STJ Peter J. (“HB”) Panuthos has a chicken-and-egg in Simon R. Workman, Docket No. 7107-16W, filed 1/16/26. This saga began 17 (count ’em, 17) years ago when Workman dropped info on Individual 1 and Companies 1 and 2.

IRS gave the whole thing one claim number, sent the info off to SB/SE who audited and no-changed Individual 1, whereupon the Ogden Sunseteers blew off Workman in 2013.

In the meantime (2015), Workman sends in a new Form 211, blowing further on Individual 1, Companies 1 and 2, and adding Companies 3 and 4. The Ogden Sunseteers don’t bother with a new file number, don’t send the stuff to any operating division or subject-matter expert, and just blow off Workman in 2016, saying their 2013 determination remains the same.

Whereupon IRS moves to toss for want of jurisdiction as Workman didn’t timely petition the 2013 shootdown  and for summary J, to which Workman counters with document demands. There’s even a trip to USDCDC.

STJ Panuthos sorts it out.

“The record demonstrates respondent did not take any action based on the additional information petitioner provided in the second submitted Form 211 on June 26, 2015. Respondent did not refer petitioner’s June 26, 2015, submission to another office of the IRS and did not initiate an examination, and therefore respondent contends he did not proceed with any relevant administrative or judicial action under section 7623(b). However, respondent did take administrative action based on the information provided by petitioner in his 2008 submission. The WBO opened a claim number, referred petitioner’s claim to SBSE, examined the target taxpayer, and issued a determination denying petitioner’s claim in the February 1, 2013, letter and then again in the February 10, 2016, letter. While respondent contends that the February 10, 2016, letter amounts to a rejection of the second Form 211, the letter is clearly in reference to Claim 2009-005937 and states that petitioner does not meet the criteria for an award.

“As such, the Court concludes that the February 10, 2016, letter was a ‘determination’ per section 7623(b)(4) and, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this case.  Therefore, we will deny respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 4. (Citations and footnote omitted.)

Workman’s document demands get dissed. Whistleblowers are record-rulers. The parties can either stip to an administrative record or IRS can put in the whole thing under seal and with a privilege log if needed and Workman can move to supplement per Rule 93(b).

Tommy Nashe’s 1592 dirge forms the backdrop for the last-ditch efforts of the Schulers, the non-TMP in North Wall Holdings, LLC, Schuler Investments, LLC, A Partner Other Than the Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 27773-21, filed 1/15/26, to escape the 18-day guillotine that fell on their Rule 162 reconsideration.

For the backstory, see my blogpost “Boechler, Meet TEFRA,” 10/21/25. Although my colleague Lyle (“Full-Court”) Pres, Esq., has announced his retirement (for the second time), he’s still onboard for the Schulers. We old hound dogs still jump up when we hear the horn.

Howbeit, the Schulers’ trusty attorneys have found hope in Kwong, a CFC opinion extending the statutory deadline for a refund suit due to Section 7508A COVID extension.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch won’t have it.

The Schulers claim change in law. But Section 7508A (whether the 2019 or the 2021 version) was around throughout. All the Schulers’ trusty attorneys have is a legal argument they failed to make the last time. Rule 162s, especially late Rule 162s, aren’t mulligans.

And Kwong is a CFC case. No Golsenization of a lower-court opinion; CFC doesn’t bind USTC, although USTC might think about it; see Order at p. 4, footnote 2.

Even if Kwong were sustained on appeal, appeal would lie in 9 Cir, and the Schulers are Golsenized to 11 Cir, not Federal Cir.

Tax Court has blown off the Jarkesy-based challenges to the Section 6662 variety chops on the public rights principle (see my blogpost “Full House,” 8/21/25), but Section 6663 fraud chops come a lot closer to the “commonlaw equivalent” than classic revenue collection.

Howbeit, Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber won’t swing at that curveball. He says it’s too late when it’s first raised in a brief accompanying a Rule 155 beancount. It was neither raised on the trial nor in the two (count ’em, two) post-trial briefs.

Rule 155 beancounts are no place to raise new legal arguments.

