Are both frustrated by Judge Buch’s magisterial wrapping-up of Tribune Media Company f.k.a. Tribune Company & Affilliates, 2021 T.C. Memo. 122, filed 10/25/21*.

Judge Buch could  put me out of business as a tax blogger, with his sweeping intro, beginning with Pres. Reagan as the Gipper, later a radio announcer of the Chicago Cubs games from afar, with the President’s brilliant improvisation when the wire went down, and concluding “(C)oincidentally, it was President Reagan who signed into law the amendments to section 707 that give us the disguised sale rule found in section 707(a)(2)(B) that applies to these cases. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.98-369, sec. 73, 98 Stat. at 591-592.” 2021 T. C. Memo. 122, at p. 6, footnote 14.

Judge Buch must have been on law review to get that many footnotes into six (count ’em, six) pages.

The case is disguised sale meets debt-financed distribution, with some remarks from the stand worth savoring. This one has all the earmarks of a classic T. C. Memo.

I’d love to give you the whole nine yards, and I will, but much later.

Tonight is the first performance  this season of the Met Opera’s Die Meistersinger. And I have Balcony Box 1, seat 1. With COVID check-in, I have to leave soon. So the baseball fan must give way to the opera fan, for now.

But I’ll be back as soon as Hans Sachs knocks it out of the park.

*Chicago Tribune Media 2021 T C Memo 122 10 26 21

CSTJ Lewis (“He Casts a Spell”) Carluzzo has some comfort for Jason Wakefield & Chere Wakefield, Docket No. 12186-20SL, filed 10/26/21*. Jason needs it; late filing, late paying, and no 1040-ES add-ons rain down on Jason, just as he’s suffering from physical ailments that keep him out of attics and crawlspaces. This keeps him from working, even though his sole-prop business was doing well. Besides, he had to pay Chere when their marriage broke up, although the record doesn’t show when he paid or how much.

Liabilities are self-reported, thus no SNOD, thus right to contest liability.

Jason was self-represented, and Chere stiped but didn’t show. CSTJ Lew is kind, but the law is the law.

“We are sympathetic to petitioner’s medical condition and the hardship due to his divorce during the relevant time. Serious illness of the taxpayer or a member of the taxpayer’s family can constitute reasonable cause for failure to file a timely return but only if the illness caused total or near total incapacity to act. On the other hand, if a taxpayer does not timely file but is able to continue to conduct his or her business affairs despite the illness or incapacity, the Court has rejected the taxpayer’s reasonable cause position. See, e.g., Ruggeri v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-300, slip op. at 7-8 (and cases cited there at [sic; should be “thereat”]).

“Again, we are sympathetic to petitioner’s difficulties, but we are not persuaded that the challenges he faced satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of section 6651(a)(1). Despite those challenges, petitioner was able to engage in his business during the relevant period, even if only on a limited basis, and although hospitalized from time to time, it was never for an extended period. Consequently, petitioners are liable for the addition to tax imposed by section 6651(a)(1).” Transcript, at pp. 11-12.

That’s late filing. But Jason is no better off with late-paying. He says the big payout to Chere sinks him.

“However, the record is unclear with respect to the circumstances surrounding the payment or at least the timing of the payment, and petitioner did not argue any set of facts or circumstances that would lead the Court to find that he was unable to pay the tax or would have suffered undue hardship if he had paid the tax in full on its actual due date. Moreover, adverse economic conditions do not necessarily constitute reasonable cause.” Order, at p. 12.

CSTJ Lew says it’s a Tax Court truism that late pay is caused by financial difficulties. And no 1040-ES is almost inexcusable.

What Jason needed was the Gonzaga Bulldogs, or the Golden Gophers, or the Harvard Foggers, or the Texas Tech Technophobes, or the Fordham Rams, or Sandy Freund, Esq.’s Rutgers  Tax Knights, or any of the LITC law school bombers. He handed IRS a win on toast.

But CSTJ Lew has taken up the mantle of The Judge With a Heart, his now-retired  predecessor STJ Robert N. Armen, Jr.

