Unlike Lilian Chinedum Ajayi, who starred in my blogpost “Just Counting The Days,” 1/1/16, Christopher J. Ventura & Sara M. Ventura, Docket No. 28185-14S, filed 6/15/16 go down for the count in a designated hitter from STJ Daniel A (“Yuda”) Guy.

Chris & Sara file four (count ‘em, four) bankruptcy petitions, each of which gets bounced, although in one case Chris & Sara get an extension of the automatic stay.

Chris & Sara burned thirty of their ninety days after getting the SNOD before filing Bankruptcy One. So they had sixty days of their original ninety days, before the automatic stay stopped everything, and 60 days per Section 6213(f) after the end of their proceeding (discharge or bounce, whichever first occurs).

Chris & Sara filed Bankruptcy Two within thirty days after Bankruptcy One was bounced.

We know that while the automatic stay is in effect, no proceedings can take place in Tax Court.

But there is an exception for quick-kick refilers.

“Specifically, 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(3)(A) and (B) provides in relevant part that, if the debtor had a single or joint bankruptcy case pending within the preceding one-year period, but that action was dismissed, the automatic stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case, unless the bankruptcy court grants the motion of a party in interest to extend the automatic stay. In Klein v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 166 (2010), the Court interpreted the so-called exploding stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(3) and concluded that they are applicable in deficiency proceedings brought in the Tax Court under section 6213(a).” Order, at p. 3.

So, when Chris & Sara filed Bankruptcy Two within a month after the first was bounced, they asked for, and got, an extension of the automatic stay. So everything was stayed again.

But after the Bankruptcy Two was bounced, the clock started again.

Chris & Sara didn’t petition Tax Court until seven months had passed since the second bankruptcy was bounced.

True, Chris & Sara filed bankruptcy twice after they petitioned, but that doesn’t help them. Their time to petition Tax Court ran before they filed Bankruptcy Three, and Bankruptcy Four, filed post-petition, is strictly a nonstarter.

So count those days, serial bankrupters, or you’re bounced from Tax Court too.

We’ve heard this Richard Lovelace classic before. See my blogpost “The Jolly Rounder,” 3/16/15. And now we hear it again from one now or formerly similarly situated, in Foundation for Harmony and Happiness, Inc., 17664-15X, filed 6/15/16.

We could all use a lot more harmony and happiness, even as I suggested to then-Ch J Michael B (“Iron Mike”) Thornton, as he wound down his Chieftainship. See my blogpost “Short!” 4/1/16.

Well, the Harmony & Happiness guy got tossed for lack of jurisdiction, and petitioned for vacation or reconsideration, as more particularly bounded and described in my last-mentioned blogpost.

Now the New Sheriff, Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel is heir-at-law to this one, and the Harmony & Happiness guy gets no joy from her.

“A motion to reconsider or to vacate typically is not granted in the absence of substantial error or unusual circumstances, such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud. In petitioner’s motion, petitioner alleges no substantial error or unusual circumstances. Rather, petitioner asserts that the dismissal of this case was unfair because he was incarcerated when respondent filed the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner further contends that this Court should either: (1) ‘make a decision to take jurisdiction by noticing that the corporation was in good standing for the subject years 1999 to 2002’, or (2) ‘allow the necessary time to fix the matter with the California Secretary of State’.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted).

Well, Harmony & Happiness guy, whether or not your outfit was in good standing during the years at issue is nothing to the point. Your outfit has to be in good standing on the day you petition. In short, that was then and this is now. And tomorrow won’t help you.

Of course this is a CA case, and we get poor ol’ David Dung Le, M.D. dragged back in again. If Doc Dave could get royalties every time this case was cited, he’d have paid his back taxes ten times over. In any case, he must be second only to Neonatology Associates on the all-time medical list.

Ch J L. Paige Iron Fist doesn’t discuss the Harmony & Happiness guy’s absence from civil life, but one can conjecture he could have filed even from prison. Like the poetical Lovelace.

Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel swings into action as she begins her second week of Chieftainship, by complying with last year’s Congressional mandate, found in Section 431 of the Revenue Act of 2015, s/a/k/a Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes.

