It’s such a cliché, but this is one on which I am prepared to wager an ale or two at Jake’s Saloon that you can’t make this stuff up. But let Judge Nega tell the story of Rosie K. Boparai, Docket No. 7789-25, filed 6/30/26.

“Petitioner’s tax return for 2019 was due (after the granting of an extension) on October 15, 2020. Petitioner did not file her 2019 return by that date. 

“On July 17, 2023, petitioner appeared in person at the Sacramento Taxpayer Assistance Center and attempted to hand-deliver her 2019 tax return. Respondent’s employees refused to accept her hand-delivered return without petitioner having first made an appointment for that purpose. That same day, petitioner sent an envelope containing her 2019 return that requested a refund and a check for $10,000 by certified mail to a no-longer-operated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) P.O. Box in San Francisco, California. She included the check despite claiming a refund on the return because she believed that the inclusion of a check would speed up the processing of the return.” Order, at p. 1.

Of course Section 7502 doesn’t help, because the mailpiece was misaddressed.  See Section 7502(a)(2)(B); see also Reg Section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(i). Had Rosie filed properly in 2023, she would have gotten the refund (IRS conceded the deficiency). The 2019 1040 instructions said for overdue returns, use the latest address, and the SF PO Box wasn’t it. 

“Had she consulted the instructions for tax year 2019 with the degree of detail that she claims, she would have seen the directive instructing her to refer to the tax year 2022 instructions to find the proper address for mailing her return.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

PS- IRS finally got Rosie’s return last May.

Two Sum. Ops., but each has a twist.

Gregory A. Rodrigues, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-4, filed 6/29/26, is the usual story of insufficiently-documented Section 274 travel, meals, and entertainment expenses for his real estate operations with his Harvard B-School buddies.  

CSTJ Zachary S. (“High Rise”) Fried: “The trips included travel with petitioner’s business school friends and with Ms. George, with whom petitioner shares a residence and a child. Although petitioner maintains that Ms. George accompanied him in her capacity as his attorney, the record contains no documentary evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and under the circumstances, we reject that assertion.” T. C. Sum. Op. 4, at p. 7. 

Seems the reverse of the usual situation.

He does get a grand or two of business expenses.

Edmund Ha, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, filed 6/29/26, is an even greater traveler, but his fiduciary duty to his clients (he’s a high-priced international broker) prevents him from doing the Section 274 number with his preparer.  This costs him deductions and chops.

But STJ Peter (“HB”) Panuthos bows to Cohan to allow Edmund his home office expense deduction.

“In support petitioner submitted a log, credit card statements, a floor plan of his apartment, and a receipt for eight rental payments at his home address…. 

“Petitioner’s log lists the expense, the amount, and the purpose of each item reported. Petitioner testified credibly as to his business as a real estate agent, and the Court is satisfied that petitioner operated exclusively out of his home, incurred the listed expenses, and that those expenses had a business purpose. Consequently, petitioner has provided sufficient evidence for the Court to rely on the Cohan rule to estimate petitioner’s home office expenses. 

“Accordingly, the Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to a deduction for his home office and related expenses.” T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, at p. 7.

It’s up to the Rule 155 beancount to see how heavily STJ Panuthos bears on Edmund for inexactitude of his own making.

Frantic Frank Wins One

IRS tried to levy on Joseph White, T. C. Memo. 2026-56, filed 6/29/26, for a Restitution-Based Assessment (RBA) north of $1.8 million.

Except.

Joe was (a) making all payments due currently on stiped decision in USDCEDPA which still has a year to run, and (b) Joe is represented by none other than The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys and barbecue king hisself, Frantic Frank Agostino, Esq. 

Joe hadn’t exactly been a model taxpayer. He hadn’t filed for nine (count ’em, nine) years, until his ex-wife’s trusty attorneys made him come clean (or at least try). He bounced a check for a subsequent year’s tax. At Appeals, his OIC was bounced, and his subsequent bankruptcy petition was tossed for bad faith. See T. C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 3-4.

When Joe contested the NITL IRS gave him five (count ’em, five) years later, the SO said RBA has nothing to do with tax owed. True, except the stiped decision in USDCEDPA said IRS would treat the RBA installments as tax paid and wouldn’t try to collect unless Joe defaulted. So Joe petitioned the NOD.

Except.

