If you’re going to frivol in Tax Court (and I definitely do not recommend that you do), show up, and you might just maybeso get a lighter chop than if you frivoled from afar. But do not presume too far upon the Court’s indulgence, lest you get an off-the-bench Section 6673 $1K frivolity chop from Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones sua sponte, even though IRS drops the Section 6662(a)s.

Here’s Jeffery Dominic Giraldi, Docket No. 1288-23, filed 4/9/24.

Jeffery served a bunch Requests for Admissions, and motions to revIew sufficiency IRS’ responses thereto, in limne (he wins part of that, as an IRS exhibit is duplicative), and to strike some IRS’ trial exhibits (hi, Judge Holmes). While IRS and Judge CD Jones are dealing with this, IRS’ counsel warned Jeffery (“correctly,” Transcript, at p. 7) about Section 6673, and so moved. Judge CD Jones denies without prejudice, while warning Jeffery it ain’t over until…you know the rest.

But trial comes.

“…at trial, the Court once again warned Mr. Giraldi that he may face a section 6673 penalty if he advanced any frivolous arguments. Nonetheless, when the Court conducted a hearing on the pending motions and advised Mr. Giraldi of its concern that his RFAs suggested frivolous positions, Mr. Giraldi declined to give a responsive answer. Further, although Mr. Giraldi later retracted his initial position that the NOD was issued without authorization, his filings before the Court are strongly associated with typical frivolous and groundless arguments.” Transcript, at pp. 8-9.

Judge CD Jones has had enough.

“The positions taken in the Petition and throughout this litigation—including through the RFAs—are certainly frivolous. Mr. Giraldi’s motion practice before the Court is troubling. For example, in the RFAs, he propounded multiple questions that strongly suggested frivolous positions. When the Court conducted its hearing on respondent’s pending motions, the Court advised Mr. Giraldi of its concern that these questions suggested frivolous positions and inquired about their relevance to the case. Mr. Giraldi declined to give a responsive answer.” Transcript, at p. 11.

Jeffery gave dodgy answers when challenged, and never advanced non-frivolous positions, even though give a chance.

Yes, he did show up for trial, and entered into a stip of facts.

“In his favor, we note that Mr. Giraldi appeared at trial and participated in submitting a Stipulation of Facts. Although he had to be reminded of the Court’s requirement that he not interrupt respondent’s counsel, he ultimately complied. Nonetheless, he continued to advance frivolous and groundless positions during his testimony. His frivolous positions throughout this litigationprevented the IRS from assessing tax that he owed. And he burdened both the Court and the IRS with all the chores necessary for the adjudication of an inevitable tax liability.” Transcript, at p. 12.

So Judge CD Jones goes easy on Jeffery.

But lest he grow elated, there’s a chop coming.  “In determining the amount of the penalty, we take account of all the foregoing facts. We impose today a $1,000 penalty, which is a relatively modest penalty, given that we have the discretion to impose a penalty twenty-five times that high. Mr. Giraldi should be aware, however, that if he should ever repeat his maintenance of frivolous tax litigation, he would stand in peril of a much steeper penalty.” Transcript, at p. 12.

Less than a week ago, I remarked, anent the wiseguys and frivolites who play discovery games, “I fear that some less-than-diligent types will ruin useful tools for the rest of us. Lose your case at discovery, indeed.”

Robert A. Zienkowski, T. C. Memo. 2024-39, filed 4/8/24, says (inter alia, as my already-on-their-second-Grey-Goose-Gibson colleagues would say), that his PA principal residence wasn’t in Montgomery County, with whose prothonotary IRS filed the NFTL which RAZ wants removed; rather, said dwelling was in “the portion of Bryn Mawr situated in Delaware County.” T. C. Memo. 2024-39, at p. 3, wherein IRS filed a NFTL when the RA in Collections noticed the anomaly during review of one of RAZ’s OIC requests.

Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber can’t find that RAZ requested a CDP on that NFTL, but mox nix.

“Petitioner advanced this argument for the first time in his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, urging that the NFTL be withdrawn because it was filed in the wrong county. Not only was this issue raised too late; as previously discussed, filing an NFTL in a county other than that in which the taxpayer resides does not invalidate the NFTL.” T. C. Memo. 2024-39, at pp. 9-10. (Citation omitted).

