No, not those famous ones some of us have heard from childish lips around the festive board year after year.

This lot is what Judge Morrison poses to IRS and the trusty attorneys for Gerda Khouw, Donor, et al., Docket No. 11217-20, filed 1/27/26, There must be a lot als (hi, Judge Holmes), because here’s Judge Morrison’s preliminary take on the fact pattern.

“Under the 2014 Northern Trust master note, dated as of December 23, 2014, Northern Trust made $122,534,567 of advances that were used to pay the premiums on policies owned by the Tan Horse Trust. The Tan Horse Trust is an irrevocable life-insurance trust (ILIT). Under the provisions of the 2014 Northern Trust master note, the borrower (Gerda Khouw and the Survivor’s Trust, collectively) promised that the advances would be used to pay the premiums on the policies through the following chain of payments: (1) the borrower would contribute the advances to the Geona Trust, (2) the Geona Trust would contribute the amounts to GK Capital in exchange for a 99.98% limited partner interest in GK Capital, and (3) GK Capital would lend the amounts to the Tan Horse Trust to enable the Tan Horse Trust to make the premium payments.” Order, at p. 1. (References to stips omitted).

The parties are invited to correct, comment, agree, disagree. And of course there is a pledge agreement and collateral-assignment agreement back to Northern Trust. As Northern Trust’s website claims it has $1.8 trillion-with-a-T under management, this $122 million deal (and another $126 million mirror image a couple years later) is pocket change. 

Except to the parties, of course.

So let the parties dish on whether this is a split-dollar life insurance arrangement (see my blogpost “The Split,” 8/29/12 for some deep background). And if it is, what difference does that make?

If you’re the type who likes to get granular, go into the weeds, go nerd, or whatever the latest buzzwords might be, check out Order, at pp. 4-5. Judge Morrison overhauls statute and regs, and comes up with the aforesaid four questions. 

But if ever there was a case where the judge was telling the parties “You really don’t want me to decide this case, guys, so settle, OK?” this is that case. See Order, at pp. 5-6.

Jabir Algarawi and Amira Hachim, T. C. Memo. 2025-8, filed 1/26/26, tell Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh that Jabir was doing free tax returns for refugees from the Middle East and Central Asia via Arizona Allnation Refugee Resource Center, of which he was president.

He did ask for cash contributions through a Facebook group and a Zelle account. He did prepare some 1250 returns in Year One and 1900 returns in Year Two.

Except.

He kept no records of donations, sent out no CWAs, had no 501(c)(3) for his outfit, and put the donations in his personal bank account. Oh yes, his resource center had no separate bank account. He claimed the donations were for expenses, but kept no records.

“We do not question petitioners’ desire to support refugees in their community, but the gaps in petitioners’ proof, especially given Mr. Algarawi’s occupation as a paid tax return preparer, sink their arguments.” T. C. Memo. 2025-8, at p. 8.

What proof he tries to proffer was too late and hearsay anyway.

Deficiencies sustained, plus five-and-ten substantial understatement chops.

Yet again Judge Joseph W. Nega raises the doleful cry of the Man From Mumbai, and the unfortunate recipient is Jason Cutler, Docket No. 4023-23L, filed 1/23/26.

IRS dinged Jason for two (count ’em, two) fraudulent returns, and a late-filed one. He never petitioned the SND for the two, and the late filed one yielded add-ons, no deficiency (and IRS abates the add-ons, Order, at p. 3). So this comes up in a CDP.

Jason claims his bankruptcy discharge knocks out the deficiencies and chops.

Negatory, says Judge Nega.

“When a petitioner challenges a collection action by alleging that the tax debt was discharged in bankruptcy, that constitutes a ‘challenge to the appropriateness of collection actions’ under section 6330(c)(2)(A) and does not constitute a challenge to the ‘existence or amount of the underlying tax liability’ under section 6330(c)(2)(B).” Order, at p. 5. (Citation omitted).

So abuse of discretion is standard of review.

“For tax years [fraud], AO K determined that the assessments were not dischargeable in bankruptcy because those assessments related to fraudulent returns. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (providing that a debt ‘with respect to which’ a debtor made a fraudulent return is not discharged by a bankruptcy discharge order). Since respondent has shown that a Notice of Deficiency asserting section 6663 fraud…was mailed to petitioner’s last known address and that petitioner did not challenge the fraud determinations by filing a petition with this Court, it is not an abuse of discretion for AO K to determine that the… assessments were not discharged by the Bankruptcy Court.” Order, at p. 6. (Name omitted).

Jason claims IRS never filed Proof of Claim in his bankruptcy proceeding, and therefore waived any claim.

“Petitioner contends that the IRS failed to object or file a claim in bankruptcy and argues that this makes the debts discharged even if those debts might otherwise be non-dischargeable. Respondent disagrees with petitioner and contends that the IRS did file a claim. Regardless of whether or not the IRS filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, the debts from [all three] tax years were not discharged by the Bankruptcy Court’s discharge order because they were excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523. AO K did not abuse his discretion by sustaining the levy action….” Order, at p. 7. (Citation omitted).