I propose a new enactment, to be entitled protecting Americans from cutesy acronyms. Good luck with that.

And she barely beats the 180-day deadline found in said statute.

I did mention the mandate in my blogpost “Cornpone – Redivivus,” 12/21/15.

The new Rules seem like a lot of wind-up for very little baseball. It’s not very likely we’ll see anything coming out of Tax Court’s special committees. Much of the new Rules are echoes of existing statutes and judicial codes generally.

Howbeit, here are rules for complaints about Judges and STJs.

http://ustaxcourt.gov/press/0614

No rounders need apply; if you lost, that’s no grounds for complaining under these Rules.

If I have a complaint about the stunning weekend just completed Far Above those “waves of blue” (which didn’t kick up much, notwithstanding dire warnings from National Weather Service), it’s the simultaneous scheduling of the Sherwoods with Cornelliana Night. C’mon, Alumni and Development, I couldn’t be in two places at once.

If all this is meaningless to you, my dear reader, I’m truly sorry. There are memories that are worth far more than the price of admission.

Anyway, I take the title of a record album (vinyl, so you know how long ago that was) by the Cornell a capellists The Sherwoods to revisit yet another Tax Court oldie-but-goody, Estate of Natale B. Giustina, Deceased, Laraway Michael Giustina, Executor, 2016 T. C. Memo. 114, filed 6/13/16.

Laraway escaped the chops, but got hit with a substantial deficiency on the valuation of his late parent’s 41.128% interest in the FLP, which held the Oregon timberland that comprised the family fortune.

For the skinny on that one, see my blogpost “Such Rarefied Heights of Pure Mathematics,” 6/25/11.

Well, Laraway wasn’t a happy woodsman after being administered the slug by Judge Morrison, so off to Ninth Circuit he ran.

The Ninth Circuiteers remanded Laraway, wanting Tax Court to elaborate on the single-asset risk premium and the going-concernedness of the FLP. See my blogpost “Such Rarefied Heights of Pure Mathematics – Part Deux,” 2/27/15, leaving Judge Morrison desperately seeking settlement.

The parties disoblige him.

Judge Morrison is clearly peeved; judges don’t like being reversed, especially in capital letters. “The Ninth Circuit’s opinion ended with the words ‘REVERSED and REMANDED for recalculation of valuation’.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 114, at p. 8.

OK, says Judge Morrison. First, any investor (our friend the hypothetical creature, see Reg. 20.2031-1(b)) will diversify. There shouldn’t be much premium on the price for the single-asset, because anyone buying in will have other assets elsewhere, so a collapse in the forest (whether or not anyone hears it) will be offset by gains in the ocean (or sky, or Cloud).

More elegantly, “Risk is not preferred by investors.  Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 182 (8th ed. 2006) (“Most investors dislike uncertainty”.).  They require a premium to bear it.  However, some of the risk associated with an asset (the “unique risk”) can be eliminated through diversification (1) if the owner of the asset also owns other assets, (2) if the risks of the other assets are not associated with the asset in question, and (3) if the other assets are great enough in value.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 114, at p. 10.

And the 25% possibility that the FLP would dissolve, itself dissolves when Judge Morrison examines Laraway’s and his kinfolks desire to keep their forests primeval and chop them down slowly, replanting as they go. Laraway and kinfolk must approve any buyer; any buyer who claims to love trees but wants to sell out the Giustina arboreal splendor would be shown to the door.

And Judge Morrison again quotes the experts on corporate finance above-cited.

“For 25 years, Larry [that’s Laraway to you] Giustina and James Giustina had run the partnership as an operating business.  The record suggests that these two men would refuse to permit someone who is not interested in having the partnership continue its business to become a limited partner.  Thus, we believe that they would not permit a multiple-owner investment entity to become a limited partner. Such an entity seeks to increase the returns on its investments.  Brealey, Myers, & Allen, supra, at 182 (“Most investors like high expected returns”.).  If such an entity owned the 41% limited-partner interest, it would attempt to have the partnership discontinue its operations and dissolve.  (At dissolution it would get 41% of the value of the partnership’s assets, or 41% of $150.68 million.  In contrast to the $150.68 million that would be received by all the partners from dissolving the partnership, the value of the cashflows from the partnership’s continued operations would be only $33.8 million (according to the estate’s expert), $51.7 million (according to our first opinion), or $65.76 million (according to the IRS’s expert).  These values are 22%, 34%, and 44%, respectively, of the $150.68 million that would be realized by dissolving the partnership.)” 2016 T. C. Memo. 114, at pp. 14-15.

