No, I haven’t taken up weather reporting, however compelling the news from NOLA. This is the latest on the surge of petitions to US Tax Court. As at 3:07 p.m., EDT, the latest docket number I can find is 20706-21S, filed 6/9/21, or about one week shy of three (count ’em, three) months ago. Might it not be an exaggeration to state that the stack of unprocessed petitions, when added to those already logged in, will far exceed the expected 24K + anticipated in my blogpost “Premature,” 7/23/21?

Might it not be reckless speculation to suggest the number of petitions filed might approach, if not exceed, 35,000 total for calendar 2021?

In the midst of which deluge, we have today Austin Leroy Bayne, Docket No. 2680-20S, filed 8/30/21*. Austin Leroy petitioned last year, and then did nothing, at least so far as Judge Gale is able to discern from the record.

IRS moves to toss Austin Leroy for want of prosecution. Judge Gale fires the following salvo.

“Petitioner’s failure to appear for trial and failure to comply with the terms of the Standing Pretrial Order requiring adequate pretrial preparation have prejudiced respondent by causing him to expend resources that could have been expended elsewhere. Moreover, petitioner’s failure to appear for trial and failure to comply with the Standing Pretrial Order have hindered the Court’s management of its docket. None of petitioner’s failures are excused. We have balanced petitioner’s interest in being heard, which has been diminished by his failure to meaningfully participate in these proceedings, against the Court’s responsibility to manage its docket, and we have concluded that dismissal is warranted.” Order, at p. 4. (Copious citation of precedent omitted.)

OK, great. Austin Leroy is out, even if it took Judge Gale four pages to get there, leaving only twenty-some thousand petitions to go.

Not quite. As the midnight telehucksters say “But wait! There’s more!”

IRS wants chops and add-ons, with BoP and BProd at no extra charge.

“Respondent has not attempted to meet his burden of production with respect to the additions to tax determined in the notice of deficiency. He instead argues that he has no burden of production as to the additions to tax because the Petition fails to put them at issue. We disagree. As we have previously explained, ‘[a]ll claims in a petition should be broadly construed so as to do substantial justice, and a petition filed by a pro se litigant should be liberally construed. The assignments of error in the Petition, which petitioner filed pro se, include the statement, ‘I don’t think it’s fair to wait 5 years then slap someone with all these charges and penal[]ties.’ That statement, construed liberally, is sufficient to put respondent on notice that petitioner disagrees with respondent’s determination that he is liable for ‘charges and penalties’, i.e., additions to tax, for the year at issue. We accordingly must determine whether respondent has satisfied his burden of production with respect to each of the additions to tax determined in the notice of deficiency.” Order, at pp. 9-10. (Citations omitted).

Judge Gale gives a great review of all thereof. IRS gets late-filing, but not late payment (Austin Leroy had enough uncontested withholding credits on his late-filed 1040A to satisfy, and IRS produced no SFR to say otherwise). And IRS has no return to show what Austin Leroy’s previous year’s tax was, so no ES-nonfiling add-on.

Austin Leroy sure got his day in court, even if he wasn’t there. All thirteen pages’ worth.

*Austin Leroy Bayne 2680-20S 8 30 21

I have never heard Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley sing, but I’m sure he’d give a great rendition of the great folksong above-referred-to. It epitomizes His Honor’s view of the United States Tax Court.

This broad view is more particularly bounded and described in Administrative Order 2021-1, 8/27/21.

“The United States Tax Court, headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a Court of nationwide jurisdiction and conducts trial sessions in 74 cities across the country. Petitioners generally select a designated trial session city for their trial location. The Court’s default is to conduct in-person trials.” Administrative Order 2021-1, at p. 1.

The AO does permit Zoomietrials and hearings, and the rules, guidelines, and protocols are set forth therein. Practitioners, read and heed. Note especially the 31-day cutoff before the first day of the trial session where you want to Zoom; that’s calendar call Day One, even if you want to set your trial for a later date and time certain.

But Ch J Mighty Mo’s judicial panel must be prepared. They’ll be “wanderin’ early and wanderin’ late, New York City to the Golden Gate.”

It’s a verb meaning attracting and holding the interest of an observer, and CFM Insurance, Inc., Docket No. 10703-19, filed 8/27/21*, certainly does that for IRS. IRS claims CFM is another microcaptive phony that shifts cash but no risk.

