Three cases to blog today, none worth a solo performance. If you want to learn how to run a California marijuana shop, a lucrative but risky business, read Judge Goeke’s how-to in Jason R. Beck, 2015 T. C. Memo. 149, filed 8/10/15.

Interestingly, IRS gives up some on cost of goods sold, allowing Jason $750K of what he claims, but not the $600K that DEA seized when they knocked over Jason’s pottery. 2015 T. C. Memo. 149, at p. 3 footnote 3.

And of course Section 280E bars any of Jason’s business deductions. Turns out Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Kroupa’s turndown of Martin Olive’s drug-induced deductions. See my blogpost “Everybody Must Get Stoned,” 8/3/12; see also Martin Olive v. CIR, No. 13-70510, filed 7/9/15.

Next up, Joshua Pingel, 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 48, filed 8/10/15, a Section 183 hobbyhorse case noteworthy for Judge Paris’s explanation of what I do.

For the edification of those recently arrived from Mars, Judge Paris states: “’Blog’ is a truncation of the expression ‘Web log’, which is a regularly updated Web site or Web page written in an informal or conversational style and typically run by an individual or small group.” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 48, at p. 4, footnote 3.

Thanks, Judge, that sums me up.

Jason wants to write books and blog and be a travel guide, but makes no money, although he roams pretty freely. But one of his blogposts fascinates me, and obviously irks Judge Paris, because that blogpost leaves us hanging.

“While petitioner included details about some of the sites he saw, places he stayed, and food he ate, many of his explanations do not give enough details for a reader to find the specific site, lodgings, or restaurant described. For example in petitioner’s Paris blog entry he states: ‘[W]e hit up The [sic] BEST ice cream in Europe. * * * there are a couple of places that serve it and pricing is much higher at one (the ‘tourist’ one as Jeff put it) than at the other one. We walked past the tourist one, which had a huge crowd and walked down the street about half a block to the other one.’ Petitioner does not give any more details about where in Paris the best ice cream in Europe can be found.” 2015 T. C. Sum. Op. 48, at p. 5.

I can understand Jason wanting to be coy about where the best ice cream in Europe can be found, lest the place be overrun with Tax Court Judges and bloggers, and suffer the fate described by that eminent sage Lawrence Peter Berra: “Nobody goes there any more, it’s too crowded.”

But as Jason spoke of “a couple of places,’ I doubt Judge Holmes will thither bend his joyful footsteps.

Well, until Jason unbosoms, if ever, I’m glad BlueBell is back in business.

Finally, I cannot end this somewhat frivolous summer reading without a serious word from that designated heavy-hitter, STJ Lewis (“A Name Resounding Down the Ages”) Carluzzo, Raymond S. McGaugh, Docket No. 13665-14, filed 8/10/15.

Ray wanted summary J back in May, but like Ol’ Blue Eyes has to change his tune, because his declaration in support thereof leaves out some facts.

So there is now a “”Motion to Withdraw Declaration and to Supplement Motion for Summary Judgment,” which STJ Lew will bounce.

“The recent motion to withdraw and supplement arises because of an evident need to clarify or correct that declaration. The motion recounts revised and expanded facts that are supposedly known to or realized by Mr. McGaugh (not his counsel). Documents are attached to the motion as exhibits.” Order, at p. 1.

So why bounce it?

“However, the motion is signed only by counsel, and is neither sworn nor signed under penalty of perjury. No declaration of Mr. McGaugh was submitted with the motion.” Order, at p. 1.

And even if counsel signed under penalty of perjury, (a) what personal knowledge did counsel have, and (b) if counsel did have personal knowledge, how would counsel respond to a motion to be removed as counsel because of the need for counsel to testify on the trial?

But counsel is not only prepared to speak for Raymond, whom he purportedly represents, but Raymond’s wife Mary is also named in the SNOD. Mary never signed petition, amended petition or anything else. That doesn’t keep counsel from the following:

“At the end of [the year at issue], Petitioner was married. The underlying notice of deficiency issued in Petitioner’s name as well as in the name of his former spouse. Petitioner’s divorce was finalized [next year] and he entered into a marital settlement agreement where he agreed to be responsible for all tax liabilities that arose during the marriage. Although his former spouse did not sign the petition, and is therefore not a party to this petition, she reserves the right to ratify it, if it later becomes necessary to do so, with leave of Court. [Emphasis added.].” Order, at p. 2.

STJ Lew is mildly peeved.

“Counsel for petitioner Raymond S. McGaugh has not filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Mary T. McGaugh, and therefore we cannot assume that he is authorized to speak for her. (Furthermore, we do not address whether Mary T. McGaugh retains at this date any right to ‘ratify’ the petition, nor whether we could have any jurisdiction over her as a petitioner.).” Order, at p. 2.

I’ll spare you STJ Lew’s FRCP 56 and Rule 121 lecture to Ray’s counsel. But do the docket search. When you see counsel’s name, then see my blogpost “You Have To Fulfill the Requirements,” 8/20/13. And while you’re at it, take a quick peek at 142. T. C. 24, 6/24/14.