The latest iteration of the Supremes’ ongoing expedition to bring discipline to the wayward acts of Congress and the boardinghouse reach of the Executive founders on sovereign immunity in Riddle Aggregates, LLC, Ornstein-Schuler, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, 165 T.C. 12, filed 12/15/25. This time it’s the “accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a), (b)(1)–(3), (c), (d), (e), and (h) for an underpayment due to negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, substantial valuation misstatement, and gross valuation misstatement” that, for want of a jury trial, should be held Constitutionally invalid. 1`65 T. C.12, at p. 4.

Jarkesy, you’ll recall, was the shootdown of SEC’s fraud penalties. But those were like an ordinary citizen suing for fraud and seeking punitives, not an exercise of collecting the revenue, a uniquely sovereign function. See my blogpost “Full House,” 8/21/25.

Same story here, says ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan.

“Recently in Silver Moss Properties, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 10646-21, 165 T.C. (Aug. 21, 2025), this Court held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits against the sovereign and that Congress has not otherwise consented to trial by jury in TEFRA partnership-level actions. That holding fully resolves petitioner’s claim here. We see no reason to revisit that holding.” 165 T. C. 12, at p. 4. (Footnote omitted, but see infra.)

“It is well settled that there is no right or mechanism to a trial by jury in either this Court or the Court of Federal Claims.” Silver Moss Props., LLC, 165 T.C., slip. op. at 4–5 (first citing Mathes v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70, 71–72 (5th Cir. 1978)(“[A] taxpayer who elects to bring his suit in the Tax Court has no right, statutory or constitutional, to a trial by jury.”), aff’g per curiam T.C. Memo. 1977-220; then citing Swanson v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1180, 1181–82 (1976); and then citing Rohland v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 36, 38 (2017)). Additionally, a jury trial is not available in district court for TEFRA partnership-level actions. Id. at 5.” 1645 T. C. 12, at p. 5, footnote 5.

“Petitioner’s Motion [partial summary J] suggests that petitioner itself fundamentally misapprehends the nature of its own suit. Petitioner largely focuses on circumstances in which the government brought judicial actions seeking monetary awards from taxpayers. But here petitioner sued the government, not the other way around. And it is petitioner who seeks to prevent the government from taking the next step in assessing and collecting administratively the tax the government believes is due from Riddle Aggregates’ partners. In this context the analytical framework reflected in petitioner’s Motion papers is inapplicable, and the authorities on which petitioner relies are inapposite.” 165 T. C.12, at p. 5.

Ex-Ch J TBS launches into a historical disquisition anent the history of Section 6662 penalties, their ancestors and progeny. The FUBAR penalty, dissed on Eighth Amendment grounds (“excessive fines”) by 11 Cir in Schwarzbaum, 127 F. 4th 259 (11 Cir, 2025), doesn’t apply here; these chops are remedial, not punitive.

Taishoff says roger that, most affirmative, tell that to the dudes who have to pay.

I see my reader, whom I’ll call Mr. Mac, and my colleague whom I’ll name, Lyle B. (“Full-Court”) Press, Esq., were on the losing side. For now. Maybe this one gets to the Supremes.

I have often praised the volunteers who show up to render assistance to hapless pro ses at trial session calendar calls. But their aid is unavailable when motion practice is on the menu, when their aid can be even more necessary.

A many-times-told tale, Christopher W.E. Jones & Sarah Jones, Docket No. 7514-25, filed 12/12/25, gets tossed when IRS Notice CP71C turns out not to be a SND.

And that, even though “Section 6212(a) authorizes the issuance of a notice of deficiency, and while that section does not prescribe any particular form, at a minimum the notice must ‘(1) advise the taxpayer that the IRS has determined that a deficiency exists for a particular year, and (2) specify the amount of the deficiency or provide the information necessary to compute the deficiency.’ The notice must fulfill the purpose of providing formal notification to the taxpayer that a deficiency in tax against that taxpayer has been determined. The purpose of a notice of deficiency is to advise the taxpayer that ‘the Commissioner means to assess him; anything that does this unequivocally is good enough.'” Order, at p. 2. (Citations omitted).

