We bloggers are mostly spectators. Sometimes we behave like fans, shouting at players and officials, expatiating on our own alleged brilliance, and, in this particular case, generally adding some color and spice to an otherwise arid and hypertechnical narrative.

I was on a tear concerning unadmitted persons, specifically CPAs, being admitted generally, not even pro hæc vice, to Tax Court without examination or statutory qualification. Well, perhaps my hollering from the bleachers has had some effect.

No one less than Ch J L Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel has put up the “No Admittance” sign on the Glasshouse door at 400 Second Street, NW. And she’s on a tear her own self in Bunthan In, Docket No. 3530-17, filed 9/14/17, although with laudable judicial restraint.

Bunthan mailed in a letter with a SNOD for the year at issue. As is only right, Ch J Iron Fist treated it as an imperfect petition, told Bunthan to file a proper amended petition and to plunk down the sixty buck entrance fee.

Bunthan stumps up the sixty bucks, with another letter saying he can’t pay what IRS says he owes, but doesn’t explain what’s wrong with the SNOD. “However, because it did not in any way explain Petitioner’s substantive disagreement with the underlying notice of deficiency, the letter was not in the nature of an Amended Petition and potentially signaled a degree of confusion as to what was required of petitioner at that juncture.” Order, at p. 1.

So Ch J Iron Fist judge-‘splained by order what a proper petition from a SNOD should say, and gave Bunthan one mo’ time to get it right.

But Bunthan stood mute and pat, so Ch J Iron Fist tossed him.

Comes now TH, CPA (name omitted), and mails Ch J Iron Fist a billet doux stating Bunthan’s average annual business income and enclosing an amended return for the year at issue.

Ch J Iron Fist is less than amused.

“Yet the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is entirely separate from the Tax Court, and it is the IRS, not the Court, that processes tax returns.” Order, at p. 2. Exactly what TH, CPA, thought he was doing is at best unclear.

If Bunthan is trying to reopen his case, he needs a proper amended petition. A tax return is not a petition. “Additionally, because the Tax Court, unlike the IRS, does NOT recognized powers of attorney, any such Amended Petition would need to be signed by petitioner personally.” Order, at p. 2.

But Ch J Iron Fist, as always protective of the rights of the perplexed, tries to save the day.

“Accordingly, to again protect petitioner to the extent possible, and in light of concerns of statutory finality, the Clerk of the Court was directed to file the representative’s correspondence on petitioner’s behalf as a Motion To Vacate Order of Dismissal. In an exercise of leniency, petitioner was then afforded yet another opportunity to file an Amended Petition and thereby to allow this case to be reopened.” Order, at p. 2.

As a far better writer than I could ever be put it, “The quality of mercy is not strained;/It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven/Upon the place beneath./It is twice blest; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.”

You can guess the rest; once again, Bunthan does nothing. Neither does TH, CPA.

So Bunthan In is out. Again.

No, not a successor to Harry Hope’s infamous dive, the venue of the 1946 Eugene O’Neill classic. This is the story of David L. (“Davy”) Jones, 2017 T. C. Sum. Op. 75, filed 9/13/17.

Davy missed a year’s tax return, so IRS gave him a SFR at no extra charge, and when Davy didn’t pay, hit him with a SNOD.

Did Davy pay? No. Did he petition? No. So IRS gave him a NITL at no additional charge. Davy does send in a Form 12153. Did Davy challenge liability? Yes. Did Davy propose a collection alternative? No.

Well, CDP hearing one gets rescheduled when Davy claims he didn’t get the SO’s letter giving him a chance to file the missing return.  CDP hearing two gets rescheduled for bad weather, and then rescheduled again because the SO “inadvertently misplaced petitioner’s case file.” 2017 T. C. Sum. Op. 75, at p. 4.

So the SO sent another letter setting up a further adjourned CDP hearing, but Davy neither came on the phone nor asked for a further adjournment.

The SO then sent Davy a “last chance” letter. This said, “If you don’t have anything to tell me I’ll go by the file and decide.”

Davy claims he never got the “last chance” letter, although IRS claims it was sent to the last address Davy gave them..

So the SO upholds the NITL, and Davy petitions.

