The Girl of My Dreams loses some of her genteel demeanor when I scream the phrase first above written at the head hereof (as my much-better-bred colleagues would say) at the television screen. The scene is Hockey Night in This Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America, and our orange-and-blue clad heroes from another outlying island are having their clichés handed to them by their opponents who swarm the defensive zone.

Coach Pat should really have his crew study Judges Nega and Copeland. They clear the puck with consummate skill and ease.

First, Judge Joseph Nega. Donato DiPasquale, Docket No. 11477-23L, filed 12/10/25, claims his restitution payments, though sufficient to erase the $435K of restitution he owed when he went down for Section 7202 criminal failure to collect and pay, were misapplied and he wants to contest liability and fight over the payments.

IRS, having messed up by omitting a bunch quarters (hi, Judge Holmes) from the administrative record, claims mootness for what they did include and summary J for what they didn’t.

“Petitioner opposes respondent’s Mootness Motion, contending that a dismissal for mootness of these tax periods would harm petitioner’s ability to dispute the proper crediting of payments that petitioner has made. Petitioner bases this argument on a ‘tax analysis’ document that purports to show that the civil (not restitution-based) tax liability for some of the same periods is not yet paid and is therefore not moot.” Order, at p. 4.

No use; Don can’t wildcard in income tax liability here. He admits restitution was shown on IRS’ books as paid. Zuch does the rest; if IRS need neither lien nor levy because everything paid, Tax Court has no jurisdiction.

It took Judge Nega eight (count ’em, eight) pages to send off Don. Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland needs only five (count ’em five) to send Marie Addoo, Docket No. 10138-23L, filed 12/10/25, back to Appeals, where she does not want to go.

Marie was fighting about five (count ’em, five) years of deficiency, but was only timely with her Letter 12153 for one of them. She didn’t put in any evidence at Appeals, but “…her counsel has informally indicated to the Court that Ms. Addoo believes Appeals (1) didn’t give her enough time to prepare for the first CDP hearing, (2) closed her case to (sic) quickly, (3) will not fairly evaluate her case, so she wants the Court to decide her case rather than Appeals.” Order, at p. 3.

Judge Tex Copeland says the Court will listen to the parties. If both agree, sure, remand. Dissenters’ objections are taken seriously, to be sure. But if remand is necessary or productive, back they go.

“Other factors might include: (1) the duration of the administrative proceedings to date; (2) the length of the pendency of the lawsuit; (3) any fault on the part of the party moving for remand; (4) whether remand can remedy the defects the first time around;  (5) whether remand would be futile because, even though the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might’ve abused its discretion, the only arguments that petitioners presented to this Court were based on legal propositions which we have previously rejected; and (6) whether there has been a material change in the law, , or a material change in the facts since the final determination.” Order, at pp. 3-4. (Internal citations omitted).

Remand gives Marie and counsel everything they could want.

“A remand will be able to remedy defects Ms. Addoo faced the first time around: She can have additional time to gather her financial information in order to demonstrate that she qualifies for currently-not-collectible status due to financial hardship, and she can further explain why she may qualify for a  reasonable cause exception to her penalties. Further, collection action will be stayed pending the remand and this Court will retain jurisdiction and oversight of the case during the remand requiring periodic status reports. If a resolution is not achieved by remand, Ms. Addoo will still have the ability to argue her case before this Court after the relevant supplemental determination is issued by Appeals.

“Finally, we note that the Notice of Determination stated that Ms. Addoo did not dispute her liability. This is untrue. In her request for a CDP hearing, Ms. Addoo wrote, ‘Remove penalty,’ and she gave a detailed explanation for why she believed she was not liable for the penalties because she had reasonable cause for her failure to pay. Contesting penalties is contesting the liability.  Appeals should consider Ms. Addoo’s reasonable cause arguments in her supplemental hearing.” Order, at p. 4. (Internal citation omitted).

Remand is not futile. Play goes on in the other end. Peace is restored.

Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS =The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan is running the biggest sealing expedition south of an Arctic icefloe in Nat S. Harty & April D. Harty, Docket No. 23354-21, filed 12/9/25. And of course it’s S. Crow Capital Corporation who’s making the running.

There are three (count ’em, three) separate orders. IRS moved to seal a stack documents (hi, Judge Holmes) and, as there are two unconsolidated cases here, it takes two of the orders to deal with IRS’ wishlist. And those two depend upon footnote 2 in Order No. 3.

Said footnote says the stuff will remain sealed until trial begins next week in the City of the Angels (and National Guard).

