This unfriendly act finds no welcome in United States Tax Court, as Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones rebukes an unadmitted attorney seeking admission pro hac vice in Augustus Hill, Docket No. 5544-18, filed 1/22/26.

Leaving aside the execrable Latin (should be “pro hæc vice,” meaning “just for this one turn”), the unadmitted attorney (whom I’ll call AP) was told by the Clerk’s office to follow Rule 200(a)(2). Instead, AP enlists the aid of an admitted attorney (whom I’ll call Bill) to move for one-off admission. Bill’s assistance is somewhat less than stellar.

“[Bill] filed, on {AP]’s behalf, a Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Doc. 83). In the process of filing the motion, [Bill] selected the ‘Entry of Appearance’ option in DAWSON. Even though DAWSON webpages advise practitioners who select the ‘Entry of Appearance’ option that they-–not another attorney––are representing the party associated with their entry, [Bill] uploaded the motion on behalf of [AP]. This effort to bypass the Court’s Rules and policies was improper as is the filing itself.” Order, at p.1.

For the right way to do it, see my blogpost “Tom Sawyer, Tax Attorney,” 6/22/18.

Meanwhile, Judge CD Jones tosses the attempted EoA and motion.

Looks like that’s what Siemens USA Holdings, Inc., & Consolidated Subsidiaries, Docket No. 3989-24, filed 1/21/26, claims. IRS makes the by-now commonplace motion for partial summary J on Boss Hossery, but Siemens & Cons objects.

Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan doesn’t give us much detail as she tosses IRS’ motion.

“In its Sur-Reply petitioner raises concerns about the penalty form being altered and references respondent’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” Order, at pp. 2-3.

The First Amended motion papers state “that a misstatement was made, and respondent produced new exhibits pertaining to the misstatement to petitioner.” Order, at p. 3.

Who misstated what is not made clear.

But it’s enough of a fact question for ex-Ch J TBS to deny the motion.

In the dozen years since The Great Chieftain of the Jersey Boys first unloaded the Section 6751(b) defense (see my blogpost “Penalty Kick,” 7/17/14), it has furnished a bumper crop of blogfodder.

Chief among all tiebreakers in the IRC is Section 7491, Burden of Proof. But the motion thus entitled isn’t really a motion to shift in Diamond Grande Resort, LLC, Diamond Grande Resort Holdings, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 16088-22, filed 1/20/26.

Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy explains in a footnote.

“Petitioner’s Motion is titled ‘Motion to Shift the Burden of Proof’ but strictly speaking the Motion asks us not to ‘shift’ the burden but simply to rule that respondent’s valuation position is a new matter for purposes of Rule 142(a) and that respondent bears the burden of proof on that issue in the first instance.” Order, at p. 2, footnote 2.

Anyway, the stip of settled issues says valuation of the Dixieland boondocks in this syndicated conservation easement case is disputed, which shows the parties knew all along that this was an open question and not new matter.

Judge Sport Landy says the burden is relevant only when there’s an evidentiary tie. If one party’s evidence clearly outweighs the other’s at conclusion of the trial, who has the burden is irrelevant.

“The Court anticipates determining the fair market value of Diamond Grande Resort’s noncash charitable contribution based on a preponderance of the evidence in the record rather than based on the parties’ burdens of proof. The entire record in this case has not been fully developed and will not be fully developed until the conclusion of trial. As a result, the Court does not have sufficient information to rule on the contentions raised in petitioner’s Motion at this time. Thus, petitioner’s Motion is premature and petitioner may refile its Motion or raise these issues again on brief. Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion is denied without prejudice.” Order, at p.3.

And so am I.

STJ Peter J. (“HB”) Panuthos has a chicken-and-egg in Simon R. Workman, Docket No. 7107-16W, filed 1/16/26. This saga began 17 (count ’em, 17) years ago when Workman dropped info on Individual 1 and Companies 1 and 2.

IRS gave the whole thing one claim number, sent the info off to SB/SE who audited and no-changed Individual 1, whereupon the Ogden Sunseteers blew off Workman in 2013.

