No, Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern is not taking us on a walking tour of Greenwich Village. The latest chapter in this promenade (see my blogposts “No Commuter Tax,” 9/17/24, and “A New Day – Redivivus,” 4/25/25, for the backstories) is the valuation of what Linda and Peter gave Papa Bruce when they cut loose Mama Clotilde’s residuary trust, their third appearance in this my blog, Linda Lewis, Donor, T. C. 2026-58, filed 7/20/26. 

Petitioners’ expert said Papa Bruce would live longer because he was rich. Hence, the Section 7520 life expectancy tables, while a baseline, merited five (count ’em, five) years of extra time for Papa Bruce. Unhappily for petitioners, they don’t do as well as Spain in extra time.

After slicing and dicing IRS’ and petitioners’ experts and dissecting the IRC and regs, Judge Big Jim ascends to such rarefied heights of pure mathematics as to get the parties within a mere $3,249,104 difference by T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 20. 

And all that’s left is Papa Bruce’s life expectancy at communtation.

The Section 7520 tables don’t apply, not because Papa Bruce is rich, but because what Mama Clotilde’s will and trust mean is decided by State law. 

And Mama Clotilde only left Papa Bruce an income interest and a limited power of appointment, not all the goodies she inherited from her daddy. T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 17.

“Respondent claims support for his position from ‘the plain language of section 7520.’ He reminds us that the statute provides that ‘the value of any . . . remainder . . . interest shall be determined’ under the prescribed tables. But respondent quotes the statute selectively. He omits the first five words of the text: ‘For purposes of this title.’ A trustee determining how to divide the assets of the Residuary Trust under section 12.8 of Clotilde’s will upon the trust’s termination would not be making that determination, in the first instance, for purposes of the Code. Instead, the trustee would be determining the beneficiaries’ entitlements to the trust property—a matter of state law.” T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at p. 21.

“We are unpersuaded that, for the purpose of valuing Bruce’s income interest in the Residuary Trust to determine the distribution to which he would have been entitled under section 12.8 of Clotilde’s will upon the termination of the trust … Bruce would have appropriately been treated as five years younger than he actually was. Life expectancy tables, such as those issued by the Social Security Administration, rely on the law of large numbers. The standard tables will inevitably understate the life expectancy of some individuals and overstate that of others. But if the tables are based on an adequate sample size, the inaccuracies in each direction will balance out. The tables will thus provide a reasonable estimate for individuals of a given age. Adjusting the estimates provided by the tables to take into account some, but not all, factors unique to a particular individual would introduce bias and, in our judgment, would be methodologically questionable. Bruce’s income was but one of myriad factors relevant in determining his life expectancy. All else being equal, that one factor might have caused the standard Social Security tables to understate Bruce’s life expectancy. Without considering all factors relevant to Bruce’s life expectancy, however, [petitioners’ expert] could not conclude that all else was equal.” T. C. Memo. 2026-58, at pp. 22-23.

And whatever said expert might have speculated that the gift might have been worth more, IRS’ concession number is substantiated by the record.