The great Boechler silt-stir continues apace. Both IRS and Jay Dunn, T. C. Memo. 2026-2, filed 1/7/26, agree that Jay can withdraw his petition without prejudice from a CDP that sustained the NITL that he now wants to deal with via an OIC. Judge Goeke leans heavily upon IRS’ concession that they won’t be prejudiced if he allows the withdrawal.

The original Wagner allowed withdrawal without prejudice because the Section 6330(d)(1) thirty-day cutoff to petition a NOD was jurisdictional, and that train had left by the time the motion to withdraw had been made. Boechler defanged the thirty-day bite.

“Dismissal without prejudice protects the plaintiff’s right to file a subsequent lawsuit. Our decision in Wagner to grant dismissal without prejudice might, on its face, have caused a taxpayer to think he had another chance for Court review of the collection action. Before Boechler that was not the case. After Boechler, taxpayers technically have another chance for Court review of the collection action if they can establish that either equitable tolling or some other relief to the 30-day petition period of section 6330(d)(1) applies.

“Nevertheless, the phrase ‘without prejudice’ may still confuse taxpayers because they are severely restricted in their ability to seek further Court review even though section 6330(d)(1) does not impose a jurisdictional bar to filing a subsequent petition. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that taxpayers will have another opportunity for Court review of the collection action. Taxpayers face a ‘heavy burden’ of proof when asserting they are entitled to equitable tolling. Tolling of federal statutes is used ‘sparingly.’” T. C. Memo. 2026-2, at pp. 5-6. (Citations and footnote omitted).

If in fact the equitable tolling road is the only one around the thirty-day barrier, then dismissal without prejudice is largely symbolic. So much time will have elapsed between the NOD and the refiling that the petitioner will need a spectacular story to get through.

But Judge Goeke isn’t done; he drives home the lesson.

“Petitioner understands that if respondent rejects his OIC, respondent will not issue a supplemental notice of determination for the Court to review. He also acknowledges that upon the Court’s granting dismissal without prejudice, he will be subject to collection actions as provided by law. He has stated that he does not intend to refile a petition.

“Because respondent does not object to petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, we will dismiss this case without prejudice.” T. C. 2026-2, at p. 6.

Taishoff says if seeking withdrawal without prejudice in a CDP, take a good hard look before relying on Dunn.

Milk Saving Starving Children Foundation, T.C. Memo. 2026-1, filed 1/6/26, leads off the Memo season with a revocation of its 501(c)(3) status. MSSC was organized to “raise money to purchase rice, soy, and/or powdered milk. It will solicit these products from their manufacturers. The milk will then be distributed world-wide to starving children.” T. C. Memo. 2026-1, at p. 3.

Problem was, as STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden found, “… while petitioner may have donated and participated in some charitable endeavors, it was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes. In addition to any charitable activities it undertook, petitioner engaged extensively, and seemingly primarily, in commercial activities, namely (1) purchasing and renovating the Property [a building MSSC bought], as well as renting out the addition to that Property to unrelated commercial businesses, and (2) using the Property to operate a coffee shop, Café Beignet.” T. C. Memo. 2026-1, at p. 14.

Although MSSC at first did some charitable milk distribution, it stopped ten (count ’em, ten) years after organization, and didn’t restart until IRS started auditing, T. C. Memo. 2026-1, at pp. 4-5.

And MSSC ran a golf fundraiser, but what happened to the funds is not explained in the administrative record, T. C. Memo. 2026-1, at p.12.

MSSC was not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose.

“In this regard the presence of a single substantial purpose that is not described in section 501(c)(3) precludes exemption from tax under section 501(a) regardless of the number or the importance of the purposes that are present and described in section 501(c)(3).” T. C. Memo. 2026-1, at p. 12.

Opening the T. C. Sum. Op. book for 2026, Luke Gibson and Breeana Gibson, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-1, filed 1/6/26, save $5700 of their noncash charitables, but lose the remaining “high end cycling EQ apparel” to a defective appraisal and Luke’s trial testimony, both of which fail to convince STJ Di. In short, keep track of your basis and appraisals, and the deductions will keep track of themselves.

