No, I’m not going to insult my ultrasophisticated readers by telling them about IRS’ Refund Tracker. No one who reads this my blog needs such babyfood. Rather, this is the story of Renee Elaine White, Docket No. 878-26S, filed 4/21/26, who wants Tax Court to give her “reimbursement for payments made with respect to the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 tax years, for which petitioner was granted innocent spouse relief pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 6015(c).” Order, at p. 1.

Renee stiped out her innocent spousery last October, no runs, no hits, no errors (no tax due, no refund due, no penalties due). But Renee claims runners left on base for the said four (count ’em, four) years of spouse’s tax obligations. IRS ripostes with “no SND, no NOD, no jurisdiction.”

Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda calls Renee out at Tax Court.

“…the relief requested by petitioner—refunds for various tax years —is not within the Court’s authority to grant in this case. In a case based on a notice of deficiency, in which the Court must determine the correct amount of tax, this Court may make a determination concerning whether there has been an overpayment of tax. See I.R.C. § 6512(b). Otherwise, this Court does not have jurisdiction to make determinations concerning overpayments or refunds. Taxpayers generally have two years to file a lawsuit following the disallowance of a claim for refund. See I.R.C. §6532(a)(1). The Tax Court, however, is not the proper court in which to file such an action. A taxpayer may seek a judicial remedy for wrongful denial of refund claims—i.e., a refund suit in compliance with I.R.C. sections 6532(a)(1) and 7422(a)—either in the United States Court of Federal Claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1491(a)(1), or in Federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1346(a)(1). Those statutes do not confer refund jurisdiction on the Tax Court. Accordingly, this Court cannot and does not decide whether petitioner is entitled to recover a refund….” Order, at p.2.

Edited to add, 4/21/26: Even if Tax Court had jurisdiction, see Order at p. 2. Renee submitted Form 843 refund claim two (count ’em two) months ago. Section 6532(a)(1) imposes a six-month cooling off period before a refund suit can be commenced, unless IRS sooner denies (which Renee doesn’t allege).

I had hoped to pass on to you some enlightenment anent the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 7002, 7004, 134 Stat. 178, 212, 217 (2020) (as amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. N, § 286, 134 Stat. 1182, 1989 (2020)), and those enacted by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 117-2, §§ 9642 and 9643, 135 Stat. 4, 171, 174 (2021). 

Alas, Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way gives us nothing but a defective-documentation case that, in his words, “… go beyond poor recordkeeping and suggest pure fabrication,” Marie M. Kanda, T. C. Sum. Op. 2026-3, filed 4/20/26, at p. 9. (Footnote omitted).

I leave it to you to read Judge Way’s unbaling of Marie’s various reporting positions. I really stopped following them, although Marie’s list of ailments at p. 2 did evoke enough sympathy for me to understand why IRS folded the Section 6676 excess deductions and credits chop.

Most motions to proceed remotely fail for mootness, either jurisdictional footfaults or stipouts. Fullview, Inc., Docket No. 16901-23, filed 4/20/26, applies Rule 140(b) to a motion made three (count ’em, three) weeks before trial, to which IRS successfully objects.

Fullview claims its request for trial in San Diego was a mistake, as its representative lives near San Francisco.

“Respondent objects to petitioner’s Motion stating that (a) petitioner has had multiple opportunities over the past three years since petitioner filed the petition to identify the mistake and has failed to do so, (b) petitioner’s internet has frozen on numerous occasions when virtually conferencing with respondent, and (c) because the primary issues for this case are document intensive, the trial is not conducive to a virtual proceeding.” Order, at p. 1.

Judge Benjamin A. (“Trey”) Guider, III, tells Fullview to show up in San Diego.

“Rule 140(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure allows a party to move to change the place of trial, but states that if the ‘motion [is] made after the notice setting the case for trial is served[, it] may be deemed dilatory and may be denied unless the ground therefor arose during that period or there was good reason for not making the motion sooner.’ Petitioner’s reasons for requesting a remote proceeding do not meet this standard and seemingly did not arise between our Order setting this case for trial and petitioner’s Motion to Proceed Remotely. And respondent has raised convincing objections.” Order, at p. 1. 

Judge David Gustafson yet again shows his obliging nature in Carl Lawrence Collins, III, Docket No. 2643-17, filed 4/202/26. Having heretofore unscrambled at-trial concessions and prepared a concordance of documents evidencing same, he agrees to postpone review of the trial transcript until the transcribed audio version has been cleaned up by the parties.

“Because of weather conditions that affected travel, the court reporter was unable to attend the trial session in person, and he relied on an audio connection to make the recording from which the transcript would be prepared. As we explained in our order of March 20, 2026 (Doc. 164), our recent review of a portion of the third volume of the trial transcript revealed numerous errors, for which we proposed corrections based on a backup audio recording.” Order, at p. 1.

So let the trial clerk send the parties what audio there is, so they can jointly or separately move to correct the transcript.

