The  three T. C. Memos cases today, 8/29/18, are a trio of no-substantiations. Judge Judy and others of her ilk have much to answer for; people think they can go to court with no paper, no witnesses, and a sob story. Well, they can, but if they have burden of proof they’re sunk.

So I’ll return to a theme from yesteryear. See my blogpost “Take the Hint,” 11/25/15. Do you take a remand to Appeals or don’t you?

Back in 2015, I said “But when a Judge suggests you might think about a remand, do think, and think twice. You might reject the suggestion if you don’t want to give Appeals a second chance to sink your client. But you might take the hint if you think you have enough good stuff to win at Appeals.”

But there are other choices, especially if you’re IRS’ counsel.

Here’s STJ Robert N Armen, “The Judge With a Heart,” dropping the hint to IRS in Michael Edward Kelly, Docket No. 26941-17SL, filed 8/29/18.

Mike is fighting a NFTL. When Mike got the NFTL, he went to Appeals. He claimed he couldn’t pay, which STJ Armen takes to be a request for currently-not-collectible, or CNC, status. Appeals proffers the Case Activity Record of the now-retired SO who bounced Mike’s CDP, which “…states that documents requested by him were never received and that petitioner never responded to the settlement officer’s letters other than in a single voice-mail message saying that he had unintentionally missed the administrative hearing and would like the settlement officer to call him back.” Order, at p. 2.

Mike “passionately” ripostes to IRS’ motion for summary J based on the foregoing with “…a very different scenario, alleging repeated efforts to contact IRS personnel and the furnishing of pertinent documentation.” Order, at p. 2.

No summary J, obviously. Whether Mike replied to the now-retired SO, or tried, and how often and with what, and what the now-retired SO did or didn’t do, are material facts. And the case is on for trial next month.

But does IRS really want a trial?

STJ Armen: “Rather than let this case proceed to trial at that time and place, the parties might care to consider whether it would be mutually advantageous if this case were to be remanded by the Court to respondent’s Appeals Office for a supplemental administrative hearing to be conducted by a settlement officer in an office proximate to petitioner’s residence…in order to consider petitioner’s request for a collection alternative. After all, if this case were to be tried, and if the Court were to conclude that petitioner strove, but to no avail, to communicate with the settlement officer during the administrative process and to provide requested documentation, then the remedy might very well be a remand for a supplemental administrative hearing. Given that the original settlement officer is now retired and may therefore not be readily available to respondent as a witness at a trial, and further given the fact that the present case involves a lien and not a levy, thereby assuring the Government of its priority over other possible creditors, the filing of a motion to remand, coupled with a motion for continuance of trial…would appear to present little (if any) downside to respondent and might very well lead to the disposition of this case on a basis that is mutually agreeable to the parties.” Order, at p. 3. (Emphasis by the Court.)

Something to think about.

Ol’ Noah W., the dictionary dude, says it means “dejected, depressed, cast down in spirit.” And after finally having run down Ernie Ryder and his traveling show, IRS sees their Section 6662 accuracy, and Section 6663 fraud, chops go “slip slidin’ away,” as a much finer writer than I put it.

The problem is Graev and Chai. If you don’t know those cases, you haven’t been reading this my blog. Ernie’s little show has been running for more than eight years, and IRS was a wee bit casual with documenting Boss Hossery back then, so when they throw in a couple “redacted Examination Case Processing Sheet (Form 3198)” they need to have some declarations from IRS personnel to backstop their claim that the 3198s somehow are Section 6751(b) sign-offs.

Well, what about res gestæ? The Form 3198 is offered for the fgact that it exists, not that it’s true.

Maybe, but that doesn’t solve the problem. Certainly not for Judge Holmes, the Mixmaster of Silt Stirring.

“In some earlier orders, we found that penalty-approval forms were admissible under the business-records exception to hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); more recently, we’ve found that the forms were verbal acts, admissible to show that the supervisor approved the penalty, not that the penalty was justified or even what the supervisor was thinking when he approved it, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) advisory committee’s note (‘[i]f the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay”). We can’t say that the verbal-act analysis applies here. While the Examination Case Processing Sheet does appear to be signed by Ms. P’s manager and does have penalty amounts listed on it, the document itself doesn’t give any indication on its face that it has anything to do with a supervisor approving Ms. P’s initial determination of penalties. Indeed, if it wasn’t for Ms. P’s declaration, it would be entirely unclear to us why the Commissioner wants the Examination Case Processing Sheet in the record.” Ernest S. Ryder & Associates, Inc., APLC, et al., 14619-10, filed 8/24/18, at p. 6. (Footnote and name omitted).

