The petition-a-bunch-of-years gambit, to try to dodge assessables (no SNOD requireds, like refund grabs for child support), has been going on for years. See my blogpost “I’m Beginning to See the Light,” 4/9/18, wherein ex-Ch J L Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel descanted on this gambit, and the vulnerability of players thereof to the Section 6673 frivolity chop.

Today ex-Ch J Iron Fist is back at the old stand, breathing the usuals at Charles William Kriel, Docket No. 6834-19, Filed 7/28/20.

Mr. Charley is petitioning 2000 to and including 2018. While the original SNODs from the first four (count ’em, four) of those years are no longer extant, notwithstanding Mr Charley’s claim that he never got nothing never nohow, IRS has proofs when same were received at last known address, and the last of them was received eleven years ago.

IRS and Mr Charley agree that his petition should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but Mr Charley has his agenda. So does IRS; they want a Section 6673 chop.

“In petitioner’s objection, he agrees that this Court should dismiss his petition, but requests that the Court state in its order the reason for dismissal. Petitioner asserts that the reason for dismissal should be that petitioner never received any notices for the years at issue. Additionally, he contends that a penalty under section 6673 is improper because respondent has failed to establish that this Court has jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 2.

Obviously Mr Charley does not read this my blog, or he’d know what’s coming.

“This case is similar to other cases recently filed in this Court where the taxpayer files a petition listing a large number of years and claims that he or she never received any notices of deficiency and/or notices of determination for any of the specified years. The taxpayer does not attach any notice of deficiency or notice of determination to the petition. This type of case forces the Commissioner to spend a considerable amount of time trying to verify the taxpayer’s allegations that the Commissioner has not issued either a notice of deficiency or a notice of determination for each of the years identified in the petition. The search foisted on the Commissioner, which takes a great deal of time and effort, often leads to the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and may lead to the taxpayer pressing for the entry of an order that specifically states the taxpayer did not receive any notice for any of the years listed in the petition. Cases similar to this one have uniformly been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and may in fact be frivolous and worthy of a section 6673 penalty. Although the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, will not impose a section 6673 penalty in this case, petitioner is warned that this Court will consider a section 6673 penalty in any future case commenced by petitioner seeking similar relief under similar circumstances.” Order, at pp. 2-3.

Judge, you’re right. I respectfully submit, however, that wits, wags and wiseacres can lay back for years after one of these stunts, and pull the same frivolity again. Perhaps a nominal couple hundred bucks (hi, Judge Holmes) of chop the first time might convince them of the error of their ways.

As if remote trials, Zoomed or otherwise, weren’t enough, today Judge Morrison has a trio of cases wherein trials shall be conducted by telephone, maybe.

Solely by way of illustration of the foregoing, as my two-Grey-Goose-Gibson-remote-lunching colleagues would say, here’s Edgardo Juan Caminos & Susana Beatriz Caminos, Docket No. 12511-19S, filed 7/28/20.

“…this case is calendared for trial during the Court’s September 21, 2020, Houston, Texas Trial Session, to be conducted remotely at a date and time certain of 4:00 p.m. (Central Time) on Wednesday, September 23, 2020. The trial will be conducted through videoconferencing, or by Order of Court, by telephone. No one participating in the trial will be present at the Houston courthouse.” Order, at p. 1.

These cases are all small-claimers. Two of the petitioners are pro se, but one has an attorney.

Without wishing to seem as if I’m second-guessing anyone’s trial strategy, how does one assess the credibility of a witness on the telephone? One can hook up a voice-analyzer, but unless the litigant is a frequent litigator if not a first-class rounder, or possesses unusual sang froid, of course his/her voice will exhibit stress. How can one assess body language, which speaks as loud as words, without looking at the witness? Perhaps Ernest Bramah’s blind detective Max Carrados could do it, but that’s fiction.

If credibility of witnesses is no issue, why have a trial? Do a Rule 122 on affidavits and documents.

I know people play video poker, where one can neither see nor hear one’s opponents; but that’s an AP statistics exam, not poker. Tells are everything, both at the table and in the courtroom.

