The mysterious English Elizabethan poet was once charged, but never convicted, with counterfeiting money. He supposedly said that he had as good a right to coin money as Queen Elizabeth I (or II, for that matter, I suppose).

Benjamin A. Rogovy & Carol J. Castellon Miranda,17513-24, filed 3.18/26, bitcoin aficionados, would agree. Howbeit, IRS claims they were hard-forked, and thus owe tax.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch understands these things, which I totally do not, despite having among my nearest and dearest one who can block a chain with the best of them. So I’ll let Judge Ingenuity Buch judge-‘splain.

“Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that can be traded, exchanged into fiat currencies, and used to pay for goods and services. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. Bitcoin exists on a blockchain, which is a public ledger of cryptocurrency transactions. The Bitcoin blockchain is governed by a set of rules and technical standards, and any changes to the protocols governing the blockchain require consensus from the Bitcoin network, which includes all participants interacting on the blockchain.

“Bitcoin is held on the blockchain at a specific address. A participant can send Bitcoin to another address on the blockchain using public and private keys. These keys are alphanumeric codes that serve a similar function to a bank account password (private) and a bank account number (public). Private keys are stored in ‘wallets’ and public keys are shortened into a ‘wallet address’ which is the identifier for specific Bitcoin addresses.” Order, at p. 2.

But Ben’s problems start at the fork. He got some forked bitcoins.

“The blockchain can split in a process called a ‘hard fork.’ A hard fork occurs when the blockchain is copied and a new protocol is adopted for the newly copied blockchain, thus creating a forked blockchain. This forked blockchain is an exact copy of the legacy blockchain at the time of the fork, but future transactions on the forked blockchain will follow the new protocol. A hard fork has no impact on the continued functioning of the legacy blockchain, and it does not alter the holdings of the legacy cryptocurrency. After a hard fork, an individual who has a wallet that controls a cryptocurrency on the legacy blockchain also has a corresponding wallet address and public key for the forked blockchain that represents the newly ‘forked coins.’ The number of forked coins in the forked blockchain wallet corresponds to the number of coins in the legacy wallet. After a hard fork, an individual would need to take additional steps to obtain the forked coins.” Id, as my expensive ex-colleagues would say.

The question is did Ben actually have constructive receipt of the forked coins. IRS claims he had receipt of $9 million worth. Ben claims he didn’t, and wants summary J.

He doesn’t get it. Too many fact questions.

I have eschewed all the obvious puns about the forking process.

To any who object that I put out too many discovery blogposts, that’s what takes up the greatest number of Tax Court Order pages beyond routine pay-and-amend or tossed-for-lateness. The CLE merchants who peddled “win your case at discovery” the last thirty (count ’em, thirty) or so years have swept the board. Pretrial faceoffs are the game; if the game itself takes place at all, it’s an afterthought.

By way of illustration of the foregoing (as my expensive former colleagues say), here’s Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins unloading eight (count ’em, eight) pages anent document production in GO Management Inc., et al., Docket No. 14012-21, filed 3/17/26, another microcaptivity dodge. 

Most of the Order deals with case-specifics, but there is one general interest point. I’ll let Judge Jenkins judge–‘splain.

“…despite respondent’s request for documents to be produced in their native format, each document produced was produced as a PDF file. Although referenced, respondent’s electronically stored information provided previously in connection with informal discovery requests, and respondent provided them with a follow-up request to provide the documents in accordance with such specifications…. Respondent also states that petitioners at no point raised concerns about the omission of the specifications. The Motion Response states that petitioners provided documents in the format in which they were maintained and, in any event, that respondent’s failure to include the ESI specifications with the Request originally was determinative.

“Respondent did make an ESI specifications request in the Request, and petitioners did not, in the Request Response, raise any specific objections to that request, as instructed in Rule 72(b)(2). Even in the Motion Response, petitioners do not raise substantive objections to the ESI specifications but simply argue that they did produce them in the format in which they were stored, which, as noted in the Reply, is the requirement under Rule 72(b)(3)(B) only if a specific form has not been requested. Furthermore, as respondent also points out in the Reply, it is dubious that all of the items produced, e.g., emails and Microsoft Excel files, were stored in PDF format. Accordingly, the Court will order petitioners to produce ESI according to the ESI specifications referenced in the Request.” Order, at. p. 2.