In the meantime, the Crows lose their motion to seal everything on their shopping list until 9 Cir rules. Taishoff says that sounds like a Section 7482 interlocutory. And if this whole story seems familiar, see my blogpost “Stone the Crows!” 12/2/25.

Ex-Ch J TBS runs the checklist.

“The following four factors are considered when evaluating whether to grant temporary relief pending an appeal: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted).

It’s a bad lie for the Crows’ trusty attorneys. They do make out that current publicity could irreparably harm the Crows, should they prevail at trail. But they can’t show they have a slam dunk case (what they want sealed is transactional, and 9 Cir has no controlling precedent);  the parties have prepared for trial, got their experts lined up and holding short, pretrial briefs at the ready; the need to clear the courtroom while sealed stuff was discussed would seriously delay trial; and the Crows’ trusty attorneys haven’t shown the public interest lies with their side.

No Marxism, either Karl nor Groucho, rather Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland’s unwrapping of a cost-of-goods-sold reduction to gross revenue of a pioneering VoIPer emerging from Chapter XI. The VoIPer claimed it was providing “information services,” not long distance telephony, so lowballed AT&T and Verizon when tying into their longlines. This came unglued when Big Telecom woke up to the con, hence the Ch XI-induced selloff of its assets to Andre Temnorod and Brianna Temnorod, et al., T. C. Memo. 2025-127, filed 12/8/25.

Andre and the als expensed the lot as COGS, but IRS said “nyet.” Judge Tex Copeland agrees.

“Addressing cost of goods sold first, it is clear from the record that the [VoIPer] was in the business of providing telecommunication services to customers, and not in the business of creating or selling any material products. And as noted above, cost of goods sold is linked to mining, manufacturing, or merchandising products and not applicable in services industries. Thus, we cannot make the leap that petitioners seem to request, that [VoIPer] is entitled to a reduction in gross income for cost of goods sold.” T. C. Memo. 2025-127, at p.; 18. (Citation omitted).

But maybe so might could be that the payments to Big Telecom were Section 162 business, to settle out the lawsuits for the “information services” shortchanging.

Except.

The Asset Purchase Agreement on which the Bankruptcy Court signed off included not only the assets, but assumption of liabilities and waiver of unsecured claims. All this extra baggage means a sale of capital assets. And that invokes Danielson. And who might Danielson be, you ask. See my blogpost RTFC, 3/9/16. You’re stuck with what your contract says.

Gotta give Andre and the als a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.”

I may be deceiving myself, and the truth may not be in me. For sure, it won’t be the first time in this my blog (and elsewhere). But a tiny inkling that not only had I got it right last week in my blogpost “‘Justified?’ – I’ll Say!” 12/5/25, but that someone actually read that blogpost arose as I skimmed Maria Gritsak, Docket No. 13840-25, filed 12/8/25.

It’s the usual months-late SND petition, where Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda trots out the standard-issue Section 6213(a) Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders boilerplate about 90 days except in 2 Cir, 3 Cir and 6 Cir.

“This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the  jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2017), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-188; Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C.126, 130 n.4 (2022) (collecting cases); see also Sanders v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 112,119–20 (2023) (holding that the Court will continue treating the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable to jurisdictions outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024).” Order, at p. 1.

What’s missing from this picture?

If you answered Pugsley, go to the head of the class.

A couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes, this one’s for you) I noted that Judge Holmes was justified in his famous Oakbrook dissent; see my blogpost “Luke 18:14,” 12/1/25. Now he’s again justified.

I failed to notice the now-boilerplate review of the CCA walkback of the Section 6213(a) jurisdictional barrier in October last; see my blogpost “United States Postmark,” 10/20/25. I routinely state I don’t follow the CCAs. I trust all readers of my blog are sufficiently hip to Shepardize any case they are going to cite; anyone who doesn’t know what “Shepardize” means had best not write memoranda of law until they learn and do likewise.

And once I start following CCAs routinely, readers will expect updates on all the cases I blog, which is far above my poor power to add or detract. The trade press and blogosphere do that better.

Howbeit, solely by way of illustration and example of the aforementioned CCA walkback,  Christopher Darrell Lewis, Docket No. 12896-25, filed 12/5/25, gets tossed because he petitions from FL, 11 Cir, where none of Oquendo, Buller, or Culp bring the Supremes’ Boechler discipline.

But again Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes foresaw this compartmentalization. Dissenting in Graev, 149 T. C. 23, eight (count ’em, eight) years ago this month, he suggested Tax Court leave extending Section 6751(b) Boss Hossery to the CCAs, rather than extending it in one Hamiltonian shot, as the majority did. See my blogpost “Stir, Baby, Stir – That Silt!” 12/20/17.

