Many individuals, sole proprietors all, conduct business under an assumed name. All, or almost all, States have filing or registration requirements (with a concomitant fee, of course) for registration of assumed business names, with lists of impermissible ones.

And all those assumed names are disregarded for income tax purposes, sole proprietors being treated as such, and multiple proprietors as partnerships.

But what happens when the sole proprietor (colloquially known as a “dba”, for “doing business as”) winds up in Tax Court?

It’s apparently a case of first impression, so Judge Patrick J (“Scholar Pat”) Urda decides it’s just like a single-member LLC, and service on the dba is service on the sole proprietor.

Here’s BM Construction, 2021 T. C. Memo. 13, filed 2/8/21. BM Construction is really Marius Bernotas, who apparently had some backup withholding problems with some subcontractors from whom he did not get TINs when he paid them.  I’m going to pass on the fact-specific issues like mailing of Letters 950-D and the effect of the Form 4669 Statement of Payments Received Marius later proffered.

I’m going to the question of how to treat BM Construction, which exists in name only, when it got the various IRS documents triggering the NITL at issue here.

“The record establishes that the notice of determination was issued to Construction, a sole proprietorship, rather than to Mr. Bernotas, its owner. A sole proprietorship is generally disregarded as a separate entity from its owner for Federal tax purposes, sec. 301.7701-2(a), (c)(2)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs., raising the question whether the notice here was valid….” 2021 T. C. Memo. 13, at pp. 8-9. (Citation and footnote omitted).

And this is a case of first impression at The Glasshouse on Second Street.

“Although we have not previously addressed this question with respect to sole proprietorships, we have done so regarding single-member LLCs disregarded for Federal tax purposes. We have explained that such LLCs and their members ‘are a single taxpayer * * * to whom notice is given’, …and that the issuance of a notice of determination to a disregarded LLC was a ‘harmless error’ where, inter alia, the member was adequately notified of the liabilities… or was not prejudiced by the IRS’ failure to treat the LLC as disregarded….

“Given that a sole proprietorship is an entity ‘in which a single individual owns all the assets, is liable for all debts, and operates in an individual capacity’ …we hold that the same rule obtains.” 2021 T. C. Memo. 13, at pp. 9-10. (Citations omitted).

So Tax Court has jurisdiction, Marius has his day in court, and loses.

No, not us solos (“single shingles”). This is the disease from which Cindy Stassi suffered, as more particularly bounded and described by Judge Kerrigan in Timothy Stassi and Cindy Stassi, 2021 T. C. Sum. Op. 5, filed 2/8/21.

While employed, Cindy suffered from said disease. She was placed on a 30-day improvement plan thereafter, then on leave without pay, and finally she quit. A week after starting her planned improvement, she “…sent to a member of [employer’s] Board of Directors a letter complaining about the work environment at [employer]. Her letter described specific problems associated with her work…. The letter did not mention physical injury or sickness.” 2021 T. C. Sum. Op. 5, at pp. 2-3. (Name omitted).

Not good, right? It doesn’t get better. Cindy found a lawyer.

Said lawyer fired off a letter to Cindy’s employer “…demanding damages for wage and hour violations, constructive termination, and ‘Emotional Distress and Punitives’.” 2021 T. C. Sum. Op. 5, at p. 5.

You know what comes next.

“The settlement recitals described petitioner wife’s claims as follows: ‘[Petitioner wife] claims she is owed wages and that she was constructively discharged and retaliated against for making certain complaints, * * * [and that] she has suffered emotional distress with physical manifestations of same.’ The words ‘physical manifestations’, which had not been part of petitioner wife’s initial complaint, were inserted into the settlement agreement during negotiations.

“The parties agreed that $10,350 of the settlement proceeds would be designated ‘consideration for lost wages’, and that [employer] would issue to petitioner wife a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, with respect to this amount. The parties further agreed that the remaining $69,650 of the settlement proceeds would be designated ‘consideration for physical manifestations of [petitioner wife’s] emotional distress claims”, and that [employer] would issue to petitioner wife a Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, with respect to this amount.” 2021 T. C. Sum. Op. 5, at p. 3.

Employer gave Cindy two checks, one for the wages and one for the manifesto.

