unscrambling of this undigested frittata. Andy B does get a trifle greater deduction than IRS would allow, but the unreported income stays. 

Judge Gustafson does write an essay on the proper preparation and use of spreadsheets in post-trial briefing.

“In principle we heartily approve of the use of such spreadsheets in a brief to present evidence taken from voluminous exhibits. In fact, at the conclusion of trial, we suggested spreadsheets, warning Mr. West that his exhibits—almost 2,000 pages showing thousands of photocopied checks, invoices, and the like—were of such volume and apparent disorganization that, by themselves and without explication by him, they would be insufficient to prove his case. We emphasized that, for every specific fact that Mr. West wanted us to find, he should point either to a page and line of transcript or to an exhibit that proves the fact. We suggested that he could undertake to support his claimed deductions by preparing and attaching to his opening brief a spreadsheet for each category of deduction for each year. We explained that a given spreadsheet should point to where in the record we could find, for each deductible amount, evidence that substantiates the nature and amount of that expenditure with citations of the exhibit numbers, Bates numbers, and testimony that was given on that subject. We noted that while it might sometimes be appropriate to deal with some expenses in bulk, the citations of individual expenditures would be essential to his prevailing.” T. C. Memo 2026-105, at p. 22, footnote 19.

Alas, “Mr. West followed our suggestion imperfectly.” Idem.

“Stuff happens” has become a cliché, although the precise phraseology often used has no place in a blog intended for reading around the family dinner table. Judge Benjamin A. (“Trey”) Guider, III, has a checklist (not in tabular form) for such mishaps in Simon Gradisnik & Marcia Pena Gradisnik, et al., Docket No. 3262-22, filed10/6/26.

With trial set for 10/19/26, long-time trusty attorney has medical issue. Si & Marcia try to file timely motion for continuance thirty-two (count ’em, thirty-two) days out (see Rule 133, penultimate sentence), but allege they “experienced issues with the United States Postal Service.” Order, at p. 1. 

You’re not alone, guys, I have a prescription refill sent eight (count ’em, eight) days from NJ and addressed to me at this Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of N. America, which this morning is sitting at a USPS distribution center in Fargo, ND. Don’t ask. Anyway, FedEx to the rescue.

Judge Trey Guider, III, is sympathetic, even though IRS says the parties haven’t yet begun the stipulation process. And this is the fourth continuance since consolidation.

So continuance (that’s adjournment for you State courtiers) granted.

Except.

Report by trial date plus ten whether and when petitioners’ counsel will resume work on these cases or whether petitioners intend to retain new counsel or proceed pro se, and describe petitioners’ plan to begin, or their efforts regarding, the stipulation process with respondent.

In short, get counsel, old or new, on board or go it alone, and hit the bedrock of Tax Court practice, the stips.

In this case, Taishoff says it helps that trusty attorney is an old-timer with 49 (count ’em, 49) years of experience at the Tax Court Bar.

Two (count ’em, two) gifts that keep on giving, Raju J. Mukhi, Docket No. 4329-22L, filed 10/5/26, making his fifth appearance in this my blog, and Section 6751(b) Boss Hossery, that hardy perennial, meet before Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler.

Raju is fighting about Appeals’ verification that Exam properly Boss Hossed the chops bestowed upon him, and whether the RA at Exam had indeed done so. “We see these as two separate issues.” Order, at p. 2. Note the RA may have done it right, but the AO may have blown verification.

Raju’s trusted (and trusty) advocates and litigators object to IRS’ motion to remand to Appeals, claiming it will delay the January trial.

Isn’t remand supposed to give the taxpayer a chance to fill in whatever was left out the first time around, and to supplement the record for judicial review?

Yss, but.

“Generally, we remand a case to the Appeals Office when a taxpayer did not receive a proper hearing, and the new hearing is necessary or will be productive. The resulting section 6330 hearing on remand is not a new hearing, but rather ‘provides the parties with the opportunity to complete the initial section 6330 hearing while preserving the taxpayer’s right to receive judicial review of the ultimate administrative determination.’. As noted earlier, we have remanded a case to the Appeals Office to clarify the record regarding an officer’s determination that a notice of deficiency was properly mailed.” Order, at p. 2. (Citations omitted).