“In closing we think it appropriate to mention an observation made by the U.S. Supreme Court, ‘[b]ad things happen if you fail to pay federal income taxes when due.’ Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 502 (2007). From petitioner’s presentation at trial, we are certain that he shares that sentiment, especially when he learns of this bench opinion. Nevertheless, petitioners should keep in mind that the focus of this case is narrow; we address and resolve only the issue before us. The resolution of this case says nothing about petitioners’ entitlement to pursue any collection alternatives that might otherwise be available to them.” Transcript, at pp. 14-15.

So no issue preclusion on illness or economic hardship? LITCs, get tore in!  

*Jason & Chere Wakefield 12186-20SL 10 26 21

It’s thirty-five years since I heard the gravelly rasp of my law partner Sid directed to a client who wanted to pretend his troubles (it was usually “his”) would go away if he did nothing. Well, his rasp echoes today, as Judge Goeke admonishes James R. Morris and Lori A. Egbers-Morris, 2021 T. C. Memo. 120, filed 10/25/21*.

Jim and Lori are victims of their own success. They turned Jim’s packaging business into a conversion business (and no, I don’t know what that is, either), and made a lot. But they didn’t file for a couple years (hi, Judge Holmes) because they made a few accounting moves that their trusty CPA, who’d theretofore been doing their taxes, thought might land them in the calabozo if they fessed up for those years. So they didn’t, and the moves didn’t, but they finally stiped out with IRS to $600K for one year and $1.7 for the other.

And now all they’re fighting about is the add-ons, non-filing, non-paying, and non-estimating.

Of course Jim and Lori claim reasonable cause, based on trusty accountant’s advice.

“Reliance on such advice ‘do[es] not sanction an abdication of responsibility for the timely filing of a return admittedly due. United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 397 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1125-1126 (7th Cir. 1981). The Code provides an unambiguous deadline, and ‘no special training or effort [is required] to ascertain * * * that it is met.’ Boyle, 469 U.S. at 252.”Petitioners were not advised that they were not required to file a return. The alleged advice was to delay filing while audits for prior years were completed. Allowing such a basis for reasonable cause would make timely filing optional for any taxpayer under audit. Petitioners were aware that they had a duty to file a return timely and consciously failed to file. It is well settled that taxpayers must file timely returns using the best information available to them and may file amended returns if necessary.” 2021 T. C. Memo. 120, at pp. 7-8. (Footnote omitted).

The rest of the add-ons follow on similar lines. Trusty accountant never testifies, and correspondence from said trusty accountant never makes it into the record. I make the morning line 8 to 5 the trusty accountant already got The Phone Call. For those tuning in late, see my blogpost thus entitled.

*James Morris &; Lori Morris 2021 T C Memo 120 10 25 21

No, not basketball; Albert G. Hill, III, 2021 T. C. Memo. 121, filed 10/25/21*, wants to mate Section 7481(c) with Rule 261 and have Tax Court give him an extra three-point “bump” (as Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber calls it) on the interest he’s getting for his $3 million gift tax deposit.

Al III was involved in the Hunt Family split-up, which required Al III to fund some trust funds for his kids. This triggered a ginormous gift tax, so Al III had his lawyers deposit $10 million with IRS against the ultimate gift tax liability when, as and if it got sorted out in USDCNDTX. Al III hadn’t filed a return at that point, but the case stiped out at $6 million gift tax due, and Al III got interest of $218K on the excess of deposit above tax due, at AFR short (Applicable Federal Rate, Short-Term).

Al III wants the rate at AFR Short plus 3 points, claiming Section 6603(d)(4).

He doesn’t get it. Judge Scholar Al says the $10 million was a deposit to stop interest, not a payment of tax. Going back through more than fifty (count’ em, fifty) years of Rev. Proc.s and statutory amendments, Judge Scholar Al concludes that Al III’s trusty attorney can’t convert a deposit into a payment, and that Tax Court never determined Al III made an overpayment.

Al III and IRS stiped to the numbers for tax and amount to be credited from the deposit against the tax thus agreed upon. This was a “below the line” agreement, below the Judge’s signature on the decision, and therefore not a determination by the Court.