So Vincent Fumo, Docket No. 17603-13, filed 1/14/26, is mulcted for the agreed-upon deficiencies and the 75% chops.

Taishoff says I get the strong feeling that, as Mary Queen of Scots used to say, “my end is my beginning.” More to come on this one.

Edited to add, 1/14/26: Judge Scholar Al has issued a “Corrected” opinion in T. C. Memo. 2025-97. As it is 90 (count ’em, 90) pages long, I will not try to digest it, as the result seems to be the same.

And yes, Silver Moss Properties did involve Section 6663 fraud chops. But I doubt it is the last word, despite Tax Court’s unanimity.

Whistleblower 11099-13W, T.C. Memo. 2026-5, filed 1/13/26, claims his blowing caused Target (not the supermarket, the taxpayer) to change its accounting method from LIFO to FIFO, thereby incurring $1 billion-with-a-b of income and $400 million in tax, abandoning their inflated COGS scheme. 11099-13W thereby claims a big Section 7623(b) award, but IRS says his explication of the scheme was unintelligible. Anyhow, voluntarily reported income is neither “collected proceeds nor “proceeds collected,” whatever IRS regulations are then applicable.

Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern buys all of IRS’ tale.

Whenever Target changed its inventory accounting, during audit or after audit, Lewis (the case, 154 T. C. 8; see my blogpost “The 6.9% Solution,” 4/8/20) says it doesn’t matter. It was voluntary, not the result of the whistleblower’s information causing IRS to commence an administrative or judicial action.

“Indeed, while respondent received in March 2012 Target’s application to change its inventory accounting method from LIFO to FIFO—five months before the 08/09 audit cycle examination team reported the results of its examination—nothing in WBO’s administrative claim file indicates that the examination team expanded its examination to include 2011 or any year for which Target may have reported under FIFO. And even if the facts were to the contrary, we would still be governed by our holding in Lewis, 154 T.C. at 134, that ‘reported, paid tax is not collected proceeds’ even if ‘an ongoing audit was expanded to include the year of the reported, paid tax.’” T. C. Memo. 2025-5, at p. 24.

In short, the repentant sinner’s disgorgement belongs to IRS alone.

Assiduous readers of this my blog (there must be some) are hanging breathless on the fate of IRS’ last remaining partial summary J motion in Ivey Branch Holdings, LLC, Ivey Branch Investors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 19189-19. filed 1/13/26. It’s the electrifying story of GA law, GA boondockery, and a real estate commonplace, told by Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber.

For prolegomenon, see my blogpost “Pulling Wires,” 9/11/25.

Back in 1975, long before the Dixieland boondockery dodges, one Tommy Davis, a prior owner of the subject boondocks, granted and conveyed a certain easement thereover to Jefferson Electric Membership Corporation, apparently a rural electricity cooperative of the type that brings enlightenment to outliers. Said easement empowers the Jeffersonians to erect poles, string wires, cut down and defoliate anywhere on the property, unlimited by a metes and bound description. It appears the Jeffersonians did none thereof nowhere since.

IRS plays the worn-out perpetuity gambit, saying this easement transgresses the perpetual conservation easement underlying the Iveys’ $24 million deduction, by allowing tree-cutting unsanctioned by the 501(c)(3) guardian, chemical defoliation, and erection of transmission lines.

Except.

Judge Scholar Al (no doubt assisted by the Ivey’s trusty attorneys, among whom we find the redoutable Vivian G. (“Golden”) Hoard, Esq.) traverses GA easement law. True, Chicago Title excepted the utility easement when they insured Ivey’s title on acquisition. Taishoff says don’t waste your time even asking an underwriter about omitting or insuring over a utility easement; most States’ public service laws put paid to that. Anyway, while GA does not favor extinguishment by nonuser (use-it-or-lose-it), there is a rebuttable presumption that twenty years of nonuse equals abandonment of the easement.

“Respondent has adduced no evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment by Jefferson Electric. The record shows that Tommy Davis conveyed the Utility Easement to Jefferson Electric in 1975. It also shows that by 2015, when Ivey Branch donated the easement to Foothills, Jefferson Electric had not exercised any of its rights under the Utility Easement with respect to the Ivey Branch property. Its ‘non-user’ had thus lasted for 40 years.” Order, at p. 6.