Got a clue for you, Judge, and the Three Wise Men you quote. Investors don’t want high “expected” returns. They want high ACTUAL returns.

Anyway, why buy a lawsuit, except at a really steep discount?

So, after yet another mix-and-match, Judge Morrison’s rarefied mathematics yield good news for Laraway and Cousin Jim and the gang.

“In our first opinion we valued the 41% limited-partner interest at $27,454,115.  After making the two changes discussed in this supplemental opinion (eliminating any weight attributed to the value of the partnership’s assets and applying the 3.5% partnership-specific risk premium), our valuation changes to $13,954,730.” 2016 T. C. Memo. at p. 16.

Judge Morrison has a table to show the good news.

Keep it up, Laraway, and you’ll end up with IRS owing you money.

It sure does, and welcoming me back from the Big Five-O on The Hill Far Above is Norma L. Slone, Transfereee, et al., 2016 T. C. Memo. 115, filed 6/13/16. Y’all will recall Norma and the et als knocked it out of the park, as Judge Haines found the Slones hadn’t collaborated with the Mid-Coast nasties to grab the loot from Dad’s broadcast empire and rob poor ol’ IRS.

If you don’t so recall, check out my blogpost “Substance Matters,” 3/1/12.

IRS, not so easily daunted, ran to the Ninth Circuit, which bounced the Slone Rangers (sorry, guys, the devil made me do it) back to Tax Court for failure to double-stop their opinion. First, were the Sloners  “transferees” per Section 6901? Second, under State law (here AZ), were they liable for the transferor’s unpaid debts (namely the income taxes from the built-in gain on the sale of the C Corp assets)?

For more about Ninth Circuit’s diss of Judge Haines, see my blogpost “Spring Cleaning,” 5/11/16.

Well, Judge Haines was no wise loath to jump into the fray, and the Slone Squad wins again.

First, the Slones sold their C Corp stock to a third party for cash. And nothing in the record suggests that the Slones knew the sale was a put-up job. Their experts did proper due diligence. The third party thereafter looted the Slone C Corp, and shuffled off. Once Judge Haines accepted the sale transaction as a real sale, that puts paid to the notion that the Slones got anything from the corporation.

So they’re not ”transferees.”

Then, IRS has only AZ law. But AZ hasn’t ruled definitively. So Judge Haines finds IL has, and here comes Alterman. See my blogpost “It’s Not Fraud,” 12/1/15.

So Judge Haines trudges exhaustively (and exhaustingly) through the AZ UFTA, and, because the Slonies never touched the corporation’s assets, nor did they connive with the Mid-Coasters, nor did they even turn a blind eye toward the post-closing skullduggery, the Family Slone comes out clean.

Are we going back to Ninth Circuit? Stay tuned.

I’ve decided to start what may well turn out to be a desultory series of posts, picking up scraps of orders and cases, and general remarks on cases I’ve already blogged but which don’t need a dedicated post for that purpose. I’ll caption these as above-stated.

A footnote to the Medtronic case I posted yesterday, June 9. More than once Judge Kerrigan noted that IRS took an all-or-nothing approach to sustain its position. My squad leader in basic training long ago related to me many years later a lesson he learned from his platoon sergeant, while serving in the Central Highlands of a country far away: Always Have a Plan B. Litigants, please copy.

Alvin Sheldon Kanofsky, Docket No. 21815-15, filed 6/10/16, earns a Taishoff “thank you” for an offer of proof of my contention that requests for place of trial must state a connection between the place requested and convenience of witnesses, location of documents or physical evidence, place of residence or place of business of petitioner, or a similar reason.

Alvin Sheldon, accomplished rounder, decides to take his show on the road.

