Scott M. Balotin & Ellen M. Balotin, Docket No. 3848-26P, filed 8/6/26, show great promise for more blogfodder even than their prior appearances in this my blog; in proof whereof, see my blogposts “Slamming the Backdoor,” 8/17/23, and “The Eighty Percent,” 2/4/26.

This time they’re pro se, claiming IRS is playing the Matty Dean Vigon cat-and-mouse gambit, denounced by that Obliging Jurist Judge David Gustafson in my blogpost “Crafty – Akin to the Weasel,” 7/24/17, with Section 7345 seriously delinquent tax debt (SDTD) certs to DoS and then decertifying. No SOL on SDTD certs, right?

Yes. Except.

Scott filed a CDP and then petitioned (late, but maybe equitably tolled) a negative NOD.

Judge Goeke: “IRS’s three certifications do not indicate that the IRS will recertify petitioners in violation of section 7345. When a certification is found to be erroneous, the IRS shall reverse the certification and notify the State Department ‘as soon as practicable.’  §7345(c)(2)(D). That occurred in this case. The IRS timely issued the first reversal after petitioners requested the CDP hearing. The IRS recertified Mr. Balotin after the 30-day period for filing a petition for review of the Notice of Determination expired. Then, it reversed the certification less than one month after petitioners’ [sic] filed the untimely petition in the CDP case. The IRS complied with its obligations under section 7345.” Order, at p. 3.

Yes, Ruesch says reversing a SDTD cert to moot a petition and then recertifying is a voluntary cessation no-no, just like successive imposition of Section 6702 chops followed by withdrawal, but only if there is a reasonable expectation that IRS will recertify the taxpayer, and interim relief or events have completely eradicated the effects of the certification.  Scott, unlike Dean Matty Vigon, precipitated the cert withdrawals with his CDP request and subsequent petition. IRS followed the statute. And Scott can petition successive SDTD certs; Dean Matty Vigon was barred by the Section 6330(b)(2) one-CDP-per-year constraint from petitioning successive NFTLs and NITLs.

In another millennium, On the Hill Far Above, when I had a lot fewer wrinkles, a lot less fat, and a lot more hair, I stood smoking a pipe (“How quaint” my native-born Texan granddaughters would say) in a smoke-filled cardroom. In memory I see Jersey Ed, Slater, Barry, and Joel, and one of them slapping his cards on the table and exclaiming “Who dealt this mess?” even if he himself had dealt the bridge hand. It’s been sixty years and more, but I remember.

So I want to give a Taishoff “Good Try, Second Class” to the trusty attorneys for Scott L. Reed and Stacy N. Reed, T. C.  Memo.  2026-64, filed 8/5/26, for rescuing even the Allowed Deductions, Exhibit A, (T. C. Memo. 2026-64, at pp., 41-45) and staving off even a modicum of the unreported income IRS heaped on their clients’ heads. They have to fold the chops, though.

Scott and Stacy (that’s Doc Stacy, the allergist/dermatologist) were a trifle casual with recordkeeping and documenting their multifarious business activities, ranging from real estate consultancy for AR historic preservation (vanishing) tax credits, used wood rescuing, medical clinic, and helping a cousin buy some real estate.

Judge Emin (“Eminent”) Toro expends fifty (count ’em, fifty) pages, including but in nowise limiting the generality of the foregoing (as my expensive colleagues would say) tables showing saved and lost deductions, to unscramble this Farinata Indiana. For a judge with no accounting credentials Judge Eminent Toro well-proves his impressive legal résume.

 And IRS’ counsel were no slouches, either. Though the ice was sometimes thin and the sun at noon above, they pressed on.

Ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel takes up the birch rod from the Supremes and lays about the BBA partnership régime with a will, as the 90-day filing deadline in Section 6234(a) is relegated to claim-processing, non-jurisdictional status in Big Apple Tompkins Realty LLC, Mojahed H. Bhutta, Partnership Representative, 167 T. C. 7, filed 8/5/26. Pro se Mo gets a Taishoff “Good Job” for his spirited rescue of his 452 (count ’em, 452) days late petition from a Final Partnership Adjustment under the post-BBA schema.

