It’s still a joint return if you intended to make one. That’s Judge Laro’s lesson for Susan R. Zimmerman-Phillips, 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 8, a small-claimer filed 1/15/14.

Sue and soon-to-be ex-husband Tom were splitsville, but not final, when the year in question ended. Their respective attorneys told them to file jointly, as they had done for the previous 25 years. As she did every year, Sue gathered the documents necessary to prepare the 1040, put them in a file folder, and handed it to Tom, who turned out the return.

Except Sue didn’t have her W-2, so she didn’t include it. And Tom didn’t let Sue see or sign the return, which he filed electronically. And Tom didn’t give Sue the PIN needed to access the return.

Sue claimed she tried to reach Tom before the return was due, but only reached him on April 16, when she found out Tom had filed electronically. At the trial, Sue testified she needed the return to file the FAFSA for her daughter (and if you don’t know what a FAFSA is, you’re lucky; I struggled for years with the Free Application for Federal Student Aid), but not because she thought there was anything fishy about the return.

Tom finally gave Sue a redacted copy of the 1040. Sue showed Tom the W-2 from her employer, and Tom’s reaction told her that the refund he thought he was getting wasn’t going to happen.

Sue tries calling the IRS, but they won’t talk to her without the PIN. And Sue never tries filing a 1040X to correct the error.

Sue claims innocent spousery, now that she’s free of Tom and IRS is breathing fire and slaughter.

No go, says Judge Laro. First, Sue’s non-signing is not dispositive. The question is did she and Tom intend to file a joint return? And burden of production is on IRS to show they did, and burden of persuasion is on Sue to show they didn’t.

“Respondent has met his burden of production by introducing evidence that petitioner intended to file a joint return with her former husband. First, petitioner did not file a separate return…, even though she had substantial income. Second, since 1988 petitioner and Mr. Phillips had always filed their Federal income tax returns as ‘Married filing jointly’. Third, petitioner’s and Mr. Phillips’ respective attorneys advised them to file jointly …. Finally, and most compellingly, petitioner created a file for her … tax documents which she gave Mr. Phillips so that he could file their … return. Petitioner testified that when she gave Mr. Phillips her tax documents file, she ‘assumed that he would prepare the taxes and then I would sign them and then he would file them.’ In the light of these facts, petitioner has not met her burden of persuasion to establish that she did not intend to file a joint return with Mr. Phillips.” 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 8, at p. 9.

Now at long last the new innocent spouse rules apply. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397. And Sue passes all the tests, except that the item she is fighting is solely hers, namely and to wit, the W-2 she got but Tom never got.

Sue claims fraud bails her out, because Tom never showed her the return and she never signed it. However, that’s a non-starter, because she never gave Tom the whole story.

But, as that great sage and orator Lawrence Peter Berra remarked, “it ain’t over ‘til it’s over.”

Judge Laro makes sure it’s over. “Our analysis, however, does not end here. As we stated above, although we consider the Commissioner’s guidelines for equitable relief, we are not bound by them. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 438-439. Thus, we determine de novo on the basis of all the facts and circumstances whether petitioner is entitled to equitable relief. See sec. 6015(f). We hold that she is not.” 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 8, at p. 14.

Sue didn’t give Tom the W-2, didn’t seek professional advice when IRS wouldn’t talk to her, didn’t try to file a 1040X–in short, Sue did nothing.

Judge Laro: “Petitioner intended to file a joint return with Mr. Phillips. To that end, it was her responsibility to ensure that Mr. Phillips received all her tax documents, it was her responsibility to inform Mr. Phillips that the file was incomplete, and it was her responsibility to correct any errors on the return or bear the consequences of her inaction. Petitioner’s excuse that ‘at that point, I couldn’t do any more’ is unavailing. She is therefore not entitled to equitable relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f).” 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 8, at p. 14.

As we learned on The Hill long ago, those who seek equity must do equity.

That obliging jurist Judge David Gustafson is always ready to lend a helping hand. But here he goes even higher above, and farther beyond, the call, when Henry J.  (“Two Trial”) Lazniarz tries it on yet again.

Remember Henry J.? No? I’m surprised, because Henry J. is a memorable type. But to avoid keeping you in suspense, see my blogpost “I Told You Once, I Told You Twice”, 11/14/13.

