It’s a sixty-four (count ’em, sixty-four) page off-the-bencher in another phony syndicated conservation easement case from the usual suspects in Oglethorpe County, GA. The phony valuation (income capitalization method blown up by comparable sales, of which there are more than two dozen) cuts a $20 million valuation down to $111K, plus 40% gross substantial overvaluation chops.

But don’t read Veribest Vesta, LLC, True North Resources, LLC, Partnership Representative, Docket No. 9158-23, filed 7/15/25, for the 58-page trudge through Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch’s evisceration of this dodge.

Read Transcript, Pages 59 through 63. Judge Ingenuity Buch fires a shot across the bows of the attorneys who try these nonsense cases. He lays out why they should be hit with Section 6673(a)(2) chops, multiplying proceedings needlessly and vexatiously.

I wish I could quote Judge Buch’s words, but the Genius Baristas have clogged Dawson’s Creek so that I cannot drag-and-drop.

But I can provide a takeaway: this is how you set up a Section 6673 chop. And more than that, this is how a judge expresses what a lot of us believe.

Estate of Billy S. Rowland, Deceased, James A. Park, Executor, T. C. Memo. 2025-76, filed 7/15/25, fails to port the DSUE (Deceased Spouse’s Unused Exclusion) of the late Fay Rowland. Fay’s last-minute-filed Form 706 fails to state the FMV of noncharitable and nonmarital assets forming part of the late Fay’s trusts FBO children and grandchildren.

Rev. Proc. 2017-34 allows the last-minute filing, but still requires full compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements for precise itemization. Substantial compliance guesstimates don’t get it in this case, although Ch. J. Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda doesn’t preclude its applicability in other cases.

Of course equitable estoppel against IRS fails on multiple grounds.

The 2022 case of the year is back at Tax Court and Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch gives it the T. S. Eliot treatment in an off-the-bencher Boechler, P. C., Docket No. 18578-17L filed 7/15/25.

Boechler, P. C., was a ND single-shingle plaintiffs’ personal injury (asbestos) firm. Boss Jeanette Boechler, Esq., had a “hectic” life during year at issue.

“Ms. Boechler was one of the caregivers for her mother who was in her late 90s. Ms. Boechler resided in the same residence as her mother and her sister, Lisa Boechler. She shared caregiving responsibilities with Lisa, as well as another sister who lived in Fargo, North Dakota. Ms. Boechler assisted her mother by making meals, taking her to doctor’s appointments, and performing other tasks around the house. Ms. Boechler was also a single mother to her son who graduated high school in [year at issue]. He was about to leave home for the first time to attend college.” Transcript, at p. 5.

The issue was late 941s which IRS claimed  and gave her a Section 6721 chop, which Jeanette disputed. Jeanette miscalculated when the petition from the CDP was due, but had a bunch PI cases percolating (hi, Judge Holmes) and was moving her son into college in NY. Jeanette’s petition, signed by her counsel, was two (count ’em, two) days late.

IRS’ response: “(W)hile Ms. Boechler’s personal circumstances may have been difficult, they were not uncommon, they were not beyond her control, and they do not rise to the level of extraordinary.” Transcript, at p. 8.

The Supremes said Congress didn’t prohibit equitable tolling of the 30-day cutoff, Section 6330 was “unusually protective of taxpayers” and such litigation is often initiated by pro se litigants.

The two-pronged test for equitable tolling is that petitioner diligently pursued their rights and that extraordinary circumstances beyond petitioner’s control prevented timely filing.

“Boechler did not allege or establish any facts that indicate it diligently pursued its rights. There is no indication that Boechler followed up with its attorney to ensure the attorney or supporting staff timely filed the petition. Cf. Holland, 560 U.S. at 653–54 (holding that a litigant diligently pursued his claim when he followed up multiple times with his attorney to ensure the petition was timely filed). Ms. Boechler testified that she could not recall if she filed the petition or if she supervised or otherwise provided direction to the person who filed the petition. And given that the petition was filed by counsel, the record is unusually silent as to what direction, if any, was provided by or to counsel to ensure timely filing of the petition. In short, the record is silent as to whether anyone diligently pursued Boechler’s rights. Failure to satisfy the first prong is sufficient for us to deny Boechler’s claim of equitable tolling. See Menominee, 577 U.S. at 256 (holding that failure to meet one element of the equitable tolling test is sufficient for the Court to deny equitable tolling).” Transcript, at pp. 11-12.

