No, not another microcaptivity dodge; this is STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel adding a gloss to the NY-NJ rivalry. Writing from a trial session on this Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of N. America, STJ Publius Siegel assures Bruce Ammerman, Docket No. 11069-25, filed 10/14/26, as to the status of his home State.

“There is no dispute that the Notice was addressed to and received by Mr. Ammerman at an address in New Jersey. There is no dispute that the Petition was filed with the Court more than 90 days after the issuance of the Notice. And Mr. Ammerman does not argue that equitable tolling should apply to extend the period for filing. Rather, he contends that he was ‘outside the United States’ as he claims to understand that term and thus should be entitled to the 150-day filing period. Although polite, Mr. Ammerman is very clearly incorrect: New Jersey is part of the United States. The 90-day period applies.” Order, at p. 2.

“New Jersey is part of the United States.” Are you sure, Judge?

That’s how Judge Joseph W. Nega finds the testimony in MD M. Rahman & Syeda Momotaz, Docket No. 8286-23, filed 10/13/26. It comes from MD M. explaining his accounting methods.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t provide Judge Nega enough to Cohanize whatever expenses Rahman claims above whatever IRS and he stiped.

 “In his testimony, Mr. Rahman not only insisted that he should prevail entirely on all disputed deduction amounts, but he repeatedly explained petitioners total lack of documentation as a result of the looting of his store on June 1st, 2020, and March 28th, 2021.

“However, his testimony did not explain how then he was able to substantiate all the deductions allowed in the stipulation of settled issues and during the examination but none of the items that now remain at issue. His admission regarding his incomplete bookkeeping and his habit of paying personal expenses from his business account do not bolster his arguments. While his testimony is refreshing, it does not give the Court enough to apply a Cohan analysis.” Transcript, at p.11.

No doubt about it, Mark S. Bonhage, Docket No. 7563-23, filed 10/13/26, had an uphill fight to stave off summary J tossing Year One, as he is “more than 1,300 days” late with his petition. Order, at p. 2.

Even though Mark is in exCulpatory 3 Cir, where equitable tolling reigns, his attempts to slide under the two-point tag of extraordinary circumstances and diligent follow-up fail.

“Petitioner mailed his Petition in this case… more than 1,300 days after the Notice of Deficiency was filed [sic; I think you meant “mailed” Judge]. Petitioner offers several reasons for the delay, including his disability, an earlier bankruptcy, and purported attorney error, among others. None of his unsubstantiated arguments demonstrate extraordinary circumstances that excuse his delay or demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights. In an attempt to allow petitioner another opportunity to present evidence and further argument regarding the applicability of equitable tolling’s application to this case, we set the motion for a hearing. Petitioner did not avail himself of that opportunity, so we will grant respondent’s Motion with respect to [Year One].” Order, at p. 2.

As to Year Two (no, they’re not consecutive, they’re three (count ’em, three) years apart), IRS’ proffered proofs are the reason for the headline first hereinabove set forth at the head hereof (as my high-priced colleagues would say).

I’m leaving in the dates, because they matter.

“Despite supplementation, respondent’s Motion fails to provide sufficient indicia showing a Notice of Deficiency respecting tax year 2017 actually existed and was mailed to petitioner on November 4, 2019. In fact, respondent’s Motion explicitly states the Notice of Deficiency was not mailed until February 2, 2023 (a statement in direct conflict with the PS Form 3877 offered to prove its mailing). Petitioner’s Objection correctly notes that February 2, 2023, is less than 90 days before the filing of the Petition. And yet, whether a Notice of Deficiency was mailed November 4, 2019, or on February 2, 2023, respondent remains unable to produce even a file copy. The conflict in respondent’s Motion demonstrates a dispute as to material fact as to the existence of the Notice of Deficiency and necessitates denial with respect to tax year 2017.” Order, at p. 2.

Translated from Judge Nega-speak, that means “IRS, drop Year Two, take Year One and run.”

