IRS wanted a remand to fill out their case against Michael E. Lunnon, and Judge Marvel gave them one. For that part of our story, see my blogpost “Chenery and the Record,” 8/12/15.

But the supplemental NOD from the remand can’t cure the problem with the first NOD. That omitted one quarter of Mike’s 941 obligations.

Judge Marvel: “Respondent contends that the Court has jurisdiction to review the NFTL filing for the [omitted] Form 941 liability because its omission from the original notices of determination was an inadvertent clerical error, petitioner ‘substantively received a hearing with respect to’ the collection action, and the supplemental notice of determination ‘simply clarifies that the hearing and determination [with respect to the liability] were embedded in the original notices of determination and hearing’. We therefore consider whether the original notices of determination confer jurisdiction over the NFTL filing for petitioner’s [omitted] Form 941 liability, and if not, whether the supplemental notice of determination cures the jurisdictional defect.” 146 T. C. 2, at p. 18.

Yes, it’s a full-dress T. C., LG Kendrick, LLC, 146 T. C. 2, filed 1/21/16.

And the answers to the considered questions Judge Marvel raises is “no and no.”

While the old truism that all Tax Court needs for Sections 6230/6330 CDP review is “a written notice that embodies a determination to proceed with the collection of the taxes in issue, and a timely filed petition,” (146 T. C. 2, at pp. 18-19, citation omitted), and typos and finger-fehler don’t disqualify a NOD if petitioner wasn’t confused or misled, this is worse.

“…the instant case is distinguishable from cases where the jurisdictional notice contained a typographical or other minor error but still revealed on its face that the Commissioner had made a determination with respect to a particular period. The tables within the original notices of determination listed all periods and collection activities for which the Appeals Office had made determinations. They did not include the NFTL filing for petitioner’s [omitted] Form 941 liability. Nothing in the remainder of the notices hints that the Appeals Office made a determination with respect to the NFTL filing for that liability. The references to the taxable period…on the first pages of the original notices of determination do not provide clarification because the notices address other collection activities with respect to that period.” 146 T. C. 2, at p. 23 (Footnote omitted, but I’ll give it to you anyway.)

“Although sec. 6320 and sec. 6330 hearings are often held jointly when the Commissioner has proposed to levy and has filed an NFTL with respect to the same taxable period, a proposed levy and an NFTL filing are distinct collection activities for which the Commissioner must make separate determinations, even if those determinations are embodied in the same notice of determination. See secs. 6320, 6321, 6330, 6331.” 146 T. C. 2, at p. 23, footnote 16.

And though IRS tries to argue some permutation of “agreed to be tried,” and claims Mike and the AO talked about this at the hearing on remand, that’s not enough.

“The fundamental purpose of a notice of determination, i.e., to notify the taxpayer of the Appeals Office’s determination to sustain a collection action for a particular taxable period, was not fulfilled. We also do not look behind the notice, as respondent urges us to do, to determine whether petitioner ‘substantively received a hearing with respect to the [omitted] Form 941 liability’. It is the Appeals Office’s written determination, not the fact that a section 6320/6330 hearing occurred, that is the basis for our jurisdiction.” 146 T. C. 2, at p. 24 (Citation omitted).

And the supplemental hearing at Appeals is just that—supplemental. It can’t put back what wasn’t there to begin with. The supplemental NOD can only deal with the original notices. Mike gets no new right of review from the supplemental NOD.

So the omitted quarter is omitted. The supplemental NOD gives Tax Court no jurisdiction over the omitted quarter. So Mike can’t contest the liability or the NFTL or the NITL therefor.

For the rest, Mike produced no evidence disputing what periods were properly in review, the AO had new evidence about those periods that Mike got to see, so Mike gets no chance to contest those now.

Once again, the same takeaway. Be careful when you ask for a remand.

Hand Out a Taishoff “Good Try”

Especially do I wish, because the recipient would be a colleague who has enlivened discussions at the meetings of an American Bar Association – New York State Bar Association Joint Subcommittee of which I am a member.

But I can’t. My colleague really went for the green off the tee, and it would have been great if he made the shot, but it lands in a bunker.