For both sets of chops, IRS has the same problem. As Mama said, “Don’t know anybody who needs to be explained.” The declarations explaining the Forms 3198 aren’t contemporaneous (they’re made years later), and the forms mean nothing without the declarations. The declarations aren’t records kept in the ordinary course of business by one required to do so, so they’re hearsay and inadmissible.

Once again, IRS is Graevly chopfallen. Sorry, guys.

If You Want a Section 170 Façade Deduction

Wm. Wordsworth’s words echo today for Harbor Lofts Associates, Crowninshield Corporation, Tax Matters Partner, 151 T. C. 3, filed 8/27/18.

Harbor Lofts had a 61-year triple-net-lease of the historical Daly Drug Building and the Vamp Building in Lynn, Massachusetts. The lessor was Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Lynn (EDIC), a Massachusetts public corporation. Harbor Lofts had benefits-and-burdens.

Harbor Lofts and EDIC gave a joint historic façade easement to a real Section 170(h)(3), Essex National Heritage Commission, Inc., to protect, preserve, defend, etc.

Harbor Lofts claims a $4 million charitable. Negatory, says IRS, you’re not fee owner. You can’t guarantee perpetuity, because at year 61 you’re outta there. But you can have a 40% overvaluation chop at no extra charge.

EDIC’s grant is valid, of course. EDIC owns the fee, so can tie it up the façade. But MA law says leases are chattels real, not real property. And State law controls characterization, while Federal law controls how taxed.

Harbor Lofts claims it’s a tenant-in-common with EDIC.

Except Judge Buch says they aren’t.

“Harbor Lofts is not a fee owner, tenant in common, or joint tenant and has not been granted a life estate or remainder interest.  Rather, Harbor Lofts leased property from the Economic Development Corp., and ‘a commercial lease is a contract rather than a conveyance of property.’” 151 T. C. 3, at p. 13 (Citation omitted).

“Harbor Lofts is correct that the Code does not specifically require a donor to hold a fee interest, but only the owner of real property or holder of a fee interest is able to grant a perpetual conservation restriction.

“Harbor Lofts has given up something of value:  the rights to make improvements, alterations, and additions to the buildings.  But those rights, initially created under the contract by which Harbor Lofts leases the property, were ceded to the Economic Development Corp.  Harbor Lofts gave up contractual rights under the lease agreement, which are personal property rights.  And a charitable contribution of a personal property right is not a qualified real property interest under section 170(h)(2)(C). “ 151 T. C. 3, at p. 14.

Finally, “Harbor Lofts also argues that its interest under the lease has made them equitable owners of the property for tax purposes.  But it supports its argument only with cases involving sale leaseback transactions and rulings applying economic substance and disguised-sale doctrines.  These cases are not relevant here.  Although Harbor Lofts took on many of the rights and obligations often associated with property ownership, its possession of these rights and obligations is of a finite duration ending on the lease’s expiration.  Section 170(h)(2)(C) specifically sets forth a perpetuity requirement for a facade easement.  Even if we were to find that Harbor Lofts holds equitable ownership in the buildings, it is equitable ownership for only a finite period and cannot satisfy the perpetuity requirements of section 170(h)(2)(C).” 151 T. C. 3, at p. 15. (Citation omitted).

Connoisseurs of the Boss Hoss Section 6751(b) sign-off for chops have had plenty to sate their appetites, as the Graev tsunami rolls on.

And that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson, is nowise loath to open other and further floodgates and add to the deluge.

Here’s Abdul M. Muhammad, Docket No. 23891-15, filed 8/24/18 (although dated 8/23/18), the follow-on to my blogpost “The Reopeners’ Checklist,” 2/7/18.

IRS has a CPAF, signed by one who claims Boss Hossery, and a declaration from one who claims to be the “immediate supervisor” of the recommender. Not the Group Manager, though.

