No, not Newcomb College or Meissen, Mission Organic Center, Inc., 165 T.C. 13, filed 12/16/25, is a State-legal vegetation trafficker with a lot of expenses that Section 280E bars from Section 162 et seq. This KOs Mission’s OIC, while birthing five (count ’em, five) separate opinions in this full-dress TC, namely, viz., and to wit, a majority (Judge Buch, joined by Ch J.  Urda, and JJ. Kerrigan, Nega, Pugh, Ashford, Copeland, Jones, Toro, Greaves, Marshall, Weiler, Way, Arbeit, Guider, and Fung; concurring, J. Copeland, joined by JJ Jones, Guider, and Fung; Judge Toro has his own concurring opinion, in which Ch J Urda,  and JJ Pugh, Ashford, Copeland, Jones, Greaves, Guider, and Fung join; Judge Landy dissents, joined by JJ Jenkins and (of course) Holmes; Judge Jenkins wants her own dissent in which JJ Landy and Holmes join; and last, but definitely not least, Judge Holmes has his own dissent, which Judge Landy joins.

Clear? Thought not.

This is a 9 Cir record-ruler off a CDP involving an OIC collectability (RCP) only, so abuse-of-discretion. And Section 7122(d)(1) gives IRS almost a free-fire zone.

“Mission argues that the Commissioner abused his discretion by disallowing business expenses when calculating Mission’s reasonable collection potential. Mission argues that IRM 5.8.5.25.2 (Sept. 24, 2021), Calculation of Future Income – Cultivation and Sale of Marijuana in Accordance with State Laws, is in conflict with the Code, Treasury regulations, and other IRM provisions. The Commissioner argues that the settlement officer did not abuse her discretion in rejecting the proposed offer-in-compromise and sustaining the proposed collection action. The Commissioner argues that the policy to exclude expenses that are disallowed by section 280E when computing reasonable collection potential is consistent with the congressional intent underlying section 280E and is consistent with the discretion granted by Congress to set guidelines for offers-in-compromise.” 165 T. C. 13, at p. 6.

IRS does not err in following an IRM policy that expresses what Congress has enacted: no deduction for herbal traffickers, hence no offset to gross income.

Judge Copeland says Mission filed and followed 280E for years, yet never paid the tax shown, essentially nullifying Section 280E. “..;.a taxpayer who files an income tax return consistent with section 280E, reports a tax liability, and then files an OIC stating the ‘actual money’ it earned was much less based on doubt as to collectibility, is arguing that it should pay a lesser amount in satisfaction of its tax liability than section 280E mandates. Such a taxpayer would be circumventing the underlying purpose of section 280E. I additionally note that such a taxpayer could likewise just default on the OIC the following year by filing consistent with section 280E, but not paying the amount due––continuing the pattern. Denying an OIC in these circumstances makes perfect sense, and the public policy outlined in the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) is thus consistent with statutory intent of section 280E and would not wreak havoc on the OIC process.” 165 T. C. 13, at p. 14.

Judge Toro finds support for adherence to general policy in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996). Where an agency has a settled policy uniformly applied, even if invented, following it is not an abuse of discretion.

Judge Landy claims the wording of the NOD doesn’t reflect what the majority says it says, hence Chenery. And the special IRM rule for potteries falls foul of the general regulations for OICs based on collectability.

Judge Jenkins says the special rule in the IRM violates the regs as to calculating RCP, so relying thereon is error.

Judge Holmes says RCP is about what income (not taxable income) the taxpayer has after allowable expenses, deductible or not. The special rule for potteries flies in the face of this regulatory scheme.

Sorry, no ooga-chaka goes with this one, but Blue Swede’s 1974 one-hit wonder gives the keynote for Mark Chernomordikov, T. C. Memo. 2025-128, filed 12/15/25.

It’s a story we’ve often heard. Son takes over immigrant Dad’s business. Dad dealt with compatriots in green, no invoices among friends (“That’s how we did it in the Old Country”), and nobody keeps books. Son falls in among some bad actors (an EA who was investigated for tax fraud and was paid a piece of the tax savings, a Circular 230 no-no first class), gets involved in a number of businesses, and you know the rest. His Dad’s business was a C Corp. but father and son felt it was all their own.