As for the second prong, merely being a busy attorney with family responsibilities (especially when these are shared) isn’t extraordinary (ain’t that the truth). Nor is getting the arithmetic wrong when dealing with SOL.

IRS wins.

I expect the trade press and the blogosphere will provide the editorial comments I now refrain from making.

A bunch Dixieland Boondockery opinions (hi, Judge Holmes), with no joy for the investors.

Vivian D. (“Golden”) Hoard, Esq., and her colleagues are still hunting the Section 6751(b) bubble in Jefferson Property Holdings, LLC, Strategic Fund Manager, LLC, Partnership Representative, T. C. Memo. 2025-75, filed 7/14/25, and Sand Valley Holdings, LLC, Sand Valley Investors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo. 2025-74, filed 7/14/25. Much of a muchness, supervisors signing off before they lose their supervisees, the fight over who made the initial determination, but at the end of the day, the cool second look that Congress wanted has been swamped by the sloppy drafting of a remedial statute. Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber finds nothing new; citations are the usual suspects.

Judge Nega needs 55 (count ’em, 55) pages to deal with four (count ’em, four) consolidated cases, all with appraisal strikeouts. But even though the syndicated conservation easement deductions fail for want of competent appraisals, Judge Nega must decide if the substantial overvaluation chops that IRS wants to assess are warranted. So the defective appraisals are still at issue.

Spoiler alert!

IRS wins.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch finds that Garaad Mohamed Muse & Shukri Jeylani Abdalla, Docket No. 15191-24S, filed 7/14/25, avoid Section 6662 accuracy and negligence chops by standing on ceremony.

Gar & Shukri got married in their native Kenya in a religious ceremony valid by the laws of that country. They moved to MN, acquired irreconcilable differences, and got divorced by means of a ceremony that would have been valid back in Kenya.

When they petitioned the deficiency caused by their separate HOH filings during the year they were ceremonially divorced, they lost because MN law said they were still married. MN law says MN domiciliaries can get divorced only by judicial decree, even if validly married under foreign law. Federal tax law goes by State law for who is and is not married. If married under State law, even if living apart, one can file only MFS or MFJ. IRS classified Gar & Shukri as MFS, and recomputed their taxes accordingly.

IRS conceded the Section 6662 chops as to Shukri, but as Gar ran a tax prep business, they left him to face the chops.

“Mr. Muse married Ms. Abdallah in Kenya in manner accepted by both his religion and that country. In the eyes of Kenya, Minnesota, and the Federal government, this was a valid marriage. Following those same customs and practices, Mr. Muse and Ms. Abdalla ceremonially divorced. While not a valid dissolution of marriage in the state of Minnesota, Mr. Muse was nevertheless reasonable in his belief that he obtained a valid divorce. In his experience, following the traditions of his religion with respect to marriage was respected in the eyes of the law. We find that he acted with good faith and reasonably believed performing a ceremonial divorce would satisfy the requirements of divorce in Minnesota.” Transcript, at pp. 9-10.

I can’t close without noting yet another typographical error, but not in this opinion. Judge Buch has another off-the-bencher, Ashley M. Huber, Docket No. 10742-24, filed 7/14/25. Ashley’s a protester, who featured here a couple weeks ago (hi, Judge Holmes). Judge Buch refers to that.

“We will not impose sanctions in this case, but we caution Ms. Huber against taking frivolous positions in future litigation. Although we previously warned Ms. Huber about the possibility of a sanction in another case, Huber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-29, that opinion was issued mere days before this case was called. On this record, we will not impose a sanction under section 6673.” Transcript, at p. 11.

For the cited opinion, see my blogpost “Something New,” 6/5/25. The case is T. C. Memo. 2025-59, issued 6/5/25.