No problem, says Judge Gustafson.

“As we have noted, the phrase ‘immediate supervisor’ does not appear on the Civil Penalty Approval Form; and instead the approving official is identified by the title ‘Group Manager’. While it is possible that a ‘Group Manager’ might not be the “immediate supervisor” of the ‘Examiner’, both the text of section 6751(b)(1) and the IRS’s instructions to its personnel in the Internal Revenue Manual (cited above) are clear and repetitive that ‘managerial’ approval must come from the ‘immediate supervisor’. It appears possible that the Commissioner could argue for a presumption that the ‘Group Manager’ is the ‘immediate supervisor’ and that the form by itself therefore suffices to meet the Commissioner’s burden of production, by invoking the ‘presumption of regularity’. See Walker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-22, at *19 n.6, citing United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1976) (“’The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.’ United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, * * * (1926)”).

“Since the Commissioner has not invoked the presumption of regularity (and Mr. Muhammad has not had an occasion to attempt to rebut it), and since for other reasons (i.e., Mr. Muhammad’s non-objections) we sustain the Commissioner’s position as to the admissibility and sufficiency of the form, we need not rely on the presumption of regularity in order to conclude that the Commissioner has met his burden of production as to penalty.” Order, at p. 9.

Except.

For one year, the CPAF says only five-and-ten understatement, and specifically says negligence not on the table. But the SNOD goes for negligence. In that year, the understatement doesn’t reach the five-and-ten threshold, so no penalty. For the other, Abdul is over the top, so he gets the 20% chop for that year.

It looked like a simple off-the-bencher. The unsubstantiated charitables got blown off. Thereafter, the usual Rule 155 led to a computation from IRS, and petitioner didn’t furnish another.

Except.

There were two (count ‘em, two) Sched As with charitables. The first, attached to the 1040 that IRS processed, showed $7K, and so did the SNOD. The second, furnished with a 1040X that IRS didn’t process, showed $4K. The evidence IRS put in on the trial was the wrong Sched A, from the unprocessed 1040X.

Judge Gustafson’s off-the-bencher cut the $7K SNOD amount down to the wrong Sched A ($4K) amount. As usual, Judge Gustafson was trying to help out the taxpayer. See my blogpost “The Reopeners’ Checklist, 2/7/18.”

Judge Gustafson sorts out the Boss Hoss Section 6751(b) problem from that blogpost in a companion case, which I’ll get to when I’ve finished with Abdul M. Muhammad, Docket 23891-15, filed 8/24/18.

Judge Gustafson, pardonably, couldn’t sort out the evidentiary miscue from the Rule 155 beancount.

“Expecting to enter decision without the benefit of Mr. Muhammad’s views, we reviewed the computation and discovered that it seems to reflect no reduction–by $3,366 [the difference between the SNOD and the wrong Sched A] or any other amount—of the charitable contribution disallowance….That  is, the computation does not comply with our bench opinion; but that non-compliance is not easy to discern.

“The Commissioner’s Rule 155 submission, like most such submissions, is a document with very little narrative. It consists of a cover page, a case caption and short preamble, a signature page, a proposed ‘Decision’ document, and a 23-page “Computation Statement” consisting of terms and numbers. The Commissioner’s Rule 155 submission does not state that it corrects an error in the Court’s opinion, nor does it mention explicitly that it is not reducing the disallowance. Rather, one can infer this fact only by comparing the relevant entries in the Rule 155 computation to the entries on the equivalent documents in the SNOD and seeing that the disallowance for ‘Itemized deductions’ is unchanged.” Order, at p. 3.

Playing detective, Judge Gustafson finds the mistake.

“The Rule 155 submission may–as it did here–conceal a correction rather than revealing it. We confidently assume that concealment for partisan advantage was not the aim of the Commissioner’s counsel here, since the Rule 155 submission also reflects the Commissioner’s (unannounced) concession of penalty… (as we explain in our order dated August 23, 2018), which concession naturally benefitted petitioner. But even in the instance of a concession benefitting the other party, best practice would certainly be to make the concession explicit and clear, so that neither the Court nor one’s opponent will need to take the time (as we did) to try to figure out whether a concession was really being made and, if so, why. And where the Rule 155 computation embodies, without notice and explanation, a party’s intended correction in his own favor of the Court’s supposed error, it is a most serious violation of Rule 155.”

