I can see Lance M. McHarg, Docket No. 4488-20, filed 5/4/20, turning to his trusty attorney (whom I’ll call Josquin) and asking why.

Lance sent a letter to Tax Court, which Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley’s minions treated as a petition. Ch J Mighty Mo laid the usual “amend and ante up” order on Lance, whereupon Josquin filed Form 7 and delivered Lance’s sixty Georges.

Now all my sophisticated readers, even though socially-distanced, will shout through their m95s, “No, Rule 23, you need a properly signed original wet-ink Amended Petition.”

And so says Ch J Mighty Mo: “…on or before May 29, 2020, petitioner shall file with the Court IN PAPER FORM a Ratification of Amended Petition, bearing petitioner’s original signature (preferably in blue ink)….” Order, at p. 1. (Emphasis by the Court).

And, of course, if Lance doesn’t so file, the Court may dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.

Except.

How exactly does Lance file this Amended Petition? By USPS mail? PDS?

The following prominently appears on the main Tax Court website:

” Mail sent by standard delivery of the United States Postal Service is being held while the Tax Court building is closed. Items sent through the United States Postal Service or a designated delivery service (such as FedEx or UPS) may, however, be returned as undeliverable. If a document sent to the Court is returned, resend the document to the Court as soon as possible after the Court announces it has resumed receiving mail. Please include with your resubmission a copy of the original envelope or container in which it was first sent. You should retain a copy of any document sent to the Court.”

So Lance should file twice? Once, to comply with the aforesaid order, and, when the first filing gets bounced back to him, file again whenever the current snail-mail embargo gets lifted? And move to vacate if he gets bounced in the meantime?

I guess Lance and Josquin both will ask why.

So do I. Why?

This May Day is not the first day I have asked the above-entitled question. Often, it seems almost no one does, when, in exchange for a carefully-wrought post, I get a couple dozen views (hi, Judge Holmes) from fewer than two-handsful of viewers. Then at rare whiles I post nothing and the floodgates open. But “likes”? I average one “like” for seventy-five posts.

A blogger’s lot is not a happy one. Generally.

Except.

Yesterday I animadverted to Judge Gale’s decree that all the world, being taxed and petitioning same, should be run by electricity. See my blogpost “The Whole Country Had Ought to Be Run by Electricity,” 4/30/20.

Now in that blogpost aforementioned and above-cited (as my high-priced and highly-sheltered-in-place colleagues would say), I noted Judge Gale, like a much more exalted personage, was breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the noncompliant. He would toss their petitions for want of prosecution, as Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley would toss those who didn’t ante the sixty George big blind on the spot.

But today, the breathings against the Omaha technophobes and internetedly-unconnected have abated.

Here, solely by way of illustration of the foregoing (as the aforesaid colleagues would say), are Calvin David Goding and Susan Lee Goding, Docket No. 19480-19S, filed 5/1/20.

Note that, at page 2 of said order, yesterday’s breathing is omitted today. “The failure of a petitioner (or intervenor) to comply with this Order may result in the Court dismissing this case for lack of prosecution and entering a decision in favor of respondent,” has vanished.

See supra at the head hereof.

Congress picked up on Whistleblower 21276-12W in 2018, after Judge Julian I Jacobs and I had done two years earlier; see my blogpost “Dares or Forfeits,” 8/3/16. Then Congress codified the result, that whistleblower awards aren’t limited to Title 26 money, but include, without limitation, fines, forfeits and FBARs.

So Bradley Birkenfeld, Docket No. 9896-17W, filed 5/1/20, wants the $2.22 million IRS admits they owe him from the Title 26ers he delivered. And he wants ex-Ch J Michael B (“Iron Mike”) Thornton to make the Ogden Sunseteers fork over his piece of the FBAR chop money IRS got from the 47 (count ‘em, 47) dodgers Brad served up for them.

Ex-Ch J Iron Mike punts the whole thing back to Ogden.

