You’ll need to go to Google or your favorite search engine to find her, but she gives her name (now sometimes rendered as “Cinnamon”) to one who should’a gotten recognition as part of IRS’ winning team back in March. The opinion is Anthony A. Klein and Barbara N. Klein, T. C. Memo. 2026-29, filed back on 3/30/26. but now corrected as at 7/7/26.

I blogged the case as “Blowing Smoke,” 3/30/26, but you needn’t either reread my blogpost, nor read Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland’s corrected fourteen (count ’em, fourteen) pages.

Judge Tex Copeland has kindly provided a one-page Order of even date herewith that tells the whole story.

The corrected T. C. Memo. “reflects the following revision on page 1: “Brian J. Sullivan and James H. Wonzy, for respondent.” is substituted with the following: “Keziah Dutchak-Leonard, Brian J. Sullivan, and James H. Wonzy, for respondent.” Order, at p. 1.

Sorry to nitpick, Judge, but I think James H.’s handle is “Wozny,” and not “Wonzy.”

Btw, Keziah, Job’s middle daughter, is a symbol of woman’s equality. See Job 42:14-15. She and her sisters get equal shares in Dad’s estate, rare back then.

I requested from Transcripts & Copies a copy of the Response to Order that within seven days petr. submit copies of Badaracco, more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “AI AI, AI AI,” 6/12/26. Said Response was e-filed 6/18/26, but is not available otherwise than on request and payment of the fee.

I quote from the Preliminary statement (footnote omitted).

“I accept responsibility for the citation errors the Order identifies. The errors are mine, not the client’s, and they did not reach Petitioner’s post-trial briefing. Petitioner attaches the opinions the Order names (Exhibits A and B), withdraws the misquotations and misattributions the Order identifies, and submits this Response in compliance with the Order. The withdrawn material appeared in Petitioner’s papers opposing the Commissioner’s motions for partial summary judgment. Petitioner confines this Response to what the Order directs and does not reopen that briefing. Because the withdrawal removes material from Petitioner’s own papers, and the Court has, by Order served June 18, 2026, granted the Commissioner’s motions for partial summary judgment, Petitioner does not address the potential prejudice to Respondent.”

The senior attorney of the Petitioner’s legal team accepts personal responsibility at p 5 of the Response.

I will not comment.

With climate science mapping the retreat of glaciers, perhaps the old simile for slow progression should be retired. So I’ll propose “geological” for “glacial” to describe the pace of Possum Rock, LLC, Carrol Beavers, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 22637-22, filed 7/6/27.

This is a SCE from 2016 (pre-BBA), FPAA issued and petitioned in July, 2022. So we’re now four (count ’em, four) years into the process. A quick docket search reveals that two (count ’em, two) stips of fact and one of settled issues have so far been filed. So discovery should be about finished, right? After all, this Order says the case was set for trial in May, 2026 in Atlanta (except an Order dated 6/12/26 says May, 2027).

Not so fast, says Judge Morrison.

He lists fourteen (count ’em, fourteen) items, either facts or documents, unstiped and unprovided, which shall form a stipulation of (you should pardon the expression) basic facts. Like contracts of sale, deeds, reports, and what thereof was attached to the 1065 for year at issue. Of course, you might call the documents Proposed Trial Exhibits, but whatever the nomenclature, with a $19.8 million charitable deduction on the line and interest presumably running, y’all might want to put the pedal to the cliché.

From the United States Tax Court website, July 3, 2026:

Opinions are generally filed at 3:00 PM. If you are receiving this message after 3:00 PM, there are no opinions today.

No orders have been issued today.

John R. Dee, 167 T. C. 1, filed 7/2/26, got his whistleblowing info to IRS a month after they had finished auditing Target (the taxpayer, not the store), and had their agreed audit report undergoing internal review. John’s info related to three (count ’em, three) items in Target’s year at issue return, of which two resulted in no change and a $2 million deficiency in the third. But all this had been resolved and agreed to before John’s info got to Ogden. So Ogden bounced John’s Form 211.

