While nonreceipt of an 1153 billet doux doesn’t invalidate the Section 6672 TFRP, it does raise the question (no it doesn’t “beg” the question, a locution that betrays an imperfect education) whether the petitioner had a chance to contest the penalty.

And here IRS loses summary J, because apparently it shot a blank at the late John W. Houston, co-resident of Omaha, NE, with the great Warren Buffet.

The late John’s cudgel is taken up by his surviving spouse Sarah, in Estate of John W. Houston, Deceased, Sarah V. Houston, Personal Representative, Docket No. 11561-12L, filed 11/24/14. Sarah cross-moves, but doesn’t win either.

The late John was CFO of Merit Transportation Company, LLC, but Merit had little Merit. It stiffed the fisc of $700K in withholdings a month before firing the late John, and filed bankruptcy thereafter.

Judge Paris checks out the late John’s job description. He was:“…in charge of overseeing the ‘comp controller [sic]’ and the individual in charge of the company’s payroll. Decedent was listed on one copy of Merit’s bank account signature cards, which appeared to give him authority to direct funds on behalf of the company. This signature card was not dated and the other bank cards were not signed by decedent and there is no evidence that decedent actually used this authority to write any checks.” Order, at p. 2.

A somewhat shaky case for IRS. And it doesn’t get better.

“Decedent’s Letter 1153 was purportedly sent to decedent and petitioner’s undisputed address in Omaha, Nebraska. … the Postal Service directed the envelope back to the sender because it was ‘not deliverable as addressed’ and ‘unable to forward’. The same day… respondent received and acknowledged the envelope returned from the Postal Service. The envelope was returned within 48 hours of the initial deposit into the mail and upon return, the revenue officer in charge of the case determined that besides waiting 60 days, no further notice action was needed to assess a trust fund penalty against decedent. The revenue officer determined the mere lapse of 60 days from posting the envelope was adequate notice.” Order, at pp. 2-3.

Well, that should do it, right? Section 6672(b)(2) says give the notice, wait 60 days, and then go get ‘em.

Not quite. There was a minor problem with the letter.

“On the copy of the envelope introduced into evidence, decedent’s address does not appear on the front side of the envelope that was supposedly sent to him. The envelope has a clear window, which is supposed to align with an address printed on a sheet inserted into the envelope’s enclosure. The clear window of Letter 1153 does not show any address; instead the window shows what appears to be a security pattern on either the inside of the envelope or paper within the envelope. In any case, the envelope does not display decedent’s address and raises the issue of whether a letter was ever properly inserted into the envelope or if the Postal Service’s prompt return reflecting that it was ‘not deliverable as addressed and unable to forward’ should have alerted the revenue officer of a failed mailing. Neither decedent nor petitioner protested the proposed assessment.” Order, at p. 3.

Appeals gave Sarah a hearing, but said the IRS’ self-generated certified mail receipt showing a letter sent to the late John’s last-known address (the correctness of which no one contests) means “game over” as far as contesting liability.

Sarah petitions.

It’s one thing if the nonreceipt is the result of a USPS error or malfunction. If IRS correctly addressed and mailed the letter, that’s it as far as contesting liability goes. And if the letter was stamped “UNCLAIMED” by USPS, or the addressee ducked delivery, likewise. But see my blogposts “You Didn’t Get It”, 5/31/13, and “You Didn’t Get It – Part Deux”, 5/31/13.

And here all IRS has is the self-generated certified mail receipt.

But maybe IRS can produce something from USPS showing proper mailing of the 3172; no summary J for IRS–yet.

And no summary J for Sarah.

No, not the Peter Fonda – Dennis Hopper 1969 tale, but the story of Ben Evans, a youth with what Judge Vasquez calls the natural talent and drive to race motorcycles at a professional level.

Young Ben lived in Boise, ID, a mecca for motocross, “a motorsport in which competitors race motorcycles at high speeds on dirt courses containing jumps and obstacles.” 2104 T. C. Memo. 237, filed 11/20/14, at p. 6.

In fact, so adept was Young Ben that in one year he “won the Amateur Motocross National Championship 458 Pro Sport class at the Loretta Lynn Motocross Ranch (Loretta Lynn) in Nashville, Tennessee. The Loretta Lynn title is the premiere title in the national amateur racing circuit. Every year 25,000 entrants compete to qualify to race at Loretta Lynn, but only 40 actually make it to the championship.” 2104 T. C. Memo. 237, at p. 4.