Nevertheless, Judge Speedy Weiler, true to his cognomen, tells the parties to get ‘er done before the trial date.

Misquoting Rudy Kipling’s famous footslog, Ronald Michael Henke & Elizabeth Henke, Docket No. 27610-22L, filed 10/2/26, find out the bad news from Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way. I note the tax years here because they matter.

“The Court agrees with respondent that AO M did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the liabilities for tax years 2007, 2015, and 2016 could still be collected. The liabilities for tax years 2015 and 2016 that remain at issue constitute priority tax claims within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and such priority taxes generally are not discharged in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). The liability for tax year 2007 was an assessment made based on a substitute return prepared by the Commissioner pursuant to section 6020(b) and is excepted from bankruptcy discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i). Moreover, by failing to respond to the Motion or appear at the trial session, petitioners have abandoned any argument that AO Matthews abused his discretion in concluding that the liabilities for tax years 2007, 2015, and 2016 remain at issue.” Order, at p. 7. (Name omitted).

Note petitioners petitioned in bankruptcy (Ch 7) 4/30/18, triggering the 11 USC §507(a)(8)(A)(i) three-year lockout. The SFR (not filed by petitioners) for 2007) opens the 11 USC §523(a)(1)(A) door.

Yeah, I know Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda has to send off Parliament House of Augusta, Inc,, Docket No. 6410-26S, filed 10/2/26, notwithstanding its pathetic plea that IRS has thoroughly scrambled its Section 941s and garnished its account because IRS can’t read or add. And Letter 4384C isn’t a NOD or SND, so pore l’il ol’ Tax Court, trammeled in Congressional swaddling clothes and leading strings, can only help in a matter bounded and described in the boilerplate laundry list in the hereinabove aforesaid order set forth, as my expensive unretired colleagues would say.

But please permit this beaten-up, beaten-down, battered single-shingle oldtimer the dubious luxury of second-guessxing the august Chief Judge of the equally august Unitd States Tax Court.

Instead of just suggesting the Parliament work with IRS, why not suggest a wee word with Erin M. (“Erinys”) Collins or one of her trusty minions at the Taxpayer Advocate Service? 

Even if the path less traveled guides not to salvation, it might afford Parliament a glimmer of hope.

William M. Scott, T. C. Memo. 2026-104, filed 10/1/26, claims a Section 7623(b) blow award because he tipped off IRS that a private prison company’s tax-exempt bonds were bogus. IRS checked out the bonds, concluded they weren’t properly tax-exempt, and settled.

Company paid nothing but called in the bonds and issued replacements that were taxable. IRS agreed not to look for back taxes for the eleven (count ’em, eleven) years the dubious bonds had paid out. The Ogden Sunseteers bounced William’s claim, saying the collected nothing. William says IRS will collect a bundle going forward, wants discovery, and claims Ogden’s bounce constitutes a new issue shifting BoP.

Nope, says Judge Benjamin A. (“Trey”) Guider, III, only much more elegantly.

The “new” explanation only fleshes out the expressed rationale. The bondholders got the tax break; the Target was the prison company, which got none. Collecting from the Bondholders going forward would require monitoring a large, shifting population for many years, some of whom might be tax-exempt or have offsets like NOLs themselves, obviously infeasible.

Shands and Lissack say merely pointing out a Target isn’t enough, even if IRS collects. Blower must home in on the specific grounds whereunder IRS collects. And Targets who straighten up and fly right before IRS takes enforcement action don’t entitle blowers to an award. 

Going against the Bondholders isn’t a “related action” within the meaning of Reg. Section 301.7623-2(c)(1)(ii) and (iii); “Even assuming an IRS Operating Division were to investigate and discover the identity of the Bondholders and determine the taxes they have paid or will pay, the identities of the Bondholders would not be found without the Operating Division’s having to independently obtain additional information beyond that provided by petitioner.” T. C. Memo. 2026-104, at p. 16. Taishoff says that assumes the deal between IRS and Bondholders exonerating previous years doesn’t include the Bondholders as third-party beneficiaries to that extent.

Mr. Scott wants to see the trust indenture for the new bonds because IRS mentioned it. Not enough, says Judge Try Guider. The Administrative Record need include only what IRS relied upon, not something mentioned for its mere existence and no more. 

No payout for Mr. Scott as the company slipped its surly bonds.