Son ran the business like a Sched C. Bank deposit reconstruction followed.

“Petitioners argue that the bank accounts were [C Corp]’s, not petitioners’, and [C Corp] was not owned by Mr. Chernomordikov. But we have found above that Mr. Chernomordikov ran the business, had control over the business bank accounts, and considered them no different from his personal accounts. At trial he testified that in [Years at Issue] he ‘didn’t really feel like there was a difference’ between [C Corp]’s bank accounts and his personal bank accounts. When questioned how ONY Sales paid him for his work in [Out Year], because he received no paycheck, he testified that he ‘used the money from [C Corp] for personal expenses.’ Mr. Chernomordikov’s admission directly contradicts petitioners’ argument that cash withdrawn from [C Corp] accounts should be considered cost of goods sold. It instead supports RA H’s characterization of Mr. Chernomordikov’s cash withdrawals from [C Corp] accounts as taxable income to the extent not otherwise explained.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at p. 13.

And then there’s COGS.

“Mr. Chernomordikov claimed that cost of goods sold reduced [C Corp]’s gross receipts for [Years at Issue] and therefore should reduce any income we attribute to him from his use of [C Corp]’s funds. He produced no documents to support his claim. His explanation that he\ was simply following the practice of his late stepfather and complying with suppliers’ requests to deal in cash cannot substitute for actual evidence. Nor can he hide behind purported reliance on an absent professional to maintain records of costs of goods sold any more than he can rely upon the absent professional’s advice to avoid tax on income in [C Corp]’s accounts that he used as his own. While he may have used some of the cash withdrawn for business expenses, he offered no proof beyond the amount that respondent already conceded. Our latitude to estimate amounts on the basis of testimony requires more support than petitioners have offered, especially when Mr. Chernomordikov admitted at trial that he used funds in [C Corp]’s accounts for his personal expenses.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at pp. 14-15 (footnote omitted, but see infra).

The omitted footnote says you can Cohanize COGS even though they aren’t deductions, but the petitioners didn’t argue that nor provide a basis to Cohanize.

IRS stiped away filing status. Neither Mark nor spouse filed anything for one Year at Issue, so they can’t claim MFJ. Except the Stip of Settled Issues says they can. Except IRS now says no in Post-Trial Brief. Judge Cary Douglas (“C-Doug”) Pugh says “you stiped, you’re bound.” Mark and spouse married during that Year at Issue in CA. That’s a community property State, but counsel failed to raise any community property election issues, so they’re both on the hook.

As to chops, petitioners try Jarkesy, but on the same day that Riddle Aggregates is published that doesn’t go anywhere. Fraudulent failure to file fails when the EA who supposedly advised Mark is available but not called by either side. Judge C-Doug Pugh advises wiseguys not to try that tactic; see T. C. 2025-128, at p. 19, footnote 19. Mark gets hit with most of the rest.

One personal note: I was called to consult with a CPA in an ethnic enclave on this Minor Outlying Island. The prospective client (whom I elected not to represent) also dealt in cash with suppliers of like ethnicity. The prospective client needed to find a quarter-million dollars in COGS, and none of his compatriots was willing to write down his (it was definitely “his” in this community) telephone number. I walked downstairs from the CPA’s office and resisted the temptation to stop for lunch.

The latest iteration of the Supremes’ ongoing expedition to bring discipline to the wayward acts of Congress and the boardinghouse reach of the Executive founders on sovereign immunity in Riddle Aggregates, LLC, Ornstein-Schuler, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, 165 T.C. 12, filed 12/15/25. This time it’s the “accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a), (b)(1)–(3), (c), (d), (e), and (h) for an underpayment due to negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, substantial valuation misstatement, and gross valuation misstatement” that, for want of a jury trial, should be held Constitutionally invalid. 1`65 T. C.12, at p. 4.