“Petitioner disagrees with the SO’s determination because he contends that he did not receive the ‘last chance’ letter.  Once a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a CDP hearing but has failed to avail himself of the opportunity, the SO may proceed in making a determination by reviewing the case file.  Oropeza v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-94, aff’d, 402 F. App’x 221 (9th Cir. 2010); Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25, aff’d, 130 F. App’x 934 (9th Cir. 2005).” 2017 T. C. Sum. Op. 75, at p. 8.

Davy had two chances before the “last chance” letter to propose alternatives. Judge Ruwe says that’s enough.

Takeaway- The next-to-last chance may in fact be your last chance.

No, that’s not my phraseology, although I wish it were. My ignorance of seventeenth century Hebrew phraseology clearly disqualifies me from a Tax Court judgeship, even an STJ-ship.

That phrase comes from the linguistic arsenal of none other than The Great Dissenter, a/k/a The Judge Who Writes Like a Human Being, s/a/k/a The Implacable, Inveterate, Irrefragable, Irrefutable, Illustrious, Incontrovertible, Indefatigable, Ineffable, Ineluctable and Insuperable Foe of the Partitive Genitive, Old China Hand and Master Silt Stirrer, Judge Mark V. Holmes.

I welcome back to the blog the source of the aforementioned tohubohu, Harbinder S. Brar & Barbara P. Brar, Docket No. 1295-15, filed 9/12/17, a designated hitter from Judge Holmes’ wordprocessor.

Fans of this my blog may remember Br’er Brar’s previous appearance in my blogpost “Deft and Slimy,” 4/1/16, the companion FPAA to this partner-level deficiency.

Harb & Barb slugged it out to an almost-finish with a stip, and went off to do numbers. But they couldn’t agree about the $1,427,569 flow-through loss from Harb & Barb’s Sub S; IRS kicked $1,079,464 of it.

Judge Holmes puts the issue succinctly.

“The dispute here is whether, in performing the computation needed to enter decision in this case, we need to ignore the larger or the smaller of these amounts.” Order, at p. 2.

The rule is that this deficiency proceeding can only consider nonpartnership items.

For any who find this stuff of interest post-PATH, here’s the story.

“The key case, as both parties recognize, is Munro v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 71 (1989). The Brars argue that in Munro we said ‘respondent may not take his proposed TEFRA partnership adjustments into account in a deficiency proceeding for any purpose, including the computation of the deficiency arising out of adjustments to nonpartnership items.’ Id. at 74 (emphasis added).’ This would suggest we ignore only the lower amount.

“The Commissioner points out that we also said in Munro that ‘partnership items must be ignored in deficiency proceedings, which relate exclusively to nonpartnership items,’ id. — note the absence of the qualifying “proposed” in this sentence. This would suggest we ignore the larger amount.” Order, at p. 2.

And so have courts read Munro to and including our pal Jason Chai.

But Judge Holmes sends the parties off to work everything out after he enters decision for IRS.

“We need to sever this case to allow for entry of this decision. We urge the parties to submit a stipulated decision in the companion partnership case quickly so the Brars don’t end up having to pay and then seek an overpayment refund or otherwise suffer from a failure to coordinate the two cases.” Order, at p. 3.

Let’s not stir any more silt.

Habitual readers of this my blog, a group of hardy, patient, hard-laboring practitioners and friends, are well-used to my praises of that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson. So well-used, in fact, that I need not repeat the many proofs of his solicitude I’ve heretofore chronicled.

But Judge Gustafson is tireless in going the twain and even the thrain, when asked for barely a couple hundred (hi, Judge Holmes, I’ll be getting over to you today) meters.

Case in point: Jefferey R. Fritzler, Deceased, and Sally M. Fritzler, Docket No. 9219-16, filed 9/12/17. It’s obviously Sally’s story, as Jeff is no longer with us.

Sally seems to be having trouble doing what Judge Gustafson told her, namely, getting herself or someone else appointed as ex’r or adm’r for the late Jeff, so as to keep his estate in the case. IRS wants to toss the case as to the late Jeff.

So next week in the Motor City, Judge Gustafson wants Sally and IRS to tell him why he shouldn’t toss the late Jeff’s estate.