“…petitioner commenced this case and requested Washington, D.C. as the place of trial. In a related case at Docket No. 18162-15, petitioner requested Winston-Salem, North Carolina as the place of trial. In another related case at Docket No. 18163-15, petitioner requested Cleveland, Ohio as the place of trial, but did not file an objection to respondent’s motion to change place of trial to Winston-Salem, North Carolina. In a third related case at Docket No. 18182-15, petitioner requested Richmond, Virginia as the place of trial, but did not file an objection to respondent’s motion to change place of trial to Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Consequently, all three related cases are presently assigned to the October 24, 2016, trial calendar for Winston-Salem, North Carolina.” Order, at p. 1.

Well, IRS, tired of Alvin Sheldon’s geographic as well as juridical roundering and noting that all four  of Alvin Sheldon’s cases involve nonfiling of returns, plays the same move as before.

“… respondent filed a Motion To Change Place of Trial in this case to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to which petitioner objected.” Order, at p. 2.

Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel sends Alvin Sheldon’s latest off to Winston-Salem to join his three cases already there, apparently without consideration of Alvin Sheldon’s objection or his desire to try that case in Our Nation’s Capital.

Might be a good thing to require a reason for choosing a place of trial.

The Tax Court website, presumably vetted by the Court, states: “Generally, a Memorandum Opinion is issued in a regular case that does not involve a novel legal issue. A Memorandum Opinion addresses cases where the law is settled or factually driven. A Memorandum Opinion can be cited as legal authority, and the decision can be appealed.

“Generally, a Tax Court Opinion is issued in a regular case when the Tax Court believes it involves a sufficiently important legal issue or principle.”

The “law is settled,” huh? Well, what price 144 (count ‘em, 144) pages of Judge Kerrigan’s prose in Medtronic, Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries, 2016 T. C. Memo. 112, filed 6/9/16.

There are eight lawyers for Medtronic, et al., and eleven (count ‘em, eleven) for IRS.

And there’s a billion, three hundred fifty million or so in deficiencies.

The Meds US sent IP to Meds Puerto Rico (PR) for purposes of manufacturing various medical devices. Should payments to PR be reallocated to Meds US per Section 482?

Meds US also entered into manufacturing deals with Meds Suisse; IRS claims either excess accrued royalties stashed in Switzerland or Meds US made payments in excess of arms’-length for goods manufactured in Switzerland by Meds Suisse. If not, IRS claims when Meds US restructured, it made transfers compensable per Section 367(c).

Thoroughly confused? If not, stand by.

Meds US made implantable medical devices, like pacemakers. If these go wrong, people die.  Meds US therefore had heavy-duty regulatory exposure and products liability exposure. It takes years to develop a product and get FDA benison. If the product thereafter maims or slays the patient, monumental liability falls on Meds US’s head, and there is no third-party insurance, so Meds US self-insured.

Meds US had a bunch of siblings, subsidiaries and related companies, all involved in this stuff.

Meds US set up first-tier subsidiaries in PR to take advantage of Section 936. When Congress phased out this unguided largesse (incidentally bankrupting the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico), US Meds organized a Swiss subsidiary to grab whatever PR had that wasn’t tax-advantaged.

PR had a lot of freedom, and ran the manufacturing operation with nearly a free hand. But FDA and foreign regulators watched them closely.

Meds US licensed its IP to PR when it set up PR. Meds US got into an infringement jumpball with Siemens, and settled by cross-licensing IP with negotiated royalty payments.

Meds US hammered out an arms’-length royalty arrangement with Siemens, which Meds US modified after entering into a Memorandum of Understanding with IRS.

PR was responsible for products liability issues. And this stuff involved ultrahazardous risk if the stuff didn’t work, and the bad will engendered thereby would trash the company’s brand.

Meantime the Swiss were manufacturing any stuff PR couldn’t, and paying royalty at same rate PR would have paid.

But various recalls affected PR, and Meds US’s competitors, chiefly Guidant (remember them?).

The IRS Memorandum of Understanding aforesaid settled IRS’s claim that the royalty arrangement with PR was too sweet. So US Meds adopted IRS’s numbers, took heavy tax hits per Section 367(d), and went forward.

Then IRS tried again, claiming the Memorandum of Understanding numbers generated excessively cheap profits to PR.