“The parties agree that the Whistleblower Office’s determination is deficient in failing to consider whether non-Title 26 proceeds were collected as a result of petitioner’s information regarding the 47 taxpayers. Respondent has moved to remand this case to the Whistleblower Office to analyze whether any non-Title 26 proceeds were collected from any of the 47 taxpayers and to issue a new determination. Petitioner’s position about respondent’s motion for remand seems to have evolved over time. In petitioner’s initial response to respondent’s motion for remand, petitioner stated that he ‘is not opposed to Respondent’s Motion to Remand if the remand will lead to the development of a complete administrative record, and if limitations are put in place to prevent the remand from leading to further unnecessary delay.’ In more recent filings with the Court, however, petitioner opposes remand as ‘completely unnecessary.’ Petitioner seems to suggest that instead of remanding this case to the Whistleblower Office this Court should decide the question, not passed on by the Whistleblower Office, as to how much of an award, if any, petitioner might be entitled to as a result of non-Title 26 proceeds collected as a result of the information he provided.” Order, at p. 4.

Tax Court isn’t going to unscramble this frittata.

Ex-Ch J Iron Mike will keep jurisdiction, to insure the OS act swiftly. Congress’ codification of the all-proceeds rule came between Brad’s petition and this remand request, so that’s a new wrinkle deserving of remand. Tax Court has to decide based on the administrative record, and everyone agrees that isn’t complete; whistleblower cases don’t get tried de novo in Tax Court.

And Brad’s motion for more discovery can await the result of the remand.

In any case, Brad doesn’t get his loot until all is said and done.

“In petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment, petitioner requests an adjudication that he is entitled to ‘immediate payment’ of the $2,229,553 award that the Whistleblower Office determined based solely on the Title 26 collected proceeds. The relevant regulations provide: Payment of an award will be made as promptly as the circumstances permit, but not until there has been a final determination of tax with respect to the action(s), as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, the Whistleblower Office has determined the award, and all appeals of the Whistleblower Office’s determination are final or the whistleblower has executed an award consent form agreeing to the amount of the award and waiving the whistleblower’s right to appeal the determination.” Sec. 301.7623-4(d)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. (emphasis added).” Order, at p. 6.

There’s nothing worth discussing so far among the orders issuing today from the off-site computers, now the loci tenens of US Tax Court. But on the Tax Court website there is a reference to Notice 2020-23, 4/9/20, which I blogged at the time without much thought; see my blogpost “Le Quinzième Juillet,” 4/10/20.

In the further editing I did to that blogpost, I danced around the issue I now raise.

Section 6213 sets firm filing deadlines for petitions from SNODs, and Section 6330 does likewise for petitions from NITL NODs. That these deadlines are jurisdictional, and not affirmative defenses, rests on the stays of collection and other enforcement actions therein set forth. This is a necessary corollary to the Section 7421 Anti-Injunction Act, which bars any injunction of IRS’ powers of collecting the revenue. Filing a Tax Court petition serves as a preliminary injunction (what we State courtiers call a temporary restraining order, or TRO), preventing IRS from doing the Assyrian while determination of the petition is pending, thus putting a loophole in Section 7421. And Congress obviously wanted to limit any such stay.

Now all the foregoing are acts of Congress. Only Congress can change an act of Congress. The Supreme Court may hold an act unConstitutional, thus unenforceable, but the act remains, however toothless. I remember a meeting with IRS representatives many years ago, when a Bar Association committee asked for restraint in enforcing a very onerous and burdensome tax lien statute. The reply was: “We are sworn to uphold the law. Meet with your Senators and Representatives.”

So how does IRS decide that the present crisis, however dire, desperate and unprecedented, allows them to set aside the law, extend the statutory period for filing, and in effect abrogate Section 7421? Or does Notice 2020-23 mean that IRS can commence collection after March 13, only to have that action reversed and set aside on July 15 if a petition is filed before then?

I entirely agree that relief is required. The requirement that petitions must be on paper, wet-inked and snail-mailed is long since outdated and burdensome. And to bounce the snail-mail filings during the current emergency, only to require them to be re-mailed whenever the emergency ends, is worse.

Lest I be contemned as a closet Libertarian, I stress that this is not a political attack on IRS or Treasury or anyone else. I impute no nefarious motives. As Prof. Paisley taught us long ago On The Hill Far Above, danger invites rescue.

But as a lawyer, I am acutely aware that human nature in unchanging. Separation of powers is the best defense against the human propensity for overreaching. The remedy must come from Congress.

