It works for estate tax (see my blogpost “Providing for the General Welfare,” 7/14/11) and for child support (see Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 NY2d 408 (1957); and no, it’s not me), but it doesn’t work when RCP is on the menu and OIC is off the table.

Judge Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda tells the bad news to Edmund Gerald Flynn, T. C. Memo. 2022-5, filed 2/3/22, and he only needs nine (count ’em, nine) pages to do it.

An OIC bounce gets abuse of discretion review, as Ed’s unpaid taxes are self-reporteds. Ed wants a push on household expenses, but the SO used the Federal guidelines, and she need do no more. And Ed wants credit for his credit card bills.

Ed’s case is a wing-stall spiral.

“Mr. Flynn asserts that the allowances were insufficient because they did not support his particular lifestyle. Deviations from the national and local allowances set by the IRS, however, are permitted only upon a showing that the standard amounts are ‘inadequate to provide for a specific taxpayer’s basic living expenses.’ IRM 5.15.1.8(6) (July 24, 2019); see Ansley, T.C. Memo. 2019-46, at *18. The taxpayer bears the burden of providing sufficient information to justify a deviation from local standards. Ansley, T.C. Memo. 2019-46, at *18; Thomas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-182, at *27. Mr. Flynn fails to point to any specific facts indicating that the standard housing amount was inadequate to accommodate for his basic living expenses.

“Mr. Flynn fares no better regarding his credit card payments. As we have observed previously, credit cards are generally considered a method of payment, not a category of expense. See Love v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-92, at *12 n.6; IRM 5.15.1.11(3) (Aug.29, 2018). We therefore must examine the nature of the payments to determine whether they constitute necessary living expense payments.  Mr. Flynn dooms his own argument by his admission that the credit card debt had not been incurred to pay basic living expenses.” T. C. Memo. 2022-5, at p. 8.