All IRS’ counsel did was quote the disfavor of abandonment cases.

So no summary J.

Taishoff says utility easements have been around ever since public water, sewers and electricity. If you wish to develop real estate, you need them. As the providers thereof are regulated, the forms of easement are non-negotiable. Live with it.

As I said in my blogpost hereinabove cited “I’m a fan of summary J, but this is ridiculous.”

Pradeep Khanna, Docket No. 17234-24L, 1/12/26, has had five (count ’em, five) years of deficiencies erased, and no fewer than ten (count ’em, ten) years of Section 6038 offshore cash stash chops obliterated by defective Section 6751(b) Boss Hossery. Clearly, Pradeep’s trusty attorney knows a thing or two.

And of course, a quick docket search shows the hand of The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys.

But Pradeep wants to fight over the interest IRS abated in the unwinding of the foregoing, claiming too little, to wit, “‘nearly half a million dollars’ of interest is at stake and this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue.” Order, at p. 4.

No, we don’t, says Judge Nega. This is a petition from a CDP, IRS dropped every claim, Pradeep’s account shows a zero balance, so  Zuch bars the door to The Glasshouse.

As for Section 6404(h), Pradeep has a real problem: either the NOD expressly denied his claim for abatement of interest (in which case his petition is too late for the 180-day cutoff to petition) or if not, his time to petition may not yet have run.

Taishoff says let’s say nothing of equitable tolling, as the parties and Judge Naga all avoid that rabbithole.

But the transcripts of the hearing of IRS’ motion to dismiss show that it’s just possible to read the NOD to deny the abatement Pradeep claims.

Except.

“…the Petition does not reflect this belief. It leaves the box designated for disputing any claim arising under section 6404(h) unchecked, alleges no assignment of error directed toward interest abatement, nor does petitioner even use the word ‘interest’ anywhere in his narratives.” Order, at p. 5. All the petition does list is $43K of misapplied refunds, not half a million or anything like it.

A month after petitioning, Pradeep sent a letter to the AO apparently still pursuing abatement. Order, at p. 5. Judge Nega deems this to be a concession that the NOD wasn’t final on that point. Taishoff isn’t so sure, but better strategy might be to hold the issue for a hearing and there seek remand, get a final rejection at a supplemental, and fight that out when the supplemental NOD is up for confirmation.

Btw, the petition doesn’t show any attempt to comply with the $2 million net worth cutoff of Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). Pradeep tries to rescue this in his Objection to IRS’ motion to toss as moot, but that’s too late. Order, at p. 6.

Bottom line: last-minute goal-line saves don’t work when the defense knows the pleading rules and had opportunity to raise relevant issues before the puck crosses the line. Red light goes on, buzzer sounds, game over.

The pattern continues. Petitioners who miss the 90-day cutoff for Tax Court relief in jurisdictions where Culp and its progeny has reduced the 90-day cutoff to a claim processing statute founder on failure to plead equitable tolling. Here is Judge Cathy (“NCY = No Cognomen Yet”) Yung sending off Hassan A. Daramy, Docket No. 2070-24, filed 1/9/26 for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

“Petitioner has not claimed, much less established, that equitable tolling extended that period for timely filing to the date that the Petition was filed.” Order, at p. 1.

Culp pointed out that the “United States Tax Court, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2024, at 23 (Feb. 1, 2023) (explaining that in Fiscal Year 2022 80% of the Tax Court petitions were filed by taxpayers proceeding pro se).” Culp, at p. 15. 

How a self-represented petitioner is to know how to plead equitable tolling is nowhere explained.

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler has an opinion worthy of a full-dress T. C., but it’s only a Memo. Kenneth Walker and Juli A. Walker, T. C. Memo. 2026-4, filed 1/8/26, didn’t reconcile their ACA Advance Premium Tax Credit and didn’t file Forms 8962 and 1095-A with their 1040 MFJ, but did pay tax shown on the last-named. IRS assessed tax shown on 1040 MFJ, but sent Letter 12C when the Health Insurance Marketplace tipped IRS off that Ken and Juli had gotten $20K APTC.