Now that you’ve refreshed your recollection, as the expensive lawyers say, Henry J. is back before Judge Gustafson with a request for Trial No. 3. His attorney for Trial No. 1 was admittedly inept, and his relief pitcher was little better in Trial No. 2.

Not a whit dismayed, dauntless Henry J. is seeking Trial No. 3. Here’s the story, in Henry J. Lazniarz & Gina M. Lazniarz, Docket No. 31002-09, filed 1/15/14.

Ya can’t make this stuff up. “…petitioners moved for a new trial (i.e., for a third trial); respondent filed an opposition…; and… the Court ruled on petitioners’ motion for a new trial by stamping it ‘Denied’. Evidently unaware of the Court’s ruling, petitioners submitted on January 14, 2014, (1) ‘Petitioners’ Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioners’ Motion for New Trial’, (2) ‘Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioners’ Motion for New Trial’, and (3) a supporting ‘Affidavit of Henry J. Lazniarz’. To the affidavit are attached documents naming TCF Bank and Premier Bank that purportedly relate to interest deductions claimed. In addition, the affidavit (at para. 9) allege ‘newly acquired documents’ that show the business purpose of  ‘professional fees’; but the documents are not attached (for reasons given); and the affidavit states that petitioners ‘can scan and email it to Respondents [sic] and the Court this week when we arrive home on January 14, 2014.” Order, at p. 1.

So Judge Gustafson gives Henry J. a week to get him and IRS the scanned documents, with IRS getting a week after that to see if they can concede anything based on those documents, and in any case, all hands must stand by the first week of February in colorful downtown St. Paul, MN, to be available to show up in Judge Gustafson’s courtroom on one hour’s telephonic notice.

This is the judge who will try your case in the jail where you are (see my blogpost “We’ll Come To You”, 9/18/12), will give you a second chance on your energy credits (see my blogpost “Obliging and Energetic”, 7/5/13), and if you’re in the slammer, he’ll give you a free lesson on Tax Court practice and procedure (see my blogpost ‘We’ll Come To You – Part Deux”, 7/24/13).

My kind of judge.

Judge Foley is, Judge Lauber isn’t, but Judge Foley has the votes and Judge Lauber has the arguments. And the arguments don’t help, as Tax Court overrules whatever’s left of Humana (Humana Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247,253 (6th Cir. 1989), aff’g in part, rev’g in part and remanding 88 T.C. 197, 206(1987), in Rent-A-Center, Inc. and Affiliated Subsidiaries, 142 T. C. 1, filed 1/14/14.

If you love insurance, you’ll love this case. We all know that non-insurance businesses can’t deduct self-insurance loss reserves, and they can’t deduct “premiums” paid to captive insurers with few or no assets, which don’t insure anyone but their captor.

But how about a captive that insures sibling subsidiaries? IRS used to have an “economic family” argument, but dumped that, post-Humana, which distinguished between parent-sub captives and parent-sibling-sub captives.  “In Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001-1 C.B. 1348, 1348, the Internal Revenue Service stated that it would ‘no longer invoke the economic family theory with respect to captive insurance  transactions.’ And in Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, 173 (2002), we held that we may treat as a concession a position taken by the IRS in a revenue ruling that has not been revoked.” 142 T. C. 1, at p. 41 (Judge Buch concurring).

Even though the captive here barely makes the Bermuda cut for solvency (needing a guarantee from the parent-captor to do so, and Bermuda Monetary Authority approval for some minor accounting shenanigans), that’s enough for Judge Foley and the majority.

Premiums allocated to the sibling subs and paid via the parent are deductible; it’s real insurance.

The sibling subs don’t own stock in the captive, the captive is solvent by local law, and IRS’ expert concedes that the risk of loss, to the extent of the captive’s coverage (they were first-dollar, with a big umbrella held by an unrelated insurer), is off the sibling subs’ balance sheets.

The test, of course, is facts and circumstances (as we march down the aisle to Sir Ed’ard Elgar’s masterpiece), and Moline Properties’ business activity and regarding entities as separate, absent sham (which Judge Lauber finds but Judge Foley doesn’t).

Judge Lauber says the Bermuda requirements are a joke, the captive’s premium-to-surplus ratio was way below what cover a regular insurer would carry, the captive insured no one but the captor, the captive’s assets were nothing like what a real insurer would carry, and the captor’s guarantee of the captive’s solvency, irrespective of whether the captor was ever called upon to perform (and captor was not), sinks the deal.