Just to make it clear that Loretta Lynn is the coal miner’s daughter and not an apparently failed nominee for Attorney General, Judge Vasquez footnotes: “The event is named after the country singer of the same name.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 237, at p. 4, footnote 4.

Anyway, Young Ben is ticketed for stardom, but Tax Court is concerned with Mom and Dad, William D. Evans and Caroline F. Evans. Mom and Dad’s personal tax return notes Dad’s income from his construction company, licensed in Idaho and doing business nowhere else.

And arriving at that income, Dad deducts money he spent on a motorhome to haul Young Ben and his motorcycles, which actually were carried in the motorhome, thus taking the motorhome out of the Section 179(d)(1) trap that knocks out lodging type property from the quick-kick deduction in Section 179.

Dad loses some deductions for a utility trailer for want of evidence, and he did put income and expenses on the wrong lines of his return, but as his trusty CPAs were qualified and had all the info, no penalty for Dad.

Finally, even though Young Ben’s racing took place afar from Boise, ID, there was some benefit to Dad’s construction business. There’s caselaw that supports racing as a promotional endeavor for construction firms. And even pizza purveyors.

But since Dad can’t show what was the industry standard for racing expenses, or what was the exact benefit his construction company got from Young Ben’s easy riding, Judge Vasquez gives Dad a Cohan approximation.

And while agreeing with IRS that just because the expenses Dad deducted were a small fraction of Dad’s gross receipts doesn’t make the expenses reasonable, Judge Vasquez allows that the Cohan rule covers this case.

So the lesson for the offspring of construction company moguls is “get on your bike.”

No, not a film noir account of a nighttime burglar, but rather the story of Omar Rohttis, Docket No. 6382-14S, filed 11/21/14, as told by CSTJ Peter Panuthos.

Omar lived on the second story of a building of a type commonly found in and about the outlying islands off the coast of North America, on one of which islands I dwell. Omar dwelt across the so-called East River, which really isn’t a river…but that’s another story.

Where Omar dwelt there was a store downstairs and a flat or two above. Omar’s mail was winding up in the store and not getting to him at his second-floor flat, so when he filed his tax return more than ninety days before IRS mailed the SNOD at issue, he noted his address as “2 Floor”.

IRS didn’t bother with the “2 Floor” on the SNOD as mailed.

Omar’s petition was nine months late, says IRS, so toss it.

CSTJ Panuthos says he will, but not for the reason IRS wants.

IRS concedes that there was enough time between when Omar filed his most recent return and the time the SNOD was mailed for IRS to correct its records to add “2 Floor.”

While it’s true that an inconsequential error (like the wrong zipcode; see my blogpost “Name and Number”, 6/9/11) won’t derail a SNOD, this wasn’t a minor error, based on Omar’s testimony concerning the configuration of the building (store downstairs, flats above) and that he wasn’t getting his mail.

“Respondent did not mail the notice of deficiency to the precise address set forth in the … return. Petitioner did not receive the notice of deficiency in time to file a timely petition. We conclude that respondent’s error prevented petitioner from receiving the notice of deficiency. Thus, respondent’s omission of the ‘2 Floor’ designation in the address on the notice of deficiency was not an inconsequential error. We conclude that the notice of deficiency was not sent to petitioner’s last known address, was not received by petitioner in time to file a timely petition, and was thus invalid.” Order, at p. 3.

So Omar’s petition is tossed because the SNOD was invalid as not sent to last known address.

A successful second story man.

From what appears to be a rich vein, here’s another of my sequels to Robert Gover’s 1962 novel, this time of the whistleblower variety. It’s a full-dress T. C., 143, number 20, filed 11/20/14, and stars Robert Lippolis.

Judge Colvin tells IRS’s counsel to move to amend the answer, and forget about dismissing for want of jurisdiction.

Rob apparently shopped an individual taxpayer and some of his flow-throughs for underreporting income, out of which shopping IRS came away with $844,746. The Ogden Sunseteers tossed Bob a discretionary  Section 7623(a) 15% award (don’t we give that to waiters?).