Jarkesy, you’ll recall, was the shootdown of SEC’s fraud penalties. But those were like an ordinary citizen suing for fraud and seeking punitives, not an exercise of collecting the revenue, a uniquely sovereign function. See my blogpost “Full House,” 8/21/25.

Same story here, says ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan.

“Recently in Silver Moss Properties, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 10646-21, 165 T.C. (Aug. 21, 2025), this Court held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits against the sovereign and that Congress has not otherwise consented to trial by jury in TEFRA partnership-level actions. That holding fully resolves petitioner’s claim here. We see no reason to revisit that holding.” 165 T. C. 12, at p. 4. (Footnote omitted, but see infra.)

“It is well settled that there is no right or mechanism to a trial by jury in either this Court or the Court of Federal Claims.” Silver Moss Props., LLC, 165 T.C., slip. op. at 4–5 (first citing Mathes v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70, 71–72 (5th Cir. 1978)(“[A] taxpayer who elects to bring his suit in the Tax Court has no right, statutory or constitutional, to a trial by jury.”), aff’g per curiam T.C. Memo. 1977-220; then citing Swanson v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1180, 1181–82 (1976); and then citing Rohland v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 36, 38 (2017)). Additionally, a jury trial is not available in district court for TEFRA partnership-level actions. Id. at 5.” 1645 T. C. 12, at p. 5, footnote 5.

“Petitioner’s Motion [partial summary J] suggests that petitioner itself fundamentally misapprehends the nature of its own suit. Petitioner largely focuses on circumstances in which the government brought judicial actions seeking monetary awards from taxpayers. But here petitioner sued the government, not the other way around. And it is petitioner who seeks to prevent the government from taking the next step in assessing and collecting administratively the tax the government believes is due from Riddle Aggregates’ partners. In this context the analytical framework reflected in petitioner’s Motion papers is inapplicable, and the authorities on which petitioner relies are inapposite.” 165 T. C.12, at p. 5.

Ex-Ch J TBS launches into a historical disquisition anent the history of Section 6662 penalties, their ancestors and progeny. The FUBAR penalty, dissed on Eighth Amendment grounds (“excessive fines”) by 11 Cir in Schwarzbaum, 127 F. 4th 259 (11 Cir, 2025), doesn’t apply here; these chops are remedial, not punitive.

Taishoff says roger that, most affirmative, tell that to the dudes who have to pay.

I see my reader, whom I’ll call Mr. Mac, and my colleague whom I’ll name, Lyle B. (“Full-Court”) Press, Esq., were on the losing side. For now. Maybe this one gets to the Supremes.

I have often praised the volunteers who show up to render assistance to hapless pro ses at trial session calendar calls. But their aid is unavailable when motion practice is on the menu, when their aid can be even more necessary.

A many-times-told tale, Christopher W.E. Jones & Sarah Jones, Docket No. 7514-25, filed 12/12/25, gets tossed when IRS Notice CP71C turns out not to be a SND.

And that, even though “Section 6212(a) authorizes the issuance of a notice of deficiency, and while that section does not prescribe any particular form, at a minimum the notice must ‘(1) advise the taxpayer that the IRS has determined that a deficiency exists for a particular year, and (2) specify the amount of the deficiency or provide the information necessary to compute the deficiency.’ The notice must fulfill the purpose of providing formal notification to the taxpayer that a deficiency in tax against that taxpayer has been determined. The purpose of a notice of deficiency is to advise the taxpayer that ‘the Commissioner means to assess him; anything that does this unequivocally is good enough.'” Order, at p. 2. (Citations omitted).

Ch J Patrick J. Urda says Notice CP71C falls short. “…the Notice CP71C does not state that it is a notice of deficiency, nor that the IRS has determined a deficiency or intends to assess a tax. Rather, the Notice CP71C merely informs petitioners that they still owe a balance in their federal income tax for taxable year 2019.” Order, at p. 3.

If the shortfall arises from incomplete payment of self-reported tax that IRS concedes is correct, then there is no deficiency. The tax shown on the return is the tax due.