Anyway, Judge Foley, Ch J Thornton, Vasquez, Wherry, Holmes, Buch, and Nega say it’s OK, it’s real insurance, no sham (Buch concurring, with Judges Foley, Gustafson, Paris, and Kerrigan joining the concurrence).

Judge Halpern has his own dissent, as does Judge Lauber; Judges Colvin, Gale, Kroupa, and Morrison join Judge Lauber’s dissent.

Judge Goeke sits this one out, and Judges Cohen and Marvel are among the missing.

At the end, I agree with Judge Halpern to this extent; it would have been better to forget the whole Humana overrule, treat this as a T. C. Memo. rather than a T.C., and let the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, to which this case is Golsen’d, sort this out.

Or, more elegantly: “Nevertheless, had Judge Foley steered clear of Humana, I believe that we could have avoided Conference consideration and have left it to the appellate process (if invoked) to determine whether Judge Foley’s findings are persuasive.” 142 T. C. 1, at p. 53 (Judge Halpern dissenting).

And a lot less reading for the poor blogger who has to digest this stuff.

Tax Court will not join together (except in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits), at least once the taxpayer gets a SNOD and petitions it.

Here’s a case that shows, as if more proof were necessary, that (a) we need a single Court of Tax Appeals, rather than the current anarchy of a dozen circuits, and (b) registration and competence testing for preparers is past due and overdue.

Specifically, here’s Isaak Abdi Ibrahim, 2014 T. C. Memo. 8, filed 1/13/14. Isaak is a Somalian refugee living in Minnesota, which must be a shock to begin with, and, as he neither reads or writes English, is somewhat isolated.

Nevertheless, he has taxable income, and goes to a local preparer who speaks Somali. Notwithstanding that Isaak is married to Rukia Hassan for the entire year at issue, the Somali preparer has Isaak filing HOH and Rukia (who also can’t speak, read or write English) filing MFS. Isaak claims two of his four stephildren as dependents, and now wants dependency and child tax credit for the other two, notwithstanding that Rukia claimed one of them for EIC purposes on her MFS return.

Somehow Isaak found a Somali-speaking USTCP when he got the SNOD, which he petitions timely.

Well, even though IRS concedes the two stepchildren Isaak claimed, neither he nor his Somali-speaking USTCP put in evidence sufficient to show the other two stepchildren as qualifying children or qualifying relatives, so that’s out, even if Rukia hadn’t claimed one of them her own self for EIC.

Now Isaak wants to file an amended return to claim MFJ status. The problem with amending after a SNOD and a timely petition is Section 6013(b)(2)(B), which prohibits that particular audible at the line of scrimmage.

But Isaak’s USTCP has a case from Fifth Circuit, which she claims lets him do it. The case is Glaze v. United States, 641 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).

Judge Nega takes up the story. “…the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that ‘separate return’ as used in section 6013(b) refers only to married filing separately status and not to any other filing status, including, as here, head of household. Through Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted all prior decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as binding precedent on all Federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit. As a result of Bonner, Glaze is binding precedent within both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 8, at pp. 5-6.

How d’ya like them apples?

Not much, says Judge Nega, and neither do other Tax Court judges or IRS Chief Counsel.

First, appeal here lies with Eighth Circuit, and that Court hasn’t ruled on the point. But Tax Court sure has, and none of those rulings follow Glaze outside Fifth or Eleventh Circuits.

“Petitioner’s argument ignores such contrary precedent. This Court has consistently held that section 6013(b)(2) applies to married taxpayers who file returns with an incorrect status, such as head of household or single filer. See, e.g., Currie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-71; Blumenthal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-737; Saniewski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-337; see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 433, 439 (1986) (‘[W]e believe that that reading of section 6013(b) [in Glaze] is too narrow[.]”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on another issue, 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

“Additionally, both the Office of Chief Counsel and the Internal Revenue Service have announced they will not follow Glaze. See Rev. Rul. 83-183, 1983-2 C.B. 220; Action on Decision 1981-140 (June 2, 1981). In declining to follow Glaze, the Office of Chief Counsel and the Internal Revenue Service noted that the legislative history of section 6013(b) does not indicate that ‘separate return’ is limited to married filing separately, as Glaze pronounced. This rationale is supported by the fact that Congress enacted the predecessor statute to section 6013(b) in 1951 but did not establish a separate rate structure for married taxpayers filing separately until 1969. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 803(a), 83 Stat. at 676.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 8, at pp. 6-7.

