Is Better Than the Best Testimony

The old Chinese proverb I learned long ago was “the worst piece of paper is better than the best human memory”. Here, a variation on a theme from the first two small-claimers of the 2014 program; if the promissory notes you got in your IRA are worthless because the obligor real estate partnerships went bust, why not get a copy of the notes and a copy of any foreclosure judgments, bankruptcy filings, or correspondence?

Might help when the IRA trustee terminates your IRA and sends you a 1099-R claiming you got something, when in truth and in fact you got nothing.

Consolidated for trial only are Bernard L. Berks and Claire Berks, 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 2, filed 1/6/14, and Steven C. Gist and Constance L. Gist, 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 1, filed 1/6/14. So we get two opinions for the price of whatever.

Handling both cases is Special Trial Judge Daniel A. (“Yuda”) Guy, Jr.

Bernie and Claire and Steve and Connie handed over their self-directed IRAs to their old friend J. Richard Blazer, with instructions to invest in high-risk, high-reward real estate deals.

J. Richard does, giving the IRAs promissory notes from the various partnerships that he serves as general partner, but which go down in a blaze of anything but glory. J. Richard as 50% partner in one walks away from the deal, and the rest get foreclosed.

At the maturity of the promissory notes, the IRA trustee asks “what gives?”, and J. Richard does some epistolary jousting with the trustee. The trustee, losing patience, tells J. Richard and the gang that the notes are going back to them, along with 1099-Rs, stating the last known value of the notes. Needless to say, that “last known amount” wasn’t zero.

Claiming they got nothing, Bernie and Claire, and Steve and Connie, state the taxable portion of that IRA distribution was zero.

IRS is not amused.

STJ Yuda: “Mr. Blazer testified that all of the partnerships failed during the period 2001 to 2006 and that the promissory notes they issued to petitioners had become worthless. His testimony regarding the dates and circumstances related to the demise of the individual partnerships was vague and inconsistent. Remarkably, despite his central role in promoting the investments and his position as a general partner in the partnerships, he was unable to produce any documents or records to corroborate his own testimony.” 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 1, at p. 12.

Of course, STJ Yuda is as careless with logical nomenclature as his colleagues Judges Holmes and Goeke are with the partitive genitive, although his point is valid. “Even accepting Mr. Blazer’s testimony that he did not retain any relevant partnership records, that circumstance begs the question why petitioners did not search public land records or similar sources in advance of trial in an attempt to unearth any documentation that might corroborate his testimony.” 2104 T. C. Sum. Op,. 1, at p. 12.

No, STJ Yuda, it does not “beg the question”. To “beg the question” is the English equivalent (mistranslated, of course) of the Latin petitio principi, meaning to assume the conclusion in the question, a form of circular reasoning. Here’s an example: “Your resume looks good but I require another reference.” “Joe will give me a reference.” “Yes, but how do I know Joe is reliable?” “I’ll vouch for him”.

What STJ Yuda means is that the lack of documentation raises or invokes the question why no search was made of the public records or elsewhere.

Trying a case means proving something. When all you have is somebody’s word, it might help if you have some corroboration as well.

And it wasn’t only the petitioners (who apparently knew nothing), nor even J. Richard, but the petitioners (in both cases) were represented by the same counsel, with the same result.

It’s not only the experts who have to go to the woodshed, nor even only the clients and their advisers, but counsel as well needs to prepare for trial; and if no woodshed is available, surely there are other places.

And the worst piece of paper still beats the best human memory–and testimony.

Nope, not the 1904 Kerry Mills and Andrew B. Sterling tune reprised by Judy Garland and Company in the 1944 MGM feel-good, but rather news of the cancellation of the Tax Court’s roadshow in St Louis, MO, on Monday, January 6, 2014.

It seems that the weather has turned nasty. Parties will be “renotified” of the new date(s) for their trials and tribulations.

For those who tuned in late, the partitive genitive is a grammatical form extruded into English from Latin, whereby that which is the part of a greater whole is indicated by the genitive declension, as in “a cup of coffee” or “filet of sole”.