When tax time came, Tim and Cindy reported as follows. ” They reported the $10,350 portion of the settlement proceeds as taxable wages and reported $1 of the remaining $69,650 as ‘Other Income’. Petitioners attached to their… tax return a statement written by their tax return preparer explaining the decision to report only $1 of the $69,650 portion of the settlement proceeds, and a letter from petitioner wife’s attorney relating to the settlement agreement.” 2021 T. C. Sum. Op. 5, at p. 4.

By now, my ultra-hip readers have turned off their smartphones and said “Why is he wasting my time with this? Emotional distress is not a physical injury, no matter what the manifesto says! See H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 104-737, at 301 n. 56 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 741, 1041. The whole boat is taxable.”

Well, Judge Kerrigan came to the same conclusion (surprise, surprise).

And the reason I’m blogging this is so that I have materials for a CLE I’m planning to give to a trial lawyers’ group about how not to do it.

Let’s take “pedigree” for a lot. Jurisdictional pedigree, that is. Our quizmaster today is Judge Tamara Ashford, and our contestant is Estate of Georgia M. Spenlinhauer, Deceased, Robert J. Spenlinhauer, Executor, et al., Docket No. 11286-18, filed 2/8/21.

IRS assessed the estate tax liability to RJ as ex’r and separately as transferee. But the IRS is authorized by Section 6861 to quick-kick the assessment if it looks like the one assessed is about to skip with the boodle. Which it did.

RJ got a pair of Letters 1584(P), one as ex’r of the estate of the late Georgia, and the other as transferee of said estate, hitting him up jeopardy-wise for estate tax. But RJ blew the 30-day cutoff to go to IRS “…requesting a redetermination of whether or not: (1) the making of the assessment is reasonable under the circumstances, and (2) the amount so assessed or demanded as a result of the action is appropriate under the circumstances.” Order, at p. 3. And RJ got a couple NFTLs (hi, Judge Holmes) at no extra charge.

RJ is contesting the reasonableness of the assessments via a Rule 55 motion to review.

“Pursuant to section 7429(a)(1)(B), within 5 days after the day on which a jeopardy assessment is made, the Commissioner is required to provide the taxpayer with a written statement of the information that he relied upon in making such assessment. Pursuant to section 7429(a)(2), within 30 days after the day on which the taxpayer is furnished the aforementioned written statement or within 30 days after the last day of the period within which such statement is required to be furnished, the taxpayer may request an administrative review of the jeopardy assessment. This administrative review consists of determining whether or not (1) the jeopardy assessment was reasonable under the circumstances and (2) the amount so assessed or demanded as a result of the jeopardy assessment was appropriate under the circumstances. Sec. 7429(a)(3).” Order, at p. 4. (Footnote omitted).

Usually one contesting a jeopardy assessment after losing admin review has to go to USDC per Section 7429(b)(2)(A). But pore l’il ole Tax Court can wade in if the jeopardized petitions a deficiency before the jeopardy assessment is made. But RJ didn’t. His Letters 12153 (one as ex’r of the estate and one as transferee) “…unmistakably show that they were requests by Mr. Spenlinhauer for a collection due process hearing with respect to the filed notices of Federal tax lien of which he was advised on or around the same day as the making of the jeopardy assessments. Indeed, nowhere on these forms does Mr. Spenlinhauer indicate that he is requesting administrative review of the jeopardy assessments; his stated ‘reason for the dispute or * * * [his] request for a CDP hearing’ was to deny ‘any responsibility or liability’ for the estate tax…, i.e., to challenge the underlying liabilities, and he checked the box on these forms for lien withdrawal. Each jeopardy assessment notice to Mr. Spenlinhauer clearly instructed him as to how to challenge the jeopardy assessment, i.e., ‘you must file a written protest with the Area Director within 30 days from the [jeopardy assessment notice’s] date, requesting a redetermination’.” Order, at p. 5, footnote 7.

That sinks RJ. Quoting Abraitis v. United States, 709 F.3d 641, 644-645 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that section 7429(a)(2) and section 7429(b)(1) ‘lack[] jurisdictional pedigree’; rather, these rules ‘present[] an exhaustion requirement’ that ‘remains mandatory, inasmuch as the availability of judicial review hinges on either exhaustion or a timely request for administrative review’).” Order, at pp. 5-6.

So Tax Court has jurisdiction. But RJ never exhausted his administrative remedies, so he’s out.