“First, a below-the-line stipulation evidences only an agreement between the parties. It is called a ‘below-the-line’ stipulation because it appears ‘below the Judge’s signature.’ See Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-33, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134, 1136 (distinguishing a below-the-line stipulation from the decision line, which ‘determin[es] deficiencies, additions to tax, and penalties’). Such a stipulation does not constitute a finding by the Court. See sec. 7481(c)(2)(B) (permitting reopening if ‘the Tax Court finds * * * that the taxpayer has made an overpayment’ (emphasis added)). Second, the parties themselves, in their below-the-line stipulations, do not refer to any ‘overpayment.’ Rather, they ‘stipulate[] that the deficiency for [year at issue] is computed without considering the prepayment credit of $10,263,750.’ (Emphasis added.).” 2021 T. C. Memo. 121, at p. 18.

OK, so the Court never found a deficiency, because the parties negotiated and stiped out the numbers. So no jurisdiction to recompute interest.

Note that the difference here is the difference between $218K, which IRS concedes, and the $1.267 million Al III claims. Stipulate, don’t capitulate? Quite a give-up, $900K.

Taishoff asks, but is that a give-up? If Al III doesn’t stip, he goes to trial in USDCNDTX on an arcane point of Federal tax law. How likely a USDCJ is able to deal with a complex set of time value of money issues, date when gift actually made, and discounted present values, with numbers and assumptions flying around, is a not insubstantial risk. Al III might be materially the worse at close of play if he rolls the dice, risking at least $4 million to pick up $900K if his trusty attorneys hit a home run. I say “at least” $4 million, because the USDCJ might find IRS bore BoP for a greater deficiency than IRS first alleged. And Al III has legal fees for the trial and possible appeal.

Al III loses, but his trusty attorneys get a Taishoff “Good try, second class.”

*Albert G. Hill III 2021 T. C Memo 121 10 25 21

Rule 155 beancounts are exactly that. It’s all about numbers, to the exclusion of all else. It’s not about rehashing arguments or coming up with fresh ones; it’s not a substitute for recon or vacation. Rules 161 and 162 deal with those, and the CCAs are there if an appeal is sought.

It’s just another tax prep session. What does the revised return look like, and, most importantly, what is the bottom line per the opinion?

An example of a proper objection to  IRS’ numbers at a Rule 155 is to be found today in Savino Cruz, Docket No. 16268-16, filed 10/22/21*. And even though Judge Nega overrules Savino’s objection, he makes sure that the Child Tax Credit Savino wants is folded into the bottom line.

Savino filed his objection within the ninety-day widow for filing computations, agreed or unagreed. Then Savino moved to amend his objection, and Judge Nega lets it in. IRS filed and responded accordingly.

“Petitioner argues that respondent’s computation failed to include a $1,000 Child Tax Credit for his son therefore, is inconsistent with the Court’s opinion in this case. Accordingly, petitioner requests that this Court correct the inconsistency and adjust the balance due from petitioner… from $8,308 to $7,308. Respondent counters that the proposed computation does, in fact, provide petitioner a $1,000 Child Tax Credit in accordance with the Court’s Opinion. Respondent explained that the Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, attached to the notice of deficiency included a $1,000 Child Tax Credit on line 8a, however, respondent failed to subtract that credit on line 13a to reflect his belief that petitioner was not entitled to the credit. As a result, respondent asserts that the Form 4549 essentially provided petitioner a $1,000 Child Tax Credit that respondent did not believe petitioner was previously entitled to at the time. However, since the Court later determined that petitioner was entitled to the credit, respondent explained that his computation left the Child Tax Credit the way it had been reported on the Form 4549.

“Upon review of the record, the Court is satisfied that respondent’s computation included a $1,000 Child Tax Credit that petitioner was entitled to for the 2014 taxable year therefore, is consistent with our opinion.” Order, at p. 2.

A Taishoff “Good Job” to Savino’s trusty attorney, Andy.

*Savino Cruz 16268-16 10 22 21

Rule in CDPs

Richard Hudec, Docket No. 1953-20L, filed 10/21/21*, is the usual you-didn’t raise it-at-Appeals-so-fuggedaboutit. Richard had an EA as agent (not Power of Attorney, Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler; a power of attorney is a piece of paper or a concatenation of electrons wherewith the taxpayer-principal appoints a Representative or Agent). The EA may not have been in the picture at Appeals; I can’t discern the whole story from the order.