Here’s the story, featuring Andy Beer, last seen in my blogpost “The Front,” 3/12/15. Andy, Harvard BA and MBA, was a monger of dubious (to be polite) tax dodges.

IRS wants to slug Andy with the Section 6707 dodger chops. My colleague and his firm, summoned to represent a brigade of Andy’s dodge ‘em cars, in this case Endeavor Partners Fund, LLC, Delta Currency Trading, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., 2016 T. C. Memo. 12, filed 1/20/16, gets the short end of the stick from Judge Lauber.

My colleague and firm (hereinafter “the guys”) want IRS to hold off on Andy while they duke it out on the LLCs, because the TMPs for the LLCs might win on their accuracy chops fight with IRS. If IRS nails Andy, they claim, the LLCs are deprived of their chance of winning thereon.

IRS says “same facts, but different statutory provisions, and Tax Court can’t interfere on a Section 6707 chop.”

Oh yes we can, says Judge Lauber, but only in a CDP where petitioner didn’t get a chance to contest liability. And we’re nowhere near there yet with Andy.

“Congress has provided this Court with jurisdiction to review assessable penalties in a collection due process (CDP) context. See Gardner v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. __, __ (slip op. at 21) (Aug. 26, 2015) (‘[S]ection 6330(d)(1) provides this Court with jurisdiction to review an appeal from the Commissioner’s determination to proceed with collection activity regardless of the type of underlying tax involved.’). If Mr. Beer receives a notice of determination with respect to the section 6707 penalties and the IRS seeks to collect those liabilities by lien or levy, he may challenge that collection action under section 6330(d). If he has not had a prior opportunity to contest the penalties and properly raises them at the CDP hearing, he may seek review in this Court under section 6330(d)(1) of his underlying liability for the penalties.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 12, at pp. 7-8, Footnote 4.

As for Gardner, see my blogpost “The End of an Affair,” 8/26/15.

The 6707 dodge-monger chop is an assessable penalty. No need for a SNOD; IRS need only demand.

Once again claiming that the “small court” has only microscopic jurisdiction, Judge Lauber can’t get into a Section 6707 dust-up at this stage.

The guys claim Tax Court needs to protect its jurisdiction to rule on the accuracy chops for the LLCs. But they have no authority for their position, and the Anti-Injunction Act, Section 7421, stymies their attempt to stop IRS. Tax Court can enjoin certain IRS actions as respects partnerships, but this isn’t one of them.

The guys claim there are common questions of law and fact in Andy’s chops and the FPAAs that the LLCs have to deal with.

Judge Lauber says, that isn’t my problem.

“There may well be issues of fact or law that are common to these cases and to the ongoing IRS investigation of Mr. Beer. But if that is true, it has absolutely no effect on this Court’s ability to ‘make a binding ruling’ in the cases over which it has jurisdiction. Indeed, it often happens that a factual or legal issue raised in a case before us is also involved in a pending IRS proceeding, e.g., in an audit of the same taxpayer or a related taxpayer for a different tax period. The remedy in such circumstances is not to have this Court enjoin the pending IRS proceeding. Rather, if the outcome of the Tax Court proceeding is inconsistent with the outcome of the pending IRS proceeding, the taxpayer’s remedy is to appeal and bring the relevant facts and law to the attention of the reviewing court(s).” 2016 T. C. Memo. 12, at pp. 10-11.

And the guys’ final stop-loss, asking for a Section 7482 interlocutory appeal, is a complete non-starter.

“Because Mr. Beer’s potential liability for section 6707 penalties is not an issue in these cases, there is no ‘controlling question of law’ with respect to them. There is no reasonable ground, much less a ‘substantial ground,’ for difference of opinion concerning this Court’s lack of authority to enjoin an independent and ongoing IRS investigation of Mr. Beer. And an immediate appeal from our order denying the requested injunction would not advance in any way, much less ‘materially advance,’ the ultimate termination of this litigation. The trial for these consolidated cases has been completed; the record is closed; posttrial briefing is in process; and an opinion will be issued in due course.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 12, at pp. 12-13.

I don’t think the guys will be overjoyed when that opinion gets published. Sorry, guys.

