That is, it’s great if you’re in DC Circuit, the land of the Loving. The assault on IRS’ long-arm approach to roping in tax practitioners from the breaking of dawn to the fall of eventide goes on apace, the latest being the partial collapse of the §10.27 barrier to contingent fees.

You’ll recall the rule: “(b) Contingent fees — (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (b)(2), (3), and (4) of this section, a practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection with any matter before the Internal Revenue Service.

(2) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection with the Service’s examination of, or challenge to —

(i) An original tax return; or

(ii) An amended return or claim for refund or credit where the amended return or claim for refund or credit was filed within 120 days of the taxpayer receiving a written notice of the examination of, or a written challenge to the original tax return.

(3) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection with a claim for credit or refund filed solely in connection with the determination of statutory interest or penalties assessed by the Internal Revenue Service.

(4) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection with any judicial proceeding arising under the Internal Revenue Code.” 31 CFR 10.27(b).

Well, Gerald Lee Ridgely, Jr., CPA, charged a contingent fee in connection with filing an “Ordinary Refund Claim”, and Jake Lew and the 1111 Constitution Avenue gang landed on Gerry Lee with both feet.

But Judge Cooper of USDCDC, home of Loving, wasn’t buying it.

Read all about it in Gerald Lee Ridgely, Jr., v. Jacob Lew, et al., Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00565 (CRC), filed 7/16/14. And thanks to Christopher S. Rizek, Esq., for bringing this to my attention.

Judge Cooper is a man of few words. “ORDERED that Defendants lack statutory authority to promulgate or enforce the restrictions on contingent fee arrangements, as delineated in 31 C.F.R. § 10.27, with respect to the preparation and filing of Ordinary Refund Claims, where ‘preparation and filing’ precedes the inception of any examination or adjudication of the refund claim by the IRS and any formal legal representation on the part of the practitioner….” Order, p. 1.

Summary judgment to Gerry Lee.

Bottom line- until there is something adversarial or controverted, no one is representing anyone before the IRS by just filing a form, and so Circular 230 and its numerous strictures are off the table.

What is a “government”? Usually we’d answer that it’s an organized group, based in a specific geographical area, with command-and-control powers over all therein. But how about a multinational group, encompassing geography ostensibly governed by existing governments that have been there for years?

That’s the €20 million question, leading off Vol. 143 T. C., in Guardian Industries Corp., 143 T. C. 1, filed 7/17/14, with Judge Lauber writing for a unanimous Court.

Guardian admits it was a “little black sheep that has gone astray”, as Rudy Kipling would have it, entering into a price-fixing deal as regards its sales of “…float glass, fabricated-glass products, fiberglass insulation, and other building materials to customers in Europe and elsewhere.” 143 T. C. 1, at p. 11.

The Commission of the European Community, the executive arm of the European Union, has first whack at suspected price-fixers by treaty and executive order (or equivalent), and local regimes are supposed to defer to the Lord High Executioner, a/k/a the Commission.

But is the Commission a “government”, as that term is defined in Section 162(f), which bars deducting the USD$30 million or so that Guardian claimed was the dollar value of the price-fixing claim they paid, namely, the aforesaid €20 million.

“Respondent agrees that the Commission is neither ‘[t]he government of a foreign country’ nor ‘[a] political subdivision’ thereof. Accordingly, the question for decision is whether the Commission is an ‘entity serving as an agency or instrumentality’ of ‘[t]he government of a foreign country’ within the meaning of this regulation. The parties have not brought to our attention, and we have not discovered, any prior authority that addresses this question directly.” 143 T. C. 1, at p. 14. (Footnotes omitted, but Judge Lauber tells IRS to butt out; he can figure the answer without looking at IRS’ view of its regulations).

Like the New York/New Jersey Port Authority, lately in the news as a lane-closer-fixer on the George Washington Bridge, and which is an instrumentality of two governments, the Commission is not out as an instrumentality merely because it serves more than one government. So Judge Lauber uses Second Circuit learning, because, even though Guardian is a Michigan corporation, Sixth Circuit apparently hasn’t dealt with this yet.

