The frost is on the pumpkin on the mainland of Our Fair State, and with the approach of all-hallown summer, the battle-hardened preparer checks the updates on the software, sighs over the lazy, hazy, crazy days of summer now gone, and prepares for the wrath to come.

They will come, the sophisticates, the longtime clients meticulous to the point of OCD, dropping off thumbdrives PDF-ed to the gunnels with numbers and scanned backups all indexed; the little-envelopes-RedWeld types more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “The Shoebox-RedWeld System,” 12/8/21; and finally, the new clients, clearly referred by malevolent wellwishers, said newbies never having consulted practitioner until the day before the extension runs out and perform The Dump.

These last evoke a plaintive whimper as they depart, the practitioner reaching for acetonaphthone, naproxen sodium, or aspirin, whichever is handy.

Judge Joseph Nega describes The Dump, in the tones of one who has seen it as often as any practitioner, in an off-the-bencher, Robin D. Newton, Docket No. 37691-21, filed 10/19/26.

“Petitioner produced an assortment of receipts in support of her position, but appeared unaware of the amount of any deduction she was attempting to substantiate, let alone which of or how those receipts established entitlement thereof.” Transcript, at p. 9.

I often wonder if this my blog (and I, its “onlie begetter”) takes itself (and I myself) too seriously. I’ve been accused of making light of Tax Court litigants’ dilemmas, even if their wounds are self-inflicted and their errors unforced. I often make unasked-for comments on Tax Court Rules and procedures, with a certain Olympian (if not Sinaiatical) detachment.

So today, something on the lighter side.

Saul Steinberg’s immortal New Yorker magazine cover made fun of the insularity of us denizens of this Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America. I referred to it more than once under the rubric “Everything West of the Hudson is Kansas.”

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins is by no means insular. Judge Jenkins merely wants to get the mail to the proper destination in Hassine Sidane, 11877-25, filed 10/16/26.

With 30 (count ’em, 30) days to go before trial and an IRS motion for judgment on the pleadings awaiting reply from Hassine, “(P)etitioner has not filed a response to the motion and has not responded to attempted e-mail communication from the chambers administrator of the undersigned.” Order, at p. 1.

Default looms. But Judge Jenkins to the rescue.

“However, review of the record in this case indicates that petitioner’s address of record in this case is stated as in Dran Oran, rather than Oran Oran, as reflected in the address to which the Notice of Deficiency was mailed. Accordingly, the Court will update the address of record to be consistent with the latter, re-serve the relevant documents in this case, extend the time for petitioner to file a response, and set this case for hearing.” Order, at p. 1.

Apparently to IRS, everything east of Holtsville…but you know the rest.

There’s a need to provide a safe road to public filing of redacted Excel spreadsheets, heavy-laden with “metadata, formulas, hidden worksheets, hidden rows or columns, comments, notes, named ranges, pivot tables, cached values, document properties, external links, macros, filters, and other embedded workbook features.” So opines Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way at p. 4 of Marc Worrall & Sue J. Worrall, et al., Docket No. 14793-22, filed 10/15/26.

This is Discovery Kerfuffle No. 4 that I’ve blogged in this ongoing drama.

A fight over the filing of redacted trial exhibits arises from IRS’ attempt to do so, claiming it has obliterated any PII or other matter shielded by Judge Way’s previous protective order. Marc’s & Sue’s nine (count ’em, nine) trusty attorneys  object, citing the Excel spreadsheets’ backchannel porosities, trapdoors, and hidden interstices as hereinabove set forth.

So Judge Way sets up a phoneathon. 

“We agree with petitioners that respondent’s broad assurances that the exhibits have been properly redacted are insufficient to establish that confidential information does not remain accessible through metadata, formulas, or other embedded features. We are especially cautious where, as here, many of the exhibits are Excel workbooks with complex file structures spanning thousands of pages. We would have expected, at minimum, exhibit-by-exhibit descriptions of what information was removed and a technical certification describing the steps taken to remove it. Even so, risks remain.” Order, at p.3.