But is that the case here? Faced with IRS’ motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction (no SND), Petitioners “filed a one-page document, characterizing it as a ‘Motion to Withdraw,’ in which they ‘ask [the] Court to Withdraw return 2019.’ Petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw provides no additional information describing the relief it seeks (or addressing the jurisdictional question pending before the Court).” Order, at p. 3.

This is a case for the calendar call commandos. But this case never got to calendar call. The “motion to withdraw” should have prompted direction to a LITC.

I ask a lot of questions in this my blog. Proceedings in Tax Court cover so wide a range of human activity that nothing (seemingly) is too remote. I just now saw that Kevin J. Mirch and Marie C. Mirch, T. C. Memo. 2025-128, filed 12/11/25, had answered a question I has asked back in June, 2023.  See my blogpost “Bar Exam?” 6/28/23.

The Mirchs had asked then-Judge Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda to stay proceedings in their CDP while Kev, an attorney, got advice from the CA Bar; but the nature of the request was never stated.

Now comes the answer.

“Petitioners requested a stay because of concerns with an ethical issue regarding self-representation. We granted the stay over respondent’s objection.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at p. 9.

The opinion itself is the usual mix of Section 469 real estate nonprofessionalism and sloppy bookkeeping by Exam, Appeals, and petitioners.

What is unusual is what Judge Goeke says petitioners did on the trial. “Petitioners spent a substantial amount of time during the trial and in their Posttrial Briefs trying to relitigate not only issues the Court previously decided but also issues respondent has conceded. They misquoted and mischaracterized evidence in the record and made allegations of wrongdoing not supported by evidence.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at p. 32.

The Girl of My Dreams loses some of her genteel demeanor when I scream the phrase first above written at the head hereof (as my much-better-bred colleagues would say) at the television screen. The scene is Hockey Night in This Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America, and our orange-and-blue clad heroes from another outlying island are having their clichés handed to them by their opponents who swarm the defensive zone.

Coach Pat should really have his crew study Judges Nega and Copeland. They clear the puck with consummate skill and ease.

First, Judge Joseph Nega. Donato DiPasquale, Docket No. 11477-23L, filed 12/10/25, claims his restitution payments, though sufficient to erase the $435K of restitution he owed when he went down for Section 7202 criminal failure to collect and pay, were misapplied and he wants to contest liability and fight over the payments.

IRS, having messed up by omitting a bunch quarters (hi, Judge Holmes) from the administrative record, claims mootness for what they did include and summary J for what they didn’t.

“Petitioner opposes respondent’s Mootness Motion, contending that a dismissal for mootness of these tax periods would harm petitioner’s ability to dispute the proper crediting of payments that petitioner has made. Petitioner bases this argument on a ‘tax analysis’ document that purports to show that the civil (not restitution-based) tax liability for some of the same periods is not yet paid and is therefore not moot.” Order, at p. 4.

No use; Don can’t wildcard in income tax liability here. He admits restitution was shown on IRS’ books as paid. Zuch does the rest; if IRS need neither lien nor levy because everything paid, Tax Court has no jurisdiction.

It took Judge Nega eight (count ’em, eight) pages to send off Don. Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland needs only five (count ’em five) to send Marie Addoo, Docket No. 10138-23L, filed 12/10/25, back to Appeals, where she does not want to go.

Marie was fighting about five (count ’em, five) years of deficiency, but was only timely with her Letter 12153 for one of them. She didn’t put in any evidence at Appeals, but “…her counsel has informally indicated to the Court that Ms. Addoo believes Appeals (1) didn’t give her enough time to prepare for the first CDP hearing, (2) closed her case to (sic) quickly, (3) will not fairly evaluate her case, so she wants the Court to decide her case rather than Appeals.” Order, at p. 3.

Judge Tex Copeland says the Court will listen to the parties. If both agree, sure, remand. Dissenters’ objections are taken seriously, to be sure. But if remand is necessary or productive, back they go.