The Great Dissenter, a/k/a The Judge Who Writes Like a Human Being, Judge Mark V. Holmes, has long been at war with the partitive genitive, being fond of such solecisms as “couple rounds of briefing”; see my blogpost “The $2000 Misunderstanding”, 6/12/12.

But he has enlisted a most unexpected ally in Judge Joseph Robert Goeke. In witness whereof, see Qinetiq U.S. Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 14122-13, filed 1/3/14.

Remember that Judge Wherry laid a blast on Judge Holmes as a grammarian, as to which see my blogpost “The Great Dissenter – Part Deux”,  2/15/12. And Judge Goeke got all kinds of lexicographical when Judge Holmes went off on a rant; see my blogpost “Swift, Light and Unattached”, 12/19/12.

Anyway, Qineteq is about the irrelevance of the Administrative Procedures Act. Qineteq wants to strike the SNOD; no dice.

“Petitioner argues that the notice of deficiency was arbitrary and capricious because, despite the substantial sum involved, the notice consisted of only a couple sentences explaining the basis for the deficiency. However, the size of the deficiency is irrelevant to the size of the notice’s explanation of adjustments. We have procedures for analyzing the validity of notices of deficiency, but we do not hold a notice invalid just because it is succinct.”  Order, at p. 2 (Citations omitted).

“Ve haff our vays of givink you notice,” as the late great Conrad Veidt might have said.

Besides, the administrative record is not the only basis for review of a SNOD. Per Sections 6213 and 6214, Tax Court reviews the deficiency do novo, so Qineteq can duke it out with IRS and bring in whatever evidence it has.

But my point is found two paragraphs back. Judge Goeke, what is this “only a couple sentences”? Have you enlisted in Judge Holmes’ war on the partitive genitive? What is wrong with “only a couple of sentences”?

Will the luncheon menu in the Judges’ cafeteria at 400 Second Street, NW, now feature “soup day”, “filet sole”, “slice pizza” and “leg lamb”? How about “piece pie” and “cup coffee”?

No, not the 14-season television series rated number 43 on the all-time list by TV Guide, rather the extraordinary set of Orders out of Tax Court today, Friday, January 3, 2014.

Fridays are usually dull down at 400 Second Street, NW, and given the snowstorm and announcement that US gov’t workers could come in or stay home and work, as they chose, I expected little. I wasn’t surprised the designated hitters were rather poor, two stalls and another exegesis of Section 152 and related familial carryings-on.

But then I went a little farther on.  So here’s the potpurri of gems extracted from the dross by the unremitting toil of yours truly.

First up, Sumner Redstone, the Viacom king. Sumner was having a set-to with IRS over a 1972 gift of stock, as to which he never filed a 709. See my blogpost “The Flavor Du Jour”, 12/9/13. Judge Lauber blew off Sumner’s laches defense (delay of game doesn’t stop the US of A). So now IRS wants summary judgment. And Judge Lauber gives Sumner and his legal team until February 3 to find some material facts in dispute, and lay them bare. Read all about it in Sumner Redstone, Docket No. 8097-13, filed 1/3/14.

Next up, echoes of Jerry Rawls. Remember Jerry? No? Well, see my blogpost “Hail, All Hail Cornell”, 12/5/12. But this Order isn’t about Jerry’s case, only citing it for authority. This lofty Order (sorry, guys) can be found in Edge Lofts Master Tenant, L.P., A Missouri Limited Partnership, Edge Lofts MT GP, LLC, A Missouri Limited Liability Company, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 424-11, filed 1/31/4.

This was a Section 47 rehab credit case; that’s the historic structure thing. “Respondent had determined that petitioner improperly included more than $2 million in developer fees as qualified rehabilitation expenses for 2006. Respondent then mailed a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment to petitioner (Limited FPAA). Respondent also mailed a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment to Loft’s tax matters partner (Loft FPAA). The Limited FPAA purports to give effect to only the qualified rehabilitation expenditure adjustments respondent determined in the Loft FPAA. The Limited FPAA adjusted no independent partnership item of Limited for 2006.” Order, at p. 1 (Footnote omitted, but it’s important).

Here’s the omitted footnote: “The partnership-level proceeding involving the partners of Loft, Tax Court Docket Number 425-11, has not been completed.” Order, at p. 1, footnote 2.