I only blog this order because Judge Speedy Weiler provides a footnote with the latest learning on which CCAs are record-rule-only, and which are free of the Administrative Procedures Act and the record rule in CDP abuse of discretion cases.

I include Judge Speedy Weiler’s “copious citation of precedent” to make my readers’ lives easier if they need to drag-and-drop for a brief or memo of law.

” The facts in this Order are principally derived from the administrative record developed before Appeals; however, our review of Appeals’ determination is not limited to the administrative record. In Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), we held that ‘when reviewing for abuse of discretion under section 6330(d), we are not limited by the Administrative Procedure Act * * * and our review is not limited to the administrative record.’ The Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have concluded otherwise, holding that the so-called ‘record rule’ applies to Collection Due Process (CDP) cases before this Court. See Keller v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’g in part T.C. Memo. 2006-166, and aff’g in part, rev’g in part decisions in related cases; Murphy v. Commissioner, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006); Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’g 123 T.C. 85 (2004). Under sec. 7482(b)(1)(G), appeal in this case would lie in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, absent a stipulation by the parties to the contrary. Since the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue, our review of Appeals’ determination in this case is not limited by the record rule. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).” Order, Footnote 1, at pp. 1-2.

And this gives me a springboard once again to suggest that essential elements of due process should not be constrained by State lines; Federal tax law is uniform for the entire country, so the scope of review should follow the flag, not cartography.

*Richard Hudec 1953-20L 10 21 21

Many non-practitioners think tax practice is arcane, casuist, hypertechnical, and dull. But I find the human interest side irresistible, so I’m reaching back to the first American playwright to be taken seriously in Europe, for today’s title of my sermonette. Clyde Fitch’s 1905 Broadway hit captions the latest installment in the Podlucky Saga; taking center stage is Karla S. Podlucky, co-starring in Gregory J. Podlucky & Karla S. Podlucky, Docket No. 453-17, filed 10/21/21*.

I’ll defer to Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber, as he lectures us on the trial testimony hearsay exception in FRE 804(b)(1). Note this might be a dandy question for the upcoming Slaughter of the Innocents, a/k/a the US Tax Court admissions exam.

Karla wants innocent spousery, and as Greg is looking at $4 million in tax plus chops, she does well to bail. Except.

“In 2011 Mrs. Podlucky was indicted on counts of money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Government alleged that petitioners used funds extracted from Le-Nature’s, Inc., a corporation of which petitioner husband had majority control, to purchase (and later sell) jewelry from various jewelers, including Van Cleef & Arpels (VCA).” Order, at p. 1.

Longtime Antiques Roadshow addicts (of whom I’m one) have often seen Arlie Sulka and colleagues lose it over even tiny  VCA pretties, to the tune of five figures plus.

Turns out on the money laundering trial one Brent Nestor, then VCA Senior VP for Sales, testified that Karla got custom-made baubles, and that he personally had to measure her wrists and fingers to make sure they fitted exactly. Brent got a thorough cross from Karla’s defense counsel on that trial. Now IRS wants to use Brent’s prior testimony to defeat innocent spousery via Karla’s guilty knowledge about the various rocks and minerals she got.

Problem is that Brent now resides in the Helvetian Confederacy, and the Swiss gov’t doesn’t allow foreigners to take testimony of its residents on its soil. And Brent says he ain’t goin’ nowhere, so The Long Arm of Judge Scholar Al can’t help here; for the backstory on said long arm, see my blogpost thus entitled.

Karla’s lawyer says the former trial testimony is hearsay. So it is (declarant not in the courtroom), but FRE 804(b)(1) comes to the rescue.

IRS claims “…Mr. Nestor’s testimony is admissible under FRE 804(b)(1), which provides an exception when (1) the declarant is unavailable,  (2) the testimony was given ‘at a trial * * * whether given during the current proceeding or a different one,’ and (3) the testimony is ‘now offered against a party who had * * * an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.’ FRE 804(b)(1).” Order, at p. 2.