Judge Mark V Holmes has been many things to many people: from Great Dissenter to Great Concurrer; from Master Silt Stirrer to Old China Hand; always foe of the partitive genitive and the transcontinental Graev; and best of all, a good dinner companion, always ready to share a laugh at the human comedy.

Today he plays customs agent, barring from the Halls of The Glasshouse in The City of the Unrepresented a New York import, the Guardian ad litem. Here in Excelsiorland, when a State court litigant, by reason of infancy or disability, is unable to proceed in propria persona or to give instructions to, and consult with, an attorney, our Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 1202 provides for appointment, on motion and after a hearing, of a guardian ad litem, to protect that party’s rights and interests.

No, that’s not what Tax Court calls a  Rule 60 “next friend.” The Tax Court counterpart arrives in a much more informal way. Judge Holmes instructs, in Malka Yerushalmi, Petitioner, and Joseph Yerushalmi, Intervenor, Docket No. 5520-08, filed 2/8/21.

The years have not brought Malka and Joseph closer together. There’s some backstory in my blogpost “First Checklist for Innocent Spousers,” 11/4/19. Briefly, in today’s installment Judge Holmes notes the case “… has long been complicated by the difficult relationship between the spouses. Intervenor moved to name a next friend to pursue the litigation on his behalf. Petitioner objected.” Order, at p. 1.

Malka seems to enjoy the fight.

“Petitioner argues that this means that the appointment of a next friend is the legal equivalent of a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem, and that this is a somewhat formal procedure under New York law that ordinarily requires a hearing.

“We disagree. The term ‘next friend’ is not the same as ‘guardian ad litem‘ — it’s a somewhat informal designation that the Court may find someone to fill, for example, when the Court encounters a pro se litigant whose performance is such as to raise ‘a serious question as to the party’s competence.’ Petitioner also pointed us to no authority that says our Rule 60(d) incorporates by reference whatever the procedures are in the forum state for determining someone’s general competence.” Order, at p. 1.

Finally, Judge Holmes points out that this saga has reached Year Thirteen, and maybe so Joseph is tiring in the backstretch.

“Our Rules allow appointment of a ‘next friend’ under the much looser standard of when ‘justice so requires.’ We appoint ‘next friends’ only to be helpful in prosecuting a case, not in assuming an incompetent’s legal rights and obligations in a particular matter, or to control his property generally. It is, in other words, an aid to the fair and efficient conduct of litigation.” Order, at p. 1.

Despite the broad discretion accorded to Judge Morrison by FRE 706, and the eloquence of Wm. Sharp, Esq., partner in a well-known and highly-regarded tax specialist shop, Judge Morrison declined to appoint an independent court expert to sew up the raveled sleeve of care and provide the balm of hurt minds to the vexed valuation issue in Neil L. Whitesell & Tracey L. Whitesell, Docket No. 26230-15.

Note there is no written order here. Thanks to one of the very few good things to come out of COVID-19, the teletubby hearing from stronds afar remote, your reporter was on the scene throughout.

Judge Morrison did some very genteel head-banging, but the parties seem far apart, and I don’t see settlement any time soon. Judge Morrison seemed inclined to do an off-the-bencher, but if the numbers are what I was hearing this morning, I doubt that will happen.

This is the Whitesell’s fourth appearance on this my blog. For the backstory, see my blogpost “The Sum of its Parts – Part Deux,” 11/6/20.

Plenty of blogfodder yet to come, I’m thinking.

Just yesterday I gave my patient readers some obiter dicta on the need for petitioners’ practitioners to protect the client with a filing. Although in the event it may turn out to be unnecessary, it is certainly not improvident; the old saw “better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it” applies to more than insurance policies.

Today I see that IRS’ counsel takes a like approach. While settlement on the eve of trial is a real probability, there’s no harm in trying to buy time before the window closes.

Here’s Erik John Frick, Docket No. 5699-20S, filed, 2/5/21. The story is simple. The dates tell it all.

“This case is currently calendared for trial at the Court’s Boston, Massachusetts trial session beginning February 8, 2021. On January 8, 2021, respondent filed a motion for continuance. On February 4, 2021, the parties submitted to the Court a proposed stipulated decision.” Order, at p. 1.