So both IRS and Limited move to dismiss the petition, as the only result of the FPAA is a computational numbers shift. Judge Kroupa: “An FPAA containing solely computational adjustments of partnership items of a source partnership that respondent issues before completion of the source partnership-level proceeding is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Rawls Trading, L.P. v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 271 (2012).” Order, at p. 2.

But wait–there’s more. If I were doing a separate caption for this one, it would be “Do The Math Before You Send the Check”. This is Chief Judge Michael B. (“Iron Mike”) Thornton’s advice to Christopher Cruz, Docket No. 26650-13S, filed 1/3/14, but that “S” won’t be there long.

Chris was over the $50K brightline, so his “S” was in jeopardy. His attorney-in-fact, Allgood, sent in a check for $500, hoping to take Chris under the radar. Unfortunately, it wasn’t all good (sorry, guys).

Ch J Iron Mike: “John Allgood filed a Response on behalf of petitioner. Although this response was filed by the Court, petitioner should note that this Court does not recognize powers of attorney, and all filings should be made by petitioner or by a practitioner admitted to practice before this Court.” Order, at p. 1.

And see my blogpost “Powerless”, 9/14/12.

Anyway, even if John Allgood were a practitioner admitted to practice before Tax Court, he can’t add. “The Response to the Court’s Order To Show Cause states that petitioner paid $500.00 to respondent to bring the amount in dispute for tax year 2007 below the $50,000 jurisdictional maximum for small tax case procedures. For the small tax case election to be valid, the ‘amount of the deficiency placed in dispute’ may not exceed $50,000 for any one taxable year. I.R.C. sec. 7463(a), (e);  Kallich v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 676, 679-680 (1987). The ‘amount of the deficiency placed in dispute’ includes the deficiency and any additions to tax and penalties determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency upon which the case is based, I.R.C. sec. 7463(e), less any concessions made by petitioner. The amount of deficiency (when including additions to tax and penalties) for tax year 2007 exceeds $50,000, even if petitioner’s $500.00 payment is viewed as a concession.” Order, at p. 1.

So Chris loses his “S”. For the right way to deal with the problem, see my blogpost “Who Says It’s a Small-Claimer?”, 8/1/13.

The next one deserves its own blogpost, as Judge Holmes finds an unlikely ally in his war on the partitive genitive. Stay tuned.

No, not Antoine Domino’s and Dave Bartholomew’s 1955 classic, or even Pat Boone’s cover thereof, but the sad tale of Onetha A. Gilliard, Docket No. 8620-13S, filed 1/2/14,  with STJ Lew (That Man Can Spell) Carluzzo stepping up to start the 2014 Tax Court season.

Onetha claims IRS credited to a prior year’s liability (which liability Onetha contests) certain refunds she was owed for subsequent years.

But even if everything Onetha says is true (which the Court doesn’t decide), STJ Lew can’t help Onetha out.

Back on 11/13/13, Tax Court issued an Order tossing Onetha’s petition for untimely filing, on the ground that she was two years too late. She now writes a letter asking for reconsideration.

“For what it is worth, we note that as a general matter, respondent [IRS] is authorized to deny a taxpayer’s claim for refund of overpaid Federal tax for one year and instead credit that overpayment against the taxpayer’s Federal tax liability owed for a different year. See §6402(a).  (Furthermore, this Court is without overpayment jurisdiction to review respondent’s actions in that regard. See sec. 6512(b)(4)). But more importantly, for the reasons explained in the Order, we are without jurisdiction over petitioner’s 2007 Federal income tax liability.” Order, at p. 1.

By “the Order”, STJ Lew means the 11/13/13 Order tossing Onetha’s petition. Onetha had her chance, and she missed it. Once past ninety days, game over.

“In her letter, petitioner describes the series of personal family misfortunes that she suffered during the relevant time that her 2007 liability was being examined by respondent, but nothing in her letter suggests that the ruling embodied in the Order is in anyway erroneous.” Order, at p. 1.