According to Judge Gale, Woody Guthrie had the right idea back in 1941. In any event, all those eager petitioners clutching their sixty-buck-tickets-to-Tax-Court, who got bounced from the Omaha NE trial session back on 3/18/20, and assigned to Judge Gale’s division for case management by order of the Ch J, are now to be run by electricity.

Solely by way of illustration, here’s Connice D. Kelly & Richard Kelly, Docket No. 3935-19, filed 4/30/20, to give you the Talking Omaha song.

“As noted, mail delivery to the Tax Court has been suspended while the Tax Court’s eAccess system, including eService and eFiling, remains fully operational. In these circumstances, it is imperative that petitioners (or intervenors) who are currently filing documents with, and receiving documents from, the Court by paper mail instead register for eAccess in order to continue litigating their case. Accordingly, the Court will direct any petitioner (or any intervenor) in this case who currently receives paper service and/or files in paper form to register for eAccess within 30 days or show cause why such registration is not possible. The Court will also direct any such person to consent to eService and use eFiling in his or her case. Additionally, the Court will direct the parties to file a joint status report as set forth below.” Order, at p. 2. (Footnote omitted).

eAccess is free; IRS already uses it, so this is for petitioners.

And for the technophobes or the internetedly-unconnected, there’s this: “…on or before June 1, 2020, any petitioner (or intervenor) in this case who currently files in paper form and/or receives paper service from the Court by mail shall register for eAccess, by calling (202) 521-xxxx or emailing Admissions@ustaxcourt.gov. Any such person shall also consent to eService and use eFiling in his or her case. If any such person is unable to register for eAccess, consent to eService, and/or use eFiling, he or she shall, on or before June 1, 2020, either telephone the undersigned’s chambers administrator at (202) 521-xxxx and leave a voicemail, or send an email to X@ustaxcourt.gov, providing: (1) his or her name and docket number, (2) his or her telephone number, and (3) the reason(s) he or she is unable to register for eAccess, consent to eService, and/or use eFiling. Petitioners (and intervenors) are advised, however, that no documents can be filed with the Court at the foregoing email address or any other Court email address.” Order, at pp. 2-3 (Names and numbers omitted).

Well, now for the ancient lawyers’ question: what happens if someone doesn’t?

“The failure of a petitioner (or intervenor) to comply with this Order may result in the Court dismissing this case for lack of prosecution and entering a decision in favor of respondent.” Order, at p. 3.

And to wile away your enforced idle hours, guys, all y’all can Zoom (or phone, or smoke signal) to IRS’ counsel and whip up “…a joint report regarding the then-present status of this case, which shall: (1) identify the issues in the case; (2) describe the information the parties have exchanged; and (3) state the progress the parties have made in resolving each of the identified issues.” Order, at p. 3.

And get same on Judge Gale’s screen on or before 6/30/20.

Judge Elizabeth A (“Tex”) Copeland warns Aaron G. Filler, Docket No. 23581-17, filed 4/29/20*, that he can’t relitigate his NOL for the year at issue, but both he and IRS can put in papers post-trial and post-briefing to show when IRS first breathed the “P” word.

That’s “P” as in penalties. Aaron contested these on trial and on brief, but that was before Clay and Frost. For those who tuned in late, for Clay, see my blogpost “Indians Not Taxed – Not!” 4/24/19. For Frost, see my blogpost “Burdens Heavy to Bear” – Part Deux,” 1/7/20.

So it’s time to set the record straight, which means maybe a reopener to establish “…whether petitioner received, prior to the…supervisory approval date, a 30-day letter or similar communication of an intent to assert a penalty as to [year at issue] and a right to appeal that penalty.” Order, at p. 2.

Now the rule for Boss Hossery is taxpayer challenges the chops from the getgo, whereupon IRS gets either burden of production (per statute) or burden of proof (per judicial interpretation) (and if you can see this practically otherwise than as a distinction without as difference you’re a better lawyer than I am). Once IRS shows dates of first communication of chops to taxpayer and Boss Hoss sign-off, petitioner can refute them, if they can.