It took me almost seven years into my professional career to begin to learn the necessary detachment to do my job effectively. But I so internalized the lesson that the plight of the self-represented hardly swam into my ken otherwise than as a cause for a grimace and a shake of the head.

Only as I grew older and saw a lot more did I realize how what is to the practitioner so obvious that it doesn’t need even a random thought is to the pro se an insuperable obstacle. The sea through which we sail on a beam reach with one hand lazily on the tiller is Scylla and Charybdis on steroids to the self-represented.

Two cases today. Designated hitters; thanks to Judge Gustafson for making it easy.

First, Walter Nicklaus Cline, 16947-18W, filed 7/27/20. It’s part of a coupled entry with Docket No. 16605-18W. Walt’s been here before: see my blogpost “Rejection and Denial,” 3/16/20. Walt snail-mailed what Judge Gustafson recharacterizes as a delayed-by-COVID19 Rule 162 reconsideration, which Judge Gustafson denies.

The point of Walt’s motion is what the pro se’s plight is about.

“Mr. Cline’s motion states, ‘I have been told I cannot appeal.’ We do not know who has so advised Mr. Cline, and we do not know why this would be so. This case is not an unappealable ‘small tax case’, cf. I.R.C. sec. 7463(b). The deadline for filing a notice of appeal in this case would be governed by the interaction of I.R.C. sec. 7483 and Rule 13(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tax Court Rule 190(a).” Order, at p. 1.

Walt might make a COVID-19 try for extension of time per FRAP§4(a)(6). And Judge Gustafson could have treated Walt’s motion as a notice of appeal. See my blogpost “Go For It,” 1/23/12.

Next is the panic induced by the simplest correspondence.

Tony Patrinicola & Barbara Patrinicola, Docket No. 498-19, filed 7/27/20, are first-timers here, and obviously first-timers to Tax Court. They send in an “Urgent Action Request,” which Judge Gustafson decodes as a motion to restrain levy, per Section 6213(a).

Trial was set for May. As part of its usual trial prep, IRS subpoenaed Tony’s & Barbara’s bank records. The bank sent Tony & Barbara the usual notice: IRS wants your account records; if you want to object, do so. Tony & Barbara claim IRS is trying to levy.

Yes, Tax Court can enjoin a premature levy.

“In this instance, however, there has been no showing that such a levy has been begun. Rather, X Bank’s letter that prompted petitioners’ motion simply gives them notice that the bank was responding to a ‘request … seeking information’. Order, at p. 2. (Name omitted).

I can’t tell if there has been a Branerton play-nice from the docket search. There are no discovery motions, but the docket does show Tony is an accomplished epistolarian.  It’s unusual if there were no discussions about voluntary production of bank records, but maybe IRS’ counsel had reasons.

The effect is what concerns me. Even the gentle wording of the bank’s notice (which you should read for yourself) caused panic.

But Is Appraiser Qualified?

No Court does as many appraisal trials as pore l’il ole Tax Court. See my blogpost “Letter to the Editor,” 11/19/13, where I expatiate.

Today we have another summary J joust about an expert’s valuation, a coupled entry WT Art Partnership LP, Lonicera LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket Nos. 28440-15, 19604-16, filed 7/27/20. And it falls that versatile unraveller of arcane appraisals, Judge Albert G (“Scholar Al”) Lauber, to deal with China Guardian Auctions Co., Ltd., of Beijing, China. The Chinese guardians tacked values to five (count ’em, five) Chinese paintings, which WT donated to an institution I have loved from boyhood’s early hour, the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Even I have given them a few dollars.

WT took charitable deductions aggregating $75.5 million. Regrettably, I could not deduct anything like that.

The Chinese guardians identify “… four employees of China Guardian who worked on the five appraisals under Ms. Wang’s [president] supervision. WT Art subsequently identified Yin Guanghua as the individual who ‘performed the most important, substantive work’ underlying all five appraisals. Mr. Yin later testified in a deposition that he had appraised all five paintings. In that deposition he described his qualifications, stating that he has studied Chinese art for more than 50 years and was a protégé of Xu Bangda, whom Mr. Yin described as one of the most prominent art appraisers in China. Mr. Yin testified that he appraises thousands of artworks every year.” Order, at p. 2.