Judge Mark V. Holmes has a doubleplay in this order, until IRS drops the chops, thus mooting CFM’s discovery request relating to whether an attorney in Office of Chief Counsel was the real Boss Hoss, even though not the RA’s immediate supervisor. For more, see my blogpost “Call Me Mr. Silt,” 6/16/21.

But the insurance broker who ran the CFM operation and whom I’ll designate as AjG was hit with a third-party subpoena, ranging far and wide over AJG’s role in setting up and running CFM through AJG’s subsidiary Artex. My readers with long memories will remember Artex’s appearance in my blogpost “Discovered Check,” 11/30/15, part of the saga of Caylor Land & Development, Inc., to which Judge Holmes cites at p. 3 of his Order.

Spoiler alert: see my blogpost “My Kind of Insurance Company,” 3/10/21, for the dénoument of the Caylor saga.

AJG says IRS is sailing on a fishing expedition, that compliance with the subpoena is unduly burdensome, and that IRS is only entitled to a lot less than they’re asking for.

Nope, says Judge Holmes.

“The Commissioner’s theory appears to be that CFM didn’t have a ‘substantial purpose (apart from federal income tax effects) for entering into the captive insurance transaction,’ and that it didn’t act in good faith. Comparing the captive insurance that CFM provided to the more traditional commercial insurance that {AJG] provided would likely shed light on any value CFM added to the [insured]’s stores, and therefore its purpose. And examining the [insured]’s stores’ insurance arrangements in the years before CFM’s formation could do the same. This kind of compare-and-contrast analysis is one that we’ve done in every other microcaptive-insurance case we’ve had. Because part of the test for finding an arrangement to be ‘insurance’ is ‘whether an arrangement looks like commonly accepted notions of insurance,’ Caylor, slip op. at 10, a comparison of [insured]’s insurance purchases from AJG slightly before and during the years at issue is therefore relevant, and we think that the Commissioner’s first and second requests for information are reasonably tailored to discover them.

“The Commissioner’s third request seeks communications between AJG and [insured]’s, Mr. P, CFM, and JI (CFO of [insured]) between August 26 and the date the subpoena was received (i.e., a few days to a few weeks later). This is a request aimed at getting information relating to this phase of the litigation. It may be aimed at impeachment evidence or evidence of preparation of a response to the subpoena. It’s not overly burdensome, and AJG may of course respond with a privilege log (as the subpoena states) if it or CFM wants to invoke an exemption to discovery.” Order, at p. 4. (Names and citations omitted, but Judge Holmes cites to all the usual suspects I’ve blogged).

Prospect of an appeal by AJG? They’ve got a heavy-duty white shoe firm representing them. Judge Holmes, by calling their counsel “Mr.,” rather than “Esq.,” you may have provoked them.

*CFM Insurance 10703-19 8 27 21

The punchline from a horrific but hilarious example of schadenfreude (the full text of which is manifestly unfit for a blog like mine, intended for family reading), tells the story of Judge David Gustafson, obliging as always, picking out the magic word from Indu Rawat’s motion for reconsideration, in Indu Rawat, Docket No. 15340-16, filed 8/26/21^.

Y’all remember NRA Indu, right? No, she’s not a gunslinger, she’s a Non Resident Alien, who sold her US partnership interest for telephone numbers, and maybe agreed that she had to recognize the post-sale gain on partnership inventory as ordinary income to the tune of $6.25 million. No? Then see my blogpost “Che Se Firms é Perdutto – Part Deux,” 7/20/21.

Indu signed the 870-LT that locked her into recognizing the ordinary gain per Section 751. But of course Indu sold before 11/27/17, so the amendment to Section 864(c)(8), mandating Section 751 pickup by NRAs selling onshore partnership interests doesn’t apply.

Judge Gustafson: “…Ms. Rawat now evidently abandons her critique of the Commissioner’s documents and now agrees (though only arguendo) that the Form 870-LT includes both parts I and II, the Form 886-A, and its ‘Schedule of Adjustments’; and she now abandons her contention that she is ‘not [bound] to any partner-level determinations’.” Order, at p. 3.

Huh? Did Indu surrender to IRS 100%?

Negatory, good buddy, but it takes Judge Gustafson to parse out what Indu’s trusty attorneys are driving at.

“…she asks us to reconsider the meaning and effect of the Form 870-LT in requiring  her to ‘recognize ordinary income in the amount of $6,523,176.’ She contends that this ‘recogni[tion]’ provision in the closing agreement does not determine ‘taxable income’ and does not preclude her contention that the sourcing rules relieve her from taxation on that amount. We think that this contention was unclear in her reply, but we acknowledge
that she made the contention and that we gave it insufficient attention.” Order, at p. 4 (Emphasis by the Court).