Ex-Ch J Iron Fist is no slouch when she takes up the Supremes’ Herculean stable-cleansing of Congress’ jurisdiction-vs-claim-processing muddle. She brings discipline with bushels of somber reasoning and copious (and I mean copious) citation of precedent, 28 (count ’em, 28) pages’ worth.

We have Belagio Fine Jewelry (see my blogpost “It Isn’t?” 2/24/26), North Wall Holdings, LLC (see my blogpost “Boechler, Meet TEFRA,” 10/21/25), Frutiger (see my blogpost “Boechler, P. C. Meets Innocent Spousery,” 3/11/24), and our old friend Hallmark Rsch. Collective, Judge David Gustafson’s magnum opus that went two-for-five in the CCAs (if you include Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones’ view of 5 Cir (see my blogpost “Pugsley’s Child,” 4/15/26).

At the end, it’s where the 90-day cutoff happens in Section 6234(a) that tilts the balance; the heavy-duty jurisdictional stuff appears in Section 6234(b) and only implicates USDC and USCFC actions, not pore l’il ol’ Tax Court.

“By itself, section 6234(a), which provides the filing deadline, clearly contains a permissive grant for a partnership to file a claim but not a grant of jurisdiction. Compare § 6234(a), with Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 154 (concluding that the phrase “may obtain a hearing” does not speak in jurisdictional terms). Although it is not required, the statute does not contain the word “jurisdiction.” See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208–13. But see Buller, 160 F.4th at 269 (finding significant that section 6213(a) did not include the word ‘jurisdiction’ in the relevant portion of the statute); Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th at 832. It simply lists the venues in which a partnership may file after receiving a timely FPA and within the 90-day deadline. There is no language beyond mere reference to the courts of review that speaks to the Court’s authority to hear a case, just “mundane statute-of-limitations language.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Section 6234(a) does not even go as far as section 7436(b)(2) in providing the consequences of an untimely filing. See Belagio Fine Jewelry, 162 T.C. at 252.” 167 T. C. 7, at p. 16.

Of course, that the 90-day Section 6234(a) language is not jurisdictional doesn’t mean Mo and the Big Apples are safe.

“Respondent has established that he properly issued and mailed the FPA to Big Apple and to Mr. Bhutta, and that Big Apple did not timely file this Petition. However, considering the relevant text, context, and history of section 6234(a), we conclude that Congress did not clearly state that the 90-day filing deadline is jurisdictional. We therefore are not deprived of jurisdiction because of Big Apple’s untimely filing, and will deny respondent’s Motion. We reserve judgment on whether the 90-day deadline is subject to equitable tolling until the parties raise this issue in an appropriate manner.” 167 T. C. 7, at p. 28.

I make the morning line on IRS winning a Rule 40(b) failure to state a claim motion 8 to 5.

A discovery standby is the go-for-the-gold set of interrogatories served in hopes of getting a usable admission. It’s a standard strategy where depositions are unavailable (like in US Tax Court).

It doesn’t work in Amaya Insurance Company, Inc., et al., Docket No. 11946-20, filed 8/4/26.

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler: “In many responses respondent states that the interrogatory seeks legal theories, mental impressions, or the application of law to facts which are protected by the work product doctrine. See, e.g., interrogatories 2–12, 14–15, 20–27, 31–32, 34–37, and 41. Petitioners contend that respondent’s blanket assertion of the work-product doctrine is insufficient and cites Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-5, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1127, 1129 (ruling a blanket claim of the privilege is not sufficient when the taxpayer failed to show how privilege applies to any of the documents requested). After considering the interrogatories, we find respondent’s privilege objection valid. The interrogatories where respondent asserts the work product privilege seeks information regarding respondent’s litigation strategy. Collectively, the interrogatories are requesting respondent to affirmatively disprove petitioners’ case before trial. See Hambarian v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 565, 568 (2002) (“The work product privilege is intended to protect documents that reveal an attorney’s mental impressions and legal theories and that were prepared in contemplation of litigation.”); Zaentz, 73 T.C. at 478 (“It is true that Rule 70 provides that discovery may apply to an application of law to fact, but we believe that such provision was not intended to make discoverable a mere statement of a party’s legal authorities.”).” Order, at p. 3.

