It’s been quite a long-time mantra with me that a lawyer who can’t find an ambiguity should find another way of making a living. Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler surely can find an ambiguity with the best of them.

Carver Mountain Reserve, LLC, Carver Mountain Reserve IP, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 15761-24, filed 6/26/26, claims the TMP’s extensions of 3SOL are defective, because the second of the three (count ’em, three) successive extensions mentioned it was executed and delivered “For the pure purpose of appeal.” Order, at p. 2. Neither of the other two (count ’em, two) contained that phrase.

This is the second motion from Carver; the first was disposed of last month. See my blogpost “Five, Seven, Eight, Fourteen,” 5/8/26. 

Carver says the second extension “would only apply to matters proceeding to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.” Order, at p. 2. Hence the third doesn’t cover everything else.

No, says Judge Speedy Weiler. Carver didn’t raise 3SOL in its petition. 3SOL is an affirmative defense which petitioner must plead and prove; use it or lose it.

“It is the third set of Forms 872-P which extended the period of assessment to July 31, 2024, in each of these cases, and does not contain any such statement. Further, we determine the clause relied upon by petitioners and found in the second set of Forms 872-P to be ambiguous and not clearly intended to limit respondent’s authority to make a future assessment of federal income tax against the partnerships.” Order, at p. 3.

Leaving aside inartful drafting (didn’t you mean “solely to preserve petitioners’ right to appeal any determination, finding, order, or opinion adverse in whole or in part to petitioner, to any forum having or asserting jurisdiction, and to object to any assertion of claim preclusion or issue preclusion of any thereof in any other juridical or administrative proceeding”?), there’s plenty of ambiguity here.

Btw, isn’t there a typo at Order, at p. 3, third full paragraph, line 6? Don’t you mean “872-P,” and not “372-P”? 

Again I volunteer as proofreader.

No, he isn’t a partner other than the TMP who wants a last-minute intervention in IMCO Services Inc, Docket No. 7090-25L, filed 6/26/26; he was a Greek historian and Roman senator who died about 1800 years before Rule 248(b)(4) was promulgated. He appears in this my blog to highlight the extraordinary erudition of the Tax Court bench, specifically Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch, who explores the cutting of the Gordian knot as described by the late Arrian, and decides to pull the pin on the “flurry” of motions more particularly bounded and described in Order, at pp. 3-4, and their pendant replies, responses, and supporting documentation.

Ol’ Arrian’s story shows up in a footnote, Order, at p.1, footnote 1.

While the barrage and counterbarrage is going on, IMCO pays up.

A couple motions (hi, Judge Holmes) follow because IRS can’t confirm that IMCO in fact paid up, but ultimately Judge Ingenuity Buch is convinced that they did, invoking poor ol’ Jen Zuch to toss the petition for want of jurisdiction: no outstanding debt, no pending lien or levy, nothing for Tax Court to review.  IMCO wants to fight about interest during the COVID hiatus, but that’s been paid along with everything else.

Scholars Al and Pat have a worthy colleague in Judge Ingenuity Buch.

No, not another brilliant defensive move by the Champion New York Knickerbockers’ star Jalen Brunson (Party like it’s 1973!). Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh blocks shots by both IRS and Meta Platforms, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16081-25, filed 6/25/26.

IRS claims Meta underpaid for year at issue, and Meta claims they overpaid. Anyway, Meta claims IRS was charging them statutory (Section 6601(a)) interest for a period covered by a Federal disaster relief determination. IRS claims no jurisdiction per Section 7481(c), but Meta claims they overpaid and thus they’re owed interest, so Tax Court has jurisdiction.

Judge C-Doug Pugh says before assessment, Tax Court has no jurisdiction over statutory interest, and in this deficiency case we haven’t had a trial yet.

“Petitioner does not dispute our jurisdiction over statutory interest on underpayments but counters that it has invoked the Court’s overpayment jurisdiction in section 6512(b) as it alleges that respondent erred in denying a refund claim. It therefore reasons that it will be entitled to interest on any overpayment it made. And because overpayment interest is not included in the section 6601(e)(1) carve out from the definition of ‘tax’ then its interest claim should remain.” Order, at p. 2.

Negatory, good buddy, says Judge C-Doug Pugh.

“Only after our decision in this case is final, and the other conditions of section 7481 are met, will we have jurisdiction over the question of whether petitioner overpaid interest on an underpayment assessed by respondent or respondent underpaid interest on an overpayment refunded by respondent as a result of our decision. As we have not determined any deficiency or overpayment, respondent has not assessed any deficiency resulting from our determination (including statutory interest) and petitioner has not paid any deficiency (including statutory interest), or alternatively respondent has not refunded an overpayment with interest, we lack jurisdiction over the alleged error regarding computation of interest.” Order, at p. 2.