No doubt Brent is unavailable, even to the long arm of Judge Scholar Al. And yes, there was Karla’s money laundering trial. But what about motive and opportunity?

“By cross-examining Mr. Nestor during the criminal trial, Mrs. Podlucky’s counsel had a ‘similar motive’ to develop Mr. Nestor’s testimony in an effort to show that Mrs. Podlucky had no knowledge of (and derived no benefit from) the jewelry arrangements. We accordingly conclude that Mr. Nestor’s prior testimony is admissible under FRE 804(b)(1).” Order, at p. 3 (“Somber reasoning and copious citation of precedents” omitted, but read it, Innocents, it might could be that it gets on the November Death March).

When the client is facing the slammer, there’s very serious motive to show they didn’t know nuthin’.

Now IRS is moving here for an order in limine to let in Brent’s launderette trial testimony.

“In their responses to the Motion in Limine petitioners do not address the hearsay rule or the requirements of FRE 804(b)(1). Nor do they dispute that Mr. Nestor is currently an ‘unavailable’ witness. Rather, petitioners contest granular details of his prior testimony and assert that his testimony is not relevant. Mr. Nestor’s testimony is clearly relevant because Mrs. Podlucky, by requesting innocent spouse relief, has placed her knowledge of the jewelry purchases at issue in this case. And to the extent petitioners believe Mr. Nestor’s testimony to be incorrect, they were free to testify to that effect at trial.”  Order, at pp. 3-4.

When the law is against you, pound the facts. When the facts are against you, pound the law. When both law and facts are against you, pound the table. Doesn’t work with Judge Scholar Al. I make IRS 1 to 8 in the Karla Bling stakes.

*Greg Podlucky & Karla Podlucky, 453-17 10 21 21

In an off-the-bencher, Judge Kerrigan notes that even though Douglas Leon Schnitzspahn, Docket No.: 8477-20S, filed 10/20/21*, “…is making progress on filing his tax returns, petitioner did not establish that his failure to file was due to reasonable cause. Accordingly the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax is sustained….” Transcript, at p. 5.

Doug “…has a history of filing his tax returns late.” Transcript, at p. 2.

In this case Doug finally filed four (count ’em, four) years late, even taking his extension into account. IRS, not playing the waiting game, hits Doug with a SFR, with a SNOD at no extra charge. The only issue today is the add-ons, Transcript, at p. 4.

Doug can’t come up with a reasonable excuse for his late filing and late paying. And Judge Kerrigan notes that in most cases there is no reasonable cause excuse for nonpayment of estimated tax. “Generally, no reasonable cause exception exists for section 7765(a) addition to tax. [Sic; I think you meant 6654(a), Judge, as there is no Section 7765.]  Sec. 1.6654-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. There are exceptions to section 6654(a) addition to tax and petitioner does not meet the requirements of these exceptions. See sec. 6454(a) [sic; I think you meant Section 6654(e), Judge]. Accordingly petitioner is liable for the addition to tax pursuant to section 6654(a).” Transcript, at p. 6.

Not to discourage trying, but avoiding add-ons needs more than trying.

*Douglas Leon Schnitzspahn 8477-20S 10 20 21

Bob Gover’s 1962 masterpiece has truly been a gift that keeps on giving me good headlines. And last night The Great Chieftain of The Jersey Boys gave us a reminder that losing your “S” may not happen even if the chops, add-ons and interest take you over the $50K cutoff for small case treatment.

Though you may try for the Matthew 7:13 treatment, when disputed tax only is less than $50K,  small-claimerhood in US Tax Court is reached only when Section 7463(f) is in play.

Briefly, that means Section 6015 innocent spousery, CDP in Section 6330 NITL (but not Section 6320 NFTL; watch it), and Section 6404(h) interest abatement where the amount of interest in dispute is less than $50K.

All others, it’s $50K total in dispute: tax, interest, add-ons, and chops.

Check out Frantic Frank’s Continuing Ed online lectures. No charge, and well worth your time.

And no, I don’t get any compensation for any of this, other than intangible spiritual benefits.