In the meantime (2015), Workman sends in a new Form 211, blowing further on Individual 1, Companies 1 and 2, and adding Companies 3 and 4. The Ogden Sunseteers don’t bother with a new file number, don’t send the stuff to any operating division or subject-matter expert, and just blow off Workman in 2016, saying their 2013 determination remains the same.

Whereupon IRS moves to toss for want of jurisdiction as Workman didn’t timely petition the 2013 shootdown  and for summary J, to which Workman counters with document demands. There’s even a trip to USDCDC.

STJ Panuthos sorts it out.

“The record demonstrates respondent did not take any action based on the additional information petitioner provided in the second submitted Form 211 on June 26, 2015. Respondent did not refer petitioner’s June 26, 2015, submission to another office of the IRS and did not initiate an examination, and therefore respondent contends he did not proceed with any relevant administrative or judicial action under section 7623(b). However, respondent did take administrative action based on the information provided by petitioner in his 2008 submission. The WBO opened a claim number, referred petitioner’s claim to SBSE, examined the target taxpayer, and issued a determination denying petitioner’s claim in the February 1, 2013, letter and then again in the February 10, 2016, letter. While respondent contends that the February 10, 2016, letter amounts to a rejection of the second Form 211, the letter is clearly in reference to Claim 2009-005937 and states that petitioner does not meet the criteria for an award.

“As such, the Court concludes that the February 10, 2016, letter was a ‘determination’ per section 7623(b)(4) and, accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this case.  Therefore, we will deny respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 4. (Citations and footnote omitted.)

Workman’s document demands get dissed. Whistleblowers are record-rulers. The parties can either stip to an administrative record or IRS can put in the whole thing under seal and with a privilege log if needed and Workman can move to supplement per Rule 93(b).

Tommy Nashe’s 1592 dirge forms the backdrop for the last-ditch efforts of the Schulers, the non-TMP in North Wall Holdings, LLC, Schuler Investments, LLC, A Partner Other Than the Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 27773-21, filed 1/15/26, to escape the 18-day guillotine that fell on their Rule 162 reconsideration.

For the backstory, see my blogpost “Boechler, Meet TEFRA,” 10/21/25. Although my colleague Lyle (“Full-Court”) Pres, Esq., has announced his retirement (for the second time), he’s still onboard for the Schulers. We old hound dogs still jump up when we hear the horn.

Howbeit, the Schulers’ trusty attorneys have found hope in Kwong, a CFC opinion extending the statutory deadline for a refund suit due to Section 7508A COVID extension.

Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch won’t have it.

The Schulers claim change in law. But Section 7508A (whether the 2019 or the 2021 version) was around throughout. All the Schulers’ trusty attorneys have is a legal argument they failed to make the last time. Rule 162s, especially late Rule 162s, aren’t mulligans.

And Kwong is a CFC case. No Golsenization of a lower-court opinion; CFC doesn’t bind USTC, although USTC might think about it; see Order at p. 4, footnote 2.

Even if Kwong were sustained on appeal, appeal would lie in 9 Cir, and the Schulers are Golsenized to 11 Cir, not Federal Cir.

Tax Court has blown off the Jarkesy-based challenges to the Section 6662 variety chops on the public rights principle (see my blogpost “Full House,” 8/21/25), but Section 6663 fraud chops come a lot closer to the “commonlaw equivalent” than classic revenue collection.

Howbeit, Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber won’t swing at that curveball. He says it’s too late when it’s first raised in a brief accompanying a Rule 155 beancount. It was neither raised on the trial nor in the two (count ’em, two) post-trial briefs.

Rule 155 beancounts are no place to raise new legal arguments.

So Vincent Fumo, Docket No. 17603-13, filed 1/14/26, is mulcted for the agreed-upon deficiencies and the 75% chops.

Taishoff says I get the strong feeling that, as Mary Queen of Scots used to say, “my end is my beginning.” More to come on this one.

Edited to add, 1/14/26: Judge Scholar Al has issued a “Corrected” opinion in T. C. Memo. 2025-97. As it is 90 (count ’em, 90) pages long, I will not try to digest it, as the result seems to be the same.

And yes, Silver Moss Properties did involve Section 6663 fraud chops. But I doubt it is the last word, despite Tax Court’s unanimity.