IRS is all over the guardians.

” Respondent contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in both docketed cases because none of the five appraisals satisfies the statutory and regulatory requirements for ‘qualified appraisals.’ Respondent alleges that draft documents were prepared by U.S. persons affiliated with WT Art and that China Guardian in effect acted as an ‘accommodation party’ by signing the appraisals. Respondent contends that neither Ms. Wang (who signed each appraisal on behalf of China Guardian) nor any of the four individuals who allegedly worked under her supervision were ‘qualified appraisers’ because they: (1) did not regularly perform appraisals for compensation, I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(II); and (2) did not possess appraisal certifications or otherwise have the requisite background, experience, or education. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(I); sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), Income Tax Regs. Respondent contends that China Guardian and its staff cannot be ‘qualified appraisers’ in any event because China Guardian was ‘regularly used’ by WT Art and did not perform a majority of its appraisals during the taxable year ‘for other persons.’ Id. sec. 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iv)(F). Finally, respondent contends that the appraisals were not conducted under the U.S. ‘Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice’ or otherwise ‘in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards.’ I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i)(II).” Order, at pp. 3-4.

Judge Scholar Al says the China guardians don’t have to touch all the bases, because Bond; provisions cited directory, not mandatory; substantial compliance, y’know.

Besides, IRS’ points are fact-driven, and this is a motion for summary J. “The statutory and regulatory provisions on which respondent relies–requiring that we determine whether China Guardian and its staff ‘regularly performed’ appraisals, whether China Guardian was ‘regularly used’ by WT Art, and whether its appraisal staff had the requisite background and experience–present factual questions that seem ill-suited to summary adjudication. And we do not believe that WT Art should be foreclosed from showing that the appraisals were prepared ‘in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards’ even if the Chinese appraisers did not consciously follow the U.S. Uniform Standards.” Order, at p. 4.

But IRS goes down fighting. IRS “… contends that the appraisal of ‘Tiantai Mountains’ improperly valued the entire work rather than the 40% interest that WT Art actually donated…. And he contends that the appraisals of the two paintings… were inadequate because they specified a range of values, rather than a single definitive value, for each painting. It would seem to us that these arguments are directed to the correctness of the valuations, not to the qualified nature of the appraisals. In any event, since trial will be necessary in both consolidated cases, we see little to be gained by addressing these arguments now.” Order, at p. 4.

Speaking of my personal faves, why not bring in the Antiques Roadshow guys, James Callahan, Sachiko Hori, and Lark E. Mason?

Sorry, Guys, the Devil Made Me Do It

I missed Murfam Enterprises LLC, Wendell Murphy, Jr., Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 8039-16, filed 6/29/20, for which omission I now apologize. I wish this had been a designated hitter, especially since I had not blogged this case for almost two (count ’em, two) years. Had it not been for Murfam Enterprises LLC, Wendell Murphy, Jr., Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 8039-16, filed 7/27/20, I would have missed this interesting sidelight.

First, let’s go back a month. IRS was arguing that appeal would lie with 4 Cir, not 11 Cir. This matters because Section 7482(b), the Tax Court’s version of the Peace of Augsberg (1555): “Cuius regio, eius religio.” I need not, of course, translate.

“The entity that contributed the easements on the ‘River Tract’ and the ‘Landing Tract’ is Duplin Land Development, Inc. (Stip. paras. 24, 35). It appears that Duplin Land is not a TEFRA partnership but is an S Corporation in which the petitioners in Nos. 14536-16 and 14541-16 are shareholders. It appears that the deductions for contribution of the easements were disallowed in statutory notices of deficiency (not FPAAs) issued to those shareholder-petitioners. At the time they filed their petitions, one set of petitioners resided in North Carolina (Stip. 6) and the other in Florida (Stip. 10). We have therefore supposed that one of these consolidated cases would be appealable to the Fourth Circuit and the other case would be appealable to the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., Estate of Israel v. Commissioner, 159 F.3d 593, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (‘Because §7482(b) allows multiple possible venues when there are multiple petitioner-appellants with different residences, the Tax Court may be unable to confine its decision to the law of any one circuit (assuming the circuits are in disarray). But we believe the venue provision makes this circumstance, rare as it may be, unavoidable’). We would benefit from knowing why respondent concludes otherwise.” Order, 6/29/20, at pp. 1-2.