Ken and Juli sent in the forms and got a NITL. IRS assessed the missing APTC because Ken and Juli blew past the 400% poverty line, claiming the APC was self-reported, hence assessed tax.

At the CDP they requested, their trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Woody, argues the assessed APTC is invalid, as there was no SNOD. The reconciliation forms do not self-report tax.

Judge Speedy Weiler does not “find respondent’s arguments to be compelling.” T. C. Memo. 2026-4, at p. 8.

“Petitioners’ original return did not account for their receipt of the APTC. Upon request by the IRS petitioners furnished a completed Form 8962 that reported their MAGI to be $110,599—more than 401% over the federal poverty line of $24,600. The Form 8962 also reported that petitioners were not eligible to receive the PTC and, in Part III, reflected an excess APTC of $20,904. Form 8962, however, does not ultimately determine an amount of tax due from petitioners. Furthermore, petitioners’ return, as originally filed, failed to account for the PTC. Therefore, and upon receipt of information received in Form 8962, it was necessary for the IRS to determine whether petitioners had a deficiency in tax. See I.R.C. § 6211.

“On brief petitioners contend that Congress provided protections to taxpayers from inappropriate assessments. Petitioners argue that the IRS adjusted their 2018 tax return and determined that a deficiency in tax was due, and the IRS was therefore obligated to issue a Notice of Deficiency under the deficiency procedures of subchapter B of chapter 63 of subtitle F of the Code, namely sections 6211 through 6215. We agree.” T. C. Memo. 2026-4, at p. 8.

Woody gets a Taishoff “Good Job, First Class, with Swords and Diamonds.”

The great Boechler silt-stir continues apace. Both IRS and Jay Dunn, T. C. Memo. 2026-2, filed 1/7/26, agree that Jay can withdraw his petition without prejudice from a CDP that sustained the NITL that he now wants to deal with via an OIC. Judge Goeke leans heavily upon IRS’ concession that they won’t be prejudiced if he allows the withdrawal.

The original Wagner allowed withdrawal without prejudice because the Section 6330(d)(1) thirty-day cutoff to petition a NOD was jurisdictional, and that train had left by the time the motion to withdraw had been made. Boechler defanged the thirty-day bite.

“Dismissal without prejudice protects the plaintiff’s right to file a subsequent lawsuit. Our decision in Wagner to grant dismissal without prejudice might, on its face, have caused a taxpayer to think he had another chance for Court review of the collection action. Before Boechler that was not the case. After Boechler, taxpayers technically have another chance for Court review of the collection action if they can establish that either equitable tolling or some other relief to the 30-day petition period of section 6330(d)(1) applies.

“Nevertheless, the phrase ‘without prejudice’ may still confuse taxpayers because they are severely restricted in their ability to seek further Court review even though section 6330(d)(1) does not impose a jurisdictional bar to filing a subsequent petition. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that taxpayers will have another opportunity for Court review of the collection action. Taxpayers face a ‘heavy burden’ of proof when asserting they are entitled to equitable tolling. Tolling of federal statutes is used ‘sparingly.’” T. C. Memo. 2026-2, at pp. 5-6. (Citations and footnote omitted).

If in fact the equitable tolling road is the only one around the thirty-day barrier, then dismissal without prejudice is largely symbolic. So much time will have elapsed between the NOD and the refiling that the petitioner will need a spectacular story to get through.

But Judge Goeke isn’t done; he drives home the lesson.

“Petitioner understands that if respondent rejects his OIC, respondent will not issue a supplemental notice of determination for the Court to review. He also acknowledges that upon the Court’s granting dismissal without prejudice, he will be subject to collection actions as provided by law. He has stated that he does not intend to refile a petition.

“Because respondent does not object to petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, we will dismiss this case without prejudice.” T. C. 2026-2, at p. 6.

Taishoff says if seeking withdrawal without prejudice in a CDP, take a good hard look before relying on Dunn.