Tax Court announces the death of Judge Harry A. Haines. Here is the press release.

No, not a political protest; this blog will obdurately remain neutral. I merely repeat an old favorite blogpost for this date (coincidentally a very happy one for my nearest and dearest).

This from 10/13/14.

As Harry Golden, raconteur and essayist, put it more than fifty years ago, “The most famous expression among the immigrants on the East Side of New York was ‘A klug zu Columbus’n’ which, freely translated, meant that Columbus should have broken his head before he discovered it (America).  The expression was always used in good humor and often as a term of endearment, as we shall see.”

Mr. Golden went on to describe Columbus as a folk-hero, a kind of mythic figure both praised and blamed, but ultimately the source of good-humored comment.

Howbeit, my readers, descendants of immigrants as we all are, whether our several ancestors crossed the Bering Strait coming from the Olduvai Gorge, or from the steppes of Central Asia, or even across the Atlantic or Pacific, I note that Tax Court is closed today, so I can bring y’all neither entertainment nor enlightenment.

Enjoy a day off, whether it be for you Indigenous Peoples’ Day or Columbus Day. And anyway, have a klug zu Columbus’n.

Ever since my earliest acquaintance with United States Tax Court practice, Judge Dawson’s sacred mantra from his immortal decision in Branerton Corp., 61 T. C. 691 (1974), at p. 692, has been resounding throughout this my blog: “For many years the bedrock of Tax Court practice has been the stipulation process, now embodied in Rule 91.”

So why are we getting orders like Darryl M. Jacobs & Suzanne M. Jacobs, et al., Docket No. 14682-23, filed 10/9/26?

It’s the standard IRS Section 6751(b) Boss Hoss compliance motion for summary J. To which petitioners’ trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Steve, files “…a Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment indicating that petitioners do not object to the granting of respondent’s Motion as it relates to the supervisory approval requirement of section 6751(b)(1).” Order, at p. 1.

Judge Nega agrees, after the boilerplate recitations of the virtues of summary J, with which I heartily concur. But do we need this?

I must assume that Steve, clearly not a Tax Court novice (I wish I knew all that he knows about it), has done at least one Branerton phonecall with IRS in this case. And that at least one of the ten (count ’em, ten) IRS counsel assigned to this case has had a wee word with Steve about chops, add-ons, and Boss Hossery. If not, why not?

Surely Judge Nega’s time is too valuable, and Tax Court clerical resources too overstretched, to require a formal order for an undisputed factual question in six (count ’em, six) conjoined cases.

How about a sentence in Stip One like this. “P and R agree that R’s applicable employees have complied with the formal requisites of IRC Section 6751(b). The foregoing sentence shall not be deemed or construed to be a concession by or on behalf of P that any tax, penalty, additions to tax, charge, fee, or impost, however denominated, is due, payable or owing, except as may be explicitly elsewhere herein set forth.”

I was taught in my young day that making life easy for the judge was more than its own reward.

I just recently noted the exemplary protections afford whistleblowers both generally by Section 6103 and specifically by Rule 345, and yet Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way has to admonish both Whistleblower 36070-21W, filed 10/8/26, and IRS’ counsel not to e-file unredacted documents containing PII.

And Judge Way has to seal, enumerate, and set out specifically what documents they need to redact and refile.

This despite his having earlier ordered them to do exactly that. Both parties then blithely repeated their previous errors.

Some beg too late for a level of anonymity provided only to certain petitioners. But when those already accorded special treatment ignore the protection they’re offered, I can only shake my head.

Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes doesn’t disrespect a single partitive genitive in Drake Johnson, Docket No. 10265-25L, filed 10/8/26. What he does, is to cut the usual three-page toss of a petitioned CDP down to a page.

The usual toss order goes into the history of Sections 6320 and 6330, de novo vs abuse of discretion, a procedural history of the case, and the fact that petitioner never submitted a complete Form 433-A or B and backups for the requested CA. Then follows the boilerplate copious citation of precedent.