A NFTL has to state name, tax liability giving rise to the lien, and date of assessment. Filing in the wrong jurisdiction may give IRS problems in foreclosing the lien, and let a bona fide purchaser take free of the lien (as apparently happened when RAZ sold the house), but the lien remains. And the NFTL is valid, despite Section “6323(f)(1)(A)(i), which provides that an NFTL shall be filed ‘in one office within the State (or the county, or other governmental subdivision), as designated by the laws of such State, in which the property subject to the lien is situated.’”.  T. C. Memo. 2024-39, at p. 7.

So, as the Immortal Duo sang it, “it’s the same old story, everywhere I go.”

Burt Kroner is back, to receive the Section 6662(a) negligence chops at the hands of ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel that 11 Cir reinstated after ex-Ch J Iron Fist tossed same for want of Boss Hossery. See my blogposts “Imaginary Friend?” 6/1/20, and “‘Positively Farcical,'” 8/2/23.

We get the name of the imaginary friend, David Haring, in Burt Kroner, T. C. Memo. 2024-41, filed 4/8/23, at p. 2. We also get the name of Burt’s trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Bobby Berns, who represented both Dave and Burt, and who told Burt that the $25 million wire transfers Burt got from Dave wasn’t reportable, as it was a gift.

Ex-Ch J Iron Fist never reached reasonable cause four (count ’em , four) years ago, so now she finds that Burt never told Bobby Berns how much he got nor when he got it. Their testimony, with no contemporaneous written confirmation, isn’t enough to stave off the chops.

“While it may not have been necessary for Mr. Kroner to provide [Bobby Berns] with a complete accounting of the size or frequency of the transfers in advance, [Bobby Berns}’s alleged overall lack of understanding of the nature of the transfers undermines the contention that Mr. Kroner provided him with necessary and accurate information before he gave advice. For one, [Bobby Berns] disclaimed any knowledge that the timing of the transfers correlated to liquidity events experienced by Mr. Haring as an investor in [Burt’s deal]. In addition, large transfers between business associates may make a business purpose more likely and a gift purpose less likely, at least under circumstances similar to those here, but [Bobby Berns] claims that he did not know the magnitude of the transfers.” T. C. Memo. 2024-41, at p. 8.

Chops sustained.

The heavy-duty chops amerced upon Raju J. Mukhi, 162 T. C. 8, filed 4/8/24, are not eclipsed by the Eighth Amendment, says Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves, as said chops are there to protect the public fisc and bring into compliance such as Raju, who stash their cash in “strands afar remote”.

And he gives IRS summary J, sustaining the NOD handed Raju, when his RCP turns out to be a lot more than enough to reject his IA or OICs. And the reference that SO3 made at the CDP to the memo AO prepared at postassessment review isn’t sufficient to contaminate the CDP with prohibited prior involvement, or make the AO the de facto reviewer at the CDP.

Incidentally, Raju copped to ” one count of subscribing to false U.S. individual income tax returns and one count of failure to file an FBAR. The plea agreement expressly stated that it did not limit the rights of the U.S. Government to take any civil or administrative actions against petitioner, except as agreed regarding civil liability for failure to file an FBAR.” 162 T. C. 8, at p. 2.

So Raju is down on chops for his Section 6677 failure to file information returns on his offshoring. And Raju also violated Section 6038(b)(1) foreign corp reporting.

Except.

IRS is without statutory jurisdiction to collect Section 6038(b) chops. See Fahmy, 160 T. C. 6, filed 4/3/23. For the Fahmy story, see my blogpost “Nor Assessable,” of even date therewith. IRS asks Judge Tag Greaves to toss Fahmy, but he won’t. First, though Fahmy is on appeal to DC Cir, he asked the parties to brief the impact thereof, and they didn’t. Second, Raju is a MO resident, and thus is Golsenized to 8 Cir, which has said nothing about the issue, so Tax Court can go with its own precedents.

Summary J, and a Taishoff “Good Job,” for Raju’s trusty attorneys on the 6038(b) chops.

Taishoff says once again, our ridiculous Circuit Court appellate system for the national statute that impacts more citizens than any other exalts Rare Noodledom.