Ch J Patrick J. Urda says Notice CP71C falls short. “…the Notice CP71C does not state that it is a notice of deficiency, nor that the IRS has determined a deficiency or intends to assess a tax. Rather, the Notice CP71C merely informs petitioners that they still owe a balance in their federal income tax for taxable year 2019.” Order, at p. 3.

If the shortfall arises from incomplete payment of self-reported tax that IRS concedes is correct, then there is no deficiency. The tax shown on the return is the tax due.

But is that the case here? Faced with IRS’ motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction (no SND), Petitioners “filed a one-page document, characterizing it as a ‘Motion to Withdraw,’ in which they ‘ask [the] Court to Withdraw return 2019.’ Petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw provides no additional information describing the relief it seeks (or addressing the jurisdictional question pending before the Court).” Order, at p. 3.

This is a case for the calendar call commandos. But this case never got to calendar call. The “motion to withdraw” should have prompted direction to a LITC.

I ask a lot of questions in this my blog. Proceedings in Tax Court cover so wide a range of human activity that nothing (seemingly) is too remote. I just now saw that Kevin J. Mirch and Marie C. Mirch, T. C. Memo. 2025-128, filed 12/11/25, had answered a question I has asked back in June, 2023.  See my blogpost “Bar Exam?” 6/28/23.

The Mirchs had asked then-Judge Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda to stay proceedings in their CDP while Kev, an attorney, got advice from the CA Bar; but the nature of the request was never stated.

Now comes the answer.

“Petitioners requested a stay because of concerns with an ethical issue regarding self-representation. We granted the stay over respondent’s objection.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at p. 9.

The opinion itself is the usual mix of Section 469 real estate nonprofessionalism and sloppy bookkeeping by Exam, Appeals, and petitioners.

What is unusual is what Judge Goeke says petitioners did on the trial. “Petitioners spent a substantial amount of time during the trial and in their Posttrial Briefs trying to relitigate not only issues the Court previously decided but also issues respondent has conceded. They misquoted and mischaracterized evidence in the record and made allegations of wrongdoing not supported by evidence.” T. C. Memo. 2025-128, at p. 32.

The Girl of My Dreams loses some of her genteel demeanor when I scream the phrase first above written at the head hereof (as my much-better-bred colleagues would say) at the television screen. The scene is Hockey Night in This Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America, and our orange-and-blue clad heroes from another outlying island are having their clichés handed to them by their opponents who swarm the defensive zone.

Coach Pat should really have his crew study Judges Nega and Copeland. They clear the puck with consummate skill and ease.

First, Judge Joseph Nega. Donato DiPasquale, Docket No. 11477-23L, filed 12/10/25, claims his restitution payments, though sufficient to erase the $435K of restitution he owed when he went down for Section 7202 criminal failure to collect and pay, were misapplied and he wants to contest liability and fight over the payments.

IRS, having messed up by omitting a bunch quarters (hi, Judge Holmes) from the administrative record, claims mootness for what they did include and summary J for what they didn’t.

“Petitioner opposes respondent’s Mootness Motion, contending that a dismissal for mootness of these tax periods would harm petitioner’s ability to dispute the proper crediting of payments that petitioner has made. Petitioner bases this argument on a ‘tax analysis’ document that purports to show that the civil (not restitution-based) tax liability for some of the same periods is not yet paid and is therefore not moot.” Order, at p. 4.

No use; Don can’t wildcard in income tax liability here. He admits restitution was shown on IRS’ books as paid. Zuch does the rest; if IRS need neither lien nor levy because everything paid, Tax Court has no jurisdiction.

It took Judge Nega eight (count ’em, eight) pages to send off Don. Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland needs only five (count ’em five) to send Marie Addoo, Docket No. 10138-23L, filed 12/10/25, back to Appeals, where she does not want to go.