The magic word is “taxable.”

So let IRS and Indu dish on their viewpoints, and confabulate via Zoom or phoneathon about settlement.

I’m sure Indu’s trusty attorneys, whom I’ll here denominate as the capdale guys, are grateful.

*Inmdu Rawat 8 26 21

I’ve seen this many times over the last fifty-four (count ’em, fifty-four) years: a developer (usually taxed as a partnership, even if LLC) finds the property, and seeks financing. The lender wants return of capital, return on capital, and something extra, namely, viz., and to wit, a piece of the action, whether during operation or sale or both.

We call this piece of the action an equity kicker, and it’s either embedded in the mortgage, or, more likely, in a side agreement. Of course, we put in a load of jive about not creating a partnership, co-venture, or anything but a debtor-creditor relationship. Yeah, most affirmato, roger that.

Anyhow, that’s the deal with Progressive Life Insurance Company (PLI) that Alexander C. Deitch, et al., Docket  No. 21282-17, filed 8/25/21*, made. But the als were individual members with Alex of an LLC known as WTS. Wherefore, when WTS paid PLI $1 million and called it interest, IRS handed out SNODs to Alex and the als.

Judge David Gustafson man-‘splains: “This payment constituted 50% of the net proceeds of the sale of a commercial property as calculated pursuant to an ‘Additional Interest Agreement’ into which WTS and PLI had entered when PLI agreed to lend to WTS approximately $4.4 million for the purchase of the commercial property.” Order, at p. 1.

Now Alex and one of the als were the sole members of WTS, and, as they were both individuals, WTS was a small partnership for TEFRA purposes, therefore no need for FPAA, therefore straight to the individuals (the other al is the wife of the other member).

And there were facially-valid SNODs to Alex and the als, and timely petitions from both.

Except.

IRS argues in its pretrial brief that PLI and WTS were co-venturers, not borrower-lender, so whatever WTS paid PLI out of operations once the property was up and running were Section 707(c) guaranteed payments, and what PLI got on the sale was a distributive share of the sales proceeds.

So what?

So TEFRA. I’m sure my ultra-hip readers reacted as did Judge Gustafson (although Judge Gustafson gives us elegant language, somber reasoning, and copious citations). “Hey, if WTS and PLI are co-venturers, then they’re partners for tax purposes. While PLI is a C Corp and could qualify for the TEFRA small-partnership duck, WTS is a pass-through and not a disregarded (having two members), so WTS and PLI cannot duck TEFRA. And splitting operating profits and sales proceeds are clearly partnership items. So IRS must use TEFRA, but here no FPAA., so no Tax Court jurisdiction.”

Take a look at Jimastowlo Oil, LLC, more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “Honor Your Partner,” 8/26/13.

So let IRS’ counsel report (a) whether TEFRA ousts Judge Gustafson of jurisdiction to decide IRS’ claim that the equity kicker payments are the result of a co-venture between WTS and PLI, and (b) if so, what else is there to decide?

And let Alex and the als reply.

Now I’ve said often enough that Judge David Gustafson is an obliging jurist. He’ll bring over his laptop and do your papers for you, bring Krispy Kremes and Mayorga with half-and-half to calendar call, and feed the parking meter while you wait. See my blogpost “Obliging? This Beats All,” 3/6/19. Then I said he won’t do your research for you. But here he’s written the memo for Alex’s trusty attorneys, the Lords Chamberlain.

*Alex Deitch 21282-17 8 25 21

We’ve met them many times in our practices. You know, the loveable rogue. Yeah, straight as a corkscrew, but there’s something about the dude.

Note: very rarely does a woman fall into this category; women eschew persiflage, are too direct. Ms. Elizabeth Holmes is intimidating, not ingratiating.

Anyway, Greg Podlucky is back today, and just two words in Judge Albert G (“Scholar Al”) Lauber’s stitching up of summary J precluding Greg from denying that he “fraudulently underpaid his tax for the 2005 tax year” brought even more than a grimace to my battered visage. I smiled, even got a wee bit teary, remembering times long ago. And the memories of those times brought a fleeting moment of fellow-feeling for Greg.

Then, of course, it dissipated.