IRS and Meds US agree about arms’-length manufacturing numbers, but not about IP.

However, at close of play, it’s all about arms’-length. The critical question is how much product quality plays in determining what PR brought to the deal. IRS says PR brought little, and marketing controls; PR and Meds US says it’s all about quality and marketing means nothing without quality.

The recall evidence sinks IRS. Past recalls murdered both Meds US and Guidant, because doctors fled each time.

Judge Kerrigan: “Respondent [IRS] does not place enough emphasis on the importance of quality in the industry. The final product is the key to success. Product quality is the foundation for which implantable medical devices can be successful. A recall could make it very difficult for a company to continue to compete in the industry at the same level. A company can have a strong sales force and a creative marketing department, but these will not make a difference if the underlying product is unsafe and ineffective.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 112, at p. 102.

OK, says IRS, but quality is spread over the entire intercompany setup. PR is just the last link in the chain. Roger that, says Meds US, PR is goalkeeper, the last defense against unreliable, dangerous pacemakers that maim and slay. And blow up everyone connected therewith.

Meds US shows PR ran all the quality control ends of the show.

IRS’s expert downplayed PR’s contribution, mismatched its operations with those of the comparables he provided, and aggregated all the functions of producing Meds US’s products unnecessarily, ignoring the facts-and-circumstances test that places great value on PR’s goalkeeping functions.

Ultimately, though, neither IRS’s expert nor Meds US’s expert provided Tax Court with a meaningful method for fixing an arms’-length royalty for the IP Meds US gave PR.

So Judge Kerrigan goes with the comparable uncontrolled transaction, or CUT method. But Meds US’s expert didn’t account for variation in profit potential. So Meds US doesn’t show IRS was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in its adjustment of royalty rates.

Judge Kerrigan does the usual mix-and-match, and comes out with a number that matches the Memorandum of Understanding number Meds US hammered out with Siemens, but she claims it’s coincidental. And she applies the same number to the Swiss deal.

And whatever intangibles IRS claims were transferred to PR in an outward bound transaction that renders taxable that which Section 351 exempts from tax were given to PR before the restructuring, so no Section 367(d) taxation.

IRS loses a big one.

But is this really just facts-and-circumstances? Is the law really so “settled”?

I would have taken a pass on James Clement Powell and Lucy H. Powell, 2016 T. C. Memo. 111, filed 6/8/16.But there’s a twist, although it isn’t at first apparent.

It was another run-of-the-mine unsubstantiated deductions (hop-farming in Hillsborough, NC, and Section 274 car mileage, of which Judge Pugh allows JC a pittance) deficiency with an arithmetic (transposition) error thrown in.

Footing errors usually don’t figure in Tax Court cases, but since the error was mentioned in the SNOD, Judge Pugh decided she had jurisdiction. And since IRS didn’t claim the number that gave rise to the transposition error was bogus, Judge Pugh corrected the mistake. The Rule of 9 saved JC and Emily.

JC and Emily had twice been to Tax Court before, so Judge Pugh admonishes them. “Petitioners have appeared before the Court on two previous occasions and are aware of the rules requiring substantiation of their expenses.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 111, at p. 16.

It’s nice when you’re a frequent flyer and aircrew recognize you, as happened recently to a certain Principal-to-be in a Big Four accounting firm. It is less good when Tax Court Judges give you the “Here comes the Rounder” look.

But the best is saved for last.

JC and Emily want to sue IRS for damages. And in the words of a certain elected official, “Yes We Can.”

See Section 7433. Judge Pugh explains.

“Petitioners seek $25,000 and $10,000 in damages for tax years 2011 and 2012, respectively, from respondent under section 7433.  Section 7433(a) provides that a taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a U.S. District Court if an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally or by reason of negligence disregards any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.  This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ section 7433 claim.  See, e.g., Petito v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-271.” 2016 T. C. Memo. 111, at pp. 19-20.

And for readers with exceptional memories, petitioner in the Petito case aforementioned appeared in my later blogpost “Save the Cutesy,” 7/1/14.