Remember this fandango started with Judge David Gustafson’s plea for a simple one-size-fits-all stip. See my blogpost “Mise En Place,” 6/25/18.

Well, today Judge Gustafson got his answer, but wants more.

“…respondent shall file a supplemental memorandum addressing the contention as to Docket No. 14536-16 in paragraph 9(c) of petitioners’ memorandum–i.e., ‘Due to the stipulated reallocation of the D.M. Farms contribution, the other contributions do not impact Dell and Wendy’s tax for their only year before the Court, 2010. Code § 170(b)(1)(A) (contributions limited to 50 percent of AGI); Stip. ¶ 19 (agreed $9 million contribution by D.M. Farms); Exs. 56-J, p. 1 (AGI of $3,537,641); 58-J, p. 77 (Dell owns 99 percent of D.M. Farms). Dell and Wendy’s 99 percent share of the D.M. Farms contribution exceeds their 50 percent AGI limitation.'” Order, 7/27/29, at p. 1.

I’ve commented before that we need a single Federal Circuit to deal with tax appeals. If there isn’t enough money or business for a separate Federal Circuit Court of Tax Appeals, then send it all to DC Cir. But anything is better than this hodge-podge.

I will make no political comment on the likelihood of anything so rational occurring.

I echo that common household request, as I read Judge Albert G (“Scholar Al”) Lauber’s designated hitter, Tamecca Seril a.k.a. Tamecca Tillard, Docket No. 4491-19, filed 7/24/20. Thanks for the designation, Judge. Though I’d read the order earlier, I’m glad I don’t have to search for it as deadline nears.

All y’all will recollect Tamecca’s difficult story, and how she fell into the IRA trap. What, no? Then see my blogpost “The IRA Trap,” 7/8/20.

Within two (count ’em, two) weeks after Judge Scholar Al hit Tamecca with tax, but spared her the chops, Tamecca asks that the entire case be sealed. Judge Scholar Al apparently did seal one trial exhibit.

“By statute, all hearings, reports, and evidence received by the Tax Court are generally public. See I.R.C. §§7458,7461. These sections reflect the well-established principle that official proceedings and records of courts generally shall be open and available to the public. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914, 917 (1985). We have the discretionary authority to order all or part of a record to be sealed where such action is necessary to protect trade secrets and confidential information or to avoid annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. See Tax Court Rule 103(a); Willie Nelson Music Co., 85 T.C. at 918- 919. However, the moving party must show that sufficient countervailing interests outweigh the presumptively paramount public interest in understanding the underlying dispute and its disposition. Ibid.” Order, at p. 1.

OK, Judge, “by statute, all hearings…are generally public.” And in Tamecca’s case, “(T)he balance of interests weighs in favor of openness so that the Court’s reasoning and disposition of these issues may be understood.” Order, at p. 2.

So what about these remote trials that are being scheduled right now? Can the public see any? I know that the Nixon case, supra, as my expensive colleagues would say, says we journos have no greater rights than the general public to view court proceedings and documents involved therein.

But at least give me those rights. Or else how can I understand the court’s reasoning and disposition of issues, and explain them to my readers in 142 countries, territories, SARs, and what-not, if all I get is a bunch of electrons long after the fact?

It’s a cliché, but justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done.

So please pass the remote and let me look at what’s on the screen at these trials.

No, not the late-night dietary nostrums of the telehawkers, rife with FDA disclaimers, nor yet another tale of State-legal potteries. This is the ping-pong game between IRS and Whistleblower 5903-19W, filed 7/23/22.

Long-suffering Ch J Maurice B (“Mighty Mo”) Foley has this one, and if he isn’t wondering why he ever ran for re-election to the office of Ch J, he’s a better man than I am.

“On January 6, 2020, petitioner submitted a document titled first motion for summary judgment, which the Court filed as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On January 7, 2020, petitioner submitted a document titled second motion for partial summary judgment, which was filed by the Court as a First Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On February 25, 2020, respondent filed a Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, As Supplemented.