Bob, wanting more,  appeals to Tax Court. IRS claims Bob should be happy with what he got, because he  has no basis for claiming a Section 7623(b) mandatory 15%-30% award.

Section 7623(b)(5) only allows a Section 7623(b) mandatory award if the amount “in dispute” exceeds $2 million. IRS says this is a jurisdictional limit. If $2 million isn’t on the table, IRS bids Rob and Judge Colvin a nice day, but there’s nothing doing.

Judge Colvin says Section 7623(b)(4) gives Tax Court jurisdiction. The Section 7623(b)(5) $2 million is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limit. And IRS admits that Section 7623(b)(5) is not “jurisdictional in character”, but Bob should be tossed anyway. 143 T. C. 20, at p. 6.

For the nonlawyers among you, a jurisdictional limit means the Court can’t say anything. An affirmative defense means that, if the defense can be established, defense wins, but the Court has to decide if they established it.

So Judge Colvin hauls out statutes where Congress made dollar-amount jurisdictional limits, and cases where Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Supremes have canvassed the issue.

Judge Colvin: “Specifically, courts are to review whether Congress ‘clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional’ * * * [b]ut when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional’ [in character].’ Moreover, the “jurisdictional analysis must focus on the ‘legal character’ of the requirement, * * * which * * * [may be] discerned by looking to the condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment”.143 T. C. 20, at p. 7 (Citations omitted, but save them for your next brief).

Legislative history sheds no light. And the mere fact that the limiting Section 7623(b)(5) follows the jurisdictional grant of Section 7623(b)(4) means nothing. “Mere proximity will not turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle.” 143 T. C. 20, at p. 8 (Citation omitted).

And Judge Colvin finds any number of statutes where Congress was very clear about what constituted a jurisdictional limit, and this isn’t one of them.

But if Section 7623(b)(5) is an affirmative defense, it must be pled and proven.

And the term “in dispute” was only defined by Reg. 301.7623-2(e)(2) for claims made or matters open on or after 8/12/14.

Rob’s claim was made long before that.

Judge Colvin ducks. No need to decide what was or was not “in dispute.” Rob claims he can’t know, because only IRS has the records and they may involve taxpayer privacy.

Judge Colvin tells IRS to plead it and prove it.

“The Commissioner generally should have easy access to all of the records or documents that would show whether the amount in dispute in ‘the action’, i.e., ‘any administrative or judicial action’, sec. 7623(b)(1), initiated against the target as a result of the whistleblower claim exceeds $2 million. Those documents may not be available to the whistleblower and may constitute confidential taxpayer information of the target. It would be unduly burdensome to require the whistleblower to provide or perhaps even to know of the existence of those records.” 143 T. C. 20, at p. 12.

But Judge Colvin will give IRS a second chance.

“We will deny respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 41, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, provides that ‘leave [to amend a pleading] shall be given freely when justice so requires’, and that ‘[a] motion for leave to amend a pleading shall state the reasons for the amendment and shall be accompanied by the proposed amendment.’ We will issue an order allowing respondent 60 days to file a motion for leave to amend the answer to raise the section 7623(b)(5)(B) affirmative defense and to include allegations of fact supporting the amendment to the answer. If the Court grants respondent’s motion to amend raising the section 7623(b)(5)(B) affirmative defense, petitioner will have 45 days from the date of service of the amendment to answer to file a reply or 30 days from that date within which to move with respect to the amendment. See Rule 37.” 142 T. C. 20, at p. 14.

I bet that even post-8/12/14, IRS will have to plead and prove what was “in dispute”.

We all know that the record in a case is the key, the linchpin, the cornerstone; you win or lose on the record. An advocate’s whole art can be found in building the record.

No opinions out of Tax Court today, and the one STJ Lew (“He Can Spell”) Carluzzo designated hitter is a Rule 40(b) failure to state a claim by a frivolity merchant.

But here’s an example from The Judge With a Heart, STJ Robert N. Armen, Jr., who shows what happens when an advocate doesn’t build a record.

This is Dardanelle Community Hospital, LLC, Docket No. 303-14L, filed 11/19/14. And to show what a menschadicher dude I am, I won’t name IRS’s attorney.