I haven’t gone in for writing John LeCarre spy-counterspy stories. I take the title of Mr. Cornwell’s 1968 novel to discuss Gerd Topsnik, lead-off hitter in 146 T. C., and his peregrinations from Germany to the United States to the Philippines. In the meantime, IRS hits Gerd with a $139K deficiency when Gerd tried to bail on his US Green Card without jumping through the Section 877A hoops and disgorging appropriately.

There are actually three (count ‘em, three) towns in Germany (whether small or not I cannot tell) where Gerd claims his German passport, driver license and actual abode was situated, but the German Competent Authority couldn’t find hide nor hair of Gerd, so the tax treaty between US and Germany avails him not. Though Germany taxes its citizens on their world-wide income (I bet you didn’t know that either), Gerd never paid taxes there.

Gerd sold out of his CA gourmet food business after a feud with his partners, and got paid on the installment plan.

The issue was the value of the installment obligation in Gerd’s hand the day before he handed in his green card. That is, the day he filed Form I-407, the official notice to bail, and US Citizenship & Immigration Service accepted the form.

Gerd had a wee problem. “Since filing his Form I-407 petitioner has failed to file the required Form 8854, Initial and Annual Expatriation Statement, and has failed to certify, under penalties of perjury, that he has complied with all of his U.S. Federal tax obligations for the five taxable years preceding the taxable year that includes the expatriation date, including his obligations to file income tax returns and obligations to pay all relevant tax liabilities, interest, and penalties.” 146 T. C. 1, at p. 5.

Gerd couldn’t so certify, because he hadn’t.

You can see where this is going. IRS hit Gerd with a jeopardy assessment and levied on the monthly installment payments Gerd was getting from his former partners. Gerd sued in USDCCDCA, but got tossed because he claimed he resided in Germany, and had therefore to go to USCFC, which has jurisdiction over tax refund claims wherever the claimant may be. This Gerd did, while his appeal to Ninth Circuit over the District Court toss was pending. IRS objected, but Gerd’s case is still in USCFC.

Meanwhile, Gerd is fighting in Tax Court, and Judge Kerrigan gives IRS summary J.

Gerd claims he’s a German national and protected from the US tax regime by virtue of the tax treaty. But the magic language is in a protocol adopted after the treaty was signed, which reads as follows: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof. The term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in that State or of profits attributable to a permanent establishment in that State or capital situated therein.” 146 T. C. 1, at p. 12.

Now intangible property (like an installment note from a US partnership) is taxed in country of residence, per the treaty. And Gerd had his green card until he handed it over. The German Competent Authority couldn’t find Gerd in “the German township of Oerlenbach, Freiburg City, or Bruchsal.” 146 T. C. 1, at p. 17. Occasional stopovers in the odd wirtschaft don’t cut it.

Question remaining: is Gerd a “covered expatriate” per Section 877(a)? In that case all his property is marked-to-market as of the day before the day he bails, and he owes tax on the ganze geschäft.

Judge Kerrigan: “Section 877A(i) provides that the Secretary shall prescribe regulations as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of the section. Such regulations have not been yet been provided. Instead, the IRS has promulgated guidance regarding this section in Notice 2009-85, 2009-45 I.R.B. 598.   We are not bound by Notice 2009-85, supra…, but it is an official statement of the Commissioner’s position and we may let it persuade us….” 146 T. C. 1, at p. 20 (citations omitted).

Judge Kerrigan lets it persuade her.

The test is whether the property would be included in Gerd’s estate for estate tax purposes if he had died, rather than bailed. Of course it would.

And Gerd’s claim that he made the sale before Section 877A was enacted is nothing to the point. He still held the installment note, it was worth a bundle, and payments were still due.

What remains to be litigated in USCFC is a good question.

Once again the divorce lawyers mess up, and the clients take the hit. The pain comes to Richard W. Leavitt, a chiropractor, but all his skills cannot cure the pain Judge Dawson gives him in Family Chiropractic Sports Injury & Rehab Clinic, Inc., 2016 T. C. Memo. 10, filed 1/19/16, a very special day in our family.