Guardian didn’t concede that the payment was a “fine or penalty”, but wasn’t going to fight it out in Tax Court.

Judge Lauber diligently parses the terms “agency” or “instrumentality” (Guardian claims it means “subordinate”, but Judge Lauber finds five varieties of ambiguity in those terms). And the Commission need not exercise every governmental function to be recognized as an agency or instrumentality; it is enough that it exercises an essential function, and enforcing anti-monopolies laws certainly fit the bill.

“When sovereign states enter into a treaty to accomplish shared goals, it is rare that any signatory nation exercises unilateral control over the entities thus created. Typically, signatories voluntarily restrict their authority to act unilaterally, as the EC member states have done, in favor of a collective regulatory scheme that they believe will serve their long-term interests. The fact that the Commission is not subordinate to, or subject to the control of, any individual member state thus has little relevance in deciding whether it is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the member states collectively.” 143 T. C. 1, at p. 36.

And if the usual five-point test for governmental agency is applied, the Commission gets three out of five easily. The five are : (1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign country]; and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law. See 143 T. C. 1, at p. 42.

Sorry, Guardian, you’re out of commission.

Yes, I know the World Cup is over. And so, I presume, does that Obliging Judge David Gustafson. But Judge Gustafson has a penalty kick anyway, and he gives it in favor of one who made a guest appearance on this blog, Lawrence G. Graev & Lorna Graev, Docket No. 30638-08, filed 7/16/14.

And yes, this is another order that should have been a designated hitter, but wasn’t. This is what keeps me up at night, digging this stuff out.

On background, check out my blogpost “Money Back Guarantee”, 6/24/13. Briefly, Larry and Lorna had a high-priced Manhattan MacMansion, whereupon they placed a façade easement, which blew up to the extent of a 40% overvaluation chop.

It’s who does the chopping that causes Judge Gustafson to kick.

“Petitioners assert that respondent [IRS] failed to comply with the requirement of section 6751(b)(1) that ‘the initial determination of such [penalty] assessment [must be] * * * personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination’.” Order, at p. 1.

Responses and counter-responses flew back and forth, but Judge Gustafson still isn’t satisfied.

“The statutory notice of deficiency (“SNOD”) that underlies this case … was signed by a ‘Territory Manager’ in the IRS’s “Small Business and Self-Employed” (‘SBSE’) division. In that SNOD respondent determined gross valuation misstatement penalties pursuant to section 6662(h) and asserted, in the alternative, that petitioners are liable for section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties. It appears that respondent’s position is that, for purposes of section 6751(b)(1), ‘the individual’ who made ‘the initial determination’ of the alternative section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties is attorney X, of the Office of Chief Counsel–and not the Revenue Agent originally assigned to this case, Mr. Y (or any another individual in Exam or the Technical Services Unit)–and that X’s immediate supervisor approved his determination in compliance with section 6751(b). We understand respondent’s contention to be not that X simply advised or recommended the penalty to IRS examination personnel who then made the determination (since advising and recommending are evidently not subject to section 6751(b)), but rather that X was ‘the individual’ who made ‘the initial determination’. However, the document asserting that penalty determination is not a pleading filed in this suit by Chief Counsel (e.g., an answer or amended answer that newly pleads an alternative penalty), but is instead the original SNOD issued by SBSE.” Order, at pp. 1-2. (Names omitted).

Now Delegation Order 4-8 (Internal Revenue Manual pt. 1.2.43.9 (Sept. 4, 2012) lets SBSE Territory Managers sign SNODs, but Office of Chief Counsel is not among the blessed communion, fellowship divine, so empowered.

So Judge Gustafson wonders “If, in fact, it was X who made ‘the initial determination of such [sec. 6662(a) penalty] assessment’, then it would seem that there must be some delegation of authority to Chief Counsel to make such a determination. The undersigned judge is unaware of any other delegation to Chief Counsel of the authority to determine a penalty liability in an [sic] SNOD; and respondent has not yet identified a relevant delegation of authority that would enable a Chief Counsel attorney to be ‘the individual’ who makes such a determination.” Order, at p. 2. (Name omitted).

So Judge Gustafson wants IRS to find the delegation.