Wherever else same be permitted or required, The Glasshouse in the City of the Disenfranchised is off the list. The Big Shillelagh has shattered the need for health self-certification by those seeking entrance to The Glasshouse that Vic Built. Admin.  Order 2024-1, dated 4/2/24 (Happy Palindrome Day!) repeals its predecessor 2023-1.

Here’s the ganze myseh, if you’ll pardon an arcane technical phrase.

Click to access Administrative_Order_2024-01.pdf

Pauls Farm grows more than what springs from its GA boondock soil; it sure brings in a good crop of blogfodder.

Pauls Farm Properties, LLC, Eco Terra 2016 Fund, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, et al., Docket No. 7519-20, filed 4/5/24, has Judge Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda reaching back ten (count ’em, ten) years, to the heyday of Jim (“Little Jim”) Haber, immunologist. Of course, it’s more discovery tohubohu, with the Paulists claiming client-attorney privilege for their communications with their trusty attorneys K&C.

To thwart IRS’ assertions of massive chops, the Paulists claim good-faith reliance. Yes, K&C were retained by the promoter of these deals (the Paulists and the als) to “[r]eview all due diligence material for the underlying transaction, including tax returns, title reports. appraisals, market studies, feasibility studies, biology and/or geology studies where applicable, conservation easement deeds . . . .” Order, at p. 2. But the Paulists claim they didn’t rely on K&C; they say they relied on other professional advisers, and exercised due care their own selves. So the Paulists claim client-attorney privilege for the K&C stuff.

But client-attorney privilege may be waived when a party puts at issue matters that out of fairness the other side must examine and contest.

“Petitioners have affirmatively put at issue whether their reliance on advisors was in good faith. As a matter of fairness, we must evaluate all of the advice that was provided in order to assess whether they acted inc good faith. Petitioners thus have waived any privilege over the [K&C] material.

“Petitioners attempt to avoid this conclusion by asserting that they do not intend to claim reasonable reliance on [K&C}’s advice. This is ‘beside the point.” Ad Investment 2000 Fund, 142 T.C. at 257. “[B]y placing the partnerships’ legal knowledge and understanding into issue in an attempt to establish the partnerships’ reasonable legal beliefs in good faith arrived at (a good-faith and state-of-mind defense), petitioners forfeit the partnerships’ privilege protecting attorney-client communications relevant to the content and the formation of their legal knowledge, understanding, and beliefs.” Id.” Order, at p. 4.

For the Ad Investment story, see my blogpost “Self-Determination,” 4/16/14.

Hand it over, Paulists.

As long as the Boss Hoss remains in the saddle before assessment, the Section 6751(b) signoff is timely, says Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves, to Amgen Inc. & Subsidiaries, T. C. Memo. 2024-38, filed 4/4/24.

Amgen is routinely audited. Three (count ’em, three) years before the SNOD at issue here, Exam sent Amgen a memo for previous years stating that Amgen’s Section 482 transfer pricing compliance might preclude any good-faith defense to chops. Then IRS audited years at issue here, proposed chops, got Boss Hossery, gave Amgen the thirty-day package with the chops in, and moved for summary J.

Amgen, being a C Corp, doesn’t get the Section 7491(c) shield for IRS burden of production, so Amgen is on their own.

Amgen claims the memo should have been Boss Hossed. IRS relies on 9 Cir’s Laidlaw’s approach, where Boss Hossery can take place any time before supervisor loses jurisdiction over supervised. Amgen’s trusty attorneys say Laidlaw’s was an assessable penalty, namely a Section 6011(a) failure to report a dodge, so no SNOD required. The SNOD here is nonassessable, because Section 6312(a), so let’s wait for 9 Cir to speak to this type.

Judge Tag Greaves won’t wear it.

“While petitioner is correct in noting the distinction in the type of penalties at issue, we recently held that for cases appealable to the Ninth Circuit, the holding in Laidlaw’s Harley Davidson encompasses penalties subject to deficiency procedures. See Kraske v. Commissioner, No. 27574-15, 161 T.C., slip op. at 7–8 (Oct. 26, 2023). Kraske directly resolves the issue, and therefore we see no reason to delay ruling on it.” T. C. Memo. 2024-38, at p. 5.

For the Kraske story, see my blogpost “Beating the (Dead) Boss Hoss,” 10/26/23.