Scrub the metadata is an obvious desideratum. PDF does that. Taishoff says Judge Jenkins is right to call it “dubious” that documents subject, or potentially subject, to a litigation hold would be stored in PDF only. Once preserved in PDF, an essential element of the original is gone. Spoliation of evidence, maybe so? I do hope none of the aforementioned merchants are making this suggestion.

Gets No Help from Boechler

That’s the bad news from Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy to Arbor Vita Corporation d.b.a. Hemediagnostics, 166 T. C. 5, filed 3/16/26. Heme, a CA Corp, was decorpitated by the CA Franchise Tax Board for failure to pay State taxes. While thus powerless, Heme got a NFTL for failure to pay FUTA and file W-2s sustained by Appeals, so Heme timely petitioned. Heme doesn’t get restored to CA good standing until five (count ’em, five) months after the 30-day claim processing limitation has run. 

IRS claims want of corporate capacity and moves to toss. If this sounds familiar to my longtime readers, you’re right; see my blogpost “Being and Nothingness,” 5/7/13.

Except.

Judge Sport Landy checks CA law and finds while revival gives back corporate powers and allows continuation of litigation, it doesn’t deprive opponent in ongoing litigation of claims or defenses. IOW, revival doesn’t defeat SOL Judge Sport Landy is more elegant in his phraseology. “…if relation back of revival would prejudice or invalidate an opposing party’s defense that accrued because of the suspension of corporate status, regardless of the nature of that defense, then revivor cannot retroactively validate an otherwise procedural act.” 166 T. C. 5, at p. 5.

What about Boechler?

Cases like Hom, referred to in my above-cited blogpost, were deficiency cases, not CDPs. So there is some wiggle room for defunct corporations in CDPs. 

Except.

“…31 days after issuing the Notice of Determination, the Commissioner accrued a statute of limitations defense against any petition filed by Arbor Vita. To retroactively validate Arbor Vita’s Petition at this juncture would prejudice the Commissioner’s defense by effectively nullifying it because Arbor Vita’s Petition would be considered valid and timely filed. Therefore, under California law, we cannot relate Arbor Vita’s corporate revival back to the time it filed its Petition.” 166 T. C. 5, at p. 7. (Citations omitted).

Except.

Doesn’t Boechler take away jurisdictional SOL?

Yes, but here the petition was timely filed. While CA law allows revival to validate a notice of appeal filed while a corporation was defunct, the Supremes have said pore l’il ol’ Tax Court isn’t an appellate court. 

Equitable tolling works to extend the 30-day cutoff for petitions from a CDP NOD. But since the petition was timely filed here, there’s nothing to extend.

Heme’s trusty attorney gets a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.”

The evidentiary dust-up in Amgen Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16017-21, filed 3/16/26, has produced documents and disputes that come near to overshadowing the infamous Epstein files. The record is still open, while Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves contemplates the approaching tsunami. “During trial, we admitted into evidence thousands of exhibits, and the parties represented that they were working together to stipulate to the admission of thousands more.” Order, at p. 1.

The joust goes on. Judge Tag Greaves, however, gives us a vest-pocket précis of the FRE worth keeping in your memo of law file.

“This Court applies the FRE when deciding evidentiary issues. See § 7453; Rule 143(a). The Court has broad discretion over the admission of evidence. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. FRE 402. Evidence is relevant if ‘it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence’ and ‘the fact is of consequence in determining the action.’ FRE 401. One exception to the general admissibility of relevant evidence is the rule against hearsay; hearsay may not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted unless an exception applies. FRE 801, 802. The Court may also ‘judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FRE 201(b).” Order, at pp. 2-3. (Citation omitted).

Judicial notice is routinely taken of SEC filings, for example.

But IRS wants stricter rules here, for evidence submitted to reopen the record. No, says Judge Tag Greaves, the record is still open. “Neither party has sought to close the record, nor has either party sought limitations on the admission of additional evidence while the record remains open. Since the conclusion of trial, we have admitted additional exhibits into evidence pursuant to the FRE, and we see no reason to depart from that practice here.” Order, at p. 3. If IRS claims ambush, they’ll get supplemental briefing to deal with it.