Note this is not the old tax protester dodge that the SNOD wasn’t signed by the Secretary or his delegate. The SNOD isn’t at issue here, it’s who determined, rather than advised or recommended, to assert the penalty set forth in the SNOD. And there’s a specific statutory provision on that point.

A Taishoff “good job” to petitioners’ counsel.

No, not the USC fight song, which many of us have heard booming from the television surround-sound, amidst popcorn, peanuts, nachos et hoc genus omne, as the football went sailing through the uprights.

No, this is the apparently unending story of James (“Little Jim”) Haber, Tax Court perennial and master immunologist, this time in a continuation of Humboldt-Shelby Holding Corporation and Subsidiaries, Docket No. 25936-07, filed 7/16/17.

Little Jim wants a Rule 161 reconsideration, and Rule 162 vacation, claiming Judge Goeke didn’t properly Golsenize his previous opinion. What previous opinion, you ask? Well, check out my blogpost “Immunology”, 3/18/14, and enlightenment will be yours, at no extra cost.

Little Jim claims that if his deal could have made money (and everyone agrees it could have yielded a pittance, provided one disregards the fees Little Jim paid to acquire this bargain), game over, and economic substance, sham and all that nastiness are off the table.

Unhappily, the case Little Jim relies on is a broken reed.

First, the obligatory bow to Golsen v. Com’r, 54 T. C. 742, at p. 757 (1970). Tax Court must follow controlling Circuit Court of Appeals precedent.

Here, it’s our own Second Circuit, up the street from me at Foley Square. And Second Circuit has two prongs, rather than unitary, when dissecting the economics of a deal. First, could it make a profit? Judge Goeke agrees it could, if he left out the acquisition fees aforesaid, but whether he counts the fees or not, mox nix (as we say).

“However, the effect of that finding [that Little Jim might have made maybe a few bucks] was tempered by the significant tax savings the transaction was sure to generate. Our analysis was consistent with the Second Circuit’s economic substance approach. Although the Second Circuit has not before compared a transaction’s tax benefits to its profit potential, it has indicated that all facts and circumstances are relevant in determining whether a transaction has economic substance. The disparity between the guaranteed tax savings and the potential profit in this case was a relevant fact and convinced us that petitioner engaged in the transaction solely for tax reasons.” Order, at pp. 2-3. (Citations omitted).

Little Jim does have one last down, and he throws the usual “Hail Mary”.

Little Jim has a 1991 Second Circuit case called Gilman where the Court only analyzed whether the deal could make a profit, however minimal.

OK, says Judge Goeke, but “(T)he Second Circuit held that the transaction in Gilman presented no reasonable opportunity for profit. Therefore, the court did not have to consider whether, if it did, the profit was sufficient to give the transaction economic substance. The Gilman court’s analysis did not foreclose our consideration of additional facts once we determined petitioner’s transaction had profit potential. The Second Circuit has not decided an economic substance case under such circumstances, so the Golsen rule did not prevent us from looking to cases in other jurisdictions for guidance. Respondent’s notices of objection to these motions further expound on this matter, and we agree in whole with their analysis.” Order, at p. 3.

Wanna bet that Second Circuit will get the chance to decide “an economic substance case under such circumstances”, Judge, if Little Jim has a shot at getting there?

Little Jim may or may not have gone to USC, but he’s sure singing their fight song.

Now I’ve got as bone to pick with Judge Goeke, and it’s a tale I’ve told before. Specifically, I’ve told it in my blogpost “And Waste Its Sweetness On The Desert Air”, 5/8/14. To quote me quoting Tommy Grey, “But too many Judges are wont to issue orders to fortune and to fame unknown. And I’ve blogged these.” Op. cit., as my high-priced colleagues would say.

Have I ever. This Order has some important learning in it. But Judge Goeke hasn’t designated it. It’s sitting, in the words of Bartolomeo Vanzetti, “unknown, unmarked, a failure,” amidst six pages of soul-destroying banalities.

Today, 7/16/14, we have three small-claimers with unsupplied 433-As or missing documentation, and three designated hitters with absolutely nothing new in any of them. And we have this gem from Judge Goeke, that alone is worthy of my time, effort, and wordprocessor.