So Tax Court follows Laidlaw’s, and since no one suggests that any of the Boss Hosses, whether at Exam, Appeals, or OCC, lost jurisdiction over any underling at any time during the chain of events that led up to the SNOD prior to assessment, and that the memo was issued four (count ’em, four) months before IRS even started auditing the years at issue here, Amgen loses.

As I said in my above-cited blogpost, “(O)nce again, the sloppy drafting of Section 6751(b) and the statute’s mechanical application by Circuit Courts of Appeals utterly eviscerate the protection sought in 1998 against IRS juniors using the threat of penalties to beat up taxpayers and obtain unjustified settlements.”

This title won’t hardly be a best-seller with the CLEflogging crowd. Everest Granite, LLC, Everest Plains Holdings, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 29477-21, filed 4/3/24, was engaged in a prolonged request for admissions pingpong, wherein IRS was distinctly getting the worst of it.

In fact, so far was IRS behindhand with responses that the Everests came within an inch of defaulting IRS altogether on deemed admissions, more particularly as bounded and described in that pinnacle of the trade press Tax Notes. Tax Notes carried the story I missed 6/22/23, the same day I also missed ex-STJ Eunkyong Choi’s ill-fated barrage of quick-toss OSCs. Hardly covered myself with glory, but neither did IRS’ counsel, whom I’ll call Mikey.

Mikey was relieved of duty after the Tax Notes spread. Let those who seek anonymity in Tax Court, fail, and wind up appearing in this my blog consider themselves lucky. Judge Cary Douglas Pugh recounts the tale of Mikey’s derelictions of duty, which will cost IRS the excess legal fees and costs to which the Everests were put by Mikey’s casual approach. I can’t think Mikey will get a big hello from Danny Werfel at the next IRS happy hour.

Judge Pugh rescues IRS from default, and hacks her way through the maze of discovery and summary J demands. I’ve often said I’m a great fan of both, but it takes two to play. And Judge Pugh is obviously unwilling to allow play to continue.

“We are not satisfied that the parties have righted the discovery ship and are even more unsure that an off-the-record conference call will resolve the parties’ differences. Therefore, we will set this case for hearing at our May 6, 2024, New Orleans, Louisiana, trial session.” Order, at p. 6. And she gives the parties a list of what to talk about.

“Furthermore, in light of the parties’ disputes and the attendant delays in preparing this case for trial or other disposition, we believe the continued use of requests for admissions would be counterproductive. We remind the parties of this Court’s emphasis on the stipulation process and the advantage of that process over other formal discovery options. See Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974). To the extent the parties seek agreement regarding specific facts, they should concentrate on stipulations of facts or, if necessary, motions to compel stipulation under Rule 91(f). We will look dimly on any future motions to compel discovery that do not relate to document requests. We will discuss at the May 6, 2024, hearing whether an outright ban on requests for admissions and certain formal discovery is warranted going forward.” Order, at pp. 6-7.

I fear that some less-than-diligent types will ruin useful tools for the rest of us. Lose your case at discovery, indeed.

Unless one is a professional gambler, that’s what the IRC says. Gambling winnings are ordinary income, gambling losses are itemized Sched A deductions. But the trusty attorney (whom I’ll call Shelly) for Karen Berlant & Wayne Rhine, Docket No. 34622-21L, filed palindromically on 4/2/24, has a novel twist.

K&W netted winnings against losses, came out behind (as must gamblers do) and reported neither.

I’ll give Shelly a mention-in-dispatches, because his bold attempts fall beneath the “Good Try” level, but is worthy of better than an “Oh Please.”

CSTJ Lewis (“Wotta Name!”) Carluzzo Judge-‘splains: “Relying upon a definition of wagering provided in Title 31 or the United States Code, petitioners argue that a gambling transaction should be considered an exchange of property. And, as petitioners correctly note, losses upon the exchange of property are deductible above the line. See sec. 62(a)(3). Petitioners distinguish the long line of cases holding that a gambling loss may only be deductible as an itemized deduction (professional gamblers excepted) by pointing out that none of the previously decided cases addressed the argument they present here, perhaps, as petitioners suggest, because the taxpayers in some or many of those cases were self-represented.” Transcript, at p. 7.

Except.