Judge Tag Greaves applies a minor brake-tap to Greenberg’s Express. IRS objects to some petitioner’s exhibits (hi, Judge Holmes). “These exhibits are Notices of Proposed Adjustments and the IRS’s rebuttal to a protest filed by Amgen, in which the IRS discusses whether the expense reimbursements were at arm’s length. These exhibits satisfy the low threshold of relevance due to respondent’s argument on brief that in order to qualify for set-off treatment, respondent must have disallowed the item at issue due to the arm’s length standard. Even if their significance is tempered by the general principle that the actions or views of revenue agents do not bind the Commissioner, the exhibits nonetheless have some tendency to make a material fact ‘more or less probable.’ As such, we will admit these four exhibits. Order, at pp. 3-4). (Footnote omitted, but it says IRS didn’t argue Greenberg’s Express. Taishoff wonders why not).

So go brief whatever you have and answer a few conundra Judge Tag Greaves has for y’all at Order, at p. 5. No need for more oral argument.

By far the largest part of petitions filed in Tax Court are those where Tax Court has no jurisdiction. One would expect this in a court where 80% of petitioners are self-represented and where any courtroom experience a petitioner might have is not in an Article I Court. Still, one wonders at the utility of a court which spends most of its resources deciding that it can’t do anything.

First example, Morgan H. Orlins & Nanette P. Orlins, Docket No.  16203-25S, filed 3/13/25. The Orlinses’ bœuf is a denial of refund based on a Health Savings Account contribution, coming off a CP12 and Letter 474C. Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda trots out the jurisdictional boilerplate and finds neither is a SND. The Orlinses’ expansive view of Tax Court jurisdiction doesn’t clear the Congressional barricade surrounding the Glasshouse at 400 Second Street, NW.

Yes, I know, IRS’ current form of individual SND prominently state that it is a SND. But that of course is not the whole story.

“It is well settled that no particular form is required for the notice of deficiency to be valid. See Benzvi v.Commissioner, 787 F.2d1541,1542(11th Cir. 1986); Jarvis v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 646, 655 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court to which this case is appealable barring a stipulation to the contrary, has held that the notice will be treated as valid if the Commissioner demonstrates that ‘the IRS has determined that a deficiency exists for a particular year and specify the amount of the deficiency.’ Stoecklin v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Benzvi v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d at 1542), aff’g. T.C. Memo. 1987-453.” See my blogpost “Scar Tissue,” 4/14/17.

So how is a petitioner to know what might be a SND, even if it doesn’t say so? The requirement that the SND provide contact info for TAS can apparently be satisfied even without the particularity mandated by Section 6212(a) that “such notice shall include a notice to the taxpayer of the taxpayer’s right to contact a local office of the taxpayer advocate and the location and phone number of the appropriate office.” See my blogpost “Being and Nothingness,” 5/7/13. Merely citing the TAS URL is sufficient.

Next, Carol Schellinck & Edward Schellinck, Docket No. 16098-26P, filed 3/13/26, another attempt to litigate underlying debt in a passport grab. Maybe so Notice CP508C should have written somewhere on it “IF YOU WANT TO CONTEST LIABILITY, DON’T WASTE YOUR TIME.”

My readers doubtless recall the flurry of articles and blogposts a dozen years ago as the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA) was wending its way into law, AFAIK the last enactment to bear the title “Bipartisan.” But I recall none thereof discussing the problem of the misdesignated partnership representative (whom I call the PaRep, but whom Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler calls the “PR.”  I’ll use Judge Speedy Weiler’s abbreviation hereafter). 

Judge Speedy Weiler has to confront the issue today in Infinity Cycle, LLC, John L. Green, Partnership Representative, Docket No. 9369-24, filed 3/12/26. B, managing member and 99% interest holder in Infinity Cycle, didn’t designate a PR in its 1065, but subsequently filed Form 8979, Partnership Representative Revocation, Designation, and Resignation, designating his attorney K as its PR for year at issue; names omitted.

When the FPA hit, B tried reaching K, but discovered K was ill and no longer practicing law, so B had Green, attorney for the partnership, file the petition timely. IRS answered, and five (count ’em, five) months later amends, alleging the petition didn’t name the PR or provide the contact info the regs require, so is ineffective and should be tossed. Infinity Cycle files a new 8979, but gets it wrong by not putting in the relevant year(s) for which PR acts and put the new PR, Green, in the wrong place among entities. IRS moves to toss the petition.