I know the judicial mill has little grist to spare for us bloggers. But gee, Judge Goeke, cut me a wee bit slack, huh? If it’s worth three pages, it should be worth a DH.

UPDATE

I got so wound-up with Judge Goeke’s modesty that I plumb forgot the partitive genitive. Should be “But gee, Judge Goeke, cut me a wee bit of slack, huh?”

My beloved Aunt Augusta presented me, some sixty years ago, with one of the myriad editions of Ebenezer Cobham Brewer’s classic Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. I have it still, and the 14th edition as well. They’ve been standbys and go-tos again and again, and this time old E. Cobham (as he was known to his friends) has a lesson for an AO at Appeals.

E. Cobham defined the English folk song “The Song The Old Cow Died On” as “Advice instead of relief; remonstrance instead of help.”

And Judge Haines sings the refrain (“consider, good cow, consider”) to Appeals in Synergy Environmental, Inc,.2014 T. C. Memo. 140, filed 7/15/14.

Synergy was a corporation whose philosophy was, apparently, “go for broke”, and they did. Synergy had about four years’ worth of unpaid tax, for which they offered $600 as an OIC, claiming they were stone cold dead.

IRS kicked the OIC, Synergy did nothing, but about a year later IRS laid a NFTL on Synergy. Synergy appealed the kicked OIC (then a year old), but Appeals said “no, and here’s a NOD”. Synergy petitions.

The NOD said “[b]ecause the Offer in Compromise was filed … a year earlier than the Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing for the filed federal tax lien any decision on the Offer in Compromise is covered under an earlier, separate work unit.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 140, at pp. 5-6.

Maybe so, but Judge Haines politely inquires “so what?”

“This statement does not find or decide anything with respect to the appropriateness of the …OIC. Hence, the determination does not contain all the statements required by section 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E8, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

“Additionally, the statement indicates that AO X did not consider petitioner’s … OIC as a collection alternative in making his determination pursuant to section 6320. That the … OIC was concurrently being considered in a separate appeal did not obviate the need to consider the … OIC in the section 6320 hearing. See secs. 6320(c), 6330(c)(2), (3), and (4). We think it is necessary to remand this case to Appeals for a supplemental hearing.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 140, at p. 6. (Name and footnotes omitted).

One of the omitted footnotes distinguishes Synergy from an earlier case, where an OIC had been the subject of a decided appeal. Here the OIC had never been previously disposed of by Appeals.

So Synergy gets an interesting second swing at the baseball.

And Appeals should heed the old song: “Consider, good cow, consider”.

No, not another “thing of beauty”, unlike my blogpost “A Thing of Beauty – Accept No Substitutes”, 1/28/13. This time it’s an accountant trying to use a Form 1045 refund request in place of a petition, and it doesn’t work.

STJ Daniel A. (“Yuda”) Guy has the bad news for James William Harrison, 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 69, filed 7/14/14.

J.W. claims his restaurant, A Little Asia, yielded not-so-little losses that would have resulted in no tax due, and not the $4200 that the SNOD says he owes.

But he never petitioned the SNOD. Instead, his accountant sent in the Form 1045 and asked TAS to expedite it. So J.W. petitioned the NOD he got from Appeals.

He gave the Account Appeals Resolution Specialist some info, so she put him into CNC (currently not collectible) status.

But J.W.’s claim that IRS should have dealt with his Form 1045 before Appeals goes nowhere.

Judge Yuda: “Petitioner asserts that the IRS should not be permitted to proceed with collection without first processing the Form 1045 or the amended tax return that he submitted for 2009. Petitioner’s argument amounts to a back door challenge to the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability for 2009 within the meaning of section 6330(c)(2)(B). However, as discussed above, petitioner admits that he received the notice of deficiency for 2009 but decided not to file a petition for redetermination with the Court. Consistent with section 6330(c)(2)(B), the Appeals Office correctly determined that petitioner is not permitted to challenge the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability for 2009 in this action. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 611.

