I said it back in 2022: “…dear reader, before you groan ‘Oh no, not another GA boondockery,’ know I said it first. But I have to blog it; you can stop reading now and ignore it.” See my blogpost “Price and Value,” 1/12/22.

Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber is in the same unhappy boat as I. Making its third appearance in this my blog is Hancock County Land Acquisitions, LLC, Southeastern Argive Investments, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo. 2026-28, filed 3/26/26. 

The Hancocks fold the discounted cash flow method of valuation when their appraiser who furnished the Form 8283 backup appraisal fails to testify on the trial. The sales-comparison method doesn’t help, as their argument that their land is too unique craters. There are 10 (count ’em, 10) sales close enough for Judge Scholar Al to find their $763K per acre valuation of these boondocks “an order of magnitude that is light years away” from any rational number. T. C. Memo. 2026-28, at p. 29. And the investor testimony the Hancocks proffered only proved the investors were buying tax write-offs.

The tax loss insurance the Hancocks bought was for their investors’ benefit, hence not a partnership expense and not deductible by the partnership. The Hancocks do get a $25K appraisal fee deduction, despite the appraiser having been retained by the promoter; the Hancocks were the beneficiary. They also get some additional title expenses. The rest of the claimed Section 162 partnership deductions are indocumentados. 

And as their trusty accountant also had a piece of the deal, reasonable reliance doesn’t offset the substantial understatement 20% chop Judge Scholar Al lays on whatever the gross valuation misstatement chop (no reasonable reliance offset for that) didn’t cover.

It’s a tale I’ve told many times: the injured party who settles out and finds that the award is entirely taxable. The 1996 Small Business Job Protection Act did eliminate the need for a tort judgment but left the personal physical injury or physical sickness requirement for Section 104 exclusion. This recognized the trend in the law towards no-fault and other statutory remedies that eliminated the need for a finding of fault. Ser my blogpost “The Egg and I,” 1/22/15.

Physical injury may have been at the core in Toni C. Perry, Docket No. 4647-25, filed 3/25/26, an off-the-bencher from Judge Nega, but the stip of settlement in her State law case didn’t make that clear enough.

“Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the lump sum that petitioner received was for a general release of all claims except for those related to her Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission Claim…. Petitioner presented evidence and testimony of physical injuries unrelated to this settlement and many predating the alleged date of the back injury she claims underlies the settlement. Petitioner did not testify or provide any evidence to show that any portion of the settlement proceeds were used or designated for amounts paid for medical care attributable to those injuries.” Transcript, at p. 7.

Workers’ Comp is the exclusive remedy for on-the-job physical injuries, except for employer intentionally-inflicted injuries or employer-created dangerous conditions.

Toni’s testimony shows she didn’t understand the settlement but that’s not the issue.

Toni is represented here by the Quinnipiac University Law School’s LITC. Who represented her in the PI case is not stated, but I won’t unload on him/her. CT has a high bar to avoid Comp exclusivity, and Toni’s employer has plenty of resources to fight a tort claim. Pleading physical injuries on the job will get a swift motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

“Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner could just as easily sued for workers’ compensation. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 31-284(a) (2025); Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507, 510 (Conn. 1994). They then continued [sic; probably should be “contended”] that this somehow supports their position that the settlement is not taxable under section 104. While the Court takes no position on the proper tax treatment of this alternative, it is clear that the lawsuit settled here did not give rise to proceeds that are eligible for exclusion under section 104(a)(2).” Transcript, at p. 8.

No, not any anomaly caused by divergent spousal tax incidents; this is about a penalty practitioners may incur when representing both spouses. Judges have repeatedly warned that representing both spouses can be dangerous to your practice’s health.

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler doesn’t warn the trusty attorneys for Thomas Van Alsburg & Valerie Van Alsburg, Docket No. 3959-20, filed 3/25/26, in hæc verba, because in their case it’s too late. I expect The Phone Call here, but the rest of y’all can learn.

A month after Tom & Val stiped out their deficiencies for the two (count ’em, two) years at issue, they move to vacate the stip and let Val amend the petition to claim innocent spousery. Of course, a stiped decision doesn’t become final until ninety-one (count ’em, ninety-one) days after entry, Section 7481(a)(1). But IRS objects, and there’s a problem.

“Mrs. Van Alsburg, for the first time, now seeks innocent spousal relief some six years after filing her Petition and after the Court has entered its Decision. Petitioners’ Motions essentially seek to permit petitioners to file an amended Petition and now raise for first time a new affirmative defense, without providing a valid reason as to why it was not presented prior to the Proposed Stipulated Decision.” Order, at p. 3. (Footnote omitted, but see infra, as my expensive former colleagues would say).