Of course Frantic Frank tried to wildcard in abatement of interest during COVID, but as he hadn’t raised it at Appeals, Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber calls it foul.

But Frantic Frank gets an RBI, 

“The DOJ settlement permitted petitioner to pay his … tax liabilities in regular monthly installments, with the last payment not due until July 2027. As of May 1, 2025, when Appeals upheld the levy, petitioner’s monthly payments had reduced his remaining balance … to $948,000. By sustaining a levy for $1,101,788, the SO would have allowed the IRS to collect petitioner’s entire remaining balance for those years (and then some) immediately, whereas the DOJ settlement entitled him to pay that balance in installments over the ensuing 27 months. By permitting acceleration of the payments in this way, the SO’s determination was fundamentally inconsistent with the DOJ settlement and with petitioner’s contract rights thereunder. It was therefore an abuse of discretion.” T C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 11-12.

IRS tries the “different liabilities” tack, but is thrown out at first.

“The restitution ordered by the sentencing court, $1.2 million, was identical in amount… to petitioner’s unpaid tax liabilities … as calculated by the attorneys in the criminal case and accepted by the court. The RBAs were concededly ‘distinct’ from the assessments the IRS made when receiving petitioner’s … tax returns: The two sets of assessments were made at different times using different procedures. But the RBAs were not separate from petitioner’s personal income tax liabilities …. They were identical to his personal income tax liabilities for those years, and they simply afforded the IRS a distinct mechanism for collecting those liabilities. The character of the RBAs as a collection mechanism is evident from the fact that any payment petitioner made against the RBAs would be credited toward his personal income tax liabilities ….

“What makes this case different from previous cases we have considered under section 6201(a)(4) is that, six years after the IRS made the RBAs, petitioner and the Government agreed to a different collection mechanism for his … tax liabilities, effected by the settlement of the collection suit. The United States thereby accepted $1.6 million as a compromise of petitioner’s aggregate … income tax liability and gave him the right to pay that liability in monthly installments ending in July 2027. By sustaining in May 2025 a levy issued to collect petitioner’s entire outstanding balance immediately, the SO acted in contravention of the contract DOJ and petitioner had executed.” T. C. 2026-56, at pp. 12-13.

Joe crosses the plate, and credit Frantic Frank with a Run Batted In and another oak leaf to his Taishoff “Good Job.”

Pro ses Gaetan Pelletier & Nancy J. Pelletier, Docket No. 3960-24, filed 6/29/26, employ that old coordinated-arms doctrine, firing off four (count ’em, four) motions for partial summary J, one of which Judge Benjamin A. (“Trey”) Guider, III, recharacterizes as a motion to shift BoP, and one to require discovery responses.

While all get shot down, they all point Gaetan & Nancy to where their problems of proof lie, and what weight Judge Trey Guider is likely to accord each. 

Start with the basic rookie error, making formal discovery demands and then sending a Branerton letter. The attempted cure doesn’t work. However, “parties are still actively in the process of or will be negotiating a stipulation of facts,” Order, at p. 7, so maybe so might could be the formal demand woke up IRS’ counsel and moved things along faster than the three (count ’em, three) months it took IRS to respond to Motion One (Order, at p. 3).

Since deficiencies are tried de novo, the old mantra that what happened at Exam doesn’t count sinks Gaetan’s & Nancy’s limited argument that IRS hadn’t established an evidentiary basis for denying their claimed NOLs. BoP is still with petitioners; SNDs are presumed correct, the only exception being unreported income (not in play here\). Whatever Gaetan & Nancy claim IRS ignored they can still bring out at trial, but Judge Trey Guider finds what they submitted to support their motion doesn’t cut it.

That change in method of depreciation is a Section 481 change in method of accounting is well-established. Keeping the old method of accounting while changing method of depreciation doesn’t get around Reg. Section 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2)(a). That Gaetan & Nancy didn’t elect to change their method of accounting is irrelevant.

And if IRS stands mute on its basis for change in method and denial of NOLs, mox nix. “Respondent’s lack of explanation relating to the disallowance of the NOLs and his silence as to the amended returns petitioners submitted does not preclude him from litigating those issues. For that reason, we will deny petitioners’ fourth Motion for Partial Summary (sic)….” Order, at p. 6.

Having gotten a look at what Judge Trey Guider thinks of the case and where he thinks their problems are and how great, Gaetan & Nancy can work out strategy for trial or settlement.