“The awkwardness of conceptualizing a gambling transaction as an exchange of property is a bit like trying to force a square peg into a round hole, as the saying goes. That awkwardness in and of itself makes petitioners position less than compelling, but more technical reasons suggest that the argument must be rejected.

“Section 62(a)(3) operates, as petitioners suggest, to allow losses from the exchange of property to be deduction in the computation of adjusted gross income, or ‘above the line’. But individuals are only entitled to deductions for losses as provided in section 165, and only losses incurred in the exchange of property fitting the description of a capital asset may be deducted by an individual. See secs. 165(f) and 1211.” Transcript, at pp. 7-8.

All K&W did was put up cash, hardly a capital asset. And granting their argument would strip nonprofessional gamblers of the Section 165(d) deduction they already have.

But Shelly isn’t done.

“Petitioners acknowledge the long line of authority that supports respondent’s position in this case but suggest that the authority reflects what was once a negative public impression of the activity. They point out the increase in the number of casinos over the past few decades and the more recent opportunities for gambling through Internet websites and argue that the change in public sentiment should result in a change in law respect to how gambling losses are treated for federal income tax purposes.” Transcript, at pp. 8-9.

No dice, says CSTJ Lew.

“Changes in the law on the basis of changes in public sentiment, however, are more appropriately given effect by the Congress rather than the courts.” Transcript, at p. 9.

A Taishoff “Good Job, First Class, with Oak Leaves” goes to the trusty attorneys for Mohamed K. Abdo and Fardowsa J. Farah, 162 T. C. 7, filed 4/2/24 (Happy Palindrome Day!), whom I’ll call Meg & Dave. Mo and Far are two weeks late and much more than a dollar short, when they petition their SNOD. Their last day in the Section 6213(a) 90-day stretch was 3/2/20, but they mailed their petition on Saint Patrick’s Day, 2020, from their home in OH.

Nevertheless Mo and Far have the luck of the Irish. Because Tax Court was under the COVID lockdown mail embargo between March 19 and July 9 that year. And because, as Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall judge-‘splains: ” On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared a nationwide emergency under section 501(b) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Nationwide Emergency Declaration). See Letter to Federal Agencies on an Emergency Determination for the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 2020 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 159 (Mar. 13, 2020). The President also approved major disaster declarations for each of the 50 states pursuant to section 401 of the Stafford Act. On March 31, 2020, Pete Gaynor, the administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), at the direction of the President, signed DR-4507-OH (Ohio Disaster Declaration), which declared the State of Ohio a major disaster area. See Ohio; Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,702 (May 5, 2020). As with each other state disaster declaration, the Ohio Disaster Declaration identified the pandemic conditions warranting the declaration as “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing.” See id. at 26,703.” 162 T. C. 7, at p. 4.

This let Treasury set aside deadlines, leading to the famous Notice 2020-24, 4/9/20 (see my blogpost “Le Quinzième Juillet,” 4/10/20; but see also my blogpost “Too Late is Too Late,” 9/10/21).

Meantime, IRS churns out Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g), 86 Fed. Reg. 2607, 2613 (Jan. 13, 2021), which goes final and which says that late petitioning doesn’t get the mandatory 60-day push other acts get.  IRS says Chevron deference bars Mo and Far.

Mo and Far (ably represented by Meg and Dave) say the statute controls; the Reg. is invalid because Congress filled the field.

“Section 7508A(d)(1) provides that, in the case of any ‘qualified taxpayer,’ the period beginning on the earliest incident date specified in the declaration to which the relevant disaster area relates and ending on the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified ‘shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under [section 7508A(a)].” Section 7508A(d)(2)(A) defines a ‘qualified taxpayer’ to include an individual whose principal residence is located in a disaster area. Section 7508A(d)(3), by cross-reference to section 165(i)(5)(A) and (B), defines a disaster area as an area determined by the President to warrant federal assistance under the Stafford Act. Petitioners contend that they are qualified taxpayers because they resided in Ohio at all relevant times.

“Petitioners argue that Congress clearly intended section 7508A(d) to operate in a mandatory and automatic manner and, therefore, the Secretary’s interpretation of section 7508A(d) fails under Chevron step 1. Specifically, petitioners contend that section 7508A(d) provides a mandatory extension of the deadlines and gives no discretion to the Secretary.” 162 T. C. 7, at p. 10. They claim IRS is trying to subvert Congress.

