No, I’m not pitching a new cable TV reality show, although I’ll wager it could be a scream. No, here’s Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves scrapping a stip of facts on the eve of trial based on alleged facts not brought out at discovery. It’s Rule 91(e) on steroids; because IRS claims one (count it, one) sentence out of 40 ( count ’em, 40) paragraphs doesn’t tell the whole story, the whole new stip must be ready by next Friday, while trial starts Monday.

The case is Brown Bridge Newton 53, LLC, Brown Bridge 53 Manager, LLC, Tax Matters Partner,Docket No. 21274-21, filed 2/20/26.

The now-discarded stip said 53 got the property from a trust. IRS says it got other documents showing that one Jeff Grant (not my former boss, Baptist preacher, and self-help guru) got the property from the trust and conveyed it to 53.

So IRS asked 53 to elucidate, which they didn’t. IRS then asks to be relieved, to which 53 says IRS showed no grounds for relief.

Judge Tag Greaves says oh yes, IRS did.

“We have broad discretion in determining when justice requires that a stipulation be set aside. We have previously held that justice requires setting aside a stipulation when the evidence is contrary to the stipulation. Justice requires that we strike the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts and relieve respondent of this stipulation under Rule 91(e). The evidence set forth by respondent casts doubt as to whether [53] “acquired” the property from the … Trust, or whether the transaction should be viewed as a contribution from Jeff Grant. At the time that the parties stipulated to paragraph 40, respondent did not have in his possession the recently obtained evidence from third parties. Petitioners do not allege any prejudice resulting from striking this stipulation. As such, it would be unjust to hold respondent to a stipulation based on incomplete evidence. Instead, we will allow the parties to present their competing theories of the transaction at trial. Therefore, we will grant respondent relief from the first sentence of paragraph 40 of the First Stipulation of Facts. However, we will hold respondent to the second sentence of paragraph 40, which stipulates to the recorded deed.” Order, at p. 3. (Citations and name omitted).

Taishoff says why toss the whole thing for one sentence? Deem the sentence “impertinent,” use a Rule 52 Motion to Strike, and go on with the trial.