When Rich and Heidi, his loved-once and fellow participant in the Family Chiropractic ESOP, divorced, the decree spoke of their shareholdings in Family Chiropractic, and split those fifty-fifty, but said nothing about the shares credited to her in the ESOP (and shares in Family Chiropractic, a C Corp, was all the ESOP held).

Then Heidi gave away her shares in the ESOP to Rich, “in accordance with the divorce decree.”

ERISA experts will see that this breaches the anti-alienation provisions of Section 401(a)(13)(A). Like life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, you can’t give away your vested qualified ESOP benefits.

Judge Dawson waxes lyrical about protecting the poor workers from losing their vested, presumably hard-earned, benefits, but I’ll spare you.

Of course, once you’ve breached, you (or rather, your ESOP) is out, permanently. “In general, a qualification failure pursuant to section 401(a) is a continuing failure because allowing a plan to requalify in subsequent years would be to allow a plan ‘to rise phoenix-like from the ashes of such disqualification and become qualified for that year.’ Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001, 1015 (1978); see also Martin Fireproofing Profit-Sharing Plan & Tr. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 1184-1189.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 10, at p. 12.

Now we know that Section 414(p) provides that a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO, pronounced “Quadro”) trumps the anti-alienation provisions. But the divorce decree (made under Iowa law) never cites to Section 414(p) and makes no attempt to comply; it doesn’t even mention the ESOP shares.

So Judge Dawson blows it off in a footnote. “Family Chiropractic admits that the divorce decree did not address Heidi’s benefits under the ESOP. Accordingly, we need not discuss sec. 414(p) qualified domestic relations orders, which are an exception to the antialienation provisions. See sec. 401(a)(13)(B).” 2016 T. C. Memo. 10, at p. 15, footnote 10.

Two sentences in the decree would have saved the ESOP’s qualification from the divorce year going forward.

I’ve blogged the family lawyers’ errors too many times, I know. And it sounds like I’m picking on them. And I know, believe me I know, that there but for the grace of you-know-Whom go I or any of us.

But guys, when there’s a business involved, or children, or dependents, or retirement plans, or anything beyond furniture-and-household-pets, get the tax guys on the horn. Please.

Remember Rule 91(f)? If you’re a regular follower of this my blog (a poor thing but mine own), sure you do.

It’s Tax Court’s equivalent of what we here in The Empire State call a Rule 3120, referring to our Civil Practice Law and Rules, a Notice to Admit.

I’m a great fan thereof, as I’ve noted elsewhere. Cf, e.g., my blogpost “Got Gas?”, 10/21/15.

But, as I criticized Judge Laro and the IRS in that case for pulling a fast one by way of a Rule 91(f) OSC, today I criticize Big Julie, more formally known as His Honor Big Julie Judge Julian I Jacobs, hereinafter referred to as HHBJJJIJ, for adding a word to the Rule in accepting IRS’s story in toto, in a designated hitter Kevin D. Tebedo, Docket No. 3694-15, filed 1/15/16.

First, the text of the Rule, in relevant part, from Tax Court’s own website. “If no response is filed within the period specified with respect to any matter or portion thereof, or if the response is evasive or not fairly directed to the proposed stipulation or portion thereof, that matter or portion thereof will be deemed stipulated for purposes of the pending case, and an order will be issued accordingly.” Rule 91(f)(3).

HHBJJJIJ deems the entire IRS proposal admitted under Rule 91(f)(3). OK, was Kevin frivolous, or cute?

Not according to the order. “Petitioner’s response was not fairly directed to all matters in the proposed Stipulation of Facts.” Order, at p. 1.

So was Kev’s response fairly directed to some matters? Must a response be directed to all matters? What if a party responds to some matters directly, but not to some others? Is there no partially deemed admitted matter? Or did HHBJJJIJ mean that Kev’s response wasn’t fairly directed to any matters, rather than not directed to all matters? The Rule says “the proposed stipulation or portion thereof will be deemed admitted….”, not all matters.

It does matter.

Muhammad R. Siddiqui & Sadaf Rashid, Docket No. 27469-14, filed 1/14/16, don’t get to find out the answer, because Mu isn’t ignorant and Sad isn’t involved, in this designated off-the-bencher from that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson.