Taishoff, moved by Judge David Gustafson’s diligence, offers a wee correction of his own.

“ORDERED that the post-trial briefing schedule previously ordered in Docs. 159 and 167 is hereby vacated, and revised a briefing schedule will be set after the transcript has been corrected.” Order, at p. 1.

Judge Gustafson, try this: “ORDERED that the post-trial briefing schedule previously ordered in Docs. 159 and 167 is hereby vacated, and a revised briefing schedule will be set after the transcript has been corrected.”

I need your help. No, I’m not asking for money.

The aim of this blog is to cover United States Tax Court in a different way from the trade press (e.g., Tax Notes, Accounting Today, Forbes) and the blogosphere. I’m aiming for a short  (around 500 words) daily summary of orders, opinions and decisions, written for the busy practitioner (Circular 230, Section 7525 type).

I was an EA for 10 (count ’em, 10) years and an attorney at law for 58 years. Now in retirement, I’m a part-time journalist because I can’t stop.

I’m writing to try to stay sane and to give back to the profession and calling I love. And maybe help some of you help a client, or a pro bono at a calendar call or LITC.

But I need feedback. Is this blog helping? What’s wrong? What needs changing? Too much editorializing? Not enough detail? Needs more (or less) quotation from the order or opinion? Daily format too much for your overflowing inbox?

Please comment below. I promise to read and consider all responses.

Thanks.

Edited to add, 4/20/26: Thanks to all who commented; I’m very much obliged.

Lucas Calhoun, Docket No. 4554-25L, filed 4/17/26, should have been at least considered for a referral to a LITC by Appeals. When Lucas claimed he was disabled and would need help either from his father or his son, sending a couple 2848s (hi, Judge Holmes) really doesn’t answer the problem. 

Of course, the IRM contains no such instruction; IRM 8.6.1.5.3.2 (09-25-2019) places the burden on the taxpayer to request representation and to select and qualify the representative. So I’m not saying the SO did anything wrong; he followed the book, and so did STJ Diana L. (“Sidewalks of New York”) Leyden in affirming the SO sustentation of the NITL.

But when a petitioner claims “I Lucas Calhoun was in a car accident in 2018. I was a passenger in a Honda Accord that struck another vehicle head on at 50 mph. We have had a supervisor from the IRS tell us I am not collectible. Also I have a voicemail from Biran at the IRS stating that he spoke to his supervisor and we would not be held liable. To not worry. That was on 6/14/24. Please do not levy the property my dad has my son & I staying at. Please send forms for forgiveness”, Order, at p. 2, maybe so might could be that a nonlawyer nonpractitioner might not be enough.

No one shows up for Lucas, so STJ Di gives IRS summary J.

Maybe so might could be referral to a LITC could save the day. But the SO shouldn’t have to judge this without some cover from high command. Maybe a revision to the IRM? Gives no rights to taxpayers greater than they would otherwise have.

Kelby Daniel Reyes Barrios, T. C. Memo. 2026-32, filed 4/16/26, says he didn’t get the 1099-NEC from his employer until after he filed his return. Too bad, says Ch J Patrick J (“Scholar Pat”) Urda.

That doesn’t mean you don’t owe tax. Third-party information, unchallenged, is sufficient connectivity between income and taxpayer. Especially is that so when you got the money.

“The failure to receive tax information forms, however, does not excuse a taxpayer from his obligation to report income. See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-112, 2010 WL 2011013, at *8; Du Poux v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-448, 1994 WL 479018, at *1 (‘[F]ailure to receive tax documents does not excuse taxpayers from the duty to report income.’).” T. C. Memo. 2026-32, at p. 4.

Summary J to IRS.

Jonathan D. Sawyer, T. C. Memo. 2026-33, filed 4/16/26, tried to keep the family printing business afloat. He borrowed against his life insurance policy and used the premium loan feature to keep the insurance in force, borrowing against cash surrender value until exhausted.

JD never assigned the policy to the family business, although he credibly testifies he told his manager to do so. The manager testifies he doesn’t remember any such order.

Unhappily, Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland sticks JD with the policy and the COD income when the insurance company cancels the policy to satisfy the loans.

But JD’s trusty attorneys’ investment interest deduction argument scores a point with Judge Tex Copeland. Even though the business’ records were destroyed when the business folded, JD’s and manager’s testimony is credible. And because keeping the business afloat would earn dividends on JD’s stock in the business, to the extent the business generated income to JD, the interest on the cash surrender value loan was deductible.

“Mr. Sawyer’s investment in [business] was to keep the business afloat, ultimately earning income that would lead to dividends. Consequently, the [business] stock was property held for investment, and the underlying interest paid to support that investment was investment interest. As investment interest, it is likewise subject to the limitations of section 163(d)(1), which provides that ‘[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as a deduction under this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.’