So tech-savvy Judge Way finds an Adobe-lined path that satisfies everyone, IRS, Marc & Sue, and the third-parties subpoenaed into this slugfest.

“The Court proposed that respondent instead convert the relevant portions of the Excel files to PDF format and perform his proposed redactions directly on the PDFs to avoid the risk that confidential information remains embedded in the file structure. Both parties agreed that this was a workable solution.” Order, at p. 3.

I know the native-format crowd will yell that villainous PDF digg’d out of exhibits all that backchannel stuff they so need to eyeball. But parties and third-parties can still scope the stuff in secret, and the data they see in secret will reward them.

No, not another microcaptivity dodge; this is STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel adding a gloss to the NY-NJ rivalry. Writing from a trial session on this Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of N. America, STJ Publius Siegel assures Bruce Ammerman, Docket No. 11069-25, filed 10/14/26, as to the status of his home State.

“There is no dispute that the Notice was addressed to and received by Mr. Ammerman at an address in New Jersey. There is no dispute that the Petition was filed with the Court more than 90 days after the issuance of the Notice. And Mr. Ammerman does not argue that equitable tolling should apply to extend the period for filing. Rather, he contends that he was ‘outside the United States’ as he claims to understand that term and thus should be entitled to the 150-day filing period. Although polite, Mr. Ammerman is very clearly incorrect: New Jersey is part of the United States. The 90-day period applies.” Order, at p. 2.

“New Jersey is part of the United States.” Are you sure, Judge?

That’s how Judge Joseph W. Nega finds the testimony in MD M. Rahman & Syeda Momotaz, Docket No. 8286-23, filed 10/13/26. It comes from MD M. explaining his accounting methods.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t provide Judge Nega enough to Cohanize whatever expenses Rahman claims above whatever IRS and he stiped.

 “In his testimony, Mr. Rahman not only insisted that he should prevail entirely on all disputed deduction amounts, but he repeatedly explained petitioners total lack of documentation as a result of the looting of his store on June 1st, 2020, and March 28th, 2021.

“However, his testimony did not explain how then he was able to substantiate all the deductions allowed in the stipulation of settled issues and during the examination but none of the items that now remain at issue. His admission regarding his incomplete bookkeeping and his habit of paying personal expenses from his business account do not bolster his arguments. While his testimony is refreshing, it does not give the Court enough to apply a Cohan analysis.” Transcript, at p.11.

No doubt about it, Mark S. Bonhage, Docket No. 7563-23, filed 10/13/26, had an uphill fight to stave off summary J tossing Year One, as he is “more than 1,300 days” late with his petition. Order, at p. 2.

Even though Mark is in exCulpatory 3 Cir, where equitable tolling reigns, his attempts to slide under the two-point tag of extraordinary circumstances and diligent follow-up fail.

“Petitioner mailed his Petition in this case… more than 1,300 days after the Notice of Deficiency was filed [sic; I think you meant “mailed” Judge]. Petitioner offers several reasons for the delay, including his disability, an earlier bankruptcy, and purported attorney error, among others. None of his unsubstantiated arguments demonstrate extraordinary circumstances that excuse his delay or demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights. In an attempt to allow petitioner another opportunity to present evidence and further argument regarding the applicability of equitable tolling’s application to this case, we set the motion for a hearing. Petitioner did not avail himself of that opportunity, so we will grant respondent’s Motion with respect to [Year One].” Order, at p. 2.

As to Year Two (no, they’re not consecutive, they’re three (count ’em, three) years apart), IRS’ proffered proofs are the reason for the headline first hereinabove set forth at the head hereof (as my high-priced colleagues would say).

I’m leaving in the dates, because they matter.