Even though Chem-Div Inc., Docket No. 6928-23, filed 7/14/25, substantially prevailed, didn’t unreasonably delay, and its claimed litigation costs were reasonable; and IRS agreed it has no substantial justification for  alleged $2 million ChemDiv’s deficiency, ChemDiv had too much cash in the bank the day it petitioned.

In consequence whereof, Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones finds ChemDiv doesn’t get Section 7430 legals.

ChemDiv’s trusty attorneys assert “… the balance sheet on the date of its Petition was an ‘anomaly,’ attributable to approximately $10,000,000 in cash that had not been distributed. ChemDiv argues that the Court should construe the law in accordance with ChemDiv’s view of Congressional intent since, as ChemDiv claims, it is exactly the type of taxpayer who should be able to recover costs. ChemDiv states that ‘determin[ing] Petitioner’s net worth based on a snapshot in time that is not consistent with its historical and accurate net worth is inconsistent with such Congressional intent.’ Accordingly, ChemDiv submits that its net worth is $5,704,610, and argues that a holding otherwise ‘would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent, the facts of this case, and would reward Respondent’s unreasonable conduct in this case.’” Order, at p. 5.

“Unreasonable” is putting it mildly. Check out Order at pp. 1-2, where “… the revenue agent said that she would not allow the accrual no matter what documentation ChemDiv provided.”

And when an Appeals conference ended with “no litigation risk” for IRS, Order, at p. 2, I wonder who made that assessment.

But the law says what it says.

“The statutes are clear. As applicable in this case, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) provides that a “party” means in relevant part a ‘corporation . . . the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.’ Section 7430 is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be strictly construed in the Commissioner’s favor. While we are sympathetic with ChemDiv’s frustration––at having to provide its substantiation to the IRS multiple times and engage in extended proceedings before respondent ultimately conceded nearly the entirety of the case––ChemDiv does not meet the net worth requirement. Accordingly, ChemDiv is not the ‘prevailing party’ within the meaning of section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) and is not entitled to recover any costs or fees in this case.” Order, at p. 5. (Citations omitted).

The trusty attorneys, whom I’ll call The Sullivans, get a Taishoff “Good try.” The client gets nothing.

No, Brandon the NC used car dealer who trumpets his travails with his all-cash sub-$5K bargains on YouTube under the moniker first set forth hereinabove at the head hereof (as my second-Grey-Goose-Gibson colleagues would say) is not in Tax Court (yet). And may never be.

Yet the much-lamented heavy monthly car payment is on Judge Goeke’s screen in Fritz B. Ziegler & Margaret S. Ziegler, Docket No. 4466-22L, filed 7/11/25. IRS wants to levy for the seven (count ’em, seven) self-reported but unpaid years, aggregating north of $350K. Fritz says he’s got insomnia and potential heart problems, can’t work and lives on Social Security.

Problem is, notwithstanding his ownership of a Subaru, Fritz signed up last year for another car.

“Petitioners’ arguments regarding the potential medical expenses, and the impact of the medical expenses on this case, are also inconsistent with a decision made by the Petitioners to incur a substantial car loan to buy an expensive vehicle in 2024. Petitioners purchased a Honda with the retail value of in excess of $51,000, and incurred a car loan, which required an in excess of $800-a-month payment. This transaction was on May 16th, 2024. The decision to make this transaction, and incur the additional monthly expense, is inconsistent with Petitioners’ position that they were concerned with the potential offset of medical expenses.” Transcript, at p. 8.

It seems Judge Goeke hasn’t gone car-shopping recently. My sources say $745 per month was the average payment for a new car last year, and a new Honda Pilot or Odyssey would’ve cost in that range in LA, Fritz’s home state, in 2024.

That said, Fritz & Margaret have $400K in home equity.

“The Settlement officer inquired about the equity in Petitioners’ home, which exceeds $400,000 in equity, and a vehicle; Petitioners owned a Subaru. His analysis was made without considering the impact of the purchase of the Honda. But we believe that purchase of the Honda, together with the fact that Petitioners have never made any serious effort to generate cash to pay this tax liability based upon their equity, supports the analysis of the Settlement officer. Petitioners would maintain they could not obtain any cash from their equity in their home, because there’s a lien on the home. However, it’s clear that Petitioners had no intent to ever sell the home to recoup the equity, or do any other arrangement with the Internal Revenue Service which might have used the equity in the home to satisfy their tax liability.” Transcript, at p. 10.