But lest Aaron become elated, Judge Copeland has a warning: “We caution petitioner that this is not an opportunity to readdress IRS approval of his … net operating loss, and that section 6751(b) does not require the IRS to notify taxpayers of the intention to impose a penalty before taxpayers waive their appeal rights. In fact, if petitioner was unaware that the IRS intended to impose a penalty at such time, then that supports respondent’s position as to the section 6751(b) issue.” Order, at p. 3.

So, folks, out with your papers.

And thanks, Judge, for designating this order. I’d thought of blogging it, but the Anderson order absorbed a lot of oxygen. Now I see the significance.

*Aaron G Filler 23581-17 4 29 20

Not Gonna Happen

Pace Paul Simon’s 1972 hit (is it really 48 years? Oh, little darlin’ of mine, I can’t for the life of me, remember a sadder day…), the mother and child reunion will not take place. STJ Panuthos says no in William French Anderson & Kathryn D. Anderson, Docket No. 23789-16, filed 4/29/20.

STJ Panuthos is following Judge Nega’s toss of IRS’ partial summary J motion by tossing IRS’ issue preclusion try. IRS wants to prevent Wm French from claiming that a business associate, desirous of stealing the business from Wm French, got him sent up for sexually abusing a minor child. Now Wm French went all the way to the Supremes, and all he got was the same 14 (count ‘em, 14) years hard time the CA Superior Court gave him to begin with.

For the backstory, see my blogpost “Mother and Child Reunion,” 2/13/19. STJ Panuthos rules on IRS’ renewed try for a protective order redacting the names of the mother and father (and twin sister) of the abused person (now an adult). “The Court will not repeat the discussion and conclusions described in the February 13, 2019 Order. No different or new circumstances have arisen that would cause the Court to alter the prior conclusion. The Court will deny respondent’s motion for a protective order.” Order, at p. 4.

But Wm French still wants to prove he didn’t do it. He wants to deduct his legals in defending the criminal case, per Section 162 ordinary-and-necessary.

No, Wm French isn’t claiming he’s in the child-molesting business. He says he “…was the ‘Father of Gene Therapy’, that he was the former Director and founder of the Gene Therapy Laboratory at the University of Southern California and the owner of many biomedical companies around the world.” Order, at p. 2. It would seem he claims his partner(s) set him up, therefore his legals were to protect his businesses.

“We conclude that respondent has not satisfied the second condition for collateral estoppel, that the issues presented are in substance the same as those resolved in the earlier litigation. There is no doubt about petitioner’s conviction of a crime. The conviction was upheld on appeal. Petitioners have advised that they are prepared to stipulate to that conviction. They do not seek to deny that petitioner was convicted of the crimes for which he was charged. Petitioners seek to link the legal expenses incurred in defense of the criminal charges with Dr. Anderson’s business activity. Petitioners have the burden of proof on this issue. To be entitled to the claimed legal expense deduction they must establish that the expenditures were ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in a trade or business. Section 162; Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 690-695. While petitioners’ burden is substantial in this case, it does not mean that they should be denied an opportunity to prove their case. The issue in this tax case is not the same as the issue in the criminal case. The Court strongly urges the parties to communicate and stipulate facts pursuant to the Court’s rules.” Order, at p. 3.

I can see Jeff Epstein’s estate trying this one. But it didn’t do so good for Big Jim Cavanaugh. See my blogpost “Well-Settled No Deduction – Part Deux,” 1/27/12.

And Maybe Their Helpers Can’t Either

Judge Buch has a designated hitter off-the-bencher, Orlando F. Cabanday & Teresa H. Cabanday, Docket No. 5068-18, filed 4/28/20, in further proof (as if any were required) of the title of this sermonette.

Orlando parted acrimoniously from his firm and hung out his shingle. I left my last firm after the boss and I exchanged assurances of the greatest personal esteem and affection, and did likewise. I sympathize with Orlando. No support staff, and no revenue to support one.

Orlando’s trouble, of course, is that he can’t substantiate expenses. I once told a RA that if I had wanted to be a bookkeeper, I would have been one. Orlando was in a like fix.

Judge Buch, whose cursus honorum has been far from the short and simple annals of the poor like Orlando and me, has a certain fellow feeling, and allows Orlando some deductions above what IRS was willing to give.