IRS’s attorney moves for summary judgment. And STJ Armen gives the usual no-trial-is-needed, but nonmovant gets every favorable inference spiel.

But then IRS’ record crumbles. Badly.

STJ Armen: “The record in this case is sparse. In addition, the record lacks both a declaration by the settlement officer who conducted the hearing and certified transcripts of petitioner’s accounts.” Order, at p. 1. (Footnote omitted, but see infra, as my high-priced colleagues say).

Not a strong start. Procedure 101 taught us that summary J motions need to be accompanied by admissible proof, like affidavits, affirmations and declarations from persons with personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and copies of relevant documents, whose provenance is duly attested.

And the footnote hereinabove referred to doesn’t make things better. “Remarkably, although respondent did not offer certified (or indeed, any) transcript of account in support of his motion, petitioner attached as exhibits to its Opposition transcripts for two of the three taxable periods at issue in this case; notably, however, those transcripts were non-certified and temporally stale and therefore of little, if any, value. But even if we were to overlook respondent’s failure to offer certified transcripts of recent vintage, the fact remains that the record does not include any transcript for the most recent taxable period at issue.” Order, at p. 1, footnote 1.

When your adversary’s opposition papers include a hint of the essential evidence you left out, it is time to prepare for what someone, in a much more exalted position than anyone in IRS Counsel’s Office, called “the wrath to come.”

STJ Armen finds a couple of minor issues, like whether Dardanelle owed any taxes to begin with, and exactly what the SO verified by way of compliance with applicable law and administrative procedures.

So STJ Armen buries the summary J motion in a footnote. “In his motion, respondent invokes the bar of I.R.C. section 6330(c)(2)(B). In contrast, the settlement officer did not. Rather, the settlement officer ‘reviewed the documents submitted by the rep and the administrative record’ and ‘[b]ased on the evidence submitted by the taxpayer and the Service’s administrative record’ concluded that ‘[t]he taxpayer failed to meet the reasonable cause criteria.’ In so concluding, the settlement officer utilized a ‘four part multi-factor test to determine reasonable cause for non-compliance.’ In applying the test the settlement officer asserted that the taxpayer ‘has a long history with non-compliance dating back to 2010’, that the taxpayer ‘is not a first time depositor’, and that ‘[d]uring the time of the non-compliance the taxpayer paid all other creditors including pay checks to the LLC members.’ These are all factual matters, but there is no predicate to support them them [sic] in the record before us; and the ultimate issue of reasonable cause is, of course, a quintessentially factual matter, which is ordinarily not suitable for adjudication by summary disposition.” Order, at p. 2., footnote 2.

Better luck on the trial. And with your next summary J motion.

Here’s the latest and greatest information from a Big Four accounting firm.

http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/tax-services/publications/assets/pwc-irs-information-document-request-process-multinational-companies.pdf

In the CDP universe, between the Heaven of “abuse-of-discretion, lien (or levy) rejected” and the Hell of “lien (or levy) sustained”, lies the limbo of “currently not collectible”, a state of suspense, where taxpayers await the Day of Judgment.

You’ll remember Gregory Scott Savoy, who strove mightily against this indeterminate status. No? Then see my blogpost “Sorry, Sorry”, 9/20/13.

Well, Greg has company, and it’s really a company, Alabama Biodiesel Corporation Inc., Docket No. 22426-13L, filed 11/18/14, a designated hitter from one whose name is definitely his fame, STJ Lewis (“The Right Spelling”) Carluzzo.

IRS claims Alabama owes some excise taxes, but didn’t pay. IRS gave Alabama a NITL, but later sent Alabama a notice that the levy was no longer appropriate because they’re putting Alabama in currently-not-collectible status.

Of course, Alabama petitioned before IRS’s change of heart, claiming they had no opportunity to contest the underlying liability.

Oh yes you did, says IRS, but as we’re not now coming after y’all for the tax you owe, your petition should be dismissed as moot. And IRS so moves.

Oh no, says STJ Lew.