Rule 155 is no substitution for Rule 161 (no new matter, no “time yet for a hundred indecisions, And for a hundred visions and revisions,” as a much better writer than I put it).

What IRS wants is reconsideration.

Except.

There’s the 30-day “quick kick” to move for reconsideration. And IRS is well over the mark.

“It is possible that we misunderstand the Commissioner counsel’s intention and submission. It is possible that his non-reduction of the disallowance was a mere oversight and that our apparent error involving Exhibit 8-P [the wrong Sched A], recently discovered by us, had nothing to do with his computation. If so, he can explain the situation in his response to this order. But if he did use the Rule 155 computation in a misguided attempt to fix an error in our decision, then we must disallow that attempt. Counsel appearing before this Court should understand that we rely on them to perform their Rule 155 computations without making any corrections to our holdings, whatever might be the motivation and justification for such corrections. Requests for reconsideration must be filed as such.” Order, at p. 6.

And obliging as he is, Judge Gustafson refuses to exercise whatever discretion he might have to unscramble IRS’ frittata sua sponte “…on the procedural facts of this case.” Order, at p. 6. Maybe he’s afraid IRS’ will take this beneficence as an excuse to mess up their trial evidence and trial prep, hoping Tax Court judges will bail them out.

So let IRS show cause “…why we should not order him to file a supplement to his computation, in which supplement he would recompute Mr. Muhammad’s 2013 liability by reducing to $4,377 (rather than $7,743) the disallowance of charitable contributions.” Order, at p. 6.

Abdul can reply to IRS’ response, of course.

Judge, with respect, I’ll show cause on behalf of the American taxpayer, of whom I am one (oh, yes, am I one!), why Abdul shouldn’t get a free ride. Yes, ding IRS’ counsel for the foul-up, but why give Abdul a pass at the expense of us innocent bystanders just because IRS’ counsel messed up? The SNOD was correct, and Abdul had only the Michael Corleone gambit on the trial. Let IRS’ counsel come up with the tax on the differential, pour encourager les autres. Or let IRS Acting Com’r Kautter, or Sec’y Mnuchin come up with the pocket change. Rest and move for decision, Your Honor.

Louis S. Shuman and Sandra Shuman, 2018 T. C. Memo. 136, filed 8/23/18, are arguing about credit elects (overpayments from prior years to be applied to current year), but their loss on the sale of one residence is not deductible, nor is the unasserted claim against their previous tax advisers.

The case is interesting only because of the Graev implications (sorry, guys) that arise when IRS wants yet again to open the record to wild-card in the Boss Hoss sign-off for the chops.

IRS trots in a declaration and a CPAF (Civil Penalty Approval Form). The declaration says that this is the form, the signature is that of the Boss Hoss, and that the Boss Hoss signed “on or about” a certain date.

But pro se Louis (sorry about the spelling, guy), although a dentist, shows real lawyerly acumen. Though the usual hearsay objection fails to surmount the FRE res gestæ existence rule, those rules don’t authenticate the contents.

The Boss Hoss signed the CPAF, right enough, but the date is blank. And the declaration is hearsay on that score.

Judge Gale: “Respondent has not identified an exception to the hearsay rule that would permit us to admit the declaration for the purpose of establishing the date that written supervisory approval was obtained in these cases. Moreover, despite petitioners’ having raised the issue of the missing date some months ago, respondent has not requested further trial proceedings or proposed any other means of bolstering the penalty approval form, which is defective on its face.  Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion by ordering, sua sponte, further trial proceedings.” 2018 T. C. Memo. 135, at p. 28 (Citation omitted).

Whoops! Practitioner, check out every piece of paper.

Yes, racing fans, it’s ClassicStar again, the horse-breeding sham that has provided me with blogfodder and today provides Judge Mark V Holmes (Dissenter/Concurrer, Old China Hand and Master Silt Stirrer) with some lines which might earn him a diss from Judge Posner.