OK, no biggie, there are dozens of such orders, where one of a conjoined petitioner is gone from the scene with no successor in view. So what’s up with Judge Gustafson’s solicitude?

“ORDERED that the undersigned judge’s Chambers Administrator shall promptly telephone Ms. Fritzler and read this order to her.” Order, at p. 2.

If he could, I’ll bet Judge Gustafson would send over warm milk and cookies.

My kind of judge.

This causes problems, but not only in baseball games. Here’s Janice Simonson & Karin Rasmussen, Docket No. 16601-17, filed 9/12/17, to show what can happen when someone conflates IRS with Tax Court, as told by Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel.

Jan & Karin petitioned a SNOD, but what they are after is a review by IRS of the CP2000 and their amended return for the year at issue.  They didn’t want to go to Tax Court at all. So they write to Ch J Iron Fist, asking to be released from 400 Second Street, NW.

But Ch J Iron Fist, as we all know, can’t drop a deficiency case, otherwise than for mootness or want of jurisdiction, without entering decision for the amount sought by IRS.

Naturally, Jan & Karin never paid the sixty buck cover charge, so they can get tossed if they don’t ante up.

Nonetheless, Ch J Iron Fist, perhaps as a result of some comments heretofore appearing on this my blog, cautions Jan & Karin that by seeking to leave Tax Court, they are leaving behind something they might want to keep.

“If…no filing fee is received, the Court may dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. If this case is so dismissed, petitioners may lose their opportunity to dispute the…deficiency notice for [year at issue] upon which this case is based.” Order, at p. 2.

Hopefully Jan & Karin take the hint, fork over the sixty bucks, put the case on status report track, jawbone with the IRS attorney, and work it out.

When two insurance companies got the urge to merge, the successor filed a single Form 1120 for the entire year wherein the merger took place.

IRS claims there should have been a short-year 1120-PC for the predecessor, and a short year for successor, but since there wasn’t, and since the Section 368(a)(1)(F) tax-free merger was defective, IRS can go back 15 (count ‘em, 15 years) and zing successor for predecessor’s sins of omission and commission).

Negatory, says Judge Goeke, and puts out the fire in New Capital Fire, Inc., as Successor by Merger to The Capital Fire Insurance Company,” 2107 T. C. Memo. 177, filed 9/11/17.

The New Capitalists sent in a pro forma short-year 1120-PC along with the full-year 1120 for the year of the merger. That gave IRS all the numbers and started the three-years SOL running.

Fraud and substantial miscues are off the table.

“The notice of deficiency in this case was issued nearly nine years after New Capital filed its 2002 return.  Therefore, the period of limitations for the year at issue has expired and assessment is barred unless an exception to the general limitations period applies.  Respondent relies solely on the failure to file exception under section 6501(c)(3).  Under section 6501(c)(3), where a taxpayer fails to file a return, the tax may be assessed ‘at any time’.

“As we understand it, respondent’s position is that we have before us two separate taxpayers–Old Capital and New Capital–that were each required to file tax returns.  Old Capital did not file a return for the short tax year ending December 4, 2002.  Only New Capital filed a return for the tax year ending December 31, 2002.  New Capital’s 2002 return with the accompanying pro forma return, respondent urges, does not qualify as a valid return as it pertains to Old Capital’s short tax year.  On the basis of the undisputed facts, whether Old Capital was required to file a return for short tax year ending December 4, 2002, and failed to do so, makes no difference to the question of whether the period of limitations has expired.” 2017 T. C. Memo. 177, at p. 4.

But a return doesn’t have to be perfect to be a return.

“If a taxpayer files the wrong type of return, that wrong return will be sufficient to trigger the running of the period of limitations, so long as it satisfies the following test articulated in Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1984): (1) the document must contain sufficient data to calculate tax liability; (2) the document must purport to be a return; (3) there must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and (4) the taxpayer must have executed the document under penalties of perjury.” 2017 T. C. Memo. 177, at p. 6.

“The pro forma return included with New Capital’s 2002 return listed the name of the taxpayer as ‘The Capital Fire Insurance Co.’ and reported income, deductions, and credits that were included in the notice of deficiency at issue in this case.  Indeed, New Capital’s 2002 return contained sufficient information to calculate Old Capital’s tax liability.