Amend first, petition afterwards. Unless you’re in the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits.

Of course, a single Court of Tax Appeals, having national jurisdiction over a national tax, would eliminate these mental gyrations. And requiring preparers to be registered and tested, at least to the extent of assuring some minimal capability, is so long overdue and so notorious that the present Wild West system is an insult to honest taxpayers and honest practitioners.

This one is of interest to lawyers, but I’ll try to make it intelligible to human beings as well. This is Jeffrey Wycoff & Merrie Pisanno-Wycoff, Docket No. 24158-09, filed 1/13/14, from the pen of Judge Marvel.

Merrie claims innocence, but also claims her lawyer had an undisclosed conflict (he was representing her and Jeff, and moreover had been in the same firm as the lawyer who put her and Jeff in the deal IRS is trying to blow up). See my blogpost “Which Side Are You On?” 7/9/13.

Well,  IRS knew, and Jeff’s and Merrie’s attorney knew, there was a conflict, but nobody bothered to tell Judge Marvel until after the trial was over and she found out for herself.

Now what? Merrie refuses to waive the conflict, and wants to reopen the trial record to put in evidence of her innocence, and IRS has no problem with that. Jeff wants to put in evidence to show cooperation with IRS and try a Section 7491 burden shift, but that train left, says Judge Marvel.

First, the easy one. “Petitioner Merrie Pisanno-Wycoff alleges that petitioners’ former counsel failed to discuss with her whether she may be eligible for relief under section 6015. Because respondent does not oppose petitioner Merrie Pisanno-Wycoff’s request to partially reopen the record to submit evidence regarding her eligibility for relief under section 6015, we will reopen the record for this purpose.” Order, at p. 3.

Next, what to do with the rest of Jeff’s request? After a thorough reading of ABA Model Rule 1.7 (the conflicts rule, and Tax Court is bound by the ABA Model; see Tax Court Rule 201(a) and my blogpost “A Non-Christmas Carol”, 12/23/13), Judge Marvel tosses Jeff’s and Merrie’s trial counsel. Incidentally, she finds that, while IRS and Jeff’s and Merrie’s trial counsel knew about the conflict well before trial but said nothing, they did not intentionally mislead the Court, Order, at p. 8 (emphasis by the Court). Thus, reopening for fraud is not on the table.

So now that he’s tossed, how much reopening of the record is allowed or allowable? That’s of course up to the Court; the prevailing interests are economy, substantial justice and no ambushes.

Judge Marvel won’t follow either IRS’ take or Jeff’s and Merrie’s new counsel’s view. The post-opinion rules (vacating or renewing) don’t apply.

On the substantial justice (fairness) front, Judge Marvel buys new counsel’s argument that conflicted counsel failed to introduce evidence that would have conflicted with what advice his old buddy gave Jeff and Merrie. So, having shown with some particularity what they wanted to put in, and how it would change things, new counsel gets a shot.

But new counsel doesn’t get all they wish for. Here’s the anti-ambush part. “Petitioners also seek to introduce evidence regarding their cooperation with respondent [IRS] during the examination and to conduct further briefing on burden of proof issues under section 7491 and otherwise. However, petitioners concede that they do not know why Mr. X failed to raise these issues earlier, and they do not explain how Mr. X’s conflict could have caused him to fail to properly address these issues. We therefore conclude that reopening the record with respect to these issues is unnecessary and would be unfair to respondent.” Order, at p. 11 (Footnote and name omitted; I suspect the lawyer in question has troubles enough).

Anyway, Jeff and Merrie aren’t hot dogs. “Although this case is now ripe for opinion and decision, we do not think that petitioners’ failure to raise Mr. X’s conflict earlier precludes a limited reopening of the record in this case. Counsel for both parties apparently failed to recognize Mr. X’s conflict, and it would be unfair to hold petitioners to a higher standard.” Order, at p. 11. (Name omitted).

And IRS’ counsel knew about the conflict three months before the trial, so they shouldn’t be surprised either, given the expressly limited scope for which the record is reopened.

Takeaway–This is fortunately a very rare occurrence, but if you have to reopen, have a solid laundry list of what should have gone in at the trial, show why IRS isn’t ambushed, and have a sympathetic client.