“Even assuming for the sake of argument that we could consider petitioner’s complaint that the IRS failed to process his Form 1045 and related amended returns, we would not overturn the Appeals Office determination in this case. In short, petitioner’s submission of Form 1045 to the IRS claiming a tentative refund for 2009 did not preclude respondent from issuing a notice of deficiency to him for that year. See Zarnow v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 213, 215 (1967) (failure to act on a Form 1045 within the 90-day period prescribed in section 6411(b) does not prevent the Commissioner from determining a deficiency for that year).” 2014 T. C. Sum. Op. 69, at pp. 8-9.

And the AARS took J.W.’s story at face value, and put him in CNC. No abuse of discretion here.

Takeaway- Nothing substitutes for a petition, even if it’s just a letter, or even a check (see my blogpost “Show Me The Money”, 11/13/13).

See my blogpost “The Phone Call”, 4/15/14. The unhappy incident there discussed can manifest itself in ways other than a Phone Call.

Case in point: Brent T. Wiedbusch & Christina Wiedbusch, Docket No. 15257-13, filed 7/14/14.

Brent’s and Chris’ counsel, whom I’ll call Vandy, wants to bail. He claimed last month that Brent and Chris told him they wanted to go it alone. However, Judge Gale wanted to be sure, so he had Vandy file a supplement to his Motion to Withdraw, and, receiving same, invited Brent and Chris to dish thereupon.

And they do: “…they dispute some assertions in [Vandy’s] Supplement and contend that they were not adequately informed concerning various aspects of their representation in this case.” Order, at p. 1.

Judge Gale, wanting to make absolutely sure he misses nothing, “…has concluded that [Vandy] should be afforded an opportunity to respond to the assertions concerning petitioners’ representation in the Response, including their assertion that the Petition in this case was filed without their knowledge of, or consent to, its contents.” Order, at p. 1.

So Vandy will get his chance at a riposte. Should be interesting.

Takeaway for counsel- Document everything. Repeat, document everything.

See my blogpost “Leftovers”, 3/19/14. I thought that blogpost had faded into obscurity, when the following e-mail arrived today, 7/14/14.

I replied to the sender that I would post the text of the e-mail in its entirety. I omit only the sender’s e-mail address.

Here it is:

“Name: Teresa Sanak Comment: I would like you to remove the post about me dated in March of this year. Your fact’s are not correct and can cause personal harm to me. This is the post regarding The Bogart’s. These are the incorrect facts. 1)The judge added and additional $10,000.00 to the judgment for their time and trouble, judgment amount incorrect. 2) I repaid over $7,000.00 to the Bogart’s prior to going the prison. 3) I have made my monthly, court ordered restriction payment to them since I was released.”

You Know the Rest

Repeating a comment from my blogpost “No Benefits, No Burdens, No Deduction”, 12/9/13, I quote Oscar Wilde: “No good deed goes unpunished.”

In my abovecited blogpost, Lourdes Puente got the message. This time, Judge Chiechi has the message for Ronald R. Dickenson and Shirley F. Dickenson, 2014 T. C. Memo. 136, filed 7/10/14. Shirley F. is a non-participant, but she gets the hit along with Ron.

Ron is a big-hearted consultant who routinely makes loans to his employees, he says, but he never bothers with notes, repayment schedules, interest or events of default. He claims he hired back a former employee, ol’ Terry, and fronted ol’ Terry $33K to tide him over while he moved back to Ron’s bailiwick.

Ron sent ol’ Terry a billet doux which stated, in pertinent part as my high-billing colleagues like to say: “Terry… I want to tell you once again, I am quite excited to get you over here and get our operation started together. * * *From my initial marketing efforts, you can fulfill the areas I cannot achieve by myself * * *. Anyway, I want to reiterate again my commitment to you financially, and what I would expect from you in paying me back. I am not going to prepare a note, or any form of contract, because I trust you to be honest about this matter, just like all of the other people I have loaned money.

“Anyway, I agree to loan you money to get settled in over here, and help you out financially as long as I see our new company is working, and you are going to work as hard as you did for me the last time we worked together.” 2014 T. C. Memo. 136, at p. 4.

You can guess the rest. Ol’ Terry rips off Ron (he claims), and absquatulates. Ron claims a business bad debt, but sued ol’ Terry and the case wasn’t concluded (Ron lost, of course) for two years after the year at issue, when he claimed the deduction.