Marie was fighting about five (count ’em, five) years of deficiency, but was only timely with her Letter 12153 for one of them. She didn’t put in any evidence at Appeals, but “…her counsel has informally indicated to the Court that Ms. Addoo believes Appeals (1) didn’t give her enough time to prepare for the first CDP hearing, (2) closed her case to (sic) quickly, (3) will not fairly evaluate her case, so she wants the Court to decide her case rather than Appeals.” Order, at p. 3.

Judge Tex Copeland says the Court will listen to the parties. If both agree, sure, remand. Dissenters’ objections are taken seriously, to be sure. But if remand is necessary or productive, back they go.

“Other factors might include: (1) the duration of the administrative proceedings to date; (2) the length of the pendency of the lawsuit; (3) any fault on the part of the party moving for remand; (4) whether remand can remedy the defects the first time around;  (5) whether remand would be futile because, even though the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might’ve abused its discretion, the only arguments that petitioners presented to this Court were based on legal propositions which we have previously rejected; and (6) whether there has been a material change in the law, , or a material change in the facts since the final determination.” Order, at pp. 3-4. (Internal citations omitted).

Remand gives Marie and counsel everything they could want.

“A remand will be able to remedy defects Ms. Addoo faced the first time around: She can have additional time to gather her financial information in order to demonstrate that she qualifies for currently-not-collectible status due to financial hardship, and she can further explain why she may qualify for a  reasonable cause exception to her penalties. Further, collection action will be stayed pending the remand and this Court will retain jurisdiction and oversight of the case during the remand requiring periodic status reports. If a resolution is not achieved by remand, Ms. Addoo will still have the ability to argue her case before this Court after the relevant supplemental determination is issued by Appeals.

“Finally, we note that the Notice of Determination stated that Ms. Addoo did not dispute her liability. This is untrue. In her request for a CDP hearing, Ms. Addoo wrote, ‘Remove penalty,’ and she gave a detailed explanation for why she believed she was not liable for the penalties because she had reasonable cause for her failure to pay. Contesting penalties is contesting the liability.  Appeals should consider Ms. Addoo’s reasonable cause arguments in her supplemental hearing.” Order, at p. 4. (Internal citation omitted).

Remand is not futile. Play goes on in the other end. Peace is restored.

Ex-Ch J Kathleen (“TBS =The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan is running the biggest sealing expedition south of an Arctic icefloe in Nat S. Harty & April D. Harty, Docket No. 23354-21, filed 12/9/25. And of course it’s S. Crow Capital Corporation who’s making the running.

There are three (count ’em, three) separate orders. IRS moved to seal a stack documents (hi, Judge Holmes) and, as there are two unconsolidated cases here, it takes two of the orders to deal with IRS’ wishlist. And those two depend upon footnote 2 in Order No. 3.

Said footnote says the stuff will remain sealed until trial begins next week in the City of the Angels (and National Guard).

In the meantime, the Crows lose their motion to seal everything on their shopping list until 9 Cir rules. Taishoff says that sounds like a Section 7482 interlocutory. And if this whole story seems familiar, see my blogpost “Stone the Crows!” 12/2/25.

Ex-Ch J TBS runs the checklist.

“The following four factors are considered when evaluating whether to grant temporary relief pending an appeal: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Order, at p. 1. (Citations omitted).

It’s a bad lie for the Crows’ trusty attorneys. They do make out that current publicity could irreparably harm the Crows, should they prevail at trail. But they can’t show they have a slam dunk case (what they want sealed is transactional, and 9 Cir has no controlling precedent);  the parties have prepared for trial, got their experts lined up and holding short, pretrial briefs at the ready; the need to clear the courtroom while sealed stuff was discussed would seriously delay trial; and the Crows’ trusty attorneys haven’t shown the public interest lies with their side.

No Marxism, either Karl nor Groucho, rather Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland’s unwrapping of a cost-of-goods-sold reduction to gross revenue of a pioneering VoIPer emerging from Chapter XI. The VoIPer claimed it was providing “information services,” not long distance telephony, so lowballed AT&T and Verizon when tying into their longlines. This came unglued when Big Telecom woke up to the con, hence the Ch XI-induced selloff of its assets to Andre Temnorod and Brianna Temnorod, et al., T. C. Memo. 2025-127, filed 12/8/25.