Whistleblower 11099-13W, T.C. Memo. 2026-5, filed 1/13/26, claims his blowing caused Target (not the supermarket, the taxpayer) to change its accounting method from LIFO to FIFO, thereby incurring $1 billion-with-a-b of income and $400 million in tax, abandoning their inflated COGS scheme. 11099-13W thereby claims a big Section 7623(b) award, but IRS says his explication of the scheme was unintelligible. Anyhow, voluntarily reported income is neither “collected proceeds nor “proceeds collected,” whatever IRS regulations are then applicable.

Judge James S. (“Big Jim”) Halpern buys all of IRS’ tale.

Whenever Target changed its inventory accounting, during audit or after audit, Lewis (the case, 154 T. C. 8; see my blogpost “The 6.9% Solution,” 4/8/20) says it doesn’t matter. It was voluntary, not the result of the whistleblower’s information causing IRS to commence an administrative or judicial action.

“Indeed, while respondent received in March 2012 Target’s application to change its inventory accounting method from LIFO to FIFO—five months before the 08/09 audit cycle examination team reported the results of its examination—nothing in WBO’s administrative claim file indicates that the examination team expanded its examination to include 2011 or any year for which Target may have reported under FIFO. And even if the facts were to the contrary, we would still be governed by our holding in Lewis, 154 T.C. at 134, that ‘reported, paid tax is not collected proceeds’ even if ‘an ongoing audit was expanded to include the year of the reported, paid tax.’” T. C. Memo. 2025-5, at p. 24.

In short, the repentant sinner’s disgorgement belongs to IRS alone.

Assiduous readers of this my blog (there must be some) are hanging breathless on the fate of IRS’ last remaining partial summary J motion in Ivey Branch Holdings, LLC, Ivey Branch Investors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 19189-19. filed 1/13/26. It’s the electrifying story of GA law, GA boondockery, and a real estate commonplace, told by Judge Albert G. (“Scholar Al”) Lauber.

For prolegomenon, see my blogpost “Pulling Wires,” 9/11/25.

Back in 1975, long before the Dixieland boondockery dodges, one Tommy Davis, a prior owner of the subject boondocks, granted and conveyed a certain easement thereover to Jefferson Electric Membership Corporation, apparently a rural electricity cooperative of the type that brings enlightenment to outliers. Said easement empowers the Jeffersonians to erect poles, string wires, cut down and defoliate anywhere on the property, unlimited by a metes and bound description. It appears the Jeffersonians did none thereof nowhere since.

IRS plays the worn-out perpetuity gambit, saying this easement transgresses the perpetual conservation easement underlying the Iveys’ $24 million deduction, by allowing tree-cutting unsanctioned by the 501(c)(3) guardian, chemical defoliation, and erection of transmission lines.

Except.

Judge Scholar Al (no doubt assisted by the Ivey’s trusty attorneys, among whom we find the redoutable Vivian G. (“Golden”) Hoard, Esq.) traverses GA easement law. True, Chicago Title excepted the utility easement when they insured Ivey’s title on acquisition. Taishoff says don’t waste your time even asking an underwriter about omitting or insuring over a utility easement; most States’ public service laws put paid to that. Anyway, while GA does not favor extinguishment by nonuser (use-it-or-lose-it), there is a rebuttable presumption that twenty years of nonuse equals abandonment of the easement.

“Respondent has adduced no evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment by Jefferson Electric. The record shows that Tommy Davis conveyed the Utility Easement to Jefferson Electric in 1975. It also shows that by 2015, when Ivey Branch donated the easement to Foothills, Jefferson Electric had not exercised any of its rights under the Utility Easement with respect to the Ivey Branch property. Its ‘non-user’ had thus lasted for 40 years.” Order, at p. 6.

All IRS’ counsel did was quote the disfavor of abandonment cases.

So no summary J.

Taishoff says utility easements have been around ever since public water, sewers and electricity. If you wish to develop real estate, you need them. As the providers thereof are regulated, the forms of easement are non-negotiable. Live with it.

As I said in my blogpost hereinabove cited “I’m a fan of summary J, but this is ridiculous.”