For readers unfamiliar with Kipling or G. M. Fraser, “bukh” is an Anglicized version of a Hindi word meaning to talk. In the Anglo-Indian, it takes on a further meaning of to expatiate, to provide Sir W. S. Gilbert’s “corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.”

Two of today’s cases show the necessity of the foregoing.

Liangguo Chi, Docket No. 17532-24L, filed 6/24/26, seeks “the following collection alternatives: an installment agreement, an offer-in-compromise, and a lien withdrawal.” Order, at p. 1. And Liangguo also says he has $4.5 million in equity in his assets, but the Federal tax lien makes it impossible for him to borrow to satisfy the $2.5 million in tax debt he owes.

Except.

Liangguo never provides documentation for any thereof despite being given ten (count ’em, ten) months to do so. Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves gives IRS summary J sustaining the lien.

Frederick Whigham, T. C. Memo. 2026-55, filed 6/24/26, tells a tale of illness and bereavement but fails to disclose where he puts his rental income and won’t realize on his equity, Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins finds Fred’s parsimony with facts and figures is enough to deny him relief from the levy he petitioned. 

The memory comes flooding back: “Dis-miss! Fall out!” The thud of hundreds of hard rubber boot soles hitting rough asphalt; perhaps a shout. The sun setting on red South Carolinas clay and scrub pine woods and faded cream-colored World War II barracks.

I am sure STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel is haunted by no such recollections. I am likewise sure she neither gave nor heard the aforementioned order nor the consequences thereof. But perhaps some archetypical collective memory has stirred the following in Eric Gile & Melinda Gile, Docket No. 7142-25S, filed 6/24/26 (Happy Palindrome Week!).

“ORDERED that so much of respondent’s motion that seeks to dismiss petitioner Eric Gile for lack of prosecution is granted, and he is so dismissed.” Order, at p. 1.

Don’t Tax Court petitions get dismissed, and not people? Can Tax Court give Eric get the Psalm 109:13 treatment? Might I most respectfully suggest the Order be rewritten as follows? “ORDERED that so much of respondent’s motion that seeks to dismiss the petition herein as to petitioner Eric Gile for lack of prosecution is granted, and all references in said petition to Eric Gile are stricken.”

Two petitioners who’ve been here before are back, but unlike Ol’ Blue Eyes, these fare no better the second time around.

First, Albert S.N. Hee and Wendy R. Hee, T. C. Memo. 2026-53, filed 6/23/26. It’s Al’s story, all about constructive dividends from Al’s telephone C Corp and subsidiaries that paid for his kids’ education, a couple trips to exotic locations (hi, Judge Holmes), a million-dollar house near his kids’ college, and a $1246 sport coat from Saks Fifth. Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler is all over that sport coat. Judge, so am I.

“Mr. Hee was invited to dinner with executives from Raytheon by his longtime college friend and business colleague, TP. Shortly before dinner Mr. Hee purchased a sport coat from Saks Fifth Avenue for $1,246 which he wore to the dinner. The cost of the sport coat was deducted by [C Corp] as an office expense at the direction of Mr. Hee.” T. C. Memo. 2026-53, at p. 11. (Name omitted). Doesn’t make the Section 162 ordinary-and-necessary cut, because you could wear it in the street.

All Al’s written-off largesse to self and family get shot down, with fraud chops at no extra charge. 

Charlton C. Tooke, III, T. C. Memo. 2026-54, filed 6/23/26, last here on Constitutional grounds (see my blogpost “Scrapbook, 1/29/25,” filed 1/29/25), now finds his OIC and PPIA bounced. His and former spouse’s medical problems and his current special-needs adoptee’s don’t impair Charlton’s ability to pony up the self-assesseds he owes. Giving $400K to a drug-addicted spouse, while Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones doesn’t expressly say so, might could be maybe so dissipated assets. 

Candidates for Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda’s proposed hardy perennial Slaughter of the Innocents (see Proposed Rule 200(a)(3)(A)(ii), 5/26/26) will benefit from perusing Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes’ apportioning of Section 6015 by awarding complete relief to Amal H. Sleiman, without a single disrespected partitive genitive.

The case is Amal H. Sleiman, Petitioner and Chad Y. Sleiman, Intervenor, Docket No. 19155-24, filed 6/22/26 (Happy Palindrome Day!).

Turns out Chad is a bad lad, dishing out physical and mental abuse to Amal and minor offspring and loading up the marital domicile with 20 (count ’em, 20) guns, which Amal discovered when the ceiling collapsed. Transcript, at p. 11.