Answering a car question, don’t buy a new car if you owe taxes.

Unfortunately, Judge Cathy (“NCY = No Cognomen Yet”) Fung passes on applying the fuggedaboutit broadbrush of Loper-Bright Ent. to IRS Notice 2010-16, the change-of-address protocol, in Donna Davis, T. C. Memo. 2025-72, filed 7/10/25. She brushes off Donna’s trusty attorney’s attempt to brush off the famous protocol thus: “Because our decision in this case does not rely on Revenue Procedure 2010-16, we need not discuss the deference afforded to the IRS.” T. C. Memo. 2025-72, at p. 3, footnote 4.

I wish Judge NCY Fung had stirred a wee bit silt, as change-of-address jumpballs are a commonplace.

Donna’s got testimony but no paper. She even tried telephoning IRS to get her address change properly inputted but couldn’t get through the automated system. She shows the draft of a letter she says she sent IRS but can’t prove she mailed it. IRS has a properly completed PS 3877 and a tax return showing the address to which IRS sent the SND.

IRS wins; the SND was sent to the last known address, and Donna is out.

What deference, if any, Rev. Proc. 2010-16 gets remains a mystery.

Wash sales, where substantially identical securities are bought and sold within a 30 day window, generate no recognized deductible tax losses, per Section 1091. But IRS fails to go through the brokerage statement to verify if any of the losses claimed by Juan Carlos Wandemberg Boschetti, Docket No. 11045-24S, filed 7/9/25, were in fact generated from wash sales.

So Juan Carlos gets the Section 165(f) loss, as limited by Section 1211(b) to $3000. He does have to pick up the $85K in wages he didn’t report, claiming he folded them into his stock market losses (which he surely had but can’t deduct more than $3K thereof in year at issue); IRS magnanimously folds the chops.

Juan Carlos fails to articulate why the $3K limit is unconstitutional as he claims, and STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden can’t find any reason.

Juan Carlos does get a Taishoff “Good Try, Novelty Division.”

Tax Court judges don’t do tax prep; that’s why we have Rule 155 beancounts. The opinion sets out the appurtenant principles. Each party does the arithmetic in conformance therewith. If they don’t agree, they can only fight about numbers.

If one party is unhappy with the principles, they can seek reconsideration (Rule 161) or revision (Rule 162) but they have only 30 (count ’em, 30) days to do it. As this is Tax Court, of course the 30 day period starts to run from a different point under each Rule.

Of course, there is a right of appeal in regular cases, but that arises only after entry of the decision which incorporates one of the Rule 155 submissions.

Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall continues the CPE class she started a year ago in Kenneth Steven Tuma, Sr. & Deborah Ann Tuma, Docket No. 15553-18, filed 7/9/25. Part One of the lesson can be found in my blogpost “Cannot Be Proved Too Often,” 7/11/24.

Ken wants a stay while he appeals. IRS wants more time to do their numbers. As this is extension number four, Judge AIM cautions the parties they’re not getting any more after this one, despite Ken’s ill health and IRS’ innumeracy. But there’s no stay.

“If a party disagrees with the opinion, then it follows that the party will also disagree with the computation. He will disagree even with his own computation, since his computation must be based on an opinion that he thinks is incorrect. But nonetheless his task is to perform the computation according to that opinion. His task is not to perform a computation according to the opinion he thinks the Court should have issued – but rather, to perform a computation according to the opinion the Court did issue. If a party disagrees with the Court’s opinion (and with the decision entered in accordance with it), then that party’s remedy would be an appeal from the Court’s decision, see Rule 190 and I.R.C. §7482, after that decision has been entered.” Order, at p. 1.

So do the numbers.

Edited to add, 7/10/25: And note that the bond you’ll need to post per Section 7485(a)(1) will be based upon the computation with which you disagree.