“On March 2, 2020, petitioner filed a Second Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and, on March 4, 2020, filed a Reply to Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, As Supplemented. On March 9, 2020, petitioner filed a First Supplement to Reply to Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, As Supplemented.

“On March 16, 2020, petitioner filed redacted and unredacted versions of a Motion (Second) for Partial Summary Judgment, which the Court will recharacterize.” Order, at p. 1.

Brings back memories of the old epistolary volleying between the Ogden Sunseteers and various blowers, which I’ve extensively blogged. See, e. g., my blogpost “Oh, Those Letters! – Part Deux,” 3/27/19.

But Ch J Mighty Mo has run out of patience with this roundy-rounding.

After recharacterizing all the aforementioned, and sealing the unredacted, he orders “…that petitioner should not file any further reply with respect to respondent’s above-referenced response to petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment, as supplemented, unless petitioner is so directed by the Court or petitioner first files a motion for leave to do so.” Order, at p. 2.

Reminds me of Ol’ Phil, the King of Pro Se orders, back in State Court thirty-five years ago. The judges finally shut him down, too.

Yes, I know that every, or almost every, sentient being in the visible Universe is on Facebook. I am aware its devotees claim even the most exalted personages are members: “No longer do I call you servants, because a servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends.”

Judge Pugh, having to deal with a bunch motions in limine (hi, Judge Holmes) left over from the partial trial two years ago, decides to get the parties on a Special Session the end of next month.

And she’s doing it remotely. I’m sure that the Facebook team have no problem with that.

The order is Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 21959-16, filed 7/23/20.

Yet again I question why these remote hearings and trials are invisible. If confidential matters are to be discussed, of course bar the public. There’s been a thirteen (count ’em, thirteen) page confidentiality order in this case since January; see my blogpost “Facebook Confidential,” 1/31/20. But if these motions in limine don’t seek to bar or expose protected matters, why in the name of Section 7458 can’t the public view the online hearing? If Facebook can host billions of viewers simultaneously, surely the technology is not beyond the reach of The Glasshouse.

Belair Woods, LLC, Effingham Managers, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, 2020 T. C. Memo. 112, filed 7/22/20, has some new arguments why they’re entitled to the ginormous write-off they took for the conservation easement on some dubious GA scrubland. This is Belair 3. Judge Albert G (“Scholar Al”) Lauber, who’s getting his second MA after his Cambridge classics one, this time in sketchy strip-mine write-offs, notes the history.

“In Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, we held that Belair failed to satisfy the requirement that it attach a fully-completed ‘appraisal summary’ to the return on which its deduction was claimed. See sec. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(B), Income Tax Regs. However, we reserved for trial the question whether Belair could excuse this failure by showing that it ‘[wa]s due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.’ See sec. 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II). In Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. ___ (Jan. 6, 2020), we addressed, and resolved mostly in respondent’s favor, the parties’ dispute as to whether the IRS had obtained timely supervisory approval, as required by section 6751(b)(1), for the accuracy-related penalties it determined in this case.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 112, at p. 2, footnote 2. For Belair 1, see my blogpost “Channeling Bartleby – Part Deux,” 9/20/18, and for Belair 2, see my blogpost “Can We Talk – Part Deux,” 1/6/20.

Besides the already-exploded “Reg. 1.170A-14(g)(6) is invalid” (blown up by Oakbrook), and “improvements out and prior claims in,” blown up by the Coalholders, Belair claims IRS stiped out that a deed, amended to state as theirs did, was OK in USDCDAZ, but that case settled before the issue whether original or amended deed controlled was decided. A tactical concession in one case doesn’t bind in another. Besides, the Elevenses, where this case is Golsenized, has a tough two-step test, and this case isn’t close. IRS neither took a position under oath, nor would their present position make a mockery of the judicial system.

*      *       *     *       *       *       *       *       *

Please excuse the interruption, during which I vented politically about mockeries of our judicial system.

Belair claims future improvements aren’t “the land.” Judge Scholar Al isn’t buying.