“In general, in a section 6330 proceeding a taxpayer may challenge the existence or the amount of an excise tax if the taxpayer ‘did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability’. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). According to the notice, the ‘underlying liability could not be considered in the CDP proceeding as the record shows * * * [that petitioner] had a prior opportunity to deal with Appeals on that issue.….’ According to the petition, petitioner ‘is not liable for the excise taxes at issue’, and contrary to the representations made in the notice, it did not have a prior opportunity to dispute that liability. Respondent’s motion, as supplemented, proceeds as though petitioner is not entitled to challenge the existence or the amount of the underlying liability in this case, a point obviously in dispute.” Order, at p.1.

Well, because there’s clearly a fact dispute (did Alabama get a chance to contest at Appeals), IRS’s motion fails.

Alabama may now be in uncollectible Limbo, but their tax fight is still alive.

The Barzini Boot

This well-worn chivalric saying was drummed into my youthful head when I was still youthful, long, long ago. I believed it, and still do.

Perhaps Ronald L. Kirkpatrick, Sr., believed it too, but that must have been before Judge Cohen delivered 2014 T. C. Memo. 234, filed 11/17/14.

Luigi Barzini, Jr., that mordant critic of Italian life, wrote that chivalry never took hold in Italy. He cited as an example of the chilvalric creed the saying abovecited.

I’m relying on memory here, so give me a little slack, but Barzini asked why should one not kick a man when he’s down? What better time is there? Of course, one should not kick a man when he’s down if he’s old, or a policeman is watching.

Barzini’s work drew a firestorm of criticism when he published it. It’s largely forgotten now, half-a-century on.

But Ron’s story brings it back, and IRS is apparently a disciple of the post-chivalric society, with Judge Cohen’s express approval.

Ron owed about $20K for one year’s personal income tax, that he disclosed on his 1040, so entered into an installment agreement with IRS, which he was paying.

Ron was also chairman of the board of directors of a C Corp which owed about $450K in 941 payments not made.

“In Letter 2850, Approval of Request to Pay Taxes in Installments…the IRS informed [C Corp] that its request to pay its Form 941 tax liabilities through an installment agreement had been approved. The … letter addressed only Accurate and not petitioner.” 2104 T. C. Memo. 234, at p. 3.

So IRS suspended Ron’s personal income tax installment agreement, because he was a responsible person for the TFRPs for the C Corp, even though the C Corp was apparently paying its obligations under its own installment agreement and even though Ron was paying on time on his agreement.

Ron asked for a CDP, and there was some back-and-forth about what he could pay. Maybe Ron was playing games with not disclosing a bank account and some real estate. But that apparently doesn’t enter into Judge Cohen’s opinion, other than as a throwaway “on the basis of the record”.

Ron paid his back personal income tax liability in full and asked for a NOD so as to petition Tax Court. He got it.

Ron claimed he should be covered by the C Corp agreement, but never produced it.

And although the IRM might have given Ron a leg up, it applies to entering into installment agreements with businesses, not dealing with those already in effect.

I won’t speculate why Ron didn’t produce the C Corp’s installment agreement. I will note, however, that there was no allegation that the C Corp wasn’t current on an installment agreement, or might be on the brink of default.

Judge Cohen: “Moreover, the settlement officer acknowledged and considered petitioner’s argument. While petitioner does not appear to have raised specifically IRM pt. 5.14.7.4.1(6) and (7) during the section 6330 hearing, the settlement officer nonetheless looked at relevant IRM parts in reviewing petitioner’s case. In view of the record, we cannot conclude that her determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law, which is the test to be applied. Whether or not other resolutions could have been reached by the settlement officer or by the Court is not the applicable test. The settlement officer did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the proposed levy.” 2104 T. C. Memo. 234, at p. 12.

Takeaway– Practitioners, when your client is a responsible person, make sure s/he goes on the installment agreement with the business entity. If not, be prepared for the Barzini Boot.

Just as the Tax Court website and its riches “go gentle into that good night” for the weekend, leaving me to sulk tomorrow when Cornell gets hammered by Columbia at the northernmost tip of the island whereon I reside, but march noisily down Fifth Avenue as I marched quietly on Tuesday up that same, I found a Judge Gale rebuke to a dilatory litigator wherewith to brighten the aforesaid long day’s journey into cliché.

Here’s the story of CF Headquarters Corporation, Docket No. 22321-12, filed 11/14/14. Again Judge Gale is reticent about designating his orders, leaving this poor blogger once more to scrabble round the website “as the dusk gathers in”, to find fodder for my patient RSS feeders.

