Attorney-at-Law

CAR TALK

In Uncategorized on 11/22/2017 at 16:39

For many years my spouse and our lineal descendants knew Saturday morning at 11 a.m. (and later at 10 a.m.) would find me cackling at the banter emanating from the kitchen radio, as Click and Clack delved into mysterious noises and the skullduggeries attendant to vehicles propelled by internal combustion engines. I miss those guys.

Well, just now, as I was contemplating hitting the trail for home in anticipation of the pre-turkey scramble, thanks to Judges Gerber and Lauber early unloading the day’s blogfodder, who should deliver a vehicular designated hitter but The Great Dissenter, a/k/a The Judge Who Writes Like a Human Being, s/a/k/a The Implacable, Incontrovertible, Irrefragable, Ineffable, Ineluctable, Indefatigable, Indomitable, Insuperable, and Indubitable Foe of the Partitive Genitive, Old China Hand and Master Silt Stirrer, Judge Mark V. Holmes?

And it’s an off-the-bencher. Featuring the categorization of SUVs: are they automobiles (passenger vehicles) or trucks (business vehicles)?

Judge Holmes has the answer for Charles Asong-Morfaw, Docket Nos. 10629-14 and 13601-14, filed 11/22/17, but one of these consolidated cases settle pre-trial.

Chas bought a Toyota RAV 4 too late for the 100% bonus depreciation deduction, but timely for the 50% bonus. See Section 168(k)(1)(A). He claims he used the RAV4 entirely for business, but has a big-time problem with proving that. His records make no allocations, and include commuting as well as road trips.

“But we’ll begin by noting that Mr. Asong-Morfaw’s cars, both the three that he shared with members of his family and the Toyota, are what are called ‘listed property’ under section 280F(d) (4) (A) (i) and if the RAV being an SUV is not regarded as an automobile, it’s still a vehicle used for personal transportation, which would make it listed property under 280F(d)(4)(A)(ii).” Order, Transcript, at p. 5.

Now the 50% bonus applies to listed property, which is also “qualified property.” But Section 168(k)(2) sends us over the Section 280(f)(b)(1). And Chas flunks the “predominantly used in a qualified business” test for want of proof.

So Chas is relegated to Section 168(g) MACRIS, and all he gets is mileage. IRS allowed him the mileage he claimed on his 1040, even though Chas put in a mileage log on the trial which claimed less.

Judge Holmes has to check on the stipped-and-settled matters before deciding whether to give IRS a clean win, or send Chas and IRS off for a Rule 155 beancount.

But maybe Judge Homes is mellowing just a little. “So I have to continue on in my analysis and can’t simply rely on the effective date of this extra bonus depreciation created for a couple of years earlier in this decade.” Order, Transcript, at p. 7. (Emphasis added).

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