“The Cabandays’ testimony about specific vendors noted above and their nexus to the law practice was credible. Because the credit card statements and cancelled checks verify those specific payments, the Cabandays met their burden of proof as to those expenses. As to the remaining expenses, they did not, and therefore the Commissioner’s disallowance is sustained.” Transcript, at pp. 10-11.

But Orlando, perhaps recognizing his own shortcomings (notwithstanding he had passed three parts of the CPA exam, Transcript, at p. 4), hired one Mr T to reconstruct his expenses. And that gentleman produced some extraordinary results.

“In reconstructing Mr. Cabanday’s expenses, Mr. T had imperfect records to work with. For example, the law firm wrote a check to IPS in the amount of $25,000, but on the portion of the check where the amount is written in words, the check merely said twenty-five. That check cleared for $25. When Mr T tabulated that check, he took the numeral amount of $25,000, resulting in an overstatement of $24,975. Also, a check to Mr. C for $8,050 was dated January 5, 2014, and Mr. T tabulated it in 2014. On closer examination, however, the check sequence and the date the check cleared the bank show that the check was written in early 2015.

“Mr. T also made mistakes of his own. When Mr. T tabulated checks payable to ODG, he mischaracterized a $200 check as $42,212. And in the Court’s own tabulation of expenses… the Court found a $332 payment to NLS and a $2,000 payment to AMK omitted from Mr. T’s summary.

“The Commissioner suggests something nefarious in these errors. The $25,000 error relating to IP is understandable giving the manner in which the check was written. The $42,212 error relating to ODG is more difficult to plausibly explain, but the evidence is insufficient to conclude that there was an affirmative intent to mislead. Regardless of these errors, Mr. T’s summary was not admitted for the truth of the matters set forth therein.” Transcript, at pp. 7-8. (Names omitted).

Fortunately for Orlando and the equally hapless Mr. T, Judge Buch thoroughly disproves the canard that titles this blogpost.

“The Court calculated the expenses … directly from the bank and credit card records; they were not taken from any summaries or demonstrative exhibits.” Transcript, at p. 8.

There’s one lawyer here who can add, and he’s on the bench.

We’ve all been there: we’ve made a deal, the best available in the circumstances, the client signs off (literally), and then backs out.

Well, this happened to a CA attorney, whom I’ll call Bogie, and Judge Albert G (“Scholar Al”) Lauber is not amused.

But there’s a twist; there must be, or else I wouldn’t be blogging this.

Vishal Mishra & Ritu Mishra, Docket No. 16492-18, filed 4/28/20, brought Bogie in from the bullpen when IRS got Judge Scholar Al to toss their first attorney. It seems first attorney had his license lifted by the Bear Republic when he flunked the ethics test. Or so a docket search and a quick Google revealed.

Enter Bogie, under the gun, who crafts a settlement that Vishal & Ritu seem to have maybe so agreed to, but part of the deal was they had to agree to an accuracy chop.

Judge Scholar Al: “Respondent’s counsel represented that he had obtained tax computations consistent with the parties’ settlement, had prepared a decision document reflecting those computations, and had presented the proposed stipulated decision to petitioners’ counsel for signature. Petitioner’s counsel then informed respondent that petitioners no longer wish to concede liability for the accuracy-related penalties.” Order, at p.1.

Maybe Vishal & Ritu were disillusioned with lawyers generally. Or maybe, like clients of every race, color, creed, affectional preference, national origin or ancestry, occupation, and favorite indoor sport, they have a selective understanding of whatever language they most commonly speak. And all the other languages as well.

Howbeit, Judge Scholar Al lays it out.

“In the Tax Court, concessions, compromises, and settlements can be memorialized in various ways, including (as here) by the parties’ execution of a stipulation of settled issues.’[A] settlement stipulation is in all essential characteristics a mutual contract by which each party grants to the other a concession of some rights as a consideration for those secured and the settlement stipulation is entitled to all of the sanctity of any other contract.’ The agreement manifested by a stipulation of settled issues will not be set aside except as necessary to prevent ‘manifest injustice,’ e.g., in the case of fraud or material misrepresentation of fact.” Order, at pp. 1-2. (Citations omitted).

So dish, Vishal & Ritu. And it had better be good.