Though you cannot quote off-the-benchers, Judge Holmes unpacks both Section 6015(b) and Rev. Proc. 2013-34. Family practitioners should delve deep into the Rev. Proc., which Taishoff says will survive a Loper Bright attack, although none is raised here. Section 6015(e)(7) again provides cover for sworn testimony on the trial, as Appeals can take none, hence newly available. 

Also, the separation agreement between Amal and Chad gets in, though why that was unavailable at Exam, which concluded in the same month as the sep agreement was signed, and hence not in the admin record, is nowhere stated, Transcript, at p. 16. However, it does appear that Chad was pro se here as he tried on cross to beat up Amal to the point that Judge Holmes had to tell him to “shut up.” Transcript, at p.12.

I note the divorce proceedings between the Sleimans was hotly contested for eight (count ’em, eight) years, with legal fees to match, Transcript at pp. 14-15. With conceded tax due of $86K, I’m surprised neither side sought counsel here. 

See my blogpost “Remain Quietly at Home,” 6/19/23.

Unfortunately my nearest and dearest 14-year-old lives 1600 miles away, so I am unable to explain Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins’ order in GO Risk Management, Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 6/18/26. When it comes to such matters as ‘proprietary source code,’ “proprietary software architecture,’ ‘internal systems,’ or ‘raw simulation output data,'” Order, at p. 1, I must defer either to software engineers with advanced degrees or teenagers who were born with smartphones in their hands. I know none of the former.

This is the usual discovery joust in what appears to be another microcaptive dodge, wherein Judge Cracklin’ Jenkins manages to avoid both parties’ attempts to win their case at discovery.

Respondent first, with a subpoena that petitioner’s expert, whom I’ll call Mr. T., wants to quash..

“Mr. T’s response explains that he maintains and consults his proprietary databases in the anonymized format provided to respondent and does not consult the underlying documents, which consist of confidential nonparty documents. He explains that the discrepancies in the number of entries noted by respondent result from filtering of the produced database that he describes and that respondent could likewise filter to reach the same results. Mr. T also indicates that he does not retain or consider raw simulation data but that the outputs he obtained and considered could be generated using the inputs he describes with the database of information that he used and produced to respondent. Given respondent’s acknowledgements about the productions received from Mr. T and Mr. T’s explanations of how those relate to respondent’s request, the Court will not, at this juncture, order Mr. T to produce any further documents pursuant to the subpoena.” Order, at p. 2.

Now for petitioner’s move.

“In the Motion to Compel Discovery, petitioners request that respondent be compelled ‘to supplement the expert reports served in this matter pursuant to Tax Court Rule 143(g) and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and to produce the materials relied upon by Respondent’s experts in a reasonably usable and accessible format.’ The motion argues that respondent’s experts’ reports do not identify with reasonable specificity the materials supporting their opinions. It also argues that respondent’s production of documents considered by the experts does not provide reasonably usable access thereto, referring to an index provided by respondent. The response to the motion indicates that when the documents considered by respondent’s experts were first produced on April 10, 2026, prior to the April 13, 2026, deadline set pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order as modified by the order (Lead Case Doc. 163), dated March 20, 2026, they were produced on a hard drive, given that petitioners had not specified a format for production of electronically stored information. The response indicates that respondent re-produced the documents in a different manner requested by petitioners in May, that respondent has offered to reproduce them in another manner requested by petitioners if petitioners bear the costs of doing so, and that, given Rule 72(b)(3), respondent should not be required to reproduce them. The response also argues that the expert reports satisfy the requirements of Rule 143(g) by describing the facts and data considered, which do not require the point-by-point citations that it claims petitioners seek. Given the contents of respondent’s expert reports and the production that petitioners concede respondent has provided, this Court agrees with respondent that petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought by their motion.” Order, at p. 2.

Once again, the immortal words of Tom Hobbes in Ch. VIII of Leviathan come to mind: “When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so?”

That trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Fightin’ Jim, for Collette Branch, T. C. Memo. 2026-51, filed 6/17/26, can sing out loud and strong to the tune of  Broadway’s Own, George M., whose self-made inexactitude echoes down the ages from the great Learned Hand of 2 Cir to Judge Goeke.

Collette ran programs and services for the mentally and physically disabled of the Big Easy, and her recordkeeping matched. No fewer than twice does Judge Goeke deride her bookkeeping as “a mishmash of expenses.” T. C. Memo. 2026-51, at p. 35. But Judge Goeke goes on, overturning IRS’ numerous attempts to weasel out of concessions and stiped facts and Collette’s inventive doubledipping and obfuscatory testimony.

Finally unscrambling, so far as judicial acumen and patient, unrewarded toil are able, this overcooked frittata, he relegates the parties to a Rule 155 beancount for the ages.