Ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel takes up the birch rod from the Supremes and lays about the BBA partnership régime with a will, as the 90-day filing deadline in Section 6234(a) is relegated to claim-processing, non-jurisdictional status in Big Apple Tompkins Realty LLC, Mojahed H. Bhutta, Partnership Representative, 167 T. C. 7, filed 8/5/26. Pro se Mo gets a Taishoff “Good Job” for his spirited rescue of his 452 (count ’em, 452) days late petition from a Final Partnership Adjustment under the post-BBA schema.

Ex-Ch J Iron Fist is no slouch when she takes up the Supremes’ Herculean stable-cleansing of Congress’ jurisdiction-vs-claim-processing muddle. She brings discipline with bushels of somber reasoning and copious (and I mean copious) citation of precedent, 28 (count ’em, 28) pages’ worth.

We have Belagio Fine Jewelry (see my blogpost “It Isn’t?” 2/24/26), North Wall Holdings, LLC (see my blogpost “Boechler, Meet TEFRA,” 10/21/25), Frutiger (see my blogpost “Boechler, P. C. Meets Innocent Spousery,” 3/11/24), and our old friend Hallmark Rsch. Collective, Judge David Gustafson’s magnum opus that went two-for-five in the CCAs (if you include Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones’ view of 5 Cir (see my blogpost “Pugsley’s Child,” 4/15/26).

At the end, it’s where the 90-day cutoff happens in Section 6234(a) that tilts the balance; the heavy-duty jurisdictional stuff appears in Section 6234(b) and only implicates USDC and USCFC actions, not pore l’il ol’ Tax Court.

“By itself, section 6234(a), which provides the filing deadline, clearly contains a permissive grant for a partnership to file a claim but not a grant of jurisdiction. Compare § 6234(a), with Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 154 (concluding that the phrase “may obtain a hearing” does not speak in jurisdictional terms). Although it is not required, the statute does not contain the word “jurisdiction.” See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208–13. But see Buller, 160 F.4th at 269 (finding significant that section 6213(a) did not include the word ‘jurisdiction’ in the relevant portion of the statute); Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th at 832. It simply lists the venues in which a partnership may file after receiving a timely FPA and within the 90-day deadline. There is no language beyond mere reference to the courts of review that speaks to the Court’s authority to hear a case, just “mundane statute-of-limitations language.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Section 6234(a) does not even go as far as section 7436(b)(2) in providing the consequences of an untimely filing. See Belagio Fine Jewelry, 162 T.C. at 252.” 167 T. C. 7, at p. 16.

Of course, that the 90-day Section 6234(a) language is not jurisdictional doesn’t mean Mo and the Big Apples are safe.

“Respondent has established that he properly issued and mailed the FPA to Big Apple and to Mr. Bhutta, and that Big Apple did not timely file this Petition. However, considering the relevant text, context, and history of section 6234(a), we conclude that Congress did not clearly state that the 90-day filing deadline is jurisdictional. We therefore are not deprived of jurisdiction because of Big Apple’s untimely filing, and will deny respondent’s Motion. We reserve judgment on whether the 90-day deadline is subject to equitable tolling until the parties raise this issue in an appropriate manner.” 167 T. C. 7, at p. 28.

I make the morning line on IRS winning a Rule 40(b) failure to state a claim motion 8 to 5.