Taishoff says these motions are time well spent.

It’s been quite a long-time mantra with me that a lawyer who can’t find an ambiguity should find another way of making a living. Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler surely can find an ambiguity with the best of them.

Carver Mountain Reserve, LLC, Carver Mountain Reserve IP, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 15761-24, filed 6/26/26, claims the TMP’s extensions of 3SOL are defective, because the second of the three (count ’em, three) successive extensions mentioned it was executed and delivered “For the pure purpose of appeal.” Order, at p. 2. Neither of the other two (count ’em, two) contained that phrase.

This is the second motion from Carver; the first was disposed of last month. See my blogpost “Five, Seven, Eight, Fourteen,” 5/8/26. 

Carver says the second extension “would only apply to matters proceeding to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.” Order, at p. 2. Hence the third doesn’t cover everything else.

No, says Judge Speedy Weiler. Carver didn’t raise 3SOL in its petition. 3SOL is an affirmative defense which petitioner must plead and prove; use it or lose it.

“It is the third set of Forms 872-P which extended the period of assessment to July 31, 2024, in each of these cases, and does not contain any such statement. Further, we determine the clause relied upon by petitioners and found in the second set of Forms 872-P to be ambiguous and not clearly intended to limit respondent’s authority to make a future assessment of federal income tax against the partnerships.” Order, at p. 3.

Leaving aside inartful drafting (didn’t you mean “solely to preserve petitioners’ right to appeal any determination, finding, order, or opinion adverse in whole or in part to petitioner, to any forum having or asserting jurisdiction, and to object to any assertion of claim preclusion or issue preclusion of any thereof in any other juridical or administrative proceeding”?), there’s plenty of ambiguity here.

Btw, isn’t there a typo at Order, at p. 3, third full paragraph, line 6? Don’t you mean “872-P,” and not “372-P”? 

Again I volunteer as proofreader.

No, he isn’t a partner other than the TMP who wants a last-minute intervention in IMCO Services Inc, Docket No. 7090-25L, filed 6/26/26; he was a Greek historian and Roman senator who died about 1800 years before Rule 248(b)(4) was promulgated. He appears in this my blog to highlight the extraordinary erudition of the Tax Court bench, specifically Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch, who explores the cutting of the Gordian knot as described by the late Arrian, and decides to pull the pin on the “flurry” of motions more particularly bounded and described in Order, at pp. 3-4, and their pendant replies, responses, and supporting documentation.

Ol’ Arrian’s story shows up in a footnote, Order, at p.1, footnote 1.

While the barrage and counterbarrage is going on, IMCO pays up.

A couple motions (hi, Judge Holmes) follow because IRS can’t confirm that IMCO in fact paid up, but ultimately Judge Ingenuity Buch is convinced that they did, invoking poor ol’ Jen Zuch to toss the petition for want of jurisdiction: no outstanding debt, no pending lien or levy, nothing for Tax Court to review.  IMCO wants to fight about interest during the COVID hiatus, but that’s been paid along with everything else.

Scholars Al and Pat have a worthy colleague in Judge Ingenuity Buch.

No, not another brilliant defensive move by the Champion New York Knickerbockers’ star Jalen Brunson (Party like it’s 1973!). Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh blocks shots by both IRS and Meta Platforms, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16081-25, filed 6/25/26.

IRS claims Meta underpaid for year at issue, and Meta claims they overpaid. Anyway, Meta claims IRS was charging them statutory (Section 6601(a)) interest for a period covered by a Federal disaster relief determination. IRS claims no jurisdiction per Section 7481(c), but Meta claims they overpaid and thus they’re owed interest, so Tax Court has jurisdiction.

Judge C-Doug Pugh says before assessment, Tax Court has no jurisdiction over statutory interest, and in this deficiency case we haven’t had a trial yet.

“Petitioner does not dispute our jurisdiction over statutory interest on underpayments but counters that it has invoked the Court’s overpayment jurisdiction in section 6512(b) as it alleges that respondent erred in denying a refund claim. It therefore reasons that it will be entitled to interest on any overpayment it made. And because overpayment interest is not included in the section 6601(e)(1) carve out from the definition of ‘tax’ then its interest claim should remain.” Order, at p. 2.

Negatory, good buddy, says Judge C-Doug Pugh.