There’s more, so practitioners will want to get the citations and arguments to draft around the roadblocks that IRS throws up here.

STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden explores the OIC equivalent of the whistleblower rejection-or-denial dichotomy (for which see my blogpost “Rejection and Denial” 3/16/20) in Donald M. Zorn & Cynthia A. Zorn, Docket No. 15833-23L, filed 8/3/26.

TAS told the Zorns their OIC had been rejected, but their IRS account transcript showed “481 Offer in Compromise rejected or returned.” Order, at p. 4. IRS also claimed the Zorns hadn’t filed a return for one of the years at issue; they claim they did, but Cynthia couldn’t sign it because she was ill. 

If COIC returns an OIC, it means the offer was processable, but stuff is missing or incomplete. Rejected is the COIC version of NYC’s “fuggedaboutit.” If rejected, one can resubmit or go to Appeals and petition an adverse NOD.

The Zorns were paying as if the OIC had been accepted, and if it was rejected they should have a hearing at Appeals. Rejection is separate from any COIC determination, hence a hearing. If returned, the Zorns are required to be told the reason, but they get no hearing on why it was returned.

The admin record as supplemented and with materials supplied in an IRS status report looks like a frittata Fiorentino, so STJ Di sends it back to Appeals to unscramble.

Was the OIC “(1) rejected, as stated in the Taxpayer Advocate Service letter, and if so whether the Appeals Officer made an independent final determination, and whether petitioners should be permitted to submit a revised OIC; or (2) returned and whether the subsequent filing of the 2016 tax return required the Appeals Officer to send it back to COIC to reconsider if the offer should have been returned.” Order, at p. 4.

If I may double up on metaphor and describe an impossible play, Gradi Jacques Muyembi Kayembe & Melkam Muyembi, Docket No. 16438-25S, filed 8/3/26, both beat the throw and slid in under the tag.

I am sure Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda was far too engrossed in study in his youth to play much baseball, but I can imagine him as umpire, crouched over third base as Gradi & Mel slide in, then leaping up and stretching out both arms with palms downward and yelling “Safe!” as Frank (“Busy”) Bisignano races from the dugout bellowing in protest.

But Gradi & Mel actually used  FedEx 2 Day, a PDS enrolled in the “blessed communion, fellowship divine,” more particularly bounded and described in I.R.S. Notice 2016-30, 2016-18 I.R.B. 676. Hence Section 7502(a) mailed-is-filed saves Gradi & Mel.

Moreover, the SND they’re petitioning gave a petition due date seven (count ’em, seven) days after date of mailing, so Gradi & Mel get the seven on top of 90-from-mailing.

However, as the late-night Telehucksters say “But wait! There’s more!”

“The 90th day after August 29, 2025 [mailing plus 7], was November 27, 2025, Thanksgiving Day, a legal holiday. The face of the notice of deficiency stated that the last day to file a petition in Tax Court was Friday, November 28, 2025, the following day. However, on that day the Court was administratively closed. The period within which to file a petition was thus tolled by I.R.C. section 7451(b), which provides that when a filing location is inaccessible on the date a petition is due, the period for filing a petition is tolled for the number of days within the period of inaccessibility plus 14 days. See Sall v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 325, 327–28 (2023). Adding the one day of inaccessibility to the 14-day tolling period required by I.R.C. section 7451(b)(1) extended the petition deadline by 15 days, to December 13, 2025. As December 13, 2025, was a Saturday, the petition deadline was further extended to the following Monday, December 15, 2025.

“The Petition was received and filed by the Court on December 16, 2025. The shipping label on the envelope containing the Petition shows that it was shipped on December 13, 2025, by FedEx 2 Day, and scheduled to be delivered on December 16, 2025. FedEx electronic database tracking information is consistent in showing December 13, 2025, as the ship date and FedEx 2 Day as the service.” Order, at p. 2.

For Madiodio Sall’s story, see my blogpost “Take Two,” 11/30/23.

Gradi & Mel can dust off their uniforms and hug the base.