“On its 2002 return New Capital reported Old Capital’s tax payments, listed Old Capital’s EIN, and checked the box stating that it was the ‘Final Return’ for Old Capital.  New Capital’s 2002 return clearly purported to be a return and was executed under penalties of perjury.” 2017 T. C. Memo. 177, at p. 7.

So what, says IRS, the return as filed was “purposely misleading.” So what, indeed, says Judge Goeke. Fraud and evasion are off the table. So y’all were slow away from the gate in scoping out the return. That’s too bad, but that’s why there’s a three-year SOL.

I note that among winning counsel for the New Capitalists was an alumnus of the ABA/NYSBA Subcommittee on Taxation of Cooperatives and Condominiums, s/a/k/a Uncle Charlie’s Pizza Party.

Well done, OT!

The distributees of the late Minnie Sower benefit from the portable Deceased Spousal Unused Exclusion from the estate of her late husband Frank, but IRS shrunk it from $1,256,033 to $282,690. Oh, IRS also increased the late Minnie’s tax liability by the amount of her lifetime taxable gifts (unified credit, y’know). But, being all heart, IRS did give Minnie’s estate an extra $850 in funeral expenses to deduct. Thus, Minnie’s largesse is reduced by $788,165. 149 T. C. 11, at p. 6, filed 9/11/17.

Full caption reads “Estate of Minnie Lynn Sower, Deceased, Frank W. Sower, Jr. and John R. Sower, Co-Executors v. Com’r.”

IRS has first signed off on the late Frank’s estate with a Letter 627, the famous closing letter. But then IRS went back, using only the stuff Frank’s ex’rs had given them before (nothing new, so no “second examination” per Section 7605(b)), and shrunk the exclusion. But there was no SNOD issued to the late Frank’s ex’rs, and they got a new Letter 627.

Minnie’s ex’rs argue the first Letter 627 was a Section 7121 settlement agreement. But it wasn’t.

Judge Buch: “The Commissioner has strict rules governing closing agreements. Under the applicable regulations only the prescribed forms, Form 866, Agreement as to Final Determination of Tax Liability, and Form 906, Closing Agreement on Final Determination Covering Specific Matters, qualify as closing agreements.  Sec. 601.202(b), Statement of Procedural Rules; sec. 301.7212-1(d)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.” 149 T. C. 11, at p. 12. The only “extraordinarily rare” exception is an exchange of correspondence comprising an offer and acceptance, and there aren’t many. This case isn’t one.

Estoppel doesn’t apply (and that’s another rare situation), because no one changed position in reliance, and no one who had no tax liability before now has one.

And the three-year Section 6501  SOL only applies if more tax is assessed against the late Frank’s estate, and here it isn’t.

Duane Pankratz, et al. Docket No. 21255-13, filed 9/8/17, and his sly counsel play a cool hand in Tax Court, even without the als.

Duane’s counsel dissects the barebones SNOD and the even barer-boned answer to Duane’s petition by means of skillful interrogatories, and gets Judge Holmes to knock out IRS’ attempt to try by consent Duane’s Section 469 material participation or whether Duane’s sale of one of his businesses’ building was a bargain sale. IRS could have amended its answer when discovery turned up some of this stuff, but didn’t. Game over on those issues.

Then, despite an order directing Duane’s counsel to pony up all documents to be introduced at trial, Duane’s counsel slyly drafts Requests For Admissions (RFA) and therein tries to sandbag IRS by sneaking in documents otherwise precluded by the time limits of Judge Holmes’ earlier order aforesaid.

“In drafting the RFAs, petitioner attached at least some documents that will be subject to exclusion; he also apparently attached some that respondent thinks are excludable but petitioner does not. Petitioner then phrased the RFAs not as straightforward ‘Petitioner paid or incurred expenses in the amount of $ X for such and such category of expense as claimed on Schedule C, line so and so;’ but instead as ‘Petitioner provided proof of payment and invoices for 2008 Schedule C-1 costs of such and such in the amount of so forth.’

