There is still no United States Tax Court admissions examination for an attorney at law who “has been admitted to practice before and is a member in good standing of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, or of the highest or appropriate court of any State or of the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.” Tax Court Rule 200(a)(2).

I deplored this lack in my blogpost “A Book and a Modest Proposal,” 5/22/12. Eleven (count ’em, eleven) years later, no change.

In witness whereof, here’s the tale of Guy Alvarez Gayou, T. C. Memo. 2023-61, filed 5/16/23, This is a passport grab, and the only issue is substantial tax debt per Section 7345. IRS certifies $61K, the cutoff for year at issue being $54K.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones: “… the record is devoid of any evidence that would warrant the application of an exception under section 7345(b)(2). The record reflects that Mr. Gayou is not currently paying his debt pursuant to either an installment agreement under section 6159 or a compromise agreement under section 7122. Furthermore, there is no evidence that collection of Mr. Gayou’s debt is currently suspended because of a requested or pending CDP hearing under section 6330 or an election or request for relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f).” T. C. Memo. 2023-61, at p. 6.

OK, right-about-face-and-march-out GAG. So why does this run-of-the-mine grab rate a proposal from me, modest or otherwise?

“In his objection to respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Gayou, through his representative, cites several inapplicable authorities, advances multiple unfounded arguments, and ignores the Court’s limited inquiry in the instant case. First, Mr. Gayou’s objection is nearly unintelligible because it repeatedly confuses the terms  ‘petitioner’ and ‘respondent.’ See Rules 350(a), 60(b), 3(c). Second, the objection cites Rules 15 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,  which are not the primary authorities governing amended and supplemental pleadings or summary judgment, respectively, before this Court. See Rules 41, 121, 1(b). Third, the objection cites a nonprecedential order issued by this Division of the Court that discusses the IRS Independent Office of Appeals’ (Appeals) failure to discuss outstanding debts when considering a collection alternative in the context of a CDP hearing, which is wholly inapplicable to the scope of the current Passport Notice proceeding. Fourth, to the extent that an argument can be divined from the objection, it acknowledges that no CDP hearing is currently pending, which forecloses the potential application of the statutory exclusion under section 7345(b)(2)(B)(i); yet the objection still asserts that the exclusion applies. Fifth, the objection asks the Court to grant Mr. Gayou an opportunity to speak with Appeals, which is outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter. See § 7345(e)(2); Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 F.4th at 70; see also Adams, 160 T.C., slip op. at 8. Finally, the objection claims that the Court’s electronic filing system, DAWSON, somehow constrained the contents of the filing. As the Court similarly noted in its Order dated October 26, 2022, no such limit exists, and we find this argument similarly unavailing.” T. C. Memo. 2023-61, at pp. 6-7.

I don’t want to name GAG’s representative, even with a nom de guerre. I shudder to think what Judge Halpern would do in this case.

But if someone can thus represent a client in a serious litigation in a Federal court (even a humble Art. I court), should there not be some examination, however perfunctory, of the representative’s capacity?