The words? “The Government alleged that petitioner fabricated [Greg’s business]’ financial statements to induce lenders and investors to advance funds to the business. Petitioner during 2005 allegedly diverted more than $7 million of his ill-gotten gains to buy jewelry, model trains, and a mansion house.” Order, at p. 2. (Emphasis added).

Model trains, Judge? Have you ever opened the blue cardboard boxes of the first postwar American Flyer red coaches your Dad bought for you the last Christmas he was home? Have you ever set up the Hornby Mallard to run around the Christmas tree with two young and eager assistants? Ever set up the Märklin model of the railcar you rode from Ansbach to Steinach to visit your old Army buddy from boot camp?

If not, please accept my sincerest sympathies.

Model trains, indeed. Magic. A glimpse of Heaven.

Gregory J. Podlucky and Karla S. Podlucky, Docket No. 453-17, filed 8/24/21.*

*Gregory J Podlucky 453-17 8:24:21

Nilda E. Vera, 157 T. C. 6, filed 8/31/21*, shows that determination will get you a determination, hence a ticket to Tax Court, even though you were previously tossed for lateness.

Nilda sought innocent spousery for 2013, got a NOD denying it, and petitioned a day late. Tax Court tossed Nilda. Then Nilda came back a couple months (hi, Judge Holmes) later for 2010, and included 2013 in her claim, and got denied as to both, and petitioned timely.

Judge Buch says the Innocent Spouse Unit determined Nilda ineligible as to both years, so Tax Court has jurisdiction over both.

“In a determination… the Commissioner denied the request for relief that Ms. Vera had filed in November 2016. That denial was styled as a Letter 3288, Final Appeals Determination. The header of that letter specified only 2010 as the tax year. In contrast, the substance of the determination addressed both 2010 and 2013. It read:
“For tax year 2010, the information we have shows that you didn’t\ meet the requirements for relief.

“For tax year 2010, you didn’t have a reasonable expectation that the person you filed the joint return with would or could pay the tax.

“For tax year 2013, you didn’t comply with all income tax laws for the tax years that followed the years that are the subject of your claim.” 157 T. C. 6, at p. 4.

Nilda used the Form 2 petition, and put both years on it.

“Although section 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) refers to a final determination, nothing in that provision prohibits the Commissioner from issuing more than one final determination as to a given tax year. To the extent this provision might be interpreted as allowing for only one final determination, it does not specify whether it is one final determination per request for innocent spouse relief or one final determination per tax year.

“If we look to the applicable regulations to clear up this ambiguity, it is clear that the Commissioner believes that more than one final determination can be issued with respect to a single tax year. As a general matter, the regulations under section 6015 limit claimants to a single qualified request for a given year. Sec. 1.6015-1(a)(2), (h)(5), Income Tax Regs. A qualified request is defined as the ‘first timely claim for relief.’ Id. para. (h)(5). And the ‘requesting spouse is entitled to only one final administrative determination of relief.’ Sec. 1.6015-5(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. But these regulations leave open the possibility for the Commissioner to issue a second final determination. For instance, if a requesting spouse changes marital status, the regulations permit a second claim, resulting in a second final determination. Secs. 1.6015-1(h)(5), 1.6015-5(c)(1), 1.6015-3, Income Tax Regs.” 157 T. C. 5, at pp. 6-7.

And of course the whistleblower epistolary volleying is remembered.

“In the whistleblower context, we have held that successive letters that purport to be a final determination can confer on the recipient successive opportunities to file a petition. 157 T. C. 6, at p. 9. Judge Buch cites the Battling Comparinis. See my blogpost “Arts and the Man,” 10/4/14.

“In his motion to dismiss, the Commissioner characterizes the inclusion of 2013 in his determination as an error. Error or not, the Commissioner’s notice is unambiguous in its denial as to both 2010 and 2013. Although the header of the letter refers only to 2010, the body refers to both years. The description for denial of relief as to 2013 relates solely to the merits of relief. Nowhere in the letter does the Commissioner describe a rejection on the basis of an improper second request. Simply put, nothing in the Commissioner’s letter conflicts with the notion that this is a denial on the merits as to both 2010 and 2013. This leaves the Commissioner to argue that the determination was issued in error. But if we again look to our whistleblower caselaw, we have previously held that we have jurisdiction to review determinations issued in error.” 157 T. C. 6., at p. 10.

Remember Mica Ringo? No? See my blogpost “Oh, Those Letters,” 10/6/14.

There’s more, but IRS is stuck. Nilda’s determination gets her a determination, and a Tax Court review.