“Mrs. Van Alsburg alleges that she had no knowledge or reason to know of the understatements, but petitioners presented no evidence to prove that this lack of knowledge just occurred after the stipulated decision was entered based on any mistake inadvertence, [sic] surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud.” Order, at p.3, footnote 3.

Takeaway- Every intake checklist must provide for a thorough conflicts search, but not merely between the proposed client(s) and present or former clients. Too many well-credentialed practitioners have come seriously unglued when representing both spouses. 

No, not a variant on the mashbill nor another premium limited-release. I don’t even know if Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler is a fan of Kentucky’s fine distillments. 

But I must give a second Taishoff “Good Job, First Class, With Swords and Diamonds” to Woodford, s/a/k/a Woody, the trusty attorney for Kenneth Walker & Juli A. Walker. Docket No. 2801-24L, filed 3/24/26. Woodford gets Judge Speedy Weiler to reverse his 1/12/26 decision, for whose antecedents see my blogpost “Obamasnod,” 1/8/26. 

And Judge Speedy Weiler awards Woodford’s clients $8788.50 in Section 7430 legals and admins, as well as quashing the APTC IRS assessed without first issuing a SND.

Moreover, IRS folds.

Honest representation at reasonable rates, that’s Woodford’s style.

I note STJ Peter J. (“HB”) Panuthos’ Order permitting IRS to amend its answer out of time in Ashref Zarmuh, Docket No. 7127-22, filed 3/23/26, as a cautionary tale.

IRS moves to amend out of time (that means late) to up the deficiency and the Section 6662(a) chop. Ashref’s trusty attorney objects this gives IRS “a second bite at the apple.” Order, at p. 2.

STJ HB Panuthos tells the story.

“The increased deficiency and penalty arise from gross receipts on Form Schedule C of an unsigned Form 1040 provided to respondent by petitioner’s counsel as part of informal discovery. The Form Schedule C was not part of the Form 1040 electronically filed by petitioner.” Order, at p.1.

Amendment of pleadings is granted absent prejudice.

“Petitioner has not demonstrated that he would be prejudiced by allowing respondent to assert an increased deficiency at this time. The case is not calendared for trial and no formal discovery is reflected on the record. Additionally, respondent will bear the burden of proof on this increased deficiency, pursuant to Tax Court Rule 142, thus further ameliorating any potential prejudice.” Order, at p. 2. (Citation omitted).  

Practitioner, make sure you have your client’s documents, all of them, in-hand, before you ever draft a petition. If time is short, file a generic petition and amend later. E-filing can be hazardous as well as helpful; make sure you have reviewed all documents as-filed before you file.

Edited to add, 3/23/26: Especially beware of some of these “free file e-file” software services, which don’t permit the filing of schedules.

That tactic doesn’t work in Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones’ division, although the approach of the Cup playoffs makes us old-time fans recollect the great Bobby Clarke of the Broad Street Bullies doing that thing again and again.

Gurpreet S. Padda & Pamela B. Kane, Docket No. 7260-19, filed 3/20/26, and IRS tell Judge CD Jones that really truly they only need 90 (count ’em, 90) days more to stip out both this case and Docket No.15807-22.

Judge CD Jones says that’s cool but move the puck (although she puts it more elegantly than I).

“The Court appreciates the parties’ representations and will grant the requested 90 days to file a stipulated decision. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the Petition in Docket No. 7260-19 was filed more than six years ago (see Doc. 1), and the Petition in Docket No. 15807-22 was filed more than three years ago (see Doc. 1). Given the age of the cases, the parties are advised that the Court will be inclined to restore each case to the general docket so that it can be calendared for trial, if a proposed stipulated decision is not filed in 90 days.” Order, at p. 1.

I’ve often before now suggested that either the Ch J or an administrative judge traverse the dockets and bestir dilatory litigants to “stip out or try the case now.”  Moreover, she “strongly encourages the parties to meet in person, if at all possible.” Order, at p. 1. (Emphasis by the Court).

It would be presumptuous of me to award Taishoff “Good Jobs” to Judges but I can express hearty agreement with Judge CD Jones’ approach.

No, not an award from the Bureau of Prisons. Michael Smith, T. C. Memo. 2026-25, filed 3/19/26, is imprisoned in one tax year by Section 86(d)(2)(A).