“Despite supplementation, respondent’s Motion fails to provide sufficient indicia showing a Notice of Deficiency respecting tax year 2017 actually existed and was mailed to petitioner on November 4, 2019. In fact, respondent’s Motion explicitly states the Notice of Deficiency was not mailed until February 2, 2023 (a statement in direct conflict with the PS Form 3877 offered to prove its mailing). Petitioner’s Objection correctly notes that February 2, 2023, is less than 90 days before the filing of the Petition. And yet, whether a Notice of Deficiency was mailed November 4, 2019, or on February 2, 2023, respondent remains unable to produce even a file copy. The conflict in respondent’s Motion demonstrates a dispute as to material fact as to the existence of the Notice of Deficiency and necessitates denial with respect to tax year 2017.” Order, at p. 2.

Translated from Judge Nega-speak, that means “IRS, drop Year Two, take Year One and run.”

Tax Court announces the death of Judge Harry A. Haines. Here is the press release.

No, not a political protest; this blog will obdurately remain neutral. I merely repeat an old favorite blogpost for this date (coincidentally a very happy one for my nearest and dearest).

This from 10/13/14.

As Harry Golden, raconteur and essayist, put it more than fifty years ago, “The most famous expression among the immigrants on the East Side of New York was ‘A klug zu Columbus’n’ which, freely translated, meant that Columbus should have broken his head before he discovered it (America).  The expression was always used in good humor and often as a term of endearment, as we shall see.”

Mr. Golden went on to describe Columbus as a folk-hero, a kind of mythic figure both praised and blamed, but ultimately the source of good-humored comment.

Howbeit, my readers, descendants of immigrants as we all are, whether our several ancestors crossed the Bering Strait coming from the Olduvai Gorge, or from the steppes of Central Asia, or even across the Atlantic or Pacific, I note that Tax Court is closed today, so I can bring y’all neither entertainment nor enlightenment.

Enjoy a day off, whether it be for you Indigenous Peoples’ Day or Columbus Day. And anyway, have a klug zu Columbus’n.

Ever since my earliest acquaintance with United States Tax Court practice, Judge Dawson’s sacred mantra from his immortal decision in Branerton Corp., 61 T. C. 691 (1974), at p. 692, has been resounding throughout this my blog: “For many years the bedrock of Tax Court practice has been the stipulation process, now embodied in Rule 91.”

So why are we getting orders like Darryl M. Jacobs & Suzanne M. Jacobs, et al., Docket No. 14682-23, filed 10/9/26?

It’s the standard IRS Section 6751(b) Boss Hoss compliance motion for summary J. To which petitioners’ trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Steve, files “…a Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment indicating that petitioners do not object to the granting of respondent’s Motion as it relates to the supervisory approval requirement of section 6751(b)(1).” Order, at p. 1.

Judge Nega agrees, after the boilerplate recitations of the virtues of summary J, with which I heartily concur. But do we need this?

I must assume that Steve, clearly not a Tax Court novice (I wish I knew all that he knows about it), has done at least one Branerton phonecall with IRS in this case. And that at least one of the ten (count ’em, ten) IRS counsel assigned to this case has had a wee word with Steve about chops, add-ons, and Boss Hossery. If not, why not?

Surely Judge Nega’s time is too valuable, and Tax Court clerical resources too overstretched, to require a formal order for an undisputed factual question in six (count ’em, six) conjoined cases.

How about a sentence in Stip One like this. “P and R agree that R’s applicable employees have complied with the formal requisites of IRC Section 6751(b). The foregoing sentence shall not be deemed or construed to be a concession by or on behalf of P that any tax, penalty, additions to tax, charge, fee, or impost, however denominated, is due, payable or owing, except as may be explicitly elsewhere herein set forth.”

I was taught in my young day that making life easy for the judge was more than its own reward.

I just recently noted the exemplary protections afford whistleblowers both generally by Section 6103 and specifically by Rule 345, and yet Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way has to admonish both Whistleblower 36070-21W, filed 10/8/26, and IRS’ counsel not to e-file unredacted documents containing PII.

And Judge Way has to seal, enumerate, and set out specifically what documents they need to redact and refile.

This despite his having earlier ordered them to do exactly that. Both parties then blithely repeated their previous errors.

Some beg too late for a level of anonymity provided only to certain petitioners. But when those already accorded special treatment ignore the protection they’re offered, I can only shake my head.