But oh, what a splendid silt-stir this will cause!  If late for one year, timely petition another, and load ’em both aboard.

*Nilda E Vera 157 T C 6 8 23 21

No, not what happens when one sits in an endless Zoom meeting that drones on to oblivion. This is about what happens when a Notice of Determination is invalid. And that’s the story of Guadalupe Ruiz & Maria C. Ruiz, Docket No. 21277-18L, filed 8/23/21*.

Guadalupe & Maria C. petitioned a NOD. Appeals issued a supplemental NOD, but somewhere in between Guadalupe died. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones told IRS to report.

“…in response to the Court’s order, respondent filed a status report representing that the IRS never issued Mrs. Ruiz a Notice CP90, Intent to Seize Your Assets and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing. As such, respondent’s counsel contends that the notice of determination sent to Mrs. Ruiz was not a valid notice of determination. Accordingly, respondent represented that respondent would file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to Mrs. Ruiz.” Order, at p. 2.

And IRS tried to find who might represent the estate of the late Guadalupe.

Well, pore l’il ol’ Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, so no valid NOD, no jurisdiction, right?

Not quite. “Although the Office of Appeals’ determination need not follow a particular format, the determination must be in writing. A notice of determination ‘must specify to which taxable period, liability, and collection action it relates or, at least provide sufficient information so that the taxpayer cannot reasonably be deceived as to these items”. LG Kendrick, LLC v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 17, 28-29 (2016) (citing Commissioner v. Forest Glen Creamery Co., 98 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir.1938), rev’g and remanding 33 B.T.A. 564 (1935); Erickson v.  Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1991–97, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2073, 2076–2077 (1991)). For the backstory on LG Kendrick, see my blogpost “Be Careful What You Ask For – Part Deux,” 1/21/16.

So just maybe there might be jurisdiction as to Maria C., because there was a NOD specifying whatever NODs are supposed to specify. That Appeals had no jurisdiction, invalidating the NOD, because Maria C. never got the CP 90, is another story.  So let IRS’ counsel report on that angle.

There is Tax Court caselaw that says it can kick the underlying levy notice if it was improperly served. Take a look at the Order, at pp. 3-4. Although 7 Cir weighs in to state that determining IRS didn’t follow statutory requirements is “a quintessential merits analysis, not a jurisdictional ruling,” 7 Cir tossed the taxpayer in that case, saying if NOD invalid, like the Man From Mumbai said, “The door is shut…we may not look behind.” See Adolphson, 843 F.3D 478 (CA 7, 2016).

Judge CD Jones notes Adolphson is up in the air in Tax Court, as the Atlantic Pacific Management case (for which see my blogpost “The Taxpayer Bill of Goods – Part Deux,” 6/20/19) never dealt with Adolphson.

Taishoff says, anyway, the late Guadalupe & Maria C. were TX residents when they petitioned, and TX is 5 Cir, not 7 Cir.

But Judge CD Jones is the judge here, not me, so let IRS decompose some brain tissue.

Meantime, TX law does let Maria C. take up the torch for the late Guadalupe, and press ahead with her own innocent spousery. Texas Estates Code sec. 453.003.

So let IRS’ counsel discuss TX estate law, Maria C.’s innocent spousery, and maybe whether Tax Court has no jurisdiction at all.

And let the Clerk change the caption to “Guadalupe Ruiz, Deceased, Maria C. Ruiz, Surviving Spouse, & Maria C. Ruiz, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.” Order, at p. 4.

*Guadalupe Ruiz & Maria C. 8 23 21

That’s what Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall does to IRS in John W. Jermaine, 7458-19L, filed 8/20/21*. IRS gives John a SNOD, which includes a $94 deficiency, which he pays, but also reverses the $9K withholding credit John claimed and was refunded. John petitions the SNOD, but gets tossed for want of the sixty Georges. Comes then the NITL, which John answers with a 12153, asking for OIC, lien withdrawal, and innocent spousery. He also claims he paid the deficiency.

While the CDP is pending, John sues IRS and some other people in USDCMDTN. The other people get let out of the case, and John gets tossed with prejudice per FRCP 16(f); John didn’t seem to follow Court orders, which gets USDJs peevish.

Anyway, IRS wants summary J tossing John’s petition from the NOD. John wants to go back to USDCMDTN, but that’s out. He petitioned the NOD timely; that’s enough, and he isn’t asking for this case to be dismissed. And John isn’t suing for a refund per 28 USC §1346 anyway, even iof he hadn’t been tossed in USDCMDTN.