Mu has a bushelbasketful of unsubstantiated Sched As, including unreimbursed business expenses in amounts and years he can’t establish, medical payments for admittedly dependent parents ditto, and mileage for carrying friends’ kids along with his own to various events from his masjid (admittedly a 501(c)(3)).

Easy enough for IRS’ counsel to blow up Mu. And Sadaf apparently was at home with their four minor children, earning no money but working hard.

So why blog this one? Well, because Mu has a bunch of degrees, and that gets him the penalty chops.

“Admittedly, Mr. Siddiqui is not a tax expert, but he is an intelligent and educated man. Even apart from his inability or failure to substantiate his deductions at the time of trial in 2016, the errors on his [late filed] tax return… claiming deductions for medical expenses incurred in a prior year, claiming charitable contribution deductions for the cost of driving himself and his family to religious and recreational activities, and claiming deductions for employee expenses incurred four years earlier…were errors that should not have been committed by a person of above-average intelligence, with twelve years’ prior experience in filing tax returns. If… Mr. Siddiqui did not know the basic rule that one deducts in a given year the expenses that he paid or incurred in that year, then one cannot say that he exerted appropriate ‘effort to assess [his] proper tax liability’.” Order, at pp. 15-16 of transcript.

Mu’s education? “In Pakistan he had completed a bachelor’s degree in physics, chemistry, and mathematics; a second bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering; and a master’s degree in applied physics. In the U.S. he earned a master’s degree in computer science at Roosevelt University in Chicago, Illinois.” Order, at p. 4 of transcript.

Practitioner, do you really want your client’s resume on the record? Might it not be well to tell your client to hold off on bragging about his degrees?

What have Belize, Benin, Burundi, Lesotho, Chad, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Libya, Yemen, Bolivia and Rwanda in common? Nobody in any of those countries has read so much as one of my blogposts.

Come on, folks, they’re non-toxic, alcohol-free and easy on the digestion. Gib’ a kook, as Grandma would have said. Or ‘ave a dekko, if you prefer.

I’d like to say, as a much more exalted writer than I put it, “their sound is gone out into all lands, and their words unto the ends of the earth.”

Judge Tamara W. Ashford is not as obliging as her colleague Judge David Gustafson. She won’t visit you in the Stony Lonesome, especially when you’re doing 55 years hard in the State of Illinois Correctional System. And that’s sure a lot of correcting.

This is the story of Don Wang, Petitioner and Misook N. Wang, Intervenor, Docket No. 10434-14, filed 1/13/16, but it’s really Misook’s story.

“…Misook N. Wang filed with the Court a document titled ‘Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum.’ The document is actually a Cook County, Illinois petition for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, wherein intervenor requests this Court to issue a writ for her appearance before the Court at the Court’s March 14, 2016, Chicago, Illinois Trial Session.” Order, at p. 1.

It seems that, back some years ago, Misook murdered her mother-in-law. And Don, not surprisingly, wants a divorce.

Tough luck, Misook.

“This Court is without authority to direct the United States Marshals Service to transport a state prisoner to and from this federal court’s courtroom. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 39 (1985). In addition, in her motion, intervenor does not state that appropriate arrangements for payment of the costs associated with her appearance at petitioner Don Wang’s trial currently calendared for the Court’s… Chicago, Illinois Trial Session have been made.” Order, at p.1.

But Misook doesn’t have to contemplate taxation without representation in addition to her other woes. “Intervenor is advised that, in lieu of personally appearing at trial, she may choose to hire a practitioner admitted to practice before the Court to represent her or she may submit a written statement pursuant to Rule 50(c) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

So if you or a client are doing hard time, there’s an alternative to a trip to Tax Court.

In the days of my youth, the old Saturday Evening Post ran an ad for something called Hastings Piston Rings that read “Tough, but oh so gentle.”

I’d like to apply that epithet to Judge Laro. Surely Judge Laro maintains a no-nonsense persona on the bench, and is no friend of dodgers, protesters, stallers or assorted wiseacres.

But when mercy is called for, Judge Laro is the man.

For an instance where mercy asked for is denied, see my blogpost “Asperged and Disabled,” 10/19/15. But when the Good Guy needs to shine from the bench, Judge Laro comes through. For a lawyer, yet.