John petitions and wants to put in additional extra-record evidence. Judge Nega undertakes the obligatory jurisdictional review.

“Under Li and Kennedy, the Court lacks jurisdiction over a petition relating to a whistleblower’s claim if that claim is rejected at the threshold (Li) or forwarded to an examination team and no examination occurs (Kennedy). Then under Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner, 149 F.4th at 718, the Court has jurisdiction over a petition relating to a whistleblower’s claim if that claim is forwarded to an active or open examination, regardless of whether action was taken based on the whistleblower’s claim. See Lissack v. Commissioner, 125 F.4th at 255 (holding that the Court has jurisdiction when the IRS ‘proceeds with’ an action under section 7623(b)(1)).” 167 T. C. 1, at p. 6.

But what happens after the audit is over? Insinga seems to say that once audit is done, there’s nothing to review. But Judge Nega says that’s a false bright line. Until anything taxpayer owed is paid, a lot can happen, and blower info could help rake in the cash.

Happily, Rev. Proc. 2005-32, § 4.01, 2005-1 C.B. 1206, defines what is a “closed case.” And this case isn’t “closed,” because internal review hadn’t yet concluded and no Section 7121 closing agreement had been signed. And if “unagreed,” assessment hadn’t yet occurred, so the case is definitely not closed.

Now before my ultrasophisticated readers cry out as one “So what?! Since when has Tax Court been bound by a Rev. Proc, even before Loper Bright?” Judge Nega says Rev. Proc.s still provide useful guidance.

John’s additional evidence wasn’t before Exam, and his memo of a purported phonecon with a WBO Analyst is neither necessary background information, nor deliberately or negligently excluded from the record, and it does not indicate a failure to fully explain the WBO’s actions so as to frustrate judicial review. 167 T. C.1, at p. 11.

Denial of award sustained.

Long-time Tax Court observers snap up judicial conundra, admiring the intellectual sinuosities that befuddle counsel and make them yearn for any off-ramp they can sell the client. Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern is no slouch in that department, so trusty attorneys for both IRS and Todd A. Govig & April M. McGrath et al., Docket No. 22991-22, filed 7/1/26, can consider their July Fourth weekend ruined by the nine (count ’em, nine) pages of conundra Judge Big Jim bestows upon them.

After telling them to brief a Loper Bright attack on the SDLIA reg (Reg Section 1.61-22(d)(2)(ii)), he sends them down a briefing rabbit hole via Section 83(h) and Section 419, telling them to emerge with QinetiQ Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries firmly within their grasp.

For the QinetiQ backstory, see my blogposts “Truth or Forfeits,” 7/22/15, and “Unbonded,” 10/30/18.

Oh, and of course trusty attorneys may brief anything else they think is to the point.

Taishoff offers this translation from the Halpernese: “Settle this case, guys. If y’all keep this up, y’all will not like the opinion you will make me write.”

It’s such a cliché, but this is one on which I am prepared to wager an ale or two at Jake’s Saloon that you can’t make this stuff up. But let Judge Nega tell the story of Rosie K. Boparai, Docket No. 7789-25, filed 6/30/26.

“Petitioner’s tax return for 2019 was due (after the granting of an extension) on October 15, 2020. Petitioner did not file her 2019 return by that date. 

“On July 17, 2023, petitioner appeared in person at the Sacramento Taxpayer Assistance Center and attempted to hand-deliver her 2019 tax return. Respondent’s employees refused to accept her hand-delivered return without petitioner having first made an appointment for that purpose. That same day, petitioner sent an envelope containing her 2019 return that requested a refund and a check for $10,000 by certified mail to a no-longer-operated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) P.O. Box in San Francisco, California. She included the check despite claiming a refund on the return because she believed that the inclusion of a check would speed up the processing of the return.” Order, at p. 1.