ClassicStar claimed to own and lease racehorses, which lessees supposedly bred for profit, but generated big losses based upon loans from a lender commonly-controlled by ClassicStar’s principals. But the horses weren’t all thoroughbreds, and one of them was a gelding, a fact Judge Holmes mentions five (count ‘em, five) times in the opinion.

Here’s Scott A. Householder and Debra A. Householder, 2018 T. C. Memo. 136, filed 8/23/18. It’s the usual post-event ballpark guestimates to get around Section 469’s “material participation” obstacle. To the extent Scott and Deb did anything horsey, they did so at ClassicStar’s direction to paper the transaction.

Speaking of Judge Posner, Judge Holmes quotes his famous “goofy regulation” remark about the Section 183 regulations.

“The regulations tell us to determine taxpayers’ subjective intent to make a profit ‘by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances.’  Sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.  They give us nine factors to consider, but tell us that ‘[n]o one factor is determinative,’ that we can consider factors not on the list, and that we shouldn’t simply compare the number of factors that suggest a profit motive to the number of factors that don’t.  Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.  The Seventh Circuit has called this ‘a goofy regulation’ and has said we’d be better off if, instead of ‘wading through the nine factors,’ we took a more holistic approach to determining whether a taxpayer intended to turn a profit.  Roberts v. Commissioner, 820 F.3d 247, 250, 254 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’g T.C. Memo. 2014-74.  It did something like that in a recent opinion in a horse breeding case.  See Estate of Stuller v. United States, 811 F.3d 890, 896-98 (7^th Cir. 2016).  But the cases before us are appealable to the Ninth Circuit, so we’ll screw in our calks and into the mud we go.” 2018 T. C. Memo. 136, at p. 37.

Of course, Scott and Deb fail the tests, and their evidence is dubious at best.

And it really doesn’t matter whether factors or holistics rule.

“This is not a case where slogging through the ‘goofy’ regulation would ever lead to a result different from taking a ‘holistic’ approach.  The regulatory factors together show that the Householders got involved with ClassicStar with the intent to generate losses, not profits.  The documents ClassicStar sent them before each breeding season showed them how to offset the income they expected from other sources.  They signed a 2002 contract not knowing what horses they were leasing, and they signed a 2003 schedule of horse pairings that included quarter horses and a gelding.  The activities they logged were largely recreational.  And from the beginning they knew they’d be able to convert their mare-leasing interests into stakes in related entities–some of which they later used to satisfy their [controlled corporation] loans.  Looked at all together, we find that what they wanted from their horse breeding activity was tax savings to offset their large income from other sources.” 2018 T. C. Memo. 136, at p. 45.

Scott and Deb raise a last-minute plea they were robbed, and no doubt the ClassicStar promoters were guilty of a lot. But their claim depends upon the value of the stock they swapped for their leases, and this was new matter, requiring new proof, so it gets bounced.

And the Section 6751(b) Boss Hoss was already decided. See my blogpost “Greenberg’s Express – Not the Last Stop,” 7/13/18.

You’re probably eligible for Medicare if you remember this Clark Gable – Lana Turner epic, but the thought is echoed by His Honor Big Julie, Judge Julian I Jacobs, hereinafter referred to as “HHBJJJIJ.” The thought is evoked by William Mark Scott, 2018 T. C. Memo. 133, filed 8/22/18.  There’s a second case, 2018 T. C. Memo. 134 of even date therewith (as my already on their second Grey-Goose-Gibson colleagues would say), but for today’s purposes it is much of a muchness.

By the way, it’s William Mark Scott, Esq., and his resume is impressive.

“Petitioner is the former Director of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of Tax Exempt Bonds (Tax Exempt Bonds).  He worked for more than 19 years at the IRS and the IRS Office of Chief Counsel; he has more than 30 years’ experience in the area of tax-exempt municipal bonds.” 2018 T. C. Memo. 133, at p. 2.

The tax-exempt bond game is a fertile field for wags and wiseacres. Long ago I had to deal with such, involving manipulating the sales prices of defeasance funds of Treasuries to generate huge profits for dealers therein, and disguising the true interest rate, thus ripping off the taxpayers.  But that’s another story.