Innocent spouseries are all balancing acts. Mostly they’re the daily grist of separating credibility from self-service (but isn’t all testimony self-serving? Doesn’t even self-denunciation secure some intangible spiritual benefit?), innocence from exculpation? So how can we journos comment on results without having seen and heard the witnesses?

Well, because we can.

It’s only one factor in the multiplex calculus of Section 6015(f) for equitable relief, but benefit to the petitioner should figure in.

Lest I be misunderstood, I don’t say Asia Zaheen, Petitioner, and Kamran Ehsan, Intervenor, T. C. Memo. 2025-7, filed 1/22/26, was wrongly decided, nor that Kamran didn’t abuse Asia (that’s Doctor Asia). Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones saw and heard Doctor Asia, Kamran, their two older children, and their housekeeper testify and be cross-examined; I didn’t. 

But one factor gives me pause. Kamran played games with Doctor Asia’s 401(k) while illegally running her medical practice (MA law says nonprofessionals can’t run professional practices), incurring the tax liability at issue here by rolling over and then taking taxable draws therefrom. However, most of the draws went to pay down the mortgage on the medical practice’s real and personal property, all of which Doctor Asia gets in the divorce. Since the debt was north of $260K, that’s no small benefit. And there’s no evidence Kamran enriched himself excessively thereby, except maybe what he took from the practice thereafter (if anything), and then only to the extent of debt service payments no longer due.

True, if Judge CD Jones concluded Kamran was a real nogoodnik (as did the local police and MA Department of Child and Family Services) and Doctor Asia told the truth, then maybe this is the correct way to handle it.

“The income that gave rise to the understatement in this case was used to pay down debt incurred to purchase real estate and medical equipment needed to establish Zaheen Medical Center. Dr. Zaheen is now the sole owner of Zaheen Medical Center, but Mr. Ehsan, at minimum, shared enjoyment of the benefit of the transaction at issue up until Dr. Zaheen filed for divorce. The benefit Dr. Zaheen derived from the understatement is mitigated by the fact that Mr. Ehsan controlled Zaheen Medical Center’s finances and business matters through the year in issue and remitted to Dr. Zaheen only a salary. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that suggests the parties engaged in a lavish lifestyle. Under these circumstances, we find this factor to be neutral in our analysis.” T. C. Memo. 2025-7, at p. 18.

That’s the takeaway from Muhammad Zulfiqar, T. C. Memo. 2025-6, filed 1/22/26. Mu stiped out year at issue in a SND proceeding in Tax Court and paid up, but the stip omitted a couple late-filed and late-paid summary assessed add-ons (hi, Judge Holmes). It did say that Mu didn’t owe Section 6651(a)s.

IRS did give Mu a NITL at no extra charge, which Mu timely petitioned. Appeals sustained based upon an OCC memo, so IRS seeks summary J confirming Appeals’ NOD. Mu cross-moves for summary J that he owes nothing.

Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland denies both.

The add-ons are assessable without a SND, hence Tax Court had no jurisdiction if they were separately assessed and not part of the SND case. Thus, the CDP was Mu’s first chance to contest. The stip makes no mention of the later add-ons, even though they had been assessed, and there’s no “below the line” mention of them. 

There may have been a mutual misunderstanding of fact when the parties stiped out the SND proceeding.

“While the Stipulated Decision provides ‘[t]hat there is no addition to tax under I.R.C. §6651(a)(1) due from petitioners for taxable year [at issue],’ it omits any mention of the previously assessed section 6651(a)(2) and 6654 additions to tax that are clearly still at issue in this CDP proceeding. Further, the document does not distinguish between the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax subject to deficiency procedures in [SND proceeding] and the previously assessed section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax that, like the section 6651(a)(2) and 6654 additions, may likewise have been jointly omitted from consideration. The Zulfiqars emphasize that the Stipulated Decision contains no so-called below-the-line stipulation to clarify that the prior assessed section 6651(a)(1) addition remains, but such lack of modification may have been a mistake of fact. These are all material facts that prevent us from summarily adjudicating these cases at this time.” T. C. Memo. 2025-6, at p. 10.

When you’re stiping out, get the transcripts. State exactly what is still on the table, and if nothing, so state. 

This unfriendly act finds no welcome in United States Tax Court, as Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones rebukes an unadmitted attorney seeking admission pro hac vice in Augustus Hill, Docket No. 5544-18, filed 1/22/26.

Leaving aside the execrable Latin (should be “pro hæc vice,” meaning “just for this one turn”), the unadmitted attorney (whom I’ll call AP) was told by the Clerk’s office to follow Rule 200(a)(2). Instead, AP enlists the aid of an admitted attorney (whom I’ll call Bill) to move for one-off admission. Bill’s assistance is somewhat less than stellar.