Andre and the als expensed the lot as COGS, but IRS said “nyet.” Judge Tex Copeland agrees.

“Addressing cost of goods sold first, it is clear from the record that the [VoIPer] was in the business of providing telecommunication services to customers, and not in the business of creating or selling any material products. And as noted above, cost of goods sold is linked to mining, manufacturing, or merchandising products and not applicable in services industries. Thus, we cannot make the leap that petitioners seem to request, that [VoIPer] is entitled to a reduction in gross income for cost of goods sold.” T. C. Memo. 2025-127, at p.; 18. (Citation omitted).

But maybe so might could be that the payments to Big Telecom were Section 162 business, to settle out the lawsuits for the “information services” shortchanging.

Except.

The Asset Purchase Agreement on which the Bankruptcy Court signed off included not only the assets, but assumption of liabilities and waiver of unsecured claims. All this extra baggage means a sale of capital assets. And that invokes Danielson. And who might Danielson be, you ask. See my blogpost RTFC, 3/9/16. You’re stuck with what your contract says.

Gotta give Andre and the als a Taishoff “Good Try, Third Class.”

I may be deceiving myself, and the truth may not be in me. For sure, it won’t be the first time in this my blog (and elsewhere). But a tiny inkling that not only had I got it right last week in my blogpost “‘Justified?’ – I’ll Say!” 12/5/25, but that someone actually read that blogpost arose as I skimmed Maria Gritsak, Docket No. 13840-25, filed 12/8/25.

It’s the usual months-late SND petition, where Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda trots out the standard-issue Section 6213(a) Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders boilerplate about 90 days except in 2 Cir, 3 Cir and 6 Cir.

“This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the  jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2017), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-188; Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C.126, 130 n.4 (2022) (collecting cases); see also Sanders v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 112,119–20 (2023) (holding that the Court will continue treating the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable to jurisdictions outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Contra Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the deficiency deadline is not jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling); Buller v. Commissioner, 152 F.4th 84 (2d Cir. 2025) (same); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024).” Order, at p. 1.

What’s missing from this picture?

If you answered Pugsley, go to the head of the class.

A couple days ago (hi, Judge Holmes, this one’s for you) I noted that Judge Holmes was justified in his famous Oakbrook dissent; see my blogpost “Luke 18:14,” 12/1/25. Now he’s again justified.

I failed to notice the now-boilerplate review of the CCA walkback of the Section 6213(a) jurisdictional barrier in October last; see my blogpost “United States Postmark,” 10/20/25. I routinely state I don’t follow the CCAs. I trust all readers of my blog are sufficiently hip to Shepardize any case they are going to cite; anyone who doesn’t know what “Shepardize” means had best not write memoranda of law until they learn and do likewise.

And once I start following CCAs routinely, readers will expect updates on all the cases I blog, which is far above my poor power to add or detract. The trade press and blogosphere do that better.

Howbeit, solely by way of illustration and example of the aforementioned CCA walkback,  Christopher Darrell Lewis, Docket No. 12896-25, filed 12/5/25, gets tossed because he petitions from FL, 11 Cir, where none of Oquendo, Buller, or Culp bring the Supremes’ Boechler discipline.

But again Judge Mark V. (“Vittorio Emanuele”) Holmes foresaw this compartmentalization. Dissenting in Graev, 149 T. C. 23, eight (count ’em, eight) years ago this month, he suggested Tax Court leave extending Section 6751(b) Boss Hossery to the CCAs, rather than extending it in one Hamiltonian shot, as the majority did. See my blogpost “Stir, Baby, Stir – That Silt!” 12/20/17.

Sub silentio, Tax Court bench followed Judge Holmes’ lead post-Boechler, defiantly citing Hallmark Rsch. Collective and Sanders.  Where they are constrained by Supreme discipline, they sabotage the contrarian CCAs by invoking the strictures of equitable tolling.