Judge Holmes does as is first hereinabove written at the head hereof, as my expensive colleagues say.

“The only issue is this rejection of Mr. Johnson’s request for a collection alternative. When the amount of tax liability is not at issue, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. This means that we look to see if the Commissioner’s decision was based on an error of law or rested on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or whether he ruled irrationally. 

“We also review only the reasons given by the IRS in its notice of determination, not new reasons made for the first time on appeal. In other words, we follow Chenery.

“We have to conclude that the Appeals officer didn’t abuse his discretion in rejecting this request because Mr. Johnson did not submit supplemental financial information that the Appeals officer reasonably requested.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted, but they’re the usual ones). 

It’s been three years and more since I last quoted the ancient Japanese proverb: “The word once spoken, not even the Emperor’s horsemen can return” in this my blog. But I used it just the other day, responding to an appeal from a petitioner whose case I’d blogged nearly three (count ’em, three) months ago. He found that his case had brought him notoriety in the trade press and blogosphere before he stumbled upon my humble effort. He’d asked the more prominent tax journalists to temper their previous blasts to the shorn lamb and hoped I would do likewise.

I did, a little, but quoted the above-cited aforementioned wisdom. Or as we Westerners put it, ya can’t unring a bell.

That set me to wondering. How many practitioners put in their Tax Court litigation engagement (or retainer) agreements that all proceedings are public, with the very circumscribed Section 7461, Section 6103, Rule 27, and Rule 345 exceptions? How many such agreements do not state that counsel has no control over what the Court may make public or what the trade press/blogosphere/lurkers/random commentators may say or publish, or the effects thereof? And the clients should consider before the proceeding is commenced that there may be presently unforeseeable effects from the public nature of such a proceeding?

Sometimes the failing of the Emperor’s horsemen can have a worse effect than the hoofprint of the Boss Hoss.

I am sure Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland, Texas CPA for more than thirty-five (count ’em, thirty-five) years and three-time San Antonio Tax Lawyer of the Year, would not consider the documentation submitted on the trial by Andrew B. West, T. C. Memo. 2026-105, filed 10/7/26, an example of the best Texas accounting. Andy B was a TX domiciliary in years at issue and pro se on the trial.

Fortunately, the task of unscrambling the post-trial document dump (mostly ignored except to show what petitioner was contending)  and erratic trial testimony fell to Judge David Gustafson, who was apparently so deeply down this rabbit hole that he called the SND a NOD, confusing me also.

Read for yourself the unscrambling of this undigested frittata. Andy B does get a trifle greater deduction than IRS would allow, but the unreported income stays. 

Judge Gustafson does write an essay on the proper preparation and use of spreadsheets in post-trial briefing.

“In principle we heartily approve of the use of such spreadsheets in a brief to present evidence taken from voluminous exhibits. In fact, at the conclusion of trial, we suggested spreadsheets, warning Mr. West that his exhibits—almost 2,000 pages showing thousands of photocopied checks, invoices, and the like—were of such volume and apparent disorganization that, by themselves and without explication by him, they would be insufficient to prove his case. We emphasized that, for every specific fact that Mr. West wanted us to find, he should point either to a page and line of transcript or to an exhibit that proves the fact. We suggested that he could undertake to support his claimed deductions by preparing and attaching to his opening brief a spreadsheet for each category of deduction for each year. We explained that a given spreadsheet should point to where in the record we could find, for each deductible amount, evidence that substantiates the nature and amount of that expenditure with citations of the exhibit numbers, Bates numbers, and testimony that was given on that subject. We noted that while it might sometimes be appropriate to deal with some expenses in bulk, the citations of individual expenditures would be essential to his prevailing.” T. C. Memo 2026-105, at p. 22, footnote 19.

Alas, “Mr. West followed our suggestion imperfectly.” Idem.