Mr. Smith applied for and got SSDI. But in the year wherein he was paid both a lump sum and periodic payments he was also gainfully employed. SSA wanted our money back, so Mr. Smith paid it back over the following two (count ’em, two) years.

He never reported the SSDI payments in the year received.

Mr. Smith says it’s like he was loaned money (nontaxable) which he paid back, but the statute forecloses Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber from seeing it that way.

“We understand why petitioner views his predicament in this way, but this Court is bound by the provisions of the Code. Petitioner does not dispute that he received SSDI benefits in 2022, and he must include those payments in gross income to the extent provided in section 86. His repayments during 2023 and 2024 do not affect his 2022 tax liability because the payments he received during 2022 are reduced only by ‘any repayment made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.’ § 86(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This rule is one example of the ‘annual accounting principle’ that governs computation of taxable income generally.” T. C. Memo. 2026-25, at p. 4.

Generally (love that word!), each year stands on its own.

Claim of right is also barred by the explicit words of the statute.

No, not the usual six or seven pager with its injunction to play nice and prep for trial. Jones Bluff, LLC, Green Rock Management, LLC, Partnership Representative, 166 T. C. 6, filed 3/19/26, claim that the partners therein are deprived of due process because the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 vests sole right to challenge the FPA IRS unleashed on the Jones Bluffers via the Green Rockers.

Ch J Urda, and Judges Buch, Nega, Pugh, Ashford, Copeland, Jones, Toro, Greaves, Marshall, Weiler, Way, Landy, Arbeit, Guider, Jenkins, and Fung aren’t buying. Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan tells us why.

After a review of partnership taxation from before TEFRA to the current BBA régime, the Green Rockers are without standing to assert the claims of the Jones Bluff partners. Sure, the Green Rockers have standing to fight the FPA. But do they have standing to represent the partners?

“The third-party standing inquiry adds a second set of prudential considerations to the Article III requirement of injury in fact. Once a party has satisfied the requirements of Article III standing, the doctrine of third-party standing requires a plaintiff to meet additional factors to assert another party’s rights. A decision to grant third-party standing is one of ‘judicial self-governance.’” 166 T. C. 6, at p. 9. (Citations omitted). And courts are reluctant to do so except in First Amendment cases. 

Now there is a close relationship between partnership and partners, satisfying one branch of the third-party standing test. But the Green Rockers fail to satisfy the other branch, that the third party is hindered in seeking redress if third-party standing is withheld. There’s always a CDP or a pay-and-seek-refund in USDC, 166 T. C. 6, at p. 11, footnote 6.

Moreover, the summary J motion here isn’t ripe for adjudication. BBA section 6226 lets the partnership push out liability to the partners, or pay at partnership level. But that depends on whether there’s liability at all, and nobody knows that until trial and decision final beyond appeal. Courts refrain from deciding cases where the result will depend on contingent future events that may or may not happen.

“The passing on of that liability to the individual members will occur, if at all, as a result of petitioner’s actions and not respondent’s actions. Petitioner’s actions therefore are ‘contingent future events’ that render the claims it is making on behalf of the individual members not ripe at this time.” 166 T. C. 6, at p. 12. (Footnote omitted).

Judge Buch concurs, joined by Judges Copeland, Way, Jenkins, and Fung.

The Green Rockers’ claim that TEFRA let partners intervene is misleading. Some partners (like one-percenters in large partnerships) were more equal than the non-notice types. The non-noticed might be bound in TEFRA cases by decisions which no partner entitled to petition did so, or of which they were unaware, or which stiped out without their consent. And all that survived due process challenge. 

Whether the BBA communications provisions are valid or not is beyond the scope of this case. And if the PR, like predecessor TMP, didn’t tell the non-noticed, that’s not IRS’ fault.

Finally, we get another vintage Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch in full cry as he quotes from Vander Heide T. C. Memo. 1996-74, at p. 8: “We sympathize with [the partners], but must point out that [they] are not victims of [the Commissioner] or the Internal Revenue Code. They are victims of unscrupulous purveyors of tax shelters . . . . [They] are also victims of their own greed and naivete by investing in these scams, obtaining outrageous deductions and credits without paying attention to the details of the tax laws, nor putting into place some sort of check and balance system to monitor their own investments.” 

Cf. my blogpost “Judge Buch Says It All Here,:” 7/17/25.

The mysterious English Elizabethan poet was once charged, but never convicted, with counterfeiting money. He supposedly said that he had as good a right to coin money as Queen Elizabeth I (or II, for that matter, I suppose).