In Chris’ case, Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda again calmly notes to Oquendo, Buller, and Culp, but carries on.

Note the boilerplate, Order, at p. 1, cites Pugsley as an 11 Cir affirmation of Section 6213(a)’s jurisdictionality, but Taishoff says that case was decided pre-Boechler. Moreover, if you read Pugsley, it mentions Section 6213(a) but says nothing about its jurisdictional validity, if any. The case goes off on last-known-address (but petitioner got the SND in time to petition per Section 6213(a), so no hurt, no foul) and Section 7502 mailed-is-filed, as petitioner used a PDF, not USPS.

And the final straw: Though DOJ cited Pugsley at p. 14 in their losing brief before the Supremes in Boechler, the Supremes didn’t even mention it in the Boechler opinion.

Wherefore I wouldn’t bet the latte money that undisciplined Pugsley is still good Section 6213(a) Sun Belt law. But we’ll let 11 Cir decide. If Chris can’t appeal, maybe someone else can.

And again Judge Holmes goes down justified.

Michael D. Brown, T. C. Memo. 2025-126, filed 12/4/25, irrepressible, claims he now really lives in TX, no longer in NV when 9 Cir. shot down his appeal from 158 T. C. 9, filed 6/23/22, because IRS held his OIC for 27 months, making it automatically accepted per Section 7122(f). You’ll find the backstory in my blogpost “High-Flying Blogfodder,” of even date therewith, as my expensive colleagues would say.

Mike argues collateral estoppel doesn’t apply when he makes the same argument now.

Negatory, says Judge Morrison.

“The sole remaining issue is whether ‘petitioner’s offer in compromise was accepted by operation of I.R.C. § 7122(f).’ We agree with respondent that the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187, has resolved the identical issue.  Petitioner has provided no compelling reason to depart from\ that precedent. We therefore hold that the April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise was not accepted by operation of section 7122(f). Our holding does not depend on any disputed facts.” T. C. Memo. 2025-126, at p. 6. (Citation omitted).

But IRS doesn’t get summary J. If Mike wants to appeal this decision, where does he go? TX is 5 Cir, NV is 9 Cir. So let the parties argue where Mike resided when he petitioned.

Fasten your seatbelts; the flight continues.

No, not an abbreviated revival of the 1952 George Axelrod play. Judge David Gustafson has to deal with an ongoing OIC that ends the CDP in All Is Well Homecare Services, LLC, Docket No. 21210-19L, filed 12/4/25. Here’s the end of the saga I only partly followed.

Judge David Gustafson has the whole nine yards, Order, at page 1, footnote 1. But now, having bought AIW’s OIC for everything the lien and levy covered, IRS moves to dismiss as moot.

Except.

The OIC states that if AIW fails to file or pay, or otherwise breaches the IRC during the five (count ’em, five) tax years following acceptance of the OIC, IRS can revoke the cancelation of the NFTL, levy, or sue for anything from a single missed payment to all the back tax debt, less any payments made. Order, at p. 2.

And AIW claims IRS still owes them an $88K overpayment from credits applied to reduce past debt, Order, at p. 4.

So maybe this case isn’t moot.

Except.

Judge Gustafson says whatever the Supremes said in Zuch, there’s nothing more to discuss. All y’all will recall Jennifer Zuch was fighting over whether she owed IRS the money that they took when they applied her credits to the alleged debt. See my blogpost “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 12/12/16. All a CDP decides is whether a lien or levy is sustained. But like the famous grin without a cat, if no debt, then no lien and no levy, and nothing for Tax Court to decide.

AIW wants Tax Court to supervise the next five (count ’em, five) years because there might be a dispute, and because there is a current dispute about the $88K. No, says Judge David Gustafson. Fight out the $88K as a refund case in USDC or USCFC.

If AIW wants Tax Court to adjudicate the $88K dispute, which has nothing to do with lien or levy, that would be an advisory opinion, falling foul of Article III jurisdictional limits.

So this case is moot, as there’s no more relief pore l’il ol’ Tax Court can give. So this case is moot.