No, not Jodie Foster vs. Anthony Hopkins in the  1991 thriller; rather, it’s Tax Court announcing its weekend shutdown to roll out the brand-new eFiling system (which we devoutly hope is not Tax Court’s answer to the healthcare website, about which the less said, the better).

Anyway, eFiling is offline from Friday, January 17, 2014, at 8:00 a.m., EST, until Tuesday, January 21, 2014, at 6.a.m., EST.

eFiled documents due on Friday, January 17, 2014, will be deemed timely if filed before Wednesday, January 22, 2014, at 6 a.m., EST. Of course, Monday, January 20, 2014 is a holiday in DC, so nothing due that day. But only eFileds get a bye; petitions and notices of appeal are still paper-only, so if your magic date is Friday, January 17, 2014,  remember Section 7502 and get to the Post Office or your nearest approved overnighter.

For the lowdown on the new eFiling system, go to the Tax Court homepage, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/, and check it out.

Going for the hat trick today, three (count ‘em, three) posts, I have to reach back to yesterday, 1/9/14, for the final story to tell. As usual, the last race on the card is a small-claimer, Yong J. Dong and Lijun Weng, 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 4, filed 1/9/14, as told by The Judge With A Heart, STJ Armen.

And the story is of special interest to New York City practitioners.

Yong and Lijun wanted a home of their own, so they got a loan of $130K from Yong’s Mom and Dad, wherewith to assist them to purchase what everyone agrees is their principal residence in Queens County, New York, a Borough of the City of New York. And they sign two documents in favor of the aforesaid parents, a “‘Home Equtty [sic] Loan Agreement’ (loan agreement) and ‘Home Equiity [sic] Deed of Trust’ (deed of trust). The loan agreement allows for a loan amount up to $130,000 with an interest rate of 3.5% plus a prime rate not to exceed a 12% annual rate. This was not a purchase money mortgage; rather, it appears to have been a credit line mortgage.” 2014 Sum. Op. 4, at p. 3.

The issue before Tax Court, of course, is deductibility of the payments Yong and Lijun made pursuant to the terms of the Home Equtty [sic] Loan Agreement.

By now, every New York City practitioner reading this should have calculator and tax table in hand; no, not the income tax tables in the Form 1040 instructions, rather the tax table for New York State and City mortgage recording tax, imposed by Article 11 of the New York State Tax Law, and shown on Form NYSDTFMT-15.

Did you get $2665.00? Well, Yong and Lijun didn’t get anything, so they are out the deductions, even though they paid in accordance with the documents and IRS asserts no intrafamily shenanigans.

What scuttles Yong and Lijun is that the indebtedness, though real, is not secured by their principal residence. And the Regulations to Section 163 require that the security interest of the lender must be perfected under local law, by recording or otherwise.

Now all New York practitioners worth their sodium chloride know that, for realty, the only way to perfect is to record. STJ Armen: “Petitioners have not, however, alleged or shown that they perfected the deed of trust or the loan agreement in any other way. Neither have they established that there is another way to perfect the deed of trust or the loan agreement under New York State law, nor are we aware of any such way. Thus, petitioners have not satisfied the third element of a secured debt under the regulations requiring that a mortgage or deed of trust be recorded or otherwise perfected under applicable State law.” 2104 T. C. Sum. Op. 4, at p. 11.

So they saved $2665.00 in recording tax (and practitioners in other jurisdictions may well gasp at that number, but New York State, the State That has Everything, has had such a tax since 1909), but lost about $30K of deductible interest.

Oh, and from the looks of the paperwork, they may have saved something less than a grand in legal fees for preparing the documents. And spent a lot more than that on legal fees for bringing this case.

Even if you prevail in your Jacobean wrestling with IRS, you still have to limbo your way under the $2 million net worth bar to get your Section 7430 goodies, the legal and administrative fees awarded to those parties who prevail at the metaphorical ford of the Jabbok (see Genesis 32:22-32).

Estate of Mildred T. Quidley Deceased, Karen Q. Pierce, Executor, actually prevails in her bout with the IRS; and mirabile dictu, IRS concedes she did.

You can read it for yourself in Docket No. 7799-10, filed 1/10/14, a designated hitter over the signature of the redoubtable Chief Judge, Michael B. (“Iron Mike”) Thornton.

But KQ can’t show that the late Mildred T.’s real and personal property at the instant she quitted this vale of tears was worth less than $2 million. The top line on the Form 706 read north of $2.1 million.