“Respondent understandably views this as a backdoor way to get in evidence subject to the Court’s preclusion order. His responses generally took the form of denying that the attached documents had been provided in time, and then something about the substance of the RFA.” Order, at p. 2.

IRS’ carefully crafted responses pass muster.

I’m a great fan of notices to admit, as we State courtiers call Requests for Admissions. You can always try to submarine good stuff into evidence by any means at hand, but don’t be surprised if you’re torpedoed in a designated hitter.

Tax Court is the judicial counterpart of the NYC Marathon. It is the only place where the one-time small-claimer, with maybe a couple hundred (hi, Judge Holmes) bucks on the table, gets to walk onto the same playing field with the big-time, top-fuel, multinational Fortune 10, beloved of Warren Buffet, major league corporation.

Just now I blogged a retired KS lawyer fighting a $1500 deficiency. Kevin DeWitt Skaggs, star of my blogposts “The Judge Boots His ‘S’,” 4/26/17, and “Oversoon,” 4/26/17, was fighting about less than $300 EITC.

But today Judge Lauber has a designated hitter where a $3.3 billion (that’s a “b” bravo, brothers and sisters) deficiency is on the line.

And the petitioner is to be found in my refrigerator and around the world. And in the Oracle of Omaha’s portfolio.

It’s The Coca-Cola Company and Subsidiaries, Docket No. 31182-15, filed 9/7/17.

It’s a Section 482 transfer-pricing case. Coke made a deal with IRS twenty (count ‘em, twenty) years ago to use the 10-50-50 payment for IP to foreign affiliates.

Judge Lauber man-’splains.

“Under this method the supply point [the foreign sub or affiliate] would retain 10% of gross revenues as a routine return, and the residual operating income (after certain adjustments) would be split 50%- 50% between the supply point and petitioner.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

Under the deal aforesaid, Coke got Section 6662(e)(3)(D) and Section 6664(c) reasonable cause and good faith cover for any chops arising from following the deal.

Now nothing in the deal keeps IRS from coming back and slugging Coke with fire and slaughter. And IRS now wants partial summary J for the same.

“Petitioner does not contend that the 1996 closing agreement prevented the IRS from making the $3.3 billion transfer-pricing adjustment at issue. And respondent will be free to argue, at trial and in his post-trial briefs, that the 1996 closing agreement should be accorded no probative value in determining whether the IRS abused its discretion in adjusting petitioner’s income under I.R.C.§482.” Order, at p. 2.

So check out my blogpost “Advance and Retreat,” 6/26/13. IRS has to be arbitrary and capricious if it upsets the closing agreement applecart.

OK, says Judge Lauber, but that’s not the end of the story.

“But even if that argument is accepted, it does not mean that the closing agreement has no possible relevance to any issue that may arise in this case.” Order, at p. 2.

Although IRS didn’t seek chops in its answer, it can amend at any time. So the closing agreement’s plenary indulgence as to chops is still in play.

Likewise, there’s a joust about whether Coke overpaid Mexican income tax, and whether such payment was “voluntary” (in which case not creditable against US income tax) or “involuntary” (in which case it was). And the Mexican Cokers paid tax based on their cut of the 10-50-50 deal.

“At the very least, the 1996 closing agreement is ‘relevant’ to the Mexico foreign tax credit issue because it helps explain the basis on which the Mexican branch paid income tax to the Government of Mexico. That fact alone ‘might affect the outcome of the [Mexico foreign tax credit issue] under the governing law.’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).” Order, at p. 3.

And IRS wants summary J on the Mexican income tax question.

Which draws a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot from Judge Lauber.

“The motion currently before the Court is odd. Respondent has not filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from evidence on relevance grounds a document captioned ‘1996 closing agreement.’ Rather, respondent has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a ruling that an historical fact, as a matter of law, can have no conceivable relevance to any issue before the Court. We doubt that this is a proper subject for summary judgment because respondent does not seek summary adjudication in its favor on one or more ‘legal issues in controversy.’ Tax Court Rule 121(a); see Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 1718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that a summary judgment motion, in contrast to a motion in limine, is a mechanism used ‘to resolve non-evidentiary matters prior to trial’). It would be imprudent for a court to grant a summary judgment motion of this sort six months before hearing any evidence at trial. But we shall deny the motion on its merits in any event.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

IRS counsel, don’t try a motion in limine. It will not end well.