Benjamin A. Rogovy & Carol J. Castellon Miranda, Docket No. 17513-24, filed 3/18/26, bitcoin aficionados, would agree. Howbeit, IRS claims they were hard-forked, and thus owe tax.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch understands these things, which I totally do not, despite having among my nearest and dearest one who can block a chain with the best of them. So I’ll let Judge Ingenuity Buch judge-‘splain.

“Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that can be traded, exchanged into fiat currencies, and used to pay for goods and services. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. Bitcoin exists on a blockchain, which is a public ledger of cryptocurrency transactions. The Bitcoin blockchain is governed by a set of rules and technical standards, and any changes to the protocols governing the blockchain require consensus from the Bitcoin network, which includes all participants interacting on the blockchain.

“Bitcoin is held on the blockchain at a specific address. A participant can send Bitcoin to another address on the blockchain using public and private keys. These keys are alphanumeric codes that serve a similar function to a bank account password (private) and a bank account number (public). Private keys are stored in ‘wallets’ and public keys are shortened into a ‘wallet address’ which is the identifier for specific Bitcoin addresses.” Order, at p. 2.

But Ben’s problems start at the fork. He got some forked bitcoins.

“The blockchain can split in a process called a ‘hard fork.’ A hard fork occurs when the blockchain is copied and a new protocol is adopted for the newly copied blockchain, thus creating a forked blockchain. This forked blockchain is an exact copy of the legacy blockchain at the time of the fork, but future transactions on the forked blockchain will follow the new protocol. A hard fork has no impact on the continued functioning of the legacy blockchain, and it does not alter the holdings of the legacy cryptocurrency. After a hard fork, an individual who has a wallet that controls a cryptocurrency on the legacy blockchain also has a corresponding wallet address and public key for the forked blockchain that represents the newly ‘forked coins.’ The number of forked coins in the forked blockchain wallet corresponds to the number of coins in the legacy wallet. After a hard fork, an individual would need to take additional steps to obtain the forked coins.” Id, as my expensive ex-colleagues would say.

The question is did Ben actually have constructive receipt of the forked coins. IRS claims he had receipt of $9 million worth. Ben claims he didn’t, and wants summary J.

He doesn’t get it. Too many fact questions.

I have eschewed all the obvious puns about the forking process.

To any who object that I put out too many discovery blogposts, that’s what takes up the greatest number of Tax Court Order pages beyond routine pay-and-amend or tossed-for-lateness. The CLE merchants who peddled “win your case at discovery” the last thirty (count ’em, thirty) or so years have swept the board. Pretrial faceoffs are the game; if the game itself takes place at all, it’s an afterthought.

By way of illustration of the foregoing (as my expensive former colleagues say), here’s Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins unloading eight (count ’em, eight) pages anent document production in GO Management Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 3/17/26, another microcaptivity dodge. 

Most of the Order deals with case-specifics, but there is one general interest point. I’ll let Judge Jenkins judge–‘splain.

“…despite respondent’s request for documents to be produced in their native format, each document produced was produced as a PDF file. Although referenced, respondent’s electronically stored information provided previously in connection with informal discovery requests, and respondent provided them with a follow-up request to provide the documents in accordance with such specifications…. Respondent also states that petitioners at no point raised concerns about the omission of the specifications. The Motion Response states that petitioners provided documents in the format in which they were maintained and, in any event, that respondent’s failure to include the ESI specifications with the Request originally was determinative.

“Respondent did make an ESI specifications request in the Request, and petitioners did not, in the Request Response, raise any specific objections to that request, as instructed in Rule 72(b)(2). Even in the Motion Response, petitioners do not raise substantive objections to the ESI specifications but simply argue that they did produce them in the format in which they were stored, which, as noted in the Reply, is the requirement under Rule 72(b)(3)(B) only if a specific form has not been requested. Furthermore, as respondent also points out in the Reply, it is dubious that all of the items produced, e.g., emails and Microsoft Excel files, were stored in PDF format. Accordingly, the Court will order petitioners to produce ESI according to the ESI specifications referenced in the Request.” Order, at. p. 2.

Scrub the metadata is an obvious desideratum. PDF does that. Taishoff says Judge Jenkins is right to call it “dubious” that documents subject, or potentially subject, to a litigation hold would be stored in PDF only. Once preserved in PDF, an essential element of the original is gone. Spoliation of evidence, maybe so? I do hope none of the aforementioned merchants are making this suggestion.