While KQ argued that acquisition cost and not FMVDOD measured the asset side of the net worth calculation (and although the statute doesn’t define “net worth”, everyone agrees it’s FMV of assets minus liabilities), she dropped that argument, and, remarkably, couldn’t show any liabilities to offset.

She claimed the Section 2032A farmland election kept the late Mildred T.’s estate in bounds, but Ch J Iron Mike slugs that one. “Petitioner’s section 2032A election does not affect the fair market value of the estate’s assets for purposes of applying the net worth requirement. Generally, for estate tax purposes, property is valued at fair market value based on its highest and best use. See sec. 2031; sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs. Section 2032A, however, permits an estate to elect to value real property used for farming and small business purposes on the basis of income capitalization rather than on the basis of highest and best use.  These special valuation rules apply, however, only for purposes of calculating estate tax liability. In fact, section 2032A(a), expressly states that the special valuation provisions apply for ‘purposes of this chapter [i.e., Chapter 11–The Estate Tax]’;  consequently they do not apply for purposes of Chapter 76–Judicial Proceedings, which includes section 7430.” Order, at pp. 4-5. (Citations and footnote omitted, but see my blogpost “Foolish Consistency? – Part Deux”, 10/21/13).

OK, we got the top line, the asset side, but KQ has nothing for the liabilities side of the calculation, so she (and the Estate) are out.

Except they don’t owe tax, interest or penalties.

That’s STJ Lew (Love That Name!) Carluzzo’s riposte to James Elbert Aldridge, Jr. & Shirley Lorraine Aldridge, Docket No. 13742-10,  a designated hitter (and a hitter it is) filed 1/10/14.

Jim and Lorraine want STJ Lew to reconsider his Order dated 12/12/13, which denied their motion to suppress evidence (but apparently what specific evidence upset them they didn’t say at the time).

STJ Lew: “Petitioners’ reliance upon Rules 30 and 37 in support of their motion for reconsideration of Order dated December 12, 2013, filed January 6, 2014 (motion), is misplaced. Those Rules relate to pleadings, not motions. Rulings on motions are governed by Rule 50(b). Contrary to their claim, nothing in any of the Court’s Rules or in any Order directed or entitled petitioners to file a response to respondent’s objection to their motion to suppress evidence.” Order, at p. 1 (footnote omitted).

Takeaway One- Respond only when spoken to by the Court.

STJ Lew again: “Similarly, Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, also relied upon by petitioners in support of their motion, provides no support for it. To the extent applicable to this Court, see Rule 1, and contrary to petitioners’ assertions, that rule provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that the Court ‘is not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling’ on a motion.

Takeaway Two- When it comes to motions, don’t ask for reasons.

Takeaway Three- Read the Rules, closely.

My delightful and charming granddaughter was visiting a couple of days ago. Looking at her and her equally delightful and charming mother, I was reminded of the days, so long ago, when I had to reply to a question from her mother thus: “Because I’m Daddy, that’s why.”

I know my readers were waiting, breathless, on his fate, so break out the champagne for John Schmittdiel, Esq. He passed the Tax Court Admission exam.

No, not the biennial horror designed to weed out 92%+ of those with the temerity to venture where only lawyers, admitted to practice before the highest court in any State, territory, possession or commonwealth belonging to or appurtenant to the US of A, may tread. This was Judge James S. Halpern’s mini-exam, which I blogged under the heading “Tax Court Admission Exam”, 9/6/13.

Judge Halpern unloaded on poor John, IRS attorney, when he failed to object to John Foran’s A.K.A. Arthur J. Maurello’s motion for summary judgment in the case of Stephanie Lynn Christie A.K.A. Stephanie Lynn Foran, Docket No. 24515-12S, back in September.

Read my blogpost for the questions. Then try answering them. It’s a hoot. And no, the answers aren’t available on-line.

But apparently John passed with flying colors, because Ch J Michael B. (“Iron Mike”) Thornton has relieved Judge Halpern of the case, leaving him only the clean-up task of resolving John’s A.K.A. Arthur’s motion for summary judgment.

Oh yes, and trial will be held in Aberdeen, SD. See my blogpost “Delay of the Game”, 7/12/13.

You can read all about it in Stephanie Lynn Christie A.K.A. Stephanie Lynn Foran, Petitioner And John Foran A.K.A. Arthur J. Maurello, Intervenor, Docket No. 24515-12S, filed 1/9/14.