I’m sure my ultrasophisticated readers hardly need be reminded that Rule 133 sets hearings on motions for continuance to be heard on the trial date, when the motion is made fewer than thirty (count ’em, thirty) days prior to trial. And the motion is likely to be denied, trial to follow then and there.

I expect IRS counsel (now anonymous under Dawson’s Creek, for reasons unknown) wanted to allow time to hammer out the settlement stip, without being under the gun to prep for a trial that might not happen, and as protection in case the settlement negotiations fell apart. And, keeping an eye on the calendar, waited to the last minute to ask.

Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley denies the motion for continuance, of course, since there won’t be a trial.

But it’s easier to do a quick petition, or a short set of motion papers, than to be without recourse if things go south.

Suzzanne E. Ogboin, Docket No. 4100-20S, filed 2/4/21, gets embroiled in the too-common conflation of IRS with Tax Court, which bedevils the self-represented, especially when IRS’ well-beloved one-size-fits-all correspondence gambit is in play.

Suzzanne petitions the SNOD at Day 128. Of course, she says she sent IRS something timely.

“Respondent issued a notice of deficiency (notice) on October 21, 2019 to petitioner. The notice stated that petitioner had ‘the right to challenge * * * [respondent’s determination] by filing a petition with the United States Tax Court’ and that she ‘must file * * * [her] petition within 90 days from the date of this letter’. The notice also informed petitioner that ‘[t]he Court can’t consider your petition if the petition is filed late’.

“The notice provided that petitioner “could still file * * * [her] tax return” by sending it to respondent by January 21, 2020. However, the instructions stated (in bold): ‘Important: If you file a return with the IRS and you do not timely file a petition with the Tax Court, you will not be able to contest your liability or penalties with the Tax Court.‘” Order, at pp. 1-2.

Now we hip, battle-hardened practitioners know well that you file a petition immediately, whether or not you’re going to have the client send in a return, amended return, exchange billets doux with IRS, or anything else. You might omit the sixty Georges, and wait for Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley to tell you to ante up. But you need to protect the client while the matter gets sorted out. And 90 days wait for no one.

Suzzanne, obviously pro se, gets it wrong. But even Judge Colvin gets it wrong.

“Ninety days from October 21, 2019 was Sunday, January 19, 2020. When the final day falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday the period to file is extended to the following Monday (which, in this case, was January 20, 2020). The notice stated that petitioner had until January 21, 2020. Because petitioner did not file her petition until well after January 20th and 21st of 2020, we need not consider the jurisdictional implications of the notice containing an erroneous date.” Order, at p. 2, footnote 2.

No, Judge, the “erroneous” date wasn’t erroneous. January 21, 2020, was the last date on which Suzzanne could file her tax return with IRS, not the last date on which she could file a petition with Tax Court.

But if Judge Colvin, who has 32 (count ’em, 32) years on the Tax Court Bench, following a distinguished career in government, is confused by this IRS schemozzle, what chance has Suzzanne E. Ogboin (tax qualifications and expertise not stated, but I doubt they’re anywhere close to Judge Colvin’s), or any self-represented nonprofessional, to sort this out?

The IRS one-size-fits-all correspondence gambit again falls short.

All y’all will remember Judge David Gustafson commenting to like effect, for which see my blogpost “Judge on a Tear,” 6/7/19.

Lest I be misunderstood, I am no unregenerate foe of continuing legal education. Even before Our Fair State adopted the Part 22 Rules on CLE, I had more than enough hours to satisfy the requirements every year. One must keep current; law changes at an ever-accelerating rate, and we lawyers are like Mark Twain and his fellow old-time riverboat pilots: “Other craftsmen can ‘sink the shop,’ sometimes, and interest themselves in other matters. Not so with a pilot; he must devote himself wholly to his profession and talk of nothing else; for it would be small gain to be perfect one day and imperfect the next. He has no time or words to waste if he would keep ‘posted.'”

I do, however, object to the “junk CLE” sales pitches. And the “win your case anywhere but in the courtroom” discovery games thus encouraged.

Now I don’t know the facts, the questions, or the documents. So maybe so it’s all justified.

But when I read Judge Nega’s order in Mark Betz & Christine Betz, et al., Docket No. 21587-18, filed 2/3/21*, I get the feeling that things have gotten a wee bit out of hand, and maybe so don’t need to be expanded in the physical or electronic lecture hall.