Of course Section 7502 doesn’t help, because the mailpiece was misaddressed.  See Section 7502(a)(2)(B); see also Reg Section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(i). Had Rosie filed properly in 2023, she would have gotten the refund (IRS conceded the deficiency). The 2019 1040 instructions said for overdue returns, use the latest address, and the SF PO Box wasn’t it. 

“Had she consulted the instructions for tax year 2019 with the degree of detail that she claims, she would have seen the directive instructing her to refer to the tax year 2022 instructions to find the proper address for mailing her return.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

PS- IRS finally got Rosie’s return last May.

Two Sum. Ops., but each has a twist.

Gregory A. Rodrigues, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-4, filed 6/29/26, is the usual story of insufficiently-documented Section 274 travel, meals, and entertainment expenses for his real estate operations with his Harvard B-School buddies.  

CSTJ Zachary S. (“High Rise”) Fried: “The trips included travel with petitioner’s business school friends and with Ms. George, with whom petitioner shares a residence and a child. Although petitioner maintains that Ms. George accompanied him in her capacity as his attorney, the record contains no documentary evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and under the circumstances, we reject that assertion.” T. C. Sum. Op. 4, at p. 7. 

Seems the reverse of the usual situation.

He does get a grand or two of business expenses.

Edmund Ha, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, filed 6/29/26, is an even greater traveler, but his fiduciary duty to his clients (he’s a high-priced international broker) prevents him from doing the Section 274 number with his preparer.  This costs him deductions and chops.

But STJ Peter (“HB”) Panuthos bows to Cohan to allow Edmund his home office expense deduction.

“In support petitioner submitted a log, credit card statements, a floor plan of his apartment, and a receipt for eight rental payments at his home address…. 

“Petitioner’s log lists the expense, the amount, and the purpose of each item reported. Petitioner testified credibly as to his business as a real estate agent, and the Court is satisfied that petitioner operated exclusively out of his home, incurred the listed expenses, and that those expenses had a business purpose. Consequently, petitioner has provided sufficient evidence for the Court to rely on the Cohan rule to estimate petitioner’s home office expenses. 

“Accordingly, the Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to a deduction for his home office and related expenses.” T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-5, at p. 7.

It’s up to the Rule 155 beancount to see how heavily STJ Panuthos bears on Edmund for inexactitude of his own making.

Frantic Frank Wins One

IRS tried to levy on Joseph White, T. C. Memo. 2026-56, filed 6/29/26, for a Restitution-Based Assessment (RBA) north of $1.8 million.

Except.

Joe was (a) making all payments due currently on stiped decision in USDCEDPA which still has a year to run, and (b) Joe is represented by none other than The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys and barbecue king hisself, Frantic Frank Agostino, Esq. 

Joe hadn’t exactly been a model taxpayer. He hadn’t filed for nine (count ’em, nine) years, until his ex-wife’s trusty attorneys made him come clean (or at least try). He bounced a check for a subsequent year’s tax. At Appeals, his OIC was bounced, and his subsequent bankruptcy petition was tossed for bad faith. See T. C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 3-4.

When Joe contested the NITL IRS gave him five (count ’em, five) years later, the SO said RBA has nothing to do with tax owed. True, except the stiped decision in USDCEDPA said IRS would treat the RBA installments as tax paid and wouldn’t try to collect unless Joe defaulted. So Joe petitioned the NOD.

Except.

Of course Frantic Frank tried to wildcard in abatement of interest during COVID, but as he hadn’t raised it at Appeals, Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber calls it foul.

But Frantic Frank gets an RBI, 

“The DOJ settlement permitted petitioner to pay his … tax liabilities in regular monthly installments, with the last payment not due until July 2027. As of May 1, 2025, when Appeals upheld the levy, petitioner’s monthly payments had reduced his remaining balance … to $948,000. By sustaining a levy for $1,101,788, the SO would have allowed the IRS to collect petitioner’s entire remaining balance for those years (and then some) immediately, whereas the DOJ settlement entitled him to pay that balance in installments over the ensuing 27 months. By permitting acceleration of the payments in this way, the SO’s determination was fundamentally inconsistent with the DOJ settlement and with petitioner’s contract rights thereunder. It was therefore an abuse of discretion.” T C. Memo. 2026-56, at pp. 11-12.