Judge Weiler loads up the “somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent” cannons.

“Compliance with Treasury Regulation § 301.6223 and the subsequent revocation and designation of a PR under section 6223 are not the only issues before us. Rather, the precise question here is whether we have jurisdiction under the Code to consider a Petition after amendment and when a succeeding PR ratifies the original filing.” Order, at p. 4.

Rule 60(a) provides for ratification if the right person didn’t sign on to the petition. There’s bushelbasketsful of old TEFRA precedent that BBA didn’t wipe out. And Mr. B submits an affidavit telling the whole tale.

“Here, the original Petition was timely filed by the attorney representing Infinity Cycle. Mr. Green was retained by Mr. B—the managing member of Infinity Cycle. Mr. B authorized Mr. Green to respond to the FPA, and under the circumstances, file a Petition with the Court on behalf of Infinity Cycle. If we were to grant respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, then Infinity Cycle and its partners would have no judicial remedy with respect to the partnership adjustments determined in the FPA. We find the evidence surrounding the filing of this Petition–namely with authorization from the managing member of Infinity Cycle–to be compelling.” Order, at p. 5. (Name omitted.)

“Respondent contends that Form 8979, submitted by Infinity Cycle, was incomplete and not a valid revocation under Treasury Regulation § 301.6223-1(e) since the form did not indicate for which taxable year the Partnership was changing its PR, and incorrectly revoked an entity partnership representative (and designated individual), when in fact K was previously designated as an individual PR for Infinity Cycle. Petitioner argues that while there may have been inconsistencies in revocation and designation of Mr. Green as successor PR, the submission to IRS nevertheless substantially complied with Treasury Regulation §301.6223-1(e). Petitioner contends that the minor discrepancies were not material to Form 8979 as the IRS received actual notice of Infinity Cycle’s intent to designate a new PR. We agree, and conclude the PR revocation made by Infinity Cycle, followed by subsequent designation of Mr. Green, substantially complies with Treasury Regulation § 301.6223-1(e)(5).” Order, at pp. 6-7.

While substantial compliance isn’t always applied, since where compliance is essential to fulfillment of the statute there is no room for “good enough,” where the rule is merely procedural or directory good enough is good enough.

“Under the BBA, the introduction of the concept of the partnership representative was ‘intended to address the shortcomings of the TMP as the representative of the partnership under TEFRA.’ Centralized Partnership Audit Regime, 82 Fed. Reg. 27334, 27338 (June 14, 2017) (proposed regulations). These resolutions to shortcomings included broader selection of those who can be a PR—including a nonpartner—and it provided that the PR had the sole authority to bind the partnership and any final decisions in a proceeding brought under subchapter C of chapter 63. Id. at 27338–39. The purpose of Treasury Regulation § 301.6223-1(e) is to ‘provide[] flexibility to the partnership in [certain] circumstances [where the partnership would like to change the designation], allowing the partnership, through its partners, to revoke a prior designation.” Id. at 27348. Consistent with its purpose we conclude that Treasury Regulation §301.6223-1(e) is merely procedural. A PR was established to be a centralized authority for the partnership. Overall, Treasury Regulation § 301.6223-1(e) requires a taxpayer to inform the IRS by written notice for revocation of a PR and appointment of a successor PR. Therefore, substantial compliance with the requirement will suffice.” Order, at p. 7.

And, ultimately, “respondent does not contend these two discrepancies prejudice the IRS or failed to provide actual notice of the successor PR as required under the regulations.” Order, at p. 8. 

Anyway, Rule 256.6(a) gives Tax Court the power to “take such action as may be necessary to establish the identity of the partnership representative.” Order, at p. 8. Judge Speedy Weiler says he runs his own docket. 

No hurt, no foul.

So welcome aboard, Green, salute the quarterdeck and stand to your kit. And here’s a Taishoff “Good Job, First Class” to pin on your dress blues.

I have characterized Judge David Gustafson as The Obliging Jurist since 2012 (see my blogpost “We’ll Come to You,” 9/18/12). Only once before now have I found him to be unobliging, for which see my blogpost “‘Modest Experience,” 8/15/23.