“Other factors might include: (1) the duration of the administrative proceedings to date; (2) the length of the pendency of the lawsuit; (3) any fault on the part of the party moving for remand; (4) whether remand can remedy the defects the first time around;  (5) whether remand would be futile because, even though the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might’ve abused its discretion, the only arguments that petitioners presented to this Court were based on legal propositions which we have previously rejected; and (6) whether there has been a material change in the law, , or a material change in the facts since the final determination.” Order, at pp. 3-4. (Internal citations omitted).

Remand gives Marie and counsel everything they could want.

“A remand will be able to remedy defects Ms. Addoo faced the first time around: She can have additional time to gather her financial information in order to demonstrate that she qualifies for currently-not-collectible status due to financial hardship, and she can further explain why she may qualify for a  reasonable cause exception to her penalties. Further, collection action will be stayed pending the remand and this Court will retain jurisdiction and oversight of the case during the remand requiring periodic status reports. If a resolution is not achieved by remand, Ms. Addoo will still have the ability to argue her case before this Court after the relevant supplemental determination is issued by Appeals.

“Finally, we note that the Notice of Determination stated that Ms. Addoo did not dispute her liability. This is untrue. In her request for a CDP hearing, Ms. Addoo wrote, ‘Remove penalty,’ and she gave a detailed explanation for why she believed she was not liable for the penalties because she had reasonable cause for her failure to pay. Contesting penalties is contesting the liability.  Appeals should consider Ms. Addoo’s reasonable cause arguments in her supplemental hearing.” Order, at p. 4. (Internal citation omitted).

Remand is not futile. Play goes on in the other end. Peace is restored.

Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS =The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan is running the biggest sealing expedition south of an Arctic icefloe in Nat S. Harty & April D. Harty, Docket No. 23354-21, filed 12/9/25. And of course it’s S. Crow Capital Corporation who’s making the running.

There are three (count ’em, three) separate orders. IRS moved to seal a stack documents (hi, Judge Holmes) and, as there are two unconsolidated cases here, it takes two of the orders to deal with IRS’ wishlist. And those two depend upon footnote 2 in Order No. 3.

Said footnote says the stuff will remain sealed until trial begins next week in the City of the Angels (and National Guard).

In the meantime, the Crows lose their motion to seal everything on their shopping list until 9 Cir rules. Taishoff says that sounds like a Section 7482 interlocutory. And if this whole story seems familiar, see my blogpost “Stone the Crows!” 12/2/25.

Ex-Ch J TBS runs the checklist.

“The following four factors are considered when evaluating whether to grant temporary relief pending an appeal: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted).

It’s a bad lie for the Crows’ trusty attorneys. They do make out that current publicity could irreparably harm the Crows, should they prevail at trail. But they can’t show they have a slam dunk case (what they want sealed is transactional, and 9 Cir has no controlling precedent);  the parties have prepared for trial, got their experts lined up and holding short, pretrial briefs at the ready; the need to clear the courtroom while sealed stuff was discussed would seriously delay trial; and the Crows’ trusty attorneys haven’t shown the public interest lies with their side.

No Marxism, either Karl nor Groucho, rather Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland’s unwrapping of a cost-of-goods-sold reduction to gross revenue of a pioneering VoIPer emerging from Chapter XI. The VoIPer claimed it was providing “information services,” not long distance telephony, so lowballed AT&T and Verizon when tying into their longlines. This came unglued when Big Telecom woke up to the con, hence the Ch XI-induced selloff of its assets to Andre Temnorod and Brianna Temnorod, et al., T. C. Memo. 2025-127, filed 12/8/25.

Andre and the als expensed the lot as COGS, but IRS said “nyet.” Judge Tex Copeland agrees.

“Addressing cost of goods sold first, it is clear from the record that the [VoIPer] was in the business of providing telecommunication services to customers, and not in the business of creating or selling any material products. And as noted above, cost of goods sold is linked to mining, manufacturing, or merchandising products and not applicable in services industries. Thus, we cannot make the leap that petitioners seem to request, that [VoIPer] is entitled to a reduction in gross income for cost of goods sold.” T. C. Memo. 2025-127, at p.; 18. (Citation omitted).