“[Bill] filed, on {AP]’s behalf, a Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Doc. 83). In the process of filing the motion, [Bill] selected the ‘Entry of Appearance’ option in DAWSON. Even though DAWSON webpages advise practitioners who select the ‘Entry of Appearance’ option that they-–not another attorney––are representing the party associated with their entry, [Bill] uploaded the motion on behalf of [AP]. This effort to bypass the Court’s Rules and policies was improper as is the filing itself.” Order, at p.1.

For the right way to do it, see my blogpost “Tom Sawyer, Tax Attorney,” 6/22/18.

Meanwhile, Judge CD Jones tosses the attempted EoA and motion.

Looks like that’s what Siemens USA Holdings, Inc., & Consolidated Subsidiaries, Docket No. 3989-24, filed 1/21/26, claims. IRS makes the by-now commonplace motion for partial summary J on Boss Hossery, but Siemens & Cons objects.

Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan doesn’t give us much detail as she tosses ITRS’ motion.

“In its Sur-Reply petitioner raises concerns about the penalty form being altered and references respondent’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” Order, at pp. 2-3.

The First Amended motion papers state “that a misstatement was made, and respondent produced new exhibits pertaining to the misstatement to petitioner.” Order, at p. 3.

Who misstated what is not made clear.

But it’s enough of a fact question for ex-Ch J TBS to deny the motion.

In the dozen years since The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys first unloaded the Section 6751(b) defense (see my blogpost “Penalty Kick,” 7/17/14), it has furnished a bumper crop of blogfodder.

Chief among all tiebreakers in the IRC is Section 7491, Burden of Proof. But the motion thus entitled isn’t really a motion to shift in Diamond Grande Resort, LLC, Diamond Grande Resort Holdings, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 16088-22, filed 1/20/26.

Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy explains in a footnote.

“Petitioner’s Motion is titled ‘Motion to Shift the Burden of Proof’ but strictly speaking the Motion asks us not to ‘shift’ the burden but simply to rule that respondent’s valuation position is a new matter for purposes of Rule 142(a) and that respondent bears the burden of proof on that issue in the first instance.” Order, at p. 2, footnote 2.

Anyway, the stip of settled issues says valuation of the Dixieland boondocks in this syndicated conservation easement case is disputed, which shows the parties knew all along that this was an open question and not new matter.

Judge Sport Landy says the burden is relevant only when there’s an evidentiary tie. If one party’s evidence clearly outweighs the other’s at conclusion of the trial, who has the burden is irrelevant.

“The Court anticipates determining the fair market value of Diamond Grande Resort’s noncash charitable contribution based on a preponderance of the evidence in the record rather than based on the parties’ burdens of proof. The entire record in this case has not been fully developed and will not be fully developed until the conclusion of trial. As a result, the Court does not have sufficient information to rule on the contentions raised in petitioner’s Motion at this time. Thus, petitioner’s Motion is premature and petitioner may refile its Motion or raise these issues again on brief. Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion is denied without prejudice.” Order, at p.3.

And so am I.

STJ Peter J. (“HB”) Panuthos has a chicken-and-egg in Simon R. Workman, Docket No. 7107-16W, filed 1/16/26. This saga began 17 (count ’em, 17) years ago when Workman dropped info on Individual 1 and Companies 1 and 2.

IRS gave the whole thing one claim number, sent the info off to SB/SE who audited and no-changed Individual 1, whereupon the Ogden Sunseteers blew off Workman in 2013.

In the meantime (2015), Workman sends in a new Form 211, blowing further on Individual 1, Companies 1 and 2, and adding Companies 3 and 4. The Ogden Sunseteers don’t bother with a new file number, don’t send the stuff to any operating division or subject-matter expert, and just blow off Workman in 2016, saying their 2013 determination remains the same.

Whereupon IRS moves to toss for want of jurisdiction as Workman didn’t timely petition the 2013 shootdown  and for summary J, to which Workman counters with document demands. There’s even a trip to USDCDC.

STJ Panuthos sorts it out.

“The record demonstrates respondent did not take any action based on the additional information petitioner provided in the second submitted Form 211 on June 26, 2015. Respondent did not refer petitioner’s June 26, 2015, submission to another office of the IRS and did not initiate an examination, and therefore respondent contends he did not proceed with any relevant administrative or judicial action under section 7623(b). However, respondent did take administrative action based on the information provided by petitioner in his 2008 submission. The WBO opened a claim number, referred petitioner’s claim to SBSE, examined the target taxpayer, and issued a determination denying petitioner’s claim in the February 1, 2013, letter and then again in the February 10, 2016, letter. While respondent contends that the February 10, 2016, letter amounts to a rejection of the second Form 211, the letter is clearly in reference to Claim 2009-005937 and states that petitioner does not meet the criteria for an award.

“As such, the Court concludes that the February 10, 2016, letter was a ‘determination’ per section 7623(b)(4) and, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this case.  Therefore, we will deny respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 4. (Citations and footnote omitted.)

Workman’s document demands get dissed. Whistleblowers are record-rulers. The parties can either stip to an administrative record or IRS can put in the whole thing under seal and with a privilege log if needed and Workman can move to supplement per Rule 93(b).