Sub silentio, Tax Court bench followed Judge Holmes’ lead post-Boechler, defiantly citing Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders.  Where they are constrained by Supreme discipline, they sabotage the contrarian CCAs by invoking the strictures of equitable tolling.

In Chris’ case, Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda again calmly notes to Oquendo, Buller, and Culp, but carries on.

Note the boilerplate, Order, at p. 1, cites Pugsley as an 11 Cir affirmation of Section 6213(a)’s jurisdictionality, but Taishoff says that case was decided pre-Boechler. Moreover, if you read Pugsley, it mentions Section 6213(a) but says nothing about its jurisdictional validity, if any. The case goes off on last-known-address (but petitioner got the SND in time to petition per Section 6213(a), so no hurt, no foul) and Section 7502 mailed-is-filed, as petitioner used a PDF, not USPS.

And the final straw: Though DOJ cited Pugsley at p. 14 in their losing brief before the Supremes in Boechler, the Supremes didn’t even mention it in the Boechler opinion.

Wherefore I wouldn’t bet the latte money that undisciplined Pugsley is still good Section 6213(a) Sun Belt law. But we’ll let 11 Cir decide. If Chris can’t appeal, maybe someone else can.

And again Judge Holmes goes down justified.

Michael D. Brown, T. C. Memo. 2025-126, filed 12/4/25, irrepressible, claims he now really lives in TX, no longer in NV when 9 Cir. shot down his appeal from 158 T. C. 9, filed 6/23/22, because IRS held his OIC for 27 months, making it automatically accepted per Section 7122(f). You’ll find the backstory in my blogpost “High-Flying Blogfodder,” of even date therewith, as my expensive colleagues would say.

Mike argues collateral estoppel doesn’t apply when he makes the same argument now.

Negatory, says Judge Morrison.

“The sole remaining issue is whether ‘petitioner’s offer in compromise was accepted by operation of I.R.C. § 7122(f).’ We agree with respondent that the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187, has resolved the identical issue.  Petitioner has provided no compelling reason to depart from\ that precedent. We therefore hold that the April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise was not accepted by operation of section 7122(f). Our holding does not depend on any disputed facts.” T. C. Memo. 2025-126, at p. 6. (Citation omitted).

But IRS doesn’t get summary J. If Mike wants to appeal this decision, where does he go? TX is 5 Cir, NV is 9 Cir. So let the parties argue where Mike resided when he petitioned.

Fasten your seatbelts; the flight continues.

No, not an abbreviated revival of the 1952 George Axelrod play. Judge David Gustafson has to deal with an ongoing OIC that ends the CDP in All Is Well Homecare Services, LLC, Docket No. 21210-19L, filed 12/4/25. Here’s the end of the saga I only partly followed.

Judge David Gustafson has the whole nine yards, Order, at page 1, footnote 1. But now, having bought AIW’s OIC for everything the lien and levy covered, IRS moves to dismiss as moot.

Except.

The OIC states that if AIW fails to file or pay, or otherwise breaches the IRC during the five (count ’em, five) tax years following acceptance of the OIC, IRS can revoke the cancelation of the NFTL, levy, or sue for anything from a single missed payment to all the back tax debt, less any payments made. Order, at p. 2.

And AIW claims IRS still owes them an $88K overpayment from credits applied to reduce past debt, Order, at p. 4.

So maybe this case isn’t moot.

Except.

Judge Gustafson says whatever the Supremes said in Zuch, there’s nothing more to discuss. All y’all will recall Jennifer Zuch was fighting over whether she owed IRS the money that they took when they applied her credits to the alleged debt. See my blogpost “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 12/12/16. All a CDP decides is whether a lien or levy is sustained. But like the famous grin without a cat, if no debt, then no lien and no levy, and nothing for Tax Court to decide.

AIW wants Tax Court to supervise the next five (count ’em, five) years because there might be a dispute, and because there is a current dispute about the $88K. No, says Judge David Gustafson. Fight out the $88K as a refund case in USDC or USCFC.

If AIW wants Tax Court to adjudicate the $88K dispute, which has nothing to do with lien or levy, that would be an advisory opinion, falling foul of Article III jurisdictional limits.

So this case is moot, as there’s no more relief pore l’il ol’ Tax Court can give. So this case is moot.

While this my blog hardly reaches the exalted stature of President Theodore Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” it does provide a dandy soapbox, even now when soapboxes have been superseded by electrons. So Alex Golubitsky, Docket No. 11989-22, filed 12/3/25, and his trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Third, give me an opportunity for a modest yelp.