John can’t challenge the $94 deficiency, because he petitioned that and got tossed. There’s also no lien to withdraw.

But the $9K withholding refund is another story.

“The attachment to the notice of determination states: ‘[t]he taxpayer challenged the existence and amount of the liability within an attachment to the Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing. The taxpayer was precluded from raising the liability issue during this CDP hearing process due to a prior opportunity and was advised as such by the original Appeals Officer assigned the case.’

“Reading the attachment to the notice of determination in the light most favorable to the taxpayer, it might be that petitioner raised the $9,279 withholding at his IRS Appeals conference but was not permitted to provide evidence. This interpretation of the attachment to the notice of determination would not permit the Court to hold for respondent on summary judgment….

“In respondent’s motion, respondent does not address whether petitioner is entitled to raise the $9,279 withholding tax credit as a challenge to his underlying liability under section 6330(c)(2)(B). Respondent also does not address whether petitioner’s arguments with respect to this amount might be reviewed as a verification issue pursuant to section 6330(c)(1) rather than an underlying liability issue pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(B). See Dixon v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. 173, 183-184, 184 n.6 (2013). We will not grant summary judgment on this issue….” Order, at p. 9.

For the Dixon story, see my blogpost “The Great Dissenter – Redivivus,” 9/3/13.

Did the SO check all the boxes to make sure all the requirements for sustaining the lien were met? Or did the SO just rely on the flat statement that John had had a chance to contest?

John also questioned whether a $114 levy on his Social Security, while he still had a chance to petition the NOD timely, was proper. IRS has only the excuse that the levy arose from the toss of John’s petition from the SNOD, not the NOD. Judge AIM isn’t buying.

“Based on the record before us and respondent’s failure to offer statutory, regulatory, or caselaw citations addressing the levy, we are unable to conclude as a matter of law that SO K did not abuse her discretion in determining that the requirements of any applicable law and administrative procedure have been met. Because we are unable to determine whether respondent abused his discretion in this regard, we deny respondent’s motion with respect to the issue of whether SO K abused her discretion in making the determination to sustain the proposed levy.” Order, at p. 13. (Name omitted).

So there needs to be a trial on the levy and innocent spousery.

*John W. Jermaine 7458-19L 8 20 21

No, I still forswear politics here, and will not here “fight old battles o’er.” Today Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo’) Foley has a simple order that should serve as a warning in the current Petition Surge.

The blogosphere has erupted since I first raised to public view the record-breaking volume of petitions filed this year. See my blogposts “Premature,” 7/23/21, and “Draining the Swamp,” 8/17/21.

Clearly the hardlaboring intake clerks and flailing datestampers, and their coadjutors, are feeling the strain of the heavy-duty workload. As at today, 8/20/21, at noon EDT, there have been fewer than 19,500 petitions docketed (at least according to DAWSON, which I submit for the fact of that statement being made, and not for the truth thereof). Y’all will recollect that the Tax Court website itself reported receipt of more than 24,000 petitions as at 7/23/21.

So what is likely to happen at The Glasshouse in the Stateless City?

Here’s Ch J Mighty Mo to tell you. Note the dates; they’re material. Read and heed.

“By Order dated May 6, 2021, the Court directed petitioners to pay the Court’s $60.00 filing fee. On June 23, 2021, petitioners paid the Court’s $60.00 filing fee. However, due to inadvertent clerical error, on August 12, 2021, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the Court’s $60.00 filing fee.” Order, at p. 1.

The May 6 order above-referred-to did set a 6/22/21 deadline for receipt, so mailed-isn’t-filed. Petitioners were a day late. But the hardlaboring crew didn’t get around to bouncing the petitioners until 8/12/21.

Wherefore, “(O)n August 12, 2021, petitioners filed a First Amendment to Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction. However, further review indicates that petitioners’ filing appears to be more akin to a Motion To Vacate.

“The Court will vacate the Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and thereby allow this case to go forward.” Order, at p.1.

Word to attorneys, USTCPs, and self-representeds: Stay on top of your cases. Monitor them even more closely than during ordinary times. The petition surge will spill over into the pool of clerical goofs and mix-ups, driving it above usual level. And jump on them quickly, to correct your record and help out the overstressed Glasshouse Gang.

Oh yes, the Order is Joseph Raimo and Rebekah Raimo, Docket No. 6277-21S, filed 8/20/21*.

*Raimo 6277-21S 8 20 21