Howbeit, CF’s counsel has a real need, in fact a desperate need, for some of IRS’s background papers on Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699, or the legal conclusions therein. So they move to compel.

No biggie, right?

Except CF’s counsel asked for the stuff more than a year ago, and IRS handed in a privilege log covering same forthwith.

“Nonetheless, although petitioner now contends that Notice 2003-18 ‘is central to respondent’s case’ and that petitioner ‘has made a clear showing of need’, petitioner waited approximately 14.5 months after learning respondent’s position before filing its Motion to Compel. Indeed, petitioner’s Motion to Compel was filed on October 24, 2014–the last day such a motion could be filed unless otherwise authorized by the Court. See Rule 70(a)(2), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Petitioner also made no mention of any such outstanding discovery dispute in the Joint Status Report it filed on October 3, 2014.” Order, at pp. 1-2.

“Remarkably, petitioner offers no explanation for this delay. In the circumstances, given the volume of documents in dispute, petitioner’s eleventh-hour filing appears at best dilatory and at worst a deliberate attempt to thwart the orderly and expeditious resolution of this case.” Order, at p. 2.

Anyway, some documents IRS erroneously claimed were privileged were handed over.

And just because IRS will rely on statutes and regs cited in the Notice doesn’t mean that IRS is relying on the Notice. And as IRS relies on the Notice for penalties, it’s the published Notice that counts, not what documents underlay the same.

It’s now too late for me to find out the name of CF’s counsel, even if I were going to mention it here. But I won’t. Sufficient unto the day is the cliché.

Roll over, IRAs. But December 31 is approaching, and the one-roll-per-year-for-each-IRA, the rule that IRS applied pre-Bobrow, is about to be, in the immortal words of Charles Edward Anderson Berry, “gone like a cool breeze”.

Remember the Bobrows and their rolling IRAs? No? Then check out my blogposts “Practicing in Tax Court Can Be Hazardous”, 1/28/14, and “Laissez Les IRAs Roulez”, 4/15/14.

Al the Tax Lawyer tried to snow Judge Nega with the proposition that, as he was a tax lawyer, his interpretation of the law had to be correct.

Al learned this does not work.

Al called in his fellow diplomates of The American College of Tax Counsel, to which august body I do not belong, to bolster his collapsing case. Judge Nega riposted in substance “S’vet gornisht helfen, boychick.” (I need not, of course, translate).

IRS, however, in an airburst of magnanimity, agreed to let the mistaken rule stand, in the immortal words of the late great William James Basie, “one more once”; this year only.

But no good deed goes unclichéd, because rollers were wondering if they did a free-kick rollover in 2014, would they be debarred from rolling again in 2015.

So IRS issued Notice 2014-32, supplementing Notice 2014-15, 2014-16 I.R.B. 973, to unconfuse those transitioning between rolls.

“However, as a transition rule for distributions in 2015, a distribution occurring in 2014 that was rolled over is disregarded for purposes of determining whether a 2015 distribution can be rolled over under § 408(d)(3)(A)(i), provided that the 2015 distribution is from a different IRA that neither made nor received the 2014 distribution. In other words, the Bobrow aggregation rule, which takes into account all distributions and rollovers among an individual’s IRAs, will apply to distributions from different IRAs only if each of the distributions occurs after 2014.” Notice, at p. 1.

Rollovers from Trads to Roths are disregarded, but Roth-to-Roth will fall within the new Bobrow rule. Only one IRA roll of whatever kind (other than Trad-to-Roth) in any year, no many how many IRAs of whatever kind you have.

And rollovers to or from qualified plans are also not covered by the Bobrow rule.

Of course, trustee-to-trustee isn’t a rollover, and Notice 2014-32 urges trustees to tell beneficiaries so. But see my blogposts “Ignorance Is Bliss?” 11/10/11 and “A Long Dry Spell”, 11/22/11. Echoing my advice from the latter blogpost,  if I were counsel to a trustee, I’d tell the client not to give any advice of any kind to beneficiaries, but have them sign an acknowledgment in blood that they relied on independent tax counsel of their sole choice and retention at their sole cost and expense.

If the client’s advice is right they gain nothing, and if wrong they get sued.

So roll your own while you can.