I know nothing about Mark Zoch, Docket No. 15438-24, filed 1/5/26; the only anomaly is that filing fee was waived, yet the case involved a six-figure deficiency with substantial add-ons and chops. The case was on this morning in The Bayou City, where I happened to be visiting my nearest and dearest.

I couldn’t get down to Bush Street to sit in on the proceedings. I called chambers to see if any of the cases on today was going over to another day this week, but there was none. Mr. Zoch’s case was dismissed for want of prosecution.

So I didn’t get to provide an in-person “hi, Judge Holmes.”

Hence the title first set forth hereinabove at the head hereof, as my expensive colleagues would say.

Stephen C. Gilbert & Ronda D. Gilbert, Docket No. 18210-23, filed 1/2/26, hail from NJ, hence Golsenized to 3 Cir. So when they petition the SND they say they never got (and USPS tracking shows unclaimed) 177 (count ’em, 177) days late, the Culp equitable tolling gambit is playable.

And Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland is willing to listen. The Gilberts claim IRS never sent a courtesy copy first class or sent a copy to Mr. G’s workplace as their Form 2848 indicated, either or both of which they would have gotten timely if IRS followed usual procedure after the certified-mailed SND was returned undeliverable. The AO with whom the Gilberts had continuously dealt and for whom the Gilberts extended the deadline for assessment continued correspondence with them, never telling them a SND had issued. And the IRS transcripts for years at issue have no notation that a SND issued. Finally, when the Gilberts got a notice that an out year’s refund was applied to the years at issue’s deficiencies, they petitioned within two weeks.

IRS wants summary J, claiming the Gilberts fail to clear the high equitable tolling bar.

“There is a strong presumption in the law that a properly addressed letter will be delivered, or offered for delivery, to the addressee. The very strength of the presumption of regularity is rooted in the expectation that properly addressed U.S. mail failing to reach its intended recipient is a significant departure from the average. But ‘clear evidence to the contrary’ can rebut the presumption. In this case, the Gilberts have produced certified mail tracking records showing that USPS attempted to deliver the Notices of Deficiency… but ‘No Authorized Representative [was] Available’ making the delivery attempt unsuccessful. The Gilberts have also averred that they received no notice regarding the unsuccessful delivery. Further, both the Gilberts and AO L continued to correspond as if the case remained within Appeals sole jurisdiction. This information must be construed as true for purposes of summary judgment and, as such, suffices to establish a genuine dispute about whether the Gilberts received the Notices of Deficiency or were otherwise put on notice about their existence. Moreover, whether and how USPS makes its deliveries is generally beyond the Gilberts’ control. The Gilberts have therefore established a material dispute of fact as to whether extraordinary circumstances beyond their control intervened to prevent them from timely filing their Petition.

“Because the record suggests that the Gilberts may have diligently pursued their rights and may have been prevented from timely filing their Petition by extraordinary circumstances, we will deny the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” Order, at p. 5. (Citations and name omitted).

Did Culp lower the equitable tolling bar in 3 Cir?

And speaking of NJ and 3 Cir, how can there be a potentially groundbreaking NJ and 3 Cir case without you-know-whom? And of course The Great Chieftain of The Jersey Boys is among the trusty attorneys for the Gilberts. Another oak leaf cluster to his Taishoff “Good Job, First Class” awards.

I can’t say that 2025 was anything less than tumultuous, or that 2026 bids fair to be anything other than more of the same.

Come along for the ride!

The year ends on a high note for Taishofflaw, as I transition to retirement.

December brought six thousand (count ’em, six thousand) views, an all-time high for any calendar month. And the calendar year ends with forty-three thousand (count ’em, forty-three thousand) views, the best ever, even beating the COVID year 2021.

But have no fear, this my blog will go on unabated.

Not Judge Cathy (“NCY = No Cognomen Yet”) Fung. She forewent applying Loper-Bright to the Rev. Proc. 2010-16 change-of-address pronunciamento (see my blogpost “Addressing Loper-Bright,” 7/10/25), and now when USPS tells her there’s no difference when the same zip-plus-four covers two separate FL municipalities, she tosses Jason Darby, Docket No. 7964-24, filed 12/31/25, for filing 156 days after IRS mailed the SND to Pembroke Pines, but with the same zipcode as Hollywood.

Jason claims the SND wasn’t send to his last known address, because his last return showed Hollywood, not Pembroke Pines.