“Thus, as to the $40,107 interest on the $80,000 Policy Loan that was satisfied in [year at issue] with an offset to Mr. Sawyer’s cash surrender value, it was investment interest subject to the limitations of section 163(d)(1) and will only be deductible to the extent of net investment income for the [year at issue].” T. C. Memo. 2026-33, at pp. 10-11.

But failure to prove allocation between insurance and investment features in premium payments prevents JD for getting investment income interest treatment for the premium loans.

JD also escapes Section 6651(a)(2) failure-to-pay add-on.

“There is ample evidence that Mr. Sawyer had neither the assets nor the income to pay his [year at issue] tax. Nor is his inability to pay attributable to a lack of ordinary business care. Mr. Sawyer’s wages were foreseeable, and he paid the tax thereupon; conversely, the cancellation of a life insurance policy he had thought transferred and the magnitude of the constructive income therefrom were not reasonably foreseeable. Mr. Sawyer’s financial difficulties did not arise because of negligence or lavish spending. Nor could Mr. Sawyer realistically borrow to satisfy the tax liability, given his financial history, default on the loan for which his home was collateral, and the lack of other assets. Accordingly, reasonable cause existed with respect to the failure to pay.” T. C. Memo.2026-33, at p. 13.

A Taishoff “Good Job” to JD’s trusty attorneys.

Rather than showing “a substantial ground for difference of opinion” on “a controlling question of law,” Judge Jeffrey S. (“Schwer”) Arbeit finds that Blair A. Battersby, et al., Docket No. 1356-23, filed 4/16/26, IRS’ counsel, and he all agree on what Section 1377(a)(2) says and means. The Battersbys only are arguing about how the statute applies to the stock swaps more particularly bounded and described in my blogpost “Afecionados,” 4/2/26.

In short, whether there was a redemption, or a sale or gift, as between the Battersbys and their grantor(s) or grantor’s predecessor-in-interest, is not a matter that fits either 28 USC 1292(b) or 26 USC 7482(a)(2)(A). The CCA would have to scan the record, and they might as well do that after trial, as the caselaw says.

“As is clear from the Order [Doc. 116] and the parties’ own filings, the Court and the parties share the same understanding of section 1377(a)(2). There is simply no dispute of law, let alone the required ‘controlling question of law.’ See § 7482(a)(2)(A); Rule 193. We did not reject petitioners’ legal analysis; rather petitioners failed to raise any genuine dispute of material fact. Our Order is unambiguous and does not include a controlling question of law sufficient to satisfy the first requirement in section 7482(a)(2)(A) and Rule 193.” Order, at p. 3.

There’s plenty of somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent for those contemplating interlocutory Tax Court appeals. Download it for your memos of law files.

No, I do not mean an actual descendant of petitioner Henry G. Pugsley, whose appeal from a Section 6213(a) Tax Court toss of his petition was treated for a time as 11 Cir’s final word on Boechler, P. C. jurisdiction-vs-claim-processing dichotomy, until Allen. See my blogposts “Justified? – I’ll Say,” 12/5/25, and “11 Cir Has Spoken,” 2/11/26.

So as of this writing, the score in Boechler, P. C., v. Hallmark Rsch. Collective stands at three (Culp, Oquendo, and Buller) to one (Allen). 2 Cir, 3 Cir, and 6 Cir vs 11 Cir.

Unfortunately for Katharine Tarver and Pierre Tarver, Docket No. 6794-25, filed 4/15/26 (it’s That Day again), they’re Golsenized to 5 Cir.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones claims 5 Cir also has spoken, and the Tarvers are auf’d.

“This case is presumptively appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See § 7482(b)(1)(A). The Fifth Circuit has also held that the deficiency deadline is jurisdictional. See Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002); Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988). While the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have reached a different conclusion, contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024), we apply the precedent of the Fifth Circuit in this case, which has held that the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional, see Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970); see also Sanders, 161 T.C. at 119–20 (examining the Culp decision and continuing to treat the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable outside the Third Circuit). Accordingly, the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional and petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling in the instant case.” Order, at p. 4.

Taishoff says both cases cited by Judge CD Jones as 5 Cir’s definitive conclusion were decided a mere 34 (count ’em, 34) years before Boechler, P. C., in Keado and a mere 20 (count ’em, 20) years before in the case of Rochelle. Keado is mostly concerned with duplicate SNDs and the Anti-Injunction Act in USDC; never considers equitable tolling. Rochelle was 143 days late with his petition, the Tarvers a couple hours (hi, Judge Holmes) late. And Rochelle got exactly one (count it, one) paragraph of an opinion, never mentioning claim processing vs. jurisdiction.

 Would these cases survive a post-Boechler, P. C. assault launched on behalf of the Tarvers? Comment below; I read all comments.

Edited to add 4/16/26: IRS agreed to grant the Tarvers administratively all the relief they could have gotten with their proffered stiped decision. Hence there’s no ground for appeal. Oh well; wait till next time.