The Girl of My Dreams loses some of her genteel demeanor when I scream the phrase first above written at the head hereof (as my much-better-bred colleagues would say) at the television screen. The scene is Hockey Night in This Minor Outlying Island off the Coast of North America, and our orange-and-blue clad heroes from another outlying island are having their clichés handed to them by their opponents who swarm the defensive zone.

Coach Pat should really have his crew study Judges Nega and Copeland. They clear the puck with consummate skill and ease.

First, Judge Joseph Nega. Donato DiPasquale, Docket No. 11477-23L, filed 12/10/25, claims his restitution payments, though sufficient to erase the $435K of restitution he owed when he went down for Section 7202 criminal failure to collect and pay, where misapplied and he wants to contest liability and fight over the payments.

IRS, having messed up by omitting a bunch quarters (hi, Judge Holmes) from the administrative record, claims mootness for what they did include and summary J for what they didn’t.

“Petitioner opposes respondent’s Mootness Motion, contending that a dismissal for mootness of these tax periods would harm petitioner’s ability to dispute the proper crediting of payments that petitioner has made. Petitioner bases this argument on a ‘tax analysis’ document that purports to show that the civil (not restitution-based) tax liability for some of the same periods is not yet paid and is therefore not moot.” Order, at p. 4.

No use; Don can’t wildcard in income tax liability here. He admits restitution was shown on IRS’ books as paid. Zuch does the rest; if IRS need neither lien nor levy because everything paid, Tax Court has no jurisdiction.

It took Judge Nega eight (count ’em, eight) pages to send off Don. Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland needs only five (count ’em five) to send Marie Addoo, Docket No. 10138-23L, filed 12/10/25, back to Appeals, where she does not want to go.

Marie was fighting about five (count ’em, five) years of deficiency, but was only timely with her Letter 12153 for one of them. She didn’t put in any evidence at Appeals, but “…her counsel has informally indicated to the Court that Ms. Addoo believes Appeals (1) didn’t give her enough time to prepare for the first CDP hearing, (2) closed her case to (sic) quickly, (3) will not fairly evaluate her case, so she wants the Court to decide her case rather than Appeals.” Order, at p. 3.

Judge Tex Copeland says the Court will listen to the parties. If both agree, sure, remand. Dissenters’ objections are taken seriously, to be sure. But if remand is necessary or productive, back they go.

“Other factors might include: (1) the duration of the administrative proceedings to date; (2) the length of the pendency of the lawsuit; (3) any fault on the part of the party moving for remand; (4) whether remand can remedy the defects the first time around;  (5) whether remand would be futile because, even though the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might’ve abused its discretion, the only arguments that petitioners presented to this Court were based on legal propositions which we have previously rejected; and (6) whether there has been a material change in the law, , or a material change in the facts since the final determination.” Order, at pp. 3-4. (Internal citations omitted).

Remand gives Marie and counsel everything they could want.

“A remand will be able to remedy defects Ms. Addoo faced the first time around: She can have additional time to gather her financial information in order to demonstrate that she qualifies for currently-not-collectible status due to financial hardship, and she can further explain why she may qualify for a  reasonable cause exception to her penalties. Further, collection action will be stayed pending the remand and this Court will retain jurisdiction and oversight of the case during the remand requiring periodic status reports. If a resolution is not achieved by remand, Ms. Addoo will still have the ability to argue her case before this Court after the relevant supplemental determination is issued by Appeals.

“Finally, we note that the Notice of Determination stated that Ms. Addoo did not dispute her liability. This is untrue. In her request