Now Vitaly Nikolaevich Baturin, Docket No. 14796-14, filed 3/11/26, becomes the second disobliged (unobliged?) petitioner. I came late to Vitnik’s trudge through the US-Russia tax treaty, only starting in 2019. All I can say is this fight is over whether Jefferson labs paid Vitaly for services rendered or just pure research. Judge David Gustafson said services rendered hence US taxable income last month; see my blogpost “Another Bad Day for the Russians,” 2/5/26.

Vitnik wants clarification. Twice.

“‘Petitioner respectfully moves the Court to clarify what laws were/will be used for ‘judgement as a matter of law’ pursuant to provisions of Rule 121(a)(2).” Order, at p. 1. (Emphasis in original).

Judge Gustafson is remarkably abrupt. “The applicable law is set out in our Memorandum Opinion. We will not elaborate beyond that opinion.” Order, at p. 1.

“…petitioner seems to be asking us to answer two questions (“Question 1” and “Question 2”) to clarify the meaning of the Commissioner’s proposed language in a proffered stipulated decision. The parties should come to a common understanding of the document they will eventually submit as a stipulated decision. Where one of them has a question about the meaning of that language, they should reach consensus on a joint intention before filing. Petitioner’s Question 1 asks the significance of a previous refund on the amount of the deficiency to be entered, and Question 2 asks ‘[w]hether interest will be charged for’ the five year period between the… trial and the… entry of decision by the Tax Court. In a deficiency case, the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to determine interest on the deficiency. However, the parties’ stipulation for entry of decision may include (below the place for the judge’s signature) their extra-jurisdictional agreements (such as the Commissioner’s stipulation that interest should be abated, or his acknowledgement that the decision in the deficiency case does not resolve or preclude a claim for interest abatement). We encourage the parties to include such matters in the stipulation, if it would be expedient to do so. But the Court will not address matters not within its jurisdiction.” Order, at pp. 1-2. (Citations omitted).

Man, Is That a Question!

I doubt it ever occurred to Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves, when he assured the United States Senate Committee on Finance, back on 7/24/19, that “I will make every effort to balance the need to help these taxpayers understand the Court’s rules and procedures, while remaining independent and impartial,” he would find himself echoing the Rolling Stones and “perfecting ways of making sealing wax.”

I do hope that that wonderful source of blogfodder Amgen Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16017-21, filed 3/10/26, doesn’t result in anyone’s 19th nervous breakdown, and that no one “owes a million dollars tax.” Howbeit, on with the story.

Back in July last year Judge Tag Greaves unsealed a co-promotion agreement between Amgen and nonparty Pfizer. Pfizer now wants Rule 161 reconsideration, but Judge Tag Greaves converts that into a motion to seal.

Unhappily, what Pfizer wants to seal bears heavily upon the leading issue in the case: who bears the cost of the healthcare reform fees (HCR)? HCRs are legacies of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), legislation that inspired half-a-hundred repeal votes and a celebrated Senate vote. Trade secrets, which are what Pfizer claims the stuff they want sealed to be, get sealed when disclosure would seriously impair the secretor economically. The bar is lower when the secrets don’t go to the heart of the case, but when justice must be done it must be seen to be done, and the sealing wax comes off.

But Pfizer slides under the tag.

The parties are willing to mask the exact numbers. That’s good enough for Judge Tag Greaves.

“To the extent Mr. M’s testimony addresses the mechanics of expense sharing, the nature of the fee obligations, the approval process, or the operative reimbursement structure, it lies at the core of the issues before us. The public’s right to access such testimony outweighs Pfizer’s interest in confidentiality. We therefore decline to seal those portions, except to the limited extent respondent concedes that discrete numerical figures may be sealed.

“By contrast, other portions of Mr. M’s testimony concern granular operational and budgeting details that do not bear directly on the reimbursement issue. The same is true for Mr. M’s testimony concerning a dispute between Amgen and Pfizer. Those passages were not meaningfully relied upon in the parties’ briefing, nor do they presently appear necessary to our ultimate disposition. With respect to such material, Pfizer’s demonstrated interest in protecting confidential commercial information outweighs the diminished public’s interest in disclosure. We will therefore seal those portions of Mr. M’s testimony.” Order, at p. 5. (Name and footnote omitted, but the footnote says that Pfizer’s proposal to put a summary of the sealed into the record has no basis in statute or reg, and only risks disclosing sealed stuff).