There’s no unconditional obligation to repay, none of the usual indicia of a loan (note, interest, collateral, fixed repayment schedule), and the ability of the “borrower” to repay is dubious in this case. Ron himself testified that ol’ Terry was up against it when Ron sent him the $33K.

Ron was pro se, of course, and the trial record shows nothing that would indicate either a business, or even a non-business, bad debt.

The story is in a footnote, as Tax Court Judges tend to be ex-law review types, of whom a bona fide occupational qualification is the worship of footnotes.

Here it is: “Assuming arguendo that Mr. Dickinson had satisfied his burden of establishing that the … funds in question constituted loans by him to [ol’ Terry] and thus bona fide debts for purposes of sec. 166, on the basis of the record before us, we would find that he has failed to carry his burden of establishing that those alleged bad debts constitute bad debts that are not nonbusiness bad debts. See sec. 166(d); sec. 1.166-5(b), Income Tax Regs. In this connection, Mr. Dickinson has failed to show that the alleged bad debts were created or acquired in connection with a trade or business of his or that the losses from the worthlessness of the alleged bad debts were incurred in a trade or business of his. See sec. 166(d); sec. 1.166-5(b), Income Tax Regs.

“In addition, assuming arguendo that Mr. Dickinson had satisfied his burden of establishing that the … funds in question constituted loans by him to [ol’ Terry] and thus bona fide debts that are not nonbusiness bad debts, on the basis of the record before us, we would find that he has failed to carry his burden of establishing that those alleged nonbusiness bad debts became either wholly or partially worthless in taxable year 2007, the year for which petitioners claimed the deduction for those alleged business bad debts. In this connection, Mr. Dickinson has failed to show any identifiable events that could have formed the basis for his having reasonable grounds as of the end of 2007 for his abandoning any hope of recovering the …  funds in question. In fact, the record establishes that Mr. Dickinson continued … to prosecute the Dickinson lawsuit in order to recover those funds until the Marion Circuit Court dismissed that lawsuit….” 2014 Tc. Memo. 136, at p. 15, footnote 7. (Citation omitted).

One wonders if Ron had an attorney for the Marion County lawsuit. He needed one for this case, if for no other reason that to warn him.

It’s a real dull day at Tax Court, 7/9/14: no opinions, no designated hitters, not even an Order with a funny typo. So I was stumped for a blogpost, and felt that my fans, however few may be left, would have to do without a Taishoff disquisition.

All is not lost, pals. A previous poster-person may be going to knock on the doors of the Supremes.

Remember bookish Mike Oros? No? Check out my blogpost “I Could Write a Book”, 1/5/12, wherein I tell how bookish Mike’s attempt to sell his literary endeavors as a trade or business fell short of Judge Vasquez’s approbation.

Not dismayed, bookish Mike went off to Ninth Circuit, stipulating with IRS that both they and bookish Mike would be bound by whatever Ninth Circuit did with bookish Mike’s round-the-world literary extravaganza.

Back in December 2013, in a not-for-nuthin’ memo under Docket No. 12-71071, filed 12/13/13, the Ninth Circuit blew off bookish Mike, finding “(T)ax Court did not clearly err” in blowing off  bookish Mike as aforesaid, and “(W)e reject Oros’s contentions regarding conduct by Internal Revenue Service officials because it is irrelevant to the Tax Court’s determination.” Memo. at p. 2.

Still, apparently the Ninth Circuit held off on the blow-off from December, 2013, until June 5, 2014, stating in its mandate to Tax Court that same would take effect from that date.

So STJ Armen, The Judge With a Heart, gets bookish Mike’s case back from the Circuit.

But IRS, filing a status report, throws this in: “Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R.13, petitioner must file a petition for a writ of certiorari by September 3, 2014.” Order, Docket No. 19223-11S, filed 7/9/14.

Bookish Mike files no report, so STJ Armen presumes Mike agrees.

Think Mike will petition the Supremes? Given the track record of petitions from unanimous Circuit Court affirmances of Tax Court opinions in pro se petitioners’ cases, I suggest taking the snowball.