Kevin Harris seems perplexed. This is not an uncommon situation for those in the toils of the Internal Revenue Code, its Regulations and its sometimes idiosyncratic judicial interpretations. Even if Kev is a retired KS lawyer, he is not alone among his brethren and sisteren.

Judge Morrison has this one, and is somewhat befuddled by Ken’s litigating position in Kevin C. Harris and Teresa A. Harris, 2017 Sum. Op. 72, filed 9/7/17.

Kev is running four (count ‘em, four) IRAs with his bank. But he only reports distributions from one thereof. His claim is that two $5K contributions to the others came from money he inherited via his late father’s conservator, who distributed same from Daddy’s IRA to settle said estate.

Judge Morrison, as aforesaid, is befuddled by Ken’s approach.

“Contributions to an IRA are tax deductible for the year contributed (within certain limits as to the amount). Sec. 219 (a) and (b). When a distribution is made from an IRA, the recipient must include it in income for the year of the distribution. Sec. 408(d)(1). If the owner of an IRA dies and the decedent’s estate or a beneficiary receives a distribution from the IRA, the estate or beneficiary must include the distribution in income under the income-in-respect-of-a-decedent rule of section 691(a)(1). See Estate of Kahn v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 227, 231-232 (2005). This perhaps explains why the conservator of Kevin Harris’ father’s estate might have paid income tax on distributions from the father’s IRA. However, it is difficult to understand why this tax payment would affect the taxability of distributions from Kevin Harris’ own IRAs. It is undisputed that he funded his IRAs with tax-deductible contributions. The distributions should be included in the Harrises’ income, see sec. 408(d)(1), unless an exception applies, such as the exception for rollovers, see sec. 408(d)(3).” 2017 T. C. Sum. Op.73, at pp. 4-5.

OK, a common blunder, making IRA beneficiary the estate, or nobody. This guarantees a first-class tax disaster. A person other than a spouse can get the five-year payout on an inherited IRA, but it seems Daddy didn’t do that.

Well, “the sins of the fathers” and all that.

But Kev still has Judge Morrison befuddled, so Judge Morrison asked for briefing, and Kev comes up short.

“Although Kevin Harris is a retired lawyer, the Harrises’ brief did not cite any legal authority for their argument about the relevance of the source of the two $5,000 contributions. We are not persuaded that their legal theory is correct. in addition, Kevin Harris’ testimony about the source of the two $5,000 contributions was vague and unsupported by any documentation. His testimony about this matter therefore does not support any findings of fact.” 2017 T. C. Sum. Op. 73, at p. 5.

Meanwhile, only Kev petitioned the SNOD, Teri standing mute. So IRS assessed Teri the whole $1500 deficiency. But then Teri got religion and signed aboard, so IRS sent her a letter saying the assessed deficiency was scrubbed.

Kev yells “Hey, Judge Morrison, we’re off the hook! IRS scrubbed Teri’s deficiency!”

Negatory, says Judge Morrison.

“Once a taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the IRS is barred by section 6503(a)(1) from assessing the deficiency until 60 days after the Tax Court’s decision becomes final. The IRS assessed the deficiency against Teresa Harris individually after she did not sign her husband’s Tax Court petition. Once she ratified the petition and became a party to the case, the IRS reversed its assessment in recognition of section 6503(a)(1). Neither the reversal of the assessment, nor the September 2015 letter reflecting the reversal, suggests that Teresa Harris’ deficiency was zero. After our decision becomes final, the IRS is permitted to reassess the deficiency. See Pavich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-167, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 120, 121 (2006); Connell Business Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-131, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1384, 1387-1388 (2004); Pfeifer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-437, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 857 (1983).” 2017 T. C. Memo. 73, at p. 6.

Beside, the billet doux IRS sent to Teri scrubbing the deficiency wasn’t a stipulation spread upon the record in open court, wasn’t a closing agreement, wasn’t nuthin’.

And since y’all didn’t ask IRS to abate interest before raising the issue in Tax Court, Judge Morrison can’t review their action in slugging y’all therewith.