But IRS isn’t done. What does a lawyer say when confronted with a clear statute?

“…respondent further contends that the statute is ambiguous in two ways: First, Congress did not address what specific time-sensitive acts are postponed pursuant to section 7508A(d), and second, Congress did not directly address federally declared disasters without an incident date under section 7508A. In respondent’s view, the regulations are necessary to resolve these ambiguities.” 162 T.C. 7, at p.12.

Any lawyer who can’t find an ambiguity should find another way to make a living.

But Meg and Dave have a table, showing exactly where Congress lets IRS decide, and where discretion was off the table, 162 T. C. 7, at p. 15, which Judge AIM Marshall annotates.

And the table clears the boards. The contrast in language between 7508A(a) and (d) o’ercrows IRS’ wordscrabble. And the heading “Mandatory 60-day extension” while not dispositive, nevertheless provides “… an instance in which the heading is of some use for interpretative purposes, and it supports our reading of the statute.” 162 T. C. 7, at p. 17. (Citations omitted).

As for what acts are subsumed under the mandatory 60-day statutory push, Judge AIM Marshall finds no ambiguity.

“Having given full consideration to section 7508A(d) and its context, we must agree with petitioners that respondent’s interpretation conflicts with both the plain wording and the mandatory and specific nature of subsection (d). Postponement of any section 7508(a)(1) act would not be mandatory if it needed to be triggered by a discretionary act of the Secretary, who could use his discretion not to act at all. Instead, we think Congress’s intent is clear. For a defined person (a ‘qualified taxpayer’), a defined period (‘beginning on the earliest incident date . . . and . . . ending on the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date’) ‘shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under subsection (a)” of section 7508A, that is by mandatorily and automatically disregarding ‘whether any of the acts described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a),’ including the act of filing a petition with the Court, ‘were performed within the time prescribed therefor.’” 162 T. C. 7, at p. 20.

IRS fights to the finish; there is no incident date in the COVID declaration. Meg and Dave say, “So what? There was one in the OH declaration thereunder, namely, viz., and to wit, 1/20/20.”

IRS’ ex post facto regulatory binge doesn’t work.

Ch J Kerrigan, and Judges Foley, Buch, Nega, Pugh, Ashford, Urda, Copeland, Jones, Toro, Greaves, and Weiler are on board with this.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch concurs, noting that Chevron may be on the way out, as the Supremes have granted cert in a case to reconsider. Howbeit, “Over a century of precedent supports the unremarkable proposition that ‘[a] regulation to be valid must be reasonable and must be consistent with law.’ Before Chevron, it was clear that ‘regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated.’

“In recent years, the Supreme Court has held regulations to be inapplicable with only a fleeting reference to Chevron…,  or without referencing Chevron. And the Supreme Court has specifically stated that it ‘need not resort to Chevron deference . . . [when] Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the interpretive question at hand.’” 162 T. C. 7, at p. 24. (Citations omitted).

Judges Nega, Ashford, Urda, Copeland, Toro, and Greaves agree.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones says this case strikes a blow for Rare Noodledom. Hallmark Collective and Sanders keep a consistent tone. When Congress sets a limit, game over. Culp doesn’t apply outside 3 Cir, and cert has been sought there.

“Today, the opinion of the Court holds that section 7508A(d) provides for an unambiguously self-executing postponement period for certain acts set forth in section 7508(a), including the filing of a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court. § 7508(a)(1)(C); see op. Ct. p. 18. This position is consistent with the Court’s prior decisions in Hallmark and Sanders that the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional, because unlike equitable exceptions, statutory exceptions to jurisdictional deadlines are of course permissible. Moreover, our prior decisions in Hallmark and Sanders are further undergirded by the jurisdictional nature of the AIA, codified under section 7421(a)….” 162 T. C. 7, at pp. 26-27.

Judge CD Jones points out that assessment and collection are as essential as barring injunctions to prevent collection and enforcement. And as I have pointed out, the automatic stay in Section 6213(a) is a narrow exception to Anti-Injunction Act’s high wall against interference.

Judge Greaves is OK with the Section 6213(a) part. Judges Buch, Nega, Urda, Copeland, nd Toro agree with it all.