In witness whereof, check out John A. Tomassetti & Cathy C. Tomassetti, Docket No. 12746-11, filed 1/12/16.

John and Cathy were collateral damage in the blowing up of the Sterling Benefit Plan, which certainly wasn’t sterling, nor did it benefit anyone but the promoters of that dodge. For more about this penguin, see my blogpost “Splitsville,” 7/14/15.

But John and Cathy weren’t alone. They and their fellows amongst the blown-up were invited to a Rule 155 beancount. Now unscrambling this particular omelet took more than the usual unsubstantiated Sched A or Sched C, and John and Cathy’s counsel had a squad of blown-up scramblers to unravel.

Apparently counsel moved for more time to submit computations for some, but not all, of the blown-up scramblers. And got it. I told you Judge Laro was a decent guy.

But counsel left John and Cathy twisting slowly in the cliché. So IRS moves to enter their undisputed numbers, and Judge Laro does.

Finding out that IRS’ numbers went in without a fight, John and Cathy ask for a Rule 162 vacate or revise. IRS claims they showed no grounds why the decision should be vacated, revised or anything else.

“Rule 162 does not provide a standard by which to evaluate a motion to vacate a decision. See Rule 162; Brewer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-10. Accordingly, this Court refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance in this matter, specifically, to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1(b); Cinema ’84 v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 264, 267-268 (2004), afd, 412 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2005); Seiffert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-61, at *7. Motions to vacate or revise our decision are generally not granted absent a showing of unusual circumstance or substantial error, such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other reasons justifying relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Seiffert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-61, at *7.

“In this case, petitioners’ counsel handled several cases consolidated for the purpose of briefing and opinion. In some of these cases, the counsel filed a motion to extend the time to submit computations under Rule 155, but in others, including this case, failed to do the same. After reviewing the parties’ filings, we attribute petitioners’ counsel failure to comply with the deadline for submitting computations under Rule 155 to inadvertent mistake or excusable neglect. These reasons are sufficient to support petitioners’ motion to vacate the decision entered in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Seiffert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-61, at *7. Doing so would better serve the interests of justice.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

I left in the citations so y’all could drag and drop the language for your next Rule 162. And hopefully you get before Judge Laro.

Now for another goodie for lawyers, but this one is a cautionary tale. I direct this one to you calendar callers, for whose diligent pro bono efforts I have high praise. But beware lest your good nature be abused.

Cast an eyeball on Brent Edward Crummey and Cheryl Battista Crummey, 2016 T. C. Memo. 9, filed 1/12/16. Brent is a bad dude, having gone down on six (count ‘em, six) counts of filing false claims for tax refunds based on his convoluted but frivolous trust scheme.

Now for the trial on the 75% fraud chops, IRS lets Cheryl Battista off the fraud hook, but they want heavy chops on Brent, a Symantec software engineer who should know better.

I won’t go through Judge Cohen’s “somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent” to detoxify Brent’s arguments, which he drops at the last pre-trial minute, apparently realizing that the cliché is up.

No, here’s the point, calendar callers. “At the time of trial on October 26, 2015, petitioner abandoned his positions and testified that he had taken the positions in good faith. (He apparently did so after consulting with an attorney who volunteered to counsel unrepresented taxpayers without charge at the time of Tax Court calendar call and before trial.)” 2016 T. C. Memo. 9, at pp. 6-7.

Good job, volunteer, but beware. Some of these dodgers and protesters will try to hide behind your well-intentioned counsel to exculpate themselves from punishment for their well-planned and nefarious schemes. Don’t leave your skepticism at the courthouse door.

As Walt Whitman didn’t say, but Ch J Michael B. (“Iron Mike”) Thornton does. Ch J Iron Mike has good news for the computerly-enabled, as Tax Court proposes to amend the Rules to permit electronic filing of petitions and amendments thereto.

About time.

But don’t think that all you need is pdf and an internet connection, therewith to do as the late great (and Wicked) Wilson Pickett, and “wait till the midnight hour” to file.

Here’s the story. http://ustaxcourt.gov/press/011116.pdf