If I had a nickel for every time I saw such a move being pulled in the last 53 (count ‘em, 53) years, I’d be on lockdown in my 175 foot custom motorsailer off the Florida Keys, trailing long lines for Blue Marlin or tuna or something. Judge Ruwe may or not be a fisherman, but he has, I suspect, a like sentiment.

Here’s Dewayne Bridges, 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, filed 4/27/20. Dewayne and his LLC-co-owner-partner Steve got SNODs, but Dewayne claims TEFRA should apply, because really it was his self-settled trust and Steve’s that truly owned the beneficial interests in their MO LLC while he and Steve lived in the USVI.

The LLC’s 1065s for the years at issue were, Dewayne admits, “inconsistent and irreconcilable”. 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at p. 3. IRS treated the LLC as a small partnership, because the boxes on Sched B for pass-through ownership were checked “no”. Wherefore no TEFRA, no FPAA. But Dwayne claims Box 20Y on the K-1s incorrectly stated that a couple other pass-throughs were involved (hi, Judge Holmes), so IRS couldn’t reasonably believe that Dewayne and Steve were truly the owners.

So why do we care what IRS believed, reasonably or not, when it hit Dewayne with this SNOD? Because Section 6231(g)(2), that’s why.

Section 6231(g)(2) says if IRS reasonably believes that TEFRA doesn’t apply when it unloads the SNODs on the individual, then it doesn’t matter what happens later. Dwayne argues that the give-and-take at examination put IRS wise. And the RA at exam had a chart she annotated which looks like she got the word about the trusts, 2020 T.C. Memo. 51, at p. 14, but she says no.

Anyway, Judge Ruwe isn’t buying.

“This Court has noted in the past that TEFRA procedures are ‘distressingly complex and confusing’ and that it ‘can even be complex and confusing to determine whether a partnership is subject to TEFRA.’ We have also noted that the difficulties in determining whether TEFRA partnership procedures apply are generally caused by the difficulties in determining whether the partnership in question was an exempt ‘small partnership’, which is precisely the issue before us.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at pp. 18-19. (Citations omitted).

Because TEFRA is chaos codified, Congress took pity on IRS.

“The Commissioner may rely on section 6231(g)(2) if three elements are met: (1) the Commissioner determined on the basis of the partnership return that the TEFRA procedures did not apply to the partnership for that year, (2) the determination was reasonable, and (3) the determination turned out to be erroneous. Bedrosian v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. at 106. Both parties agree for purposes of this motion that respondent’s determination that TEFRA did not apply was erroneous. Accordingly, we analyze the first two elements below.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at p. 20.

The argy-bargy from the exam doesn’t defeat IRS’ reliance on the return. “Based on the record we agree with respondent that he made his determination on the basis of the partnership returns. Further, we agree with respondent that conflicting information provided during the give-and-take of the examination that remained in dispute did not prevent him from relying on the returns to make a TEFRA determination.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at p. 22.

If we let wild-carding at exams defeat returns, we’d gut Section 6231(g)(2).

OK, IRS relied on the return. Was that reasonable? Of course, Congress never defined “reasonable” in this context. So Judge Ruwe eschews an extensive dictionary chaw, and uses the standard from Reg. 1.6662- 4(d)(3)(iii) (taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments),

IRS followed Sched B. Dewayne says, but what about Lines 20C and 20Y on the K-1s? Judge Ruwe says even that’s wrong, and minor anyway.

“Respondent’s determination did not need to be right, it just needed to be reasonable. His determination that TEFRA did not apply, based on the conclusion that the partners in… LLC, were petitioner and [Steve], was eminently reasonable and well grounded in the information shown on the face of the returns.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at p. 26.

A minor inconsistency does not defeat the substance of the return.

“We think respondent can disregard minor, inaccurate inconsistencies contradicted by the totality of the returns here as well. Petitioner cannot litter his returns with misleading and inaccurate information, selectively rely upon the information, and then expect to bamboozle his way to a procedural victory.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 51, at p. 28.

Motion to dismiss denied. Go try the case.

Taishoff says this is son-of-Cohan. This was Dewayne’s and Steve’s LLC’s return. If there was any inconsistency, they created it. Someone signed it under penalty of perjury. If an error is made, it bears ”heavily upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.” Cohan v. Com’r, 39 F. 2d 540, at p. 544 (2 Cir, 1930).