I won’t paraphrase the two Rule 90 requests for admissions, other than to state that the second contained 922 (count ’em, 922) paragraphs and 854 documents. Read them, and the responses, for yourself.

But I will echo Judge Nega’s plea, noting that our new New York discovery rules bring our State court practice closer into line with the Federal.

“The Court strongly encourages the parties to meet and work together to narrow the issues for trial and stipulate to the fullest extent possible. We take this opportunity to advise the parties that the informal discovery process is essential for the voluntary exchange of facts and documents that enable preparation of stipulations and ‘the more expeditious trial of cases.’ Branerton Corp., 61 T.C. at 692. The parties must participate in this process and, in the course of doing so, we expect them to cooperate informally or formally if necessary.” Order, at p. 3.

*Mark Betz Docket No 21587 18 2 3 21

That’s Martin G. Plotkin, Docket 16224-14L, filed 2/3/21. Martin G. is still at it, reprising his inventive style, which I characterized back in 2019 thus: “Tax Court self-representeds are endlessly inventive. The hard-laboring blogger is often overmastered, trying to keep up with their improvisational reinventions of the game.” See my blogpost “The Banc Shot,” 5/13/19.

Martin G. still has all the balls in the air, and at seven years into the program and still a foe of electronic filing, the end is as far off as ever.

In less than a month, Martin G. “filed a ‘motion to the Court to review and revise it’s [sic] Order dated November 18, 2020, denying petitioner’s amended motion requesting recusal’.” Order, at p.1.

And,”… a motion for a continuance in which he stated that he would have difficulties participating in a trial through videoconference. Respondent does not object to a continuance.” Order, at p. 1.

And “… a motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal.” Order, at p. 1.

And “…a motion for continuance. We will file this a [sic; I think you meant “as”, Judge] petitioner’s supplement to his… motion for continuance.” Order, at p. 1.

IRS offers a remand, so the SO can explain “…what facts she relied upon, what law or procedures she considered, and how she reached the conclusion she did as to the balancing test.” Order, at p. 1. Because Martin G. wants to know. And to participate therein.

Judge Morrison allows that, and denies the rest.

La partie continue.

Generally (don’tcha just love that word?) as a journalist I’m frustrated when someone declines to comment. But as an attorney, I approve when a colleague declines to try his cases in the media.

I saw what seemed an interesting lead the other day on a possible story. An attorney in a pending Tax Court case is seeking an order certifying a question of law to the AL Supreme Court. A source tells me that Rule 18 of the AL Supreme Court provides “(W)hen it shall appear to a court of the United States that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of law of this state which are determinative of said cause and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court may certify such questions or propositions of law of this state to the supreme court of Alabama for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law, which certified questions the supreme court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.”

It sounded like this could be a conservation easement extinguishment case, in which, unlike the recent GA cases where it seems the GA Supreme Court has ruled, AL has no, or almost no, appellate learning on point. Our NY Court of Appeals (our highest court; our Supreme Court is our trial court, for historical reasons) has a more limited form of the AL rule. NY Rule 500.27 only applies to the Supremes, the CCAs, and the court of last resort of any State. When it comes to our Court of last resort, pore l’il ol’ Article I Tax Court is out in the cold. Maybe our last resorters can’t be bothered with what the late Justice Antonin Scalia likened to a village traffic court.

Howbeit, here’s the question I put to the attorney for the petitioner, and his reply. Name omitted.

“Mr J, I manage the LinkedIn Tax Technical Discussion Forum, of which you are a member. I see your firm represents the petitioner in Montgomery-Alabama River LLC, Docket No. 9254-19, in Tax Court. I’m a journalist as well as an attorney, and see you’re moving to certify a question in that case to the AL Supreme Court. Is this a conservation case? Is this an easement extinguishment question? I’d like to do a blogpost on this subject on my blog taishofflaw.com. Would you care to comment? Thank you for your consideration.”

He responded thus: “Hello Lewis, Thank you reaching out.  Unfortunately, we don’t comment on our pending cases.  Best regards,”

I replied that I entirely understand, and thanked him.

As I said, I well understand, and appreciate, that an attorney would rather try his case in court, and not in the media. But as a journalist, I still have to ask.

I will, of course, follow the case for any reported order of substance or decision.