“We disagree. The donation of a conservation easement gives rise to a deduction only if it imposes ‘a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.’ Sec. 170(h)(2)(C). The ‘donation under this paragraph’ thus consists of the use restrictions that are imposed in perpetuity by the easement deed. See sec. 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i), Income Tax Regs. The restrictions imposed by the easement deed necessarily apply, not only to the land, but also to any improvements made by the grantor pursuant to its reserved rights.” 2020 T. C. Memo. 112, at p. 15. The deed has much to say about said improvements. And ultimately, you can’t sell a road, driveway, pond or underground utility line separate from the land on which it sits.

Belair claims the improvements are worthless. But if so, why cut them out of the split-up on extinguishment?

Belair has a 1939 GA case that says an easement is not compensable in condemnation, but Judge Scholar Al (presumably with a little help from IRS’ counsel) has much since to the contrary.

Taishoff asks why we’re fighting over an event whose occurrence is “so remote as to be negligible.” These HRH syndicates would get demolished in an appraisal trial.

I was just now on-lining a CLE from a title insurer. One presenter noted that religious associations and entities, and non-profits generally, are very poor on organic documents and command structure. Though some have boards of trustees with savvy members, for many trustees this means having a second job with no pay other than intangible spiritual benefits.

Wherefore we get Ike K, an officer of Congregation Bais Yaakov, 2020 T. C. Sum. Op. 21, filed 7/22/20. According to STJ Daniel A (“Yuda”) Guy, CBY really tried with its FICA/FUTA/ITW.

“Generally speaking, petitioner timely files Forms 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, and timely pays its Federal employment tax liabilities. On occasion, however, petitioner has filed Form 941 late and remitted Federal employment tax deposits after the due date. For some taxable periods the IRS issued refunds to petitioner in respect of its Federal employment tax overpayments, and for other periods petitioner requested that the IRS apply its overpayments to satisfy its Federal employment tax liabilities for other taxable periods–a so-called credit elect overpayment.” 2020 T. C. Sum. Op. 21, at p. 5.

The problem starts when IRS hits CBY with Section 6651 late-file, late-pay, and Section 6656 non-deposit chops, and used some overpayments to offset. Ike K says he asked IRS to abate hits and chops, and back-credit CBY. IRS says they sent CBY a rejection, but Ike K says neither he nor CBY has any record of the bounced request to abate. This left CBY short, so IRS gave CBY a NITL. Ike K goes to Appeals timely, and says that if certain years not at issue were re-examined, and the hits and chops abated, CBY would be square.

Appeals says they can’t look at other years, but file Form 843 Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement, and let’s talk IA.

Ike K doesn’t, and petitions.

Ike K claims credit elect, so that if the overpayments from previous years were applied to year at issue, and the hits and chops abated, CBY would be square.

STJ Yuda. “The record reflects that neither the IRS nor any court has determined that petitioner is credited with an overpayment that is available to be applied to offset the unpaid balance of employment tax due for the period in issue. Although petitioner maintains that additions to tax and penalties assessed for earlier taxable periods should be abated, those matters remain unresolved and do not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction in this case. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-72, at *8-*9. In the context of this action, there is no support for petitioner’s credit elect overpayment claim.

“The record reflects that petitioner failed to make adequate employment tax deposits for the period in issue. Although Mr. K suggested that petitioner was interested in entering into an installment agreement, he failed to provide the financial information that the Appeals Office needed to evaluate petitioner’s eligibility for an alternative to the proposed levy action.” 2020 T. C. Sum. Op. 21, at p. 10. (Name omitted).

For the skinny on Murphy, supra, as my No. 10 Tanqy-swilling colleagues would say, see my blogpost “A Claim Is Not a Credit – Part Deux,” 6/11/19. Pretty much tells the story.

I see STJ Yuda credits former Jersey Boy Larry with a pro bono assist at calendar call. Good job, Mr. S.

BTW, the title co. presenter told a war story about needing an approval from His Holiness the Pope for sale of a convent. She didn’t say how she got it, but it would be the ultimate war story if, sitting at the closing table at 8 p.m. on a steamy summer night, she talked her way past the Swiss Guards and a platoon of Cardinals, and got His Holiness on the hoot ‘n’ holler in the middle of the conference room table to voice his consent. She’d get the Taishoff “Ultimate War Story with (metaphorical) Diamonds.”