But the zipcode was the same.

“To show that respondent’s address error would not have affected proper mail delivery, respondent provided the Declaration from a USPS official. The Declaration confirmed that a letter mailed to the Pembroke Pines address would be delivered to the same destination in Hollywood, Florida 33025. Thus, we are satisfied that respondent mailed the Notice to petitioner’s last known address, whether it was mailed to the Pembroke Pines address or the same address in Hollywood, Florida 33025.” Order, at pp. 6-7.

Estate of Georgia M. Spenlinhauer, Deceased, Robert J. Spenlinhauer, Executor, T. C. Memo. 2025-134, filed 12/30/25, shows that an executor must execute, or involve himself in a tax disaster.

I’ll defer to Judge Tamara W. Ashford to explicate how Robert the ex’r both torpedoes the estate and gets himself Section 6901 transferee liability for estate tax plus chops, leaving the MA Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act  to rope him in.

And he represents himself in Tax Court, notwithstanding the $600K he says he spent to litigate the worth of a 1% interest in a family business he inherited from Mom that wound up selling for $375K.

Execution is everything.

It’s only the inflated numbers that keep Carl B. Barney, T. C. Memo. 2025-133, filed 12/30/25, from the entire amount he claimed as a charitable deduction. I’ve been following Carl B.’s hike through Tax Court through four (count ’em, four) blogposts, but, as usual, it all  comes down to the valuation joust.

Carl B.’s experts used management cashflow projections, which Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler finds unrealistically optimistic, given the flak for-profit colleges had encountered at time of sale. And Cal B.’s subsequent 1040Xs can’t undo his electing out of Section 453 installmentation. Post-event reductions-in-price relief applies to purchasers, not sellers, so Section 108(e)(2) doesn’t help Carl B.

“Mr. Barney voluntarily elected out of the installment method despite being a cash basis taxpayer and entitled to report gain as payments are received. He reported the entire transaction and gain for [year at issue] despite receiving only Purchase Notes as consideration. Each tax year stands on its own, and we find it entirely inappropriate to apply a purchase price adjustment for [year at issue] on the basis of events occurring in [Year Three].” T. C. Memo. 2025-133, at pp. 26-27. (Footnotes omitted).

There was a sale, Carl B. didn’t keep more control post-sale than any purchase-money seller-lender would. There’s a gap between FMV of what Carl B. transferred and what he got, so there is a bargain sale, but there needs to be computations, although Judge Speedy Weiler doesn’t order a Rule 155.

Chops were on the table, and Carl B. claimed an overpayment of tax, but until the final numbers are done, neither can be determined.

Petitioners in Section 7345s don’t get the Isaiah 42:3 treatment. Once more, the reed gets broken and the wick gets quenched in another unsuccessful attempt to contest liability in a passport grab. George N. Gaynor, Docket No. 3631-25P, filed 12/29/25, has a trio of trusty attorneys against a single IRS attorney.

No joy for George, as Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones says the only hold Tax Court has on assessments is whether SOL has run on enforcement of collection thereof, and George folds that one.

George’s trusty attorneys claim SOL ran on George’s Section 6038 FBAR nonreporting chops before assessment.

“In this case, Mr. Gaynor’s request that we analyze the timeliness of the assessments underlying his section 7345 certification is tantamount to a request for this Court to redetermine a deficiency under section 6213. ‘Not all potential errors render a liability unenforceable.” Garcia v. Commissioner, No. 27496-22P, 164 T.C., 2025 WL 1431920, at *5 (May 19, 2025). In the section 7345 context, determining whether a federal tax debt is ‘legally enforceable’ ‘requires an inquiry into whether the limitations period for collection after assessment has expired . . .” Id. (citing Ruesch, 154 T.C. at 296) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Gaynor’s argument that the statute of limitations had expired on assessment of the liabilities misses the mark. Respondent has established here that assessment has occurred, and Mr. Gaynor makes no claim in his Petition or otherwise that the period of limitations for collecting the assessed liabilities has expired.” Order, at p. 3.

For the Garcia tale, see my blogpost “‘Are You Being Served?’ – Part Deux,” 5/19/25. For Ruesch, see my blogpost “Ruesch to Judgment,” 6/25/20.