But maybe so might could be that the payments to Big Telecom were Section 162 business, to settle out the lawsuits for the “information services” shortchanging.

Except.

The Asset Purchase Agreement on which the Bankruptcy Court signed off included not only the assets, but assumption of liabilities and waiver of unsecured claims. All this extra baggage means a sale of capital assets. And that invokes Danielson. And who might Danielson be, you ask. See my blogpost RTFC, 3/9/16. You’re stuck with what your contract says.

Gotta give Andre and the als a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.”

I may be deceiving myself, and the truth may not be in me. For sure, it won’t be the first time in this my blog (and elsewhere). But a tiny inkling that not only had I got it right last week in my blogpost “‘Justified?’ – I’ll Say!” 12/5/25, but that someone actually read that blogpost arose as I skimmed Maria Gritsak, Docket No. 13840-25, filed 12/8/25.

It’s the usual months-late SND petition, where Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda trots out the standard-issue Section 6213(a) Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders boilerplate about 90 days except in 2 Cir, 3 Cir and 6 Cir.

“This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the  jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2017), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-188; Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C.126, 130 n.4 (2022) (collecting cases); see also Sanders v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 112,119–20 (2023) (holding that the Court will continue treating the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable to jurisdictions outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024).” Order, at p. 1.

What’s missing from this picture?

If you answered Pugsley, go to the head of the class.

A couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes, this one’s for you) I noted that Judge Holmes was justified in his famous Oakbrook dissent; see my blogpost “Luke 18:14,” 12/1/25. Now he’s again justified.

I failed to notice the now-boilerplate review of the CCA walkback of the Section 6213(a) jurisdictional barrier in October last; see my blogpost “United States Postmark,” 10/20/25. I routinely state I don’t follow the CCAs. I trust all readers of my blog are sufficiently hip to Shepardize any case they are going to cite; anyone who doesn’t know what “Shepardize” means had best not write memoranda of law until they learn and do likewise.

And once I start following CCAs routinely, readers will expect updates on all the cases I blog, which is far above my poor power to add or detract. The trade press and blogosphere do that better.

Howbeit, solely by way of illustration and example of the aforementioned CCA walkback,  Christopher Darrell Lewis, Docket No. 12896-25, filed 12/5/25, gets tossed because he petitions from FL, 11 Cir, where none of Oquendo, Buller, or Culp bring the Supremes’ Boechler discipline.

But again Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes foresaw this compartmentalization. Dissenting in Graev, 149 T. C. 23, eight (count ’em, eight) years ago this month, he suggested Tax Court leave extending Section 6751(b) Boss Hossery to the CCAs, rather than extending it in one Hamiltonian shot, as the majority did. See my blogpost “Stir, Baby, Stir – That Silt!” 12/20/17.

Sub silentio, Tax Court bench followed Judge Holmes’ lead post-Boechler, defiantly citing Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders.  Where they are constrained by Supreme discipline, they sabotage the contrarian CCAs by invoking the strictures of equitable tolling.

In Chris’ case, Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda again calmly notes to Oquendo, Buller, and Culp, but carries on.

Note the boilerplate, Order, at p. 1, cites Pugsley as an 11 Cir affirmation of Section 6213(a)’s jurisdictionality, but Taishoff says that case was decided pre-Boechler. Moreover, if you read Pugsley, it mentions Section 6213(a) but says nothing about its jurisdictional validity, if any. The case goes off on last-known-address (but petitioner got the SND in time to petition per Section 6213(a), so no hurt, no foul) and Section 7502 mailed-is-filed, as petitioner used a PDF, not USPS.

And the final straw: Though DOJ cited Pugsley at p. 14 in their losing brief before the Supremes in Boechler, the Supremes didn’t even mention it in the Boechler opinion.

Wherefore I wouldn’t bet the latte money that undisciplined Pugsley is still good Section 6213(a) Sun Belt law. But we’ll let 11 Cir decide. If Chris can’t appeal, maybe someone else can.

And again Judge Holmes goes down justified.