So now it’s off to The Hill Far Above, and the semicentennial gathering of a class of distinguished attorneys (not including me) who passed through that illustrious institution so long ago.

And to drink to absent friends.

No, this is not a promo for a new TV series I’m trying to flog, so as to become a big-time producer and avoid mortgage closings.

Here Judge Lauber tries to help struggling homeowners Michael A. Rohde & Sophia M. Rohde, Docket No. 8758-15L, filed 6/8/16, caught between the battling SOs.

The Rohdes filed timely, didn’t pay, and got the usual NITL. They went to Appeals, asked for an IA, but the SO sustained in full because the Rohdes missed some estimateds. But the Rohdes petition because, for two other years, another SO gave them a “…’Sixty Day Extension of Time to Pay,’ in part to enable them to pursue sale of a two-bedroom condominium they own in Manhattan.” Order, at p. 1.

I checked it out online, and it’s about seven blocks from where I live, so I reckon, but do not guaranty, warrant or represent, that it might bring a decent piece of change, after the liens for unpaid common charges, transfer taxes, fees and costs are dealt with.

Judge Lauber gets the parties on the blower, and here is the upshot. “Petitioners informed the Court that they were in the process of selling the condominium and that, once it is sold, they will have the funds to pay most (if not all) of their tax liabilities. Petitioners stated that their real estate agent had advised them to perform some renovation to the condominium in order to maximize the sale price, and that the construction should be completed soon, at which point the unit will be listed for sale.” Order, at p. 2.

So Judge Lauber puts the case on status track with 30-day reporting requirements.

But lest the Rohdes get too elated, “(W)e advised petitioners that, if there is no progress in the near future toward listing the condominium for sale, the Court will proceed to rule on respondent’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, place the case back on a trial session.” Order, at p. 2.

Takeaway- Here’s a blueprint that might work if your clients have some equity but little cash.

And Just Maybe She Reads This Blog

I mean Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel (byname suggested by faithful reader FCAaficinado; sorry FCA, no prize, just fame). And I see our county American Legion has a new County Commander who is a woman. And we will be getting a woman as Department Commander in future. Who’d ha’ thunk it?

Back to work.

Y’all will remember the petition-before-SNOD gambit. IRS bombards taxpayer with letters, none of which is an official SNOD (but remember there is no mandated form for a SNOD, just written statement of year, amount and statutory basis for tax). Taxpayer, drawn offside, petitions. IRS then drops SNOD, claims there’s no jurisdiction as petition filed before SNOD. Then petition dismissed, too late for taxpayer to petition afresh.

Tax Court judges have danced around this on numerous occasions, and I’ve blogged many such, where letters or even Ownership Disclosures were declared to be defective petitions post-SNOD, the old docket number being erased and a new docket number assigned, with direction to petitioner to serve amended petition (actually old petition reprised).

But I did wonder about the sixty-buck filing fee. If old petition dismissed (assuming fee paid therewith), must new petition incur a new filing fee? No order or opinion I could find makes this clear.

See my blogpost “Fake Out – Part Deux,” 6/23/15, wherein I suggested “Takeaway—File early, file often. If IRS gives you the wrong advice, file anyway. When they get around to sending the SNOD, file again and apply for a filing fee waiver based on earlier filing provoked by IRS misinformation. Maybe misleading info can’t confer jurisdiction, but it could save you sixty bucks, maybe.”

Well, Ch J L. Paige Iron Fist explicitly waives the filing fee in Margie Olivo, Docket No. 8720-16, filed 6/7/16. No preamble, no explanation, just the flat statement that the fee is waived. So I can’t tell if Margie asked for the waiver or Ch J L. Paige Iron Fist waived it sua sponte.

I await enlightenment, as Ch J L. Paige Iron Fist promised us a separate order detailing at length the reasons for bouncing Margie’s first petition.

Interesting though that may be, I’d also like to see Ch J L. Paige Iron Fist expatiate on waivers of filing fees in such cases.

Finally, I again implore the Tax Court judges to designate these gems. The two designated hitters today raised no novel points. And after a mortgage closing and a big lunch to encourage more business from that source, and a meeting of the Legion, I’d appreciate finding an interesting order to blog without going through 170 uninteresting ones.