Of course, there’s the usual cold comfort; Onetha can file for a refund and sue in USDC or CFC, and best of luck with that. “We sympathize with petitioner, but as previously explained, have no jurisdiction in this proceeding over her 2007 Federal income tax liability. Petitioner, of course, is free to explore whatever remedies might be available to her administratively or judicially through the refund procedures. See §7422; McCormick v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 138, 142 (1970).” Order, at p. 2.

No, I haven’t joined the Spanish Army; I gave at the office here, 47 years ago. And the title is slightly misleading, I confess.

It’s not that I don’t want to write, but that, if you want to write to me, or comment on a post of mine, you have to be registered with wordpress.com and logged in.

The reason for this stonewalling is that the Akismet spam filter that my publisher wordpress.com has provided me has been overwhelmed, so that I am being deluged with spam, that the filter isn’t catching. I’m not surprised; the hackers and spammers and internet criminals routinely outwit the guardians.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

 “To Highlanders, of course, Christmas is a pagan festival which they are perfectly prepared to enjoy as long as no one sees them doing it, but Hogmanay is the night of the year.” G. M. Fraser, The General Danced At Dawn.

My epigraph here is a warning to all those seeking to avoid the toils of Section 183, and a Hogmanay greeting to everyone else.

To the former, don’t let them see you having fun. At least, don’t let them see you having too much fun.

To the latter, Happy New Year. And no, I won’t be found in Times Square tonight blowing a vuvuzela or similar horror; I shall be at home, decently behind a glass of Piper-Heidsieck.

As for having too much fun, while no one said a profit-making enterprise must involve suffering (see my blogpost “And All That Jazz”, 8/14/13: as I said then “…that element of personal pleasure doesn’t negate a profit motive. You can have fun and make money.”), two taxpayers had way too much fun to escape the hobby-loss chop.

From 12/30/13, two T. C. Memos.

First up, Austin Otology Associates, 2013 T. C. Memo. 293, filed 12/30/13, which is really the story of the conjoined case Patrick W. Slater, II, and Robin H. Slater.

Though Pat is a neurotolgist of note, he’s at heart a Nimrod, in the Biblical sense (see Genesis 10, verses 8 through 10).

Pat invents a noise suppressor for shooters called Shooter’s Ear, and an ear cream to prevent swimmers’ ear, but to test the same goes off numerous times to British Columbia, to take part in guided hunts, the costs of which he deducts via his business.

Pat takes other dubious write-offs, but I’ll stick with the slaughter of animals.

Judge Goeke, clearly no inordinately enthusiastic sportsman: “We address the British Columbia trips first. Dr. Slater claims he took the trips to perform research in cold weather. However, Dr. Slater could have tested the products in the same conditions without purchasing expensive hunting trips. Outdoor shooting ranges would have provided the same conditions as the guided hunts at a fraction of the cost.” 2013 T. C. Memo. 293, at p. 15.

Moreover, “Dr. Slater enjoys hunting. He took hunting trips and leased hunting property before he began developing Shooter’s Ear. Dr. Slater could have performed his research without hunting, and he spent only a small portion of his time on the trips documenting his research. On these facts we find that petitioners have not clearly established that the principal character of the trips was the active conduct of Austin Otology’s business. Therefore, the expenses did not directly relate to the active conduct of a trade or business, and Austin Otology improperly deducted them.” 2013 T. C. Memo. 293, at pp. 15-16.

Oh yes, Pat also wrote off the taxidermy expenses for his trophies.

Next up is (or are) Travis A. Mathis and Bettina C. Jary-Mathis, 2013 T. C. Memo. 294, filed 12/30/13, but it’s really Bettina’s story, although Travis, as heir to the Brown & Root engineering fortune, supplies the moolah wherewith Bettina disports herself.

Bettina is a great fan of cutting horses. No, not the kind that get the “G” in the racing form. Her cutting horses are those used by cowhands to isolate individual members of a cow herd, so as to “rope ‘em and brand ‘em and bob off their tails” with a loud whoopie-ti-yi-yo.

Ever since she could toddle round the corral, Bettina was a devotee of the cutting horse. At first she tried training and selling, but the best trainers wouldn’t go on retainer, as they wanted to exhibit their craft in many stables. Of course the training operation lost money.