“Only after our decision in this case is final, and the other conditions of section 7481 are met, will we have jurisdiction over the question of whether petitioner overpaid interest on an underpayment assessed by respondent or respondent underpaid interest on an overpayment refunded by respondent as a result of our decision. As we have not determined any deficiency or overpayment, respondent has not assessed any deficiency resulting from our determination (including statutory interest) and petitioner has not paid any deficiency (including statutory interest), or alternatively respondent has not refunded an overpayment with interest, we lack jurisdiction over the alleged error regarding computation of interest.” Order, at p. 2.

For readers unfamiliar with Kipling or G. M. Fraser, “bukh” is an Anglicized version of a Hindi word meaning to talk. In the Anglo-Indian, it takes on a further meaning of to expatiate, to provide Sir W. S. Gilbert’s “corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.”

Two of today’s cases show the necessity of the foregoing.

Liangguo Chi, Docket No. 17532-24L, filed 6/24/26, seeks “the following collection alternatives: an installment agreement, an offer-in-compromise, and a lien withdrawal.” Order, at p. 1. And Liangguo also says he has $4.5 million in equity in his assets, but the Federal tax lien makes it impossible for him to borrow to satisfy the $2.5 million in tax debt he owes.

Except.

Liangguo never provides documentation for any thereof despite being given ten (count ’em, ten) months to do so. Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves gives IRS summary J sustaining the lien.

Frederick Whigham, T. C. Memo. 2026-55, filed 6/24/26, tells a tale of illness and bereavement but fails to disclose where he puts his rental income and won’t realize on his equity, Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins finds Fred’s parsimony with facts and figures is enough to deny him relief from the levy he petitioned. 

The memory comes flooding back: “Dis-miss! Fall out!” The thud of hundreds of hard rubber boot soles hitting rough asphalt; perhaps a shout. The sun setting on red South Carolinas clay and scrub pine woods and faded cream-colored World War II barracks.

I am sure STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel is haunted by no such recollections. I am likewise sure she neither gave nor heard the aforementioned order nor the consequences thereof. But perhaps some archetypical collective memory has stirred the following in Eric Gile & Melinda Gile, Docket No. 7142-25S, filed 6/24/26 (Happy Palindrome Week!).

“ORDERED that so much of respondent’s motion that seeks to dismiss petitioner Eric Gile for lack of prosecution is granted, and he is so dismissed.” Order, at p. 1.

Don’t Tax Court petitions get dismissed, and not people? Can Tax Court give Eric get the Psalm 109:13 treatment? Might I most respectfully suggest the Order be rewritten as follows? “ORDERED that so much of respondent’s motion that seeks to dismiss the petition herein as to petitioner Eric Gile for lack of prosecution is granted, and all references in said petition to Eric Gile are stricken.”

Two petitioners who’ve been here before are back, but unlike Ol’ Blue Eyes, these fare no better the second time around.

First, Albert S.N. Hee and Wendy R. Hee, T. C. Memo. 2026-53, filed 6/23/26. It’s Al’s story, all about constructive dividends from Al’s telephone C Corp and subsidiaries that paid for his kids’ education, a couple trips to exotic locations (hi, Judge Holmes), a million-dollar house near his kids’ college, and a $1246 sport coat from Saks Fifth. Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler is all over that sport coat. Judge, so am I.

“Mr. Hee was invited to dinner with executives from Raytheon by his longtime college friend and business colleague, TP. Shortly before dinner Mr. Hee purchased a sport coat from Saks Fifth Avenue for $1,246 which he wore to the dinner. The cost of the sport coat was deducted by [C Corp] as an office expense at the direction of Mr. Hee.” T. C. Memo. 2026-53, at p. 11. (Name omitted). Doesn’t make the Section 162 ordinary-and-necessary cut, because you could wear it in the street.

All Al’s written-off largesse to self and family get shot down, with fraud chops at no extra charge. 

Charlton C. Tooke, III, T. C. Memo. 2026-54, filed 6/23/26, last here on Constitutional grounds (see my blogpost “Scrapbook, 1/29/25,” filed 1/29/25), now finds his OIC and PPIA bounced. His and former spouse’s medical problems and his current special-needs adoptee’s don’t impair Charlton’s ability to pony up the self-assesseds he owes. Giving $400K to a drug-addicted spouse, while Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones doesn’t expressly say so, might could be maybe so dissipated assets.