IRS claimed nonfiling and nonpayment add-ons on top of a $16K deficiency. Alex riposted that he had filed and paid VIBIR. Maybe this was a “cover over” that never broke cover. See my blogpost “Another Non-Virgin,” 1/30/18, for how VIBIR interfaces with IRS.

Alex made a Section 7430(g) qualified offer of $6782 plus interes;, IRS ultimately settled for $2151 (interest not stated, but not waived).

Third sought legals and admins. IRS agreed fees were reasonable, Alex didn’t stall, he did exhaust administrative remedies, and met net worth cutoff.

Except.

IRS settled.

STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel: “Petitioner provides no argument about prevailing with respect to the amount in controversy or with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i). Instead, he argues only that he is entitled to recover costs under the second option, the ‘qualified offer rule.’ See § 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g). Specifically, petitioner writes that the Government did not accept [Alex’s] offer, which results in Petitioner being the ‘prevailing party’ within the meaning of Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(i).” Order, at p. 2.

Except.

IRS settled (in case anybody missed it the first time).

“But even where the taxpayer makes a qualified offer under section 7430(g), the qualified offer rule does not apply to “any judgment issued pursuant to a settlement.” 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I).” Order, at p. 3. (Citation omitted). Alex and Third lose.

Taishoff says once again, we get a statute that aims squarely at reducing unnecessary, vexatious, and burdensome litigation, which causes the exactly opposite result.

If Alex and Third could not get legal and admins by making a qualified offer and then settling the case, but could get legals and admins by insisting upon an unnecessary, vexatious, and burdensome trial and settling on the courthouse steps, there is a positive incentive for insisting on trial. And to IRS’ objection that petitioner thereby unreasonably protracts proceedings, the answer is that the statute itself makes qualified offer settlements uneconomic. This explicit Congressional enactment requires threatened, or actual, litigation to make an injured party whole.

Congress can correct this ridiculous situation. Yeah, right.

Merriam-Webster, the ultimate chaw-source, says the phrase first hereinabove written at the head hereof (as my deliberating-the-tip-amount on their two Grey Goose Gibson lunch check colleagues would say), opines said phrase is “British, old-fashioned,” but C. Crow Collateral Corporation is still seeking sealing of their third-party subpoena responses in Nat S. Harty & April D. Harty, Docket No. 23354-21, filed 12/2/25.

And having no better luck than they had in Richard B. Stillahn & Lisa R. Lang Stillahn a year ago; see my blogpost “Even If You Don’t,” 12/20/24. Btw, appeal was taken to 9 Cir back in January.

The Crow seems to have no better luck with ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan’s now than it did back then.

Section 6103(h)(4)(C) strikes again. “… section 6103(h)(4)(C) provides there is an exception ‘if such return or return information directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer [whose information is to be disclosed] which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding.’ This exception allows information about a transactional relationship with a third-party taxpayer to be disclosed if that information has a direct bearing on the outcome of an issue in a case.” Order, at p. 2.

“Here, SCCC was the facilitator of a transaction entered into by petitioner. The dealing of petitioner and SCC were intertwined. There is no requirement that the transactional relationship require a bilateral contract between the third-party and the petitioners. To decide this case, the Court will look at the interrelated transactions that made up the transaction at issue. Accordingly, the Court will deny SCCC’s motion to seal. In a separate order, the Court will unseal documents to be consistent with this Order.” Order, at p. 2.

It’s been five (count ’em, five) years and more since Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes’ famous dissent in Oakbrook. Back then no one else agreed that valuation was the key to syndicated conservation easement swindles and historic façade fakery, relying instead upon “very contestable readings of what it means for an easement to be perpetual” and nitpicking appraisers and appraisals.

See my blogpost “They Always Must Be With Us,” 5/12/25.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch devalues the syndicated conservation easement claimed by Mize Farm, LLC, Focus on Design, Inc., Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 8979-23, filed 12/1/25, with an off-the-bencher.

Both Mize and IRS stip out all the appraiser-appraisal and textual-regulatory argy-bargy, except Judge Buch tosses one of Mize’s appraiser’s expert report and expert status because of footfaults and finger-fehler, but he testifies as fact witness anyway. Doesn’t help; this GA boondockery isn’t worth $10 million, or even $6 million, more likely not even the $425K IRS concedes. Walmart snapped up the only decent retail/industrial site for miles around.

The whole case goes off on valuation, as Judge Holmes argued it should.

Like the Man said, “I tell you, this man went down justified.”