Then Bettina turned to breeding. She studied bloodlines, took a seminar, made a business plan, hired a bookkeeper to record every expenditure and kept the same CPA preparing her tax returns for all the years she ran her ranch.

But the switch from training to breeding wasn’t starting a new activity. The two are too closely related.

Besides, “The current and expected losses of an activity should not be of such a magnitude that an overall profit going forward would not be possible. Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), aff’d, 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967). Petitioners have accumulated over $9 million in losses from their cutting horse activity. It is unrealistic to expect that petitioners would not continue to accumulate significant losses. They have presented no convincing evidence that future profits could possibly offset these losses.” 2013 T. C. Memo. 294, at p. 16.

But ultimately, Bettina was having too much fun. “After weighing all the facts and circumstances in light of the relevant factors, we conclude that petitioners did not engage in their cutting horse activity with the requisite profit objective. Mrs. Jary-Mathis is determined to be a successful horsewoman. She wants to build a reputation as a producer of top-level cutting horses. However, she has pursued this goal independently of any desire to earn profits. She has continued training and breeding cutting horses for 17 years without ever approaching profitability, yet she has never seriously considered discontinuing operations.” 2013 T. C. Memo. 294, at p. 18.

The CPA helps Bettina avoid the 20% penalty, however.

No, this is not about Ray Fouche, the victimized bus operator (see my blogposts “The Cover Up”, 11/23/11 and “The Cover Up – Uncovered”, 4/24/13).

This is about the most commented-upon topic of my blogposts, the ineffectual whistleblower statute, Section 7623.

More than one frustrated whistleblower has vented his (it’s always “his”) spleen to me about how all IRS does is stonewall, and Tax Court duly rubberstamps whatever IRS tells them. And I have commented myself on TIGTA’s failure to address the problems in administration; see my blogpost “Another Whistleblower Gets Blown”, 8/30/13.

So there’s no surprise as that obliging jurist, Judge David Gustafson, apparently at the behest of a K Street law firm, conveniently removes from public view any sign of the alleged skullduggery uncovered by Joseph (“Fighting Joe”) Insinga. K Street, as we all know, is the home of the Beltway influence peddlars. As someone remarked, “Where the carcass is, there will the vultures be gathered”.

Remember Fighting Joe Insinga? No? See my blogposts “Did Nothing”, 3/13/13, “Perpetual Discovery”, 3/21/13,  “A Voyage of Discovery”, 3/30/13, and “Youth Wants To Know”, 4/24/13. Fighting Joe fought the good fight, but was stymied by the delaying tactics so easily utilized in 7623 cases.

But Fighting Joe fights one last battle. Even though he surrendered at last, he mounts a final campaign in Joseph A. Insinga, Docket No. 4609-12 W, filed 12/31/13, Judge Gustafson’s farewell to Fighting Joe.

The unnamed skulldugger, upon whose trail Fighting Joe was fiercely treading, now moves for a permanent seal on identifying information. And gets it, Judge Gustafson retroactively applying Rule 345(b).

Rule 345 itself came into effect 7/6/12. Joe’s filing took place before that date, so Joe isn’t anonymous. But Fighting Joe wants the information in public view.

Of course, IRS “… does not object to the redaction of names, addresses, and other identifying information of the taxpayer(s) to whom the claim relates from the documents in the record of this case or the sealing of some documents in the record in this case.” Order, at p. 1. Surprise, surprise.

Fighting Joe claims the movant (anonymous, of course) filed late, and that the information isn’t proprietary or confidential.

Now that don’t make Judge Gustafson no never-mind. “Section 7461(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (‘I.R.C.’; 26 U.S.C.) provides that all reports of the Tax Court and all evidence received by the Tax Court shall be public records open to the inspection of the public. At the same time, I.R.C. section 6103 provides that returns and return information are confidential and are not subject to disclosure, except in limited circumstances. Because the taxpayer to whom the claim relates is not a party to this proceeding, the third party taxpayer has no control over what information has been included in the public record of this case. For this reason, Rule 345 was adopted to require that the parties shall redact the nonparty taxpayer’s name, address, and other identifying information and that redacted information will be sealed in a reference list. See Rule 345(b).