IRS tries the “different liabilities” tack, but is thrown out at first.

“The restitution ordered by the sentencing court, $1.2 million, was identical in amount… to petitioner’s unpaid tax liabilities … as calculated by the attorneys in the criminal case and accepted by the court. The RBAs were concededly ‘distinct’ from the assessments the IRS made when receiving petitioner’s … tax returns: The two sets of assessments were made at different times using different procedures. But the RBAs were not separate from petitioner’s personal income tax liabilities …. They were identical to his personal income tax liabilities for those years, and they simply afforded the IRS a distinct mechanism for collecting those liabilities. The character of the RBAs as a collection mechanism is evident from the fact that any payment petitioner made against the RBAs would be credited toward his personal income tax liabilities ….

“What makes this case different from previous cases we have considered under section 6201(a)(4) is that, six years after the IRS made the RBAs, petitioner and the Government agreed to a different collection mechanism for his … tax liabilities, effected by the settlement of the collection suit. The United States thereby accepted $1.6 million as a compromise of petitioner’s aggregate … income tax liability and gave him the right to pay that liability in monthly installments ending in July 2027. By sustaining in May 2025 a levy issued to collect petitioner’s entire outstanding balance immediately, the SO acted in contravention of the contract DOJ and petitioner had executed.” T. C. 2026-56, at pp. 12-13.

Joe crosses the plate, and credit Frantic Frank with a Run Batted In and another oak leaf to his Taishoff “Good Job.”

Pro ses Gaetan Pelletier & Nancy J. Pelletier, Docket No. 3960-24, filed 6/29/26, employ that old coordinated-arms doctrine, firing off four (count ’em, four) motions for partial summary J, one of which Judge Benjamin A. (“Trey”) Guider, III, recharacterizes as a motion to shift BoP, and one to require discovery responses.

While all get shot down, they all point Gaetan & Nancy to where their problems of proof lie, and what weight Judge Trey Guider is likely to accord each. 

Start with the basic rookie error, making formal discovery demands and then sending a Branerton letter. The attempted cure doesn’t work. However, “parties are still actively in the process of or will be negotiating a stipulation of facts,” Order, at p. 7, so maybe so might could be the formal demand woke up IRS’ counsel and moved things along faster than the three (count ’em, three) months it took IRS to respond to Motion One (Order, at p. 3).

Since deficiencies are tried de novo, the old mantra that what happened at Exam doesn’t count sinks Gaetan’s & Nancy’s limited argument that IRS hadn’t established an evidentiary basis for denying their claimed NOLs. BoP is still with petitioners; SNDs are presumed correct, the only exception being unreported income (not in play here\). Whatever Gaetan & Nancy claim IRS ignored they can still bring out at trial, but Judge Trey Guider finds what they submitted to support their motion doesn’t cut it.

That change in method of depreciation is a Section 481 change in method of accounting is well-established. Keeping the old method of accounting while changing method of depreciation doesn’t get around Reg. Section 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2)(a). That Gaetan & Nancy didn’t elect to change their method of accounting is irrelevant.

And if IRS stands mute on its basis for change in method and denial of NOLs, mox nix. “Respondent’s lack of explanation relating to the disallowance of the NOLs and his silence as to the amended returns petitioners submitted does not preclude him from litigating those issues. For that reason, we will deny petitioners’ fourth Motion for Partial Summary (sic)….” Order, at p. 6.

Having gotten a look at what Judge Trey Guider thinks of the case and where he thinks their problems are and how great, Gaetan & Nancy can work out strategy for trial or settlement.

Taishoff says these motions are time well spent.