Mr Scott claims to have discovered chicanery involving arbitrage yield restrictions in violation of Reg. 1-482-2, and drops a Form 211 on the Ogden Sunseteers.  Mr Martin’s Minions called in a subject matter expert from Mr Scott’s old squadron, who blew off Mr Scott’s claim. Mr Scott didn’t provide charts, tables or schedules showing how the SIDA fee should have been reckoned in as an investment fee in figuring out yield. Sort of like APR and APY.

So the subject matter guru bounces Mr Scott’s Form 211, and anyway, the bonds in question survived an earlier examination with a “no change.” Mr Scott engages in the usual epistolary volleyball with the Sunseteers, gets a second look by a different analyst, but all there is, is a difference of opinion between bond counsel for the issuer (and that’s quite a job) and Mr Scott; not enough to torpedo the exemption.

IRS wants summary J; Mr Scott wants discovery, as he claims the IRS tax-exempt bond types hide info on proceedings against bondholders rather than the issuer.

“Petitioner’s statements are not compelling.  First, we note that petitioner has no personal knowledge of the IRS actions upon which he reports.  He states that he has been informed of the IRS’ alleged malfeasance in other situations and presents what he has been told as true in this situation.  Rule 121(d) provides that ‘[s]upporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”  Our Rule 121 is modeled in large part after rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Consequently, ‘”sheer hearsay’ * * * ‘counts for nothing”’ on summary judgment.” Order, at p. 9 (Citations omitted).

Hearsay isn’t a problem opposing summary J, if the hearsay can lead to admissible evidence, but all Mr Scott has is hearsay concerning other deals, not this one, so relevancy.

Finally, Mr Scott may need discovery, but that doesn’t defeat summary J. Just saying “somewhere I’ll find you,” while having no facts to go on, cannot defeat summary J, or summary J would be a nullity.

“To conclude, we hold that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and we may render a decision as a matter of law.  As previously noted, the IRS  examined the bonds issued by the Agency and the examination was closed without any adjustments.  Respondent, via sworn affidavit, states that no proceeds were collected and petitioner presented no evidence that any such proceeds were collected in this matter.  Consequently, we shall grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment….” Order, at p. 11.

I remarked back in July last year that I was “hanging breathless on the fate” of Jean Louis Rubin & Marie F. Charrier, a.k.a. Marie F. Rubin a.k.a. Marie Rubin, Docket No. 26604-14, filed 8/22/18.

I would have come upon this order from ex-Ch J Michael B (”Iron Mike”) Thornton later today, but I saw someone had given a quick peek at my old blogpost “FBAR or FUBAR – Redux,” 11/18/16, as updated last July.

So with piqued curiosity, I did the docket search and found than Jean Louis & Marie still had the same counsel, Marie having given informed written consent thereto.

Not only that, but ex-Ch J Iron Mike has given them the pretrial preflight checklist grande, and set them for trial next March in the City of Angels.

As a dear old friend loved to quote: “Patience is a virtue/Possess it if you can/Found seldom in a woman/And never in a man.”

Frankie Laine’s and Nat King Cole’s hit vehicle from the early Nineteen-Fifties provide a background to a rather more direct requirement from the wordprocessor of His Honor Big Julie, Judge Julian I Jacobs, hereinafter sometimes referred to as HHBJJJIJ.

There are six (count ‘em, six) conjoined designated hitters, to show HHBJJJIJ means business. I’ll pick Howard N. Abrahams & Miriam Abrahams, et al., Docket No. 19353-15, filed 8/21/18, as an exemplar.

This is a motion by IRS to compel responses to interrogatories, which IRS claims it needs “…to prepare a timely defense against the contentions of petitioners and that petitioners’ failure to answer these interrogatories frustrates compliance with Tax Court 91 [sic; presumably Rule 91], which requires the parties to stipulate all relevant facts and documents.” Order, at p. 2.

Trial is set for October, but back two years ago IRS tried for a phoneathon with counsel for Howard & Miriam and the als, to get answers to the questions aforesaid. What they got was a motion for continuance (to which IRS agreed), but no answers.

HHBJJJIJ told the parties in June to get discovery over by July 31. Said counsel asked for more time the day before.

So IRS moved as aforesaid, and counsel objects.

HHBJJJIJ orders counsel to answer by month’s end, and if not, stand by for sanctions.