“Although Rule 345(b) was adopted after most documents containing the information regarding the third party were filed in this case, the Court will grant the Motion for Protective Order and seal the documents identified in the Supplement to Motion for Protective Order.” Order, at p. 2.

Oh yes, and Clerk, send a copy of this order over to K Street.

Further comment is superfluous.

The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2013 annual report for this blog.

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Sydney Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 12,000 times in 2013. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 4 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

Who’d’a thunk we’d ever see a sentence like this in a full-dress T.C.: “Common sense dictates that the answer must be no, and our findings of fact and analysis support that answer.” 141 T. C. 19, at p. 14.

That sentence made Andrew Wayne Roberts a happy camper. He’s the star of the eponymous 141 T. C. 19, filed 12/30/13, with Judge Marvel as the exponent of common sense.

Andy Wayne loved not wisely but too well; Mrs. Andy Wayne, hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Smith”, as the high-priced lawyers say, was a master of penmanship. She forged Andy’s name to a bunch of withdrawal orders from his IRAs, forged his signature on the checks the custodians of said IRAs trustingly issued (notwithstanding the forged signatures bore no resemblance to Andy Wayne’s true signature) and mailed to her job, whereupon she deposited them in a joint account (of which she alone possessed checks, and she alone got the bank statements), and finally used the cash to take their kids to Disneyland and set up a separate dwelling for herself.

And then she prepared phony tax returns for herself and Andy, and e-filed them. She’d done all their joint returns in past years, but this time Andy never got a copy, although he asked.

Andy claims he never got wind of Ms. Smith’s shenanigans until the next year, when the 1099-Rs hit the fan, and he never got any benefit from the cash she stole.

IRS says Section 408(d)(1) says IRA distributions are taxable to the “distributee” or “payee”, and that was Andy.

No, says Judge Marvel, Section 408(d)(1) doesn’t define those terms. “The taxable distributee under section 408(d)(1) may be someone other than the recipient or purported recipient eligible to receive funds from the IRA. Indeed, we have previously rejected the contention that the recipient of an IRA distribution is automatically the taxable distributee. See Bunney v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 262.” 141 T. C. Memo. 19, at p. 13.

So now we have a case of first impression (which is why this is a T. C. and not a Memo.): is payment based on forged documents, of which the true owner was unaware and from which he got no benefit, a taxable distribution?

No, of course not.

Andy testified he signed nothing, got nothing and knew nothing until he got the 1099-Rs, showing he’d been robbed. No economic benefit, no participation, and no legal obligation to make payment. This last point distinguishes Andy’s case from Vorwald, 1995 T. C. Memo. 15, because Vorwald’s IRA was grabbed to pay court-ordered child support, so did serve to discharge a legal obligation and was thus like writing Vorwald a check and having Vorwald write his spouse a check. Andy didn’t owe Ms. Smith nuthin’, at that point.

Andy is off the hook, right?

Not yet, says IRS. Under State law, Andy had a year to go back to the custodians of his IRAs, make a claim they paid on a forged instrument, get back the money, and treat it as a rollover contribution (and thus not taxable), per PLR Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201119040 (May 13, 2011). How a PLR is authority for anything is another story, but Judge Marvel lets it pass.

Even if Andy could have done (which he didn’t), he had a year to do it, and that throws the question of his ratifying the distribution by his non-action into a year not before the Court.

One last try. IRS claims Andy got the benefit of the cash Ms. Smith grabbed by way of a credit in the divorce decree two years later. But that was also after the year at issue, so no constructive or ratified distribution to Andy in that year.

Judge Marvel makes this clear: “We express no opinion as to whether petitioner’s failure to exercise available remedies under [State] law resulted in a constructive distribution from the IRA accounts in a later tax year.” 141 T. C. 19, at p. 22, footnote 18.

My comment: And they’re all probably closed years by now, anyway.

Andy’s on the hook for Ms. Smith’s erroneous 2008 tax return, because he took no steps to correct (amend) it, and he concedes he didn’t report some interest income, and underreported some wages. So he may get the Section 6662(d)(1)(A) 20% substantial underpayment based on substantial understatement chop on that money, but not on the IRA theft.

Of course, he can’t rely on Ms. Smith as preparer, even if the criminal charges against her were dismissed.