I’m sure Kirk E. Heaton, Docket No. 10833-19L, filed 10/19/21*, is singing the words of the immortal Little Richard’s and Enotris Johnson’s 1957 hit, as that Obliging Jurist, Judge David Gustafson, lets Kirk amend his petition to claim CNC, and gently suggests to IRS’ counsel that maybe so perhaps they might settle this CDP (nudge nudge, wink wink).

Kirk is an oilfield pipeline welder in the Great Northwest, but he suffers from “… progressively worsening cervical and lumbar spondylosis in addition to shortness of breath, heart palpitations, high blood pressure, and a spot on his lung suspicious of asbestosis.” Order, at p. 2. This caused him to undergo two surgeries, and study to be an inspector rather than a welder, because he wanted to keep working, but employment is spotty. He had to stop paying off an old tax liability, but it has ballooned with interest and chops. He could stop working and go on disability, so he could be in CNC status, but IRS hit Kirk with a NITL for one year where he owes only $11K.

Kirk petitioned when Appeals said he could pay more than the $500 per month he offered. He didn’t raise CNC at the hearing because he said he wanted to go on working. The SO disallowed Kirk’s claimed health insurance payments because his non-liable spouse paid them out of a bank account in her name, and sustained the NITL.

Kirk petitioned, but never mentioned CNC therein. IRS moved for summary J, claiming no disputed facts. I suspect the Gonzaga University School of Law’s LITC got into the act here, because in replying to IRS’ motion, Kirk moves for leave to amend his petition to mention CNC..

IRS claims bad faith, delay of the game, and futility. Kirk says the NOD never mentioned CNC, so he didn’t mention it in his petition.

Judge Gustafson buys Kirk’s story.

“We find that Mr. Heaton’s reason for the amendment, that he inadvertently omitted the currently not collectible issue from the petition because it was not discussed at all in the notice of determination, excuses his delay for purposes of granting leave to amend, and that any inconvenience to the Commissioner in permitting the amendment is outweighed by the justice of allowing Mr. Heaton to advance all allegations of abuse of discretion regarding the notice of determination because the Commissioner has adequate time to respond to the currently not collectible issue.” Order, at p. 6.

As for bad faith, Kirk moved to amend as soon as he realized that he’d raised CNC at the CDP. But Judge Gustafson allows IRS to answer the CNC issue in supplementary papers, and he’ll consider it with the rest of IRS’ summary J motion.

IRS claims the amendment is futile, because the record doesn’t mention CNC, and the record is what determines abuse of discretion.

Judge Gustafson: “We do not agree that Mr. Heaton’s proposed amendment is futile because the amendment asserts that SO P’s failure to consider CNC status at all was an abuse of discretion. Because the notice of determination does not discuss CNC at all, we cannot know if there was a factual basis for failing to consider currently not collectible status as a collection alternative. Mr. Heaton appears to have had a good faith basis to request CNC status as a collection alternative on the basis of his excessive medical bills, irregular employment, and reliance on limited unemployment benefits during periods where he was not working, see IRM 5.16.1.2.9(6), and he raised the CNC issue both before and during the CDP hearing.

“Based on these facts and circumstances, we can assume that whether Mr. Heaton could qualify for CNC status warranted at least some consideration by Appeals and some discussion in the notice of determination, and that failure to consider the issue could conceivably be an abuse of discretion. In our view, justice favors allowing Mr. Heaton to advance all allegations of abuse of discretion by IRS Appeals, and whether Mr. Heaton could have qualified for CNC status on the basis of the information provided to SO P is a merits issue that we would rather consider not under a motion for leave but under the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.” Order, at p. 7. (Name omitted).

So Judge Gustafson tells Kirk and IRS to fold CNC in with the summary J mix, do the papers up accordingly, and see if y’all can settle, OK?

Personal note- Lumbar spondylosis is a very painful illness. It affects one of my nearest and dearest.

On a happier note, I can’t close without a Taishoff “Good job, First Class” to Jennifer A. Gellner, Esq., now or formerly honcho of the Gonzaga LITC Bulldogs.

*Kirk E Heaton 10833-19L 10 19 21