But before Pfizer breaks out the ’07 Salon Le Mesnil, Judge Tag Greaves has a parting shot.” Should it become necessary to reference any sealed testimony in our opinion, we will do so.” Order, at p. 5.

And there follow five (count ’em, five) pages with a line-by-line statement of what Judge Tag Greaves leaves out and lets in.

We have another post-BBA look at the Section 6235(a)(2) 270 day cutoff for issuance of an FPA after “any modification of an imputed underpayment” in Mammoth Cave Property, LLC, Mammoth Cave Manager, LLC, Partnership Representative, 166 T. C. 4, filed 3/9/26.

The mammoths base their SOL claim on the facts that the FPA was mailed to the wrong entity. The mammoths were changing addresses and partnership reps in the midst of COVID, and IRS was behind the curve on posting changes.

But ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan finds that the right designated individual, who was so designated by whatever entity was Partnership Representative at the time, got all the relevant documents timely., and petitioned timely.

“Petitioner received adequate or minimal notice resulting in a timely filed Petition. It has not shown that it was prejudiced by errors in the NOPPA because the audit and communications between respondent and petitioner continued without interruption. After the NOPPA naming the wrong partnership representative was sent to the W address, petitioner timely submitted Forms 8984 and 8980, requesting an extension of time to submit a request for modification and submitting a modification, respectively. These actions resulted in the FPA’s being issued timely, and petitioner’s timely filing a Petition with this Court.” 166 T. C. 4, at p.11. (Name omitted).

And even if the address was wrong, no hurt, no foul.

Ch J Urda, and JJ. Buch, Nega, Pugh, Ashford, Copeland, Jones, Toro, Greaves, Marshall, Weiler, Way, Landy, Arbeit, Guider, Jenkins, and Fung are all on board with the above.

For the Tax Court ‘s first look at the post-BBA régime, see my blogpost “A New Day – Redux,” 7/2/25.

Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes goes back to his famous Churchill opinion in American Solar Electric Inc., Docket No. 7297-23L, filed 3/9/26. And if you ask “what was that?” see my blogpost “Back to the Future,” 8/1/11.

The dispute here is what the new AO considered on remand. Originally, remand here was to correct a mistake at the CDP hearing; AmSo had in fact currently made FICA/FUTA/ITW deposits. AmSo didn’t object to remand. But on remand, the new AO found that AmSo had gone from insolvent to plus-20-grand-per-month income, thanks to the Inflation Reduction Act. So Appeals doubles down on their toss of AmSo’s $12K OIC for $650K in back taxes.

AmSo’s trusty attorney yells foul, y’all were only supposed to consider that AmSo paid currently.

Negatory, says Judge Holmes.

“In a supplemental hearing, IRS Appeals is not limited to reviewing the administrative record of the original hearing. “[T]he very purpose of the remand to the Appeals Office was to supplement the record with evidence supporting the IRS’s action . . . . [I]t is “the proper course” where “the record before the agency does not support the agency action.”‘ Lunnon v. Commissioner, 652 Fed. Appx. 623, 624 (10th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Changed circumstances often show that the IRS should accept a lower offer: A taxpayer might have gotten divorced, Churchill, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119, or have become unemployed due to the Covid pandemic, Whittaker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-59, at *10. In such cases we insist that the Commissioner look at the taxpayer’s current situation, even if it makes compromise at a lower figure more reasonable.

“But changed circumstances can cut both ways. And that’s just what the supplemental record shows here.” Order, at pp. 3-4.

For the backstory on Lunnon, see my blogpost “Be Careful What You Ask For – Part Deux,” 1/21/16; for same on Whittaker, see my blogpost “This Old House – Remanded,” 5/15/23.

Takeaway- As I’ve warned before, here be dragons. Remand can sink you as well as help you. Note the Lunnon language above-cited: remand is to help Appeals and IRS build a record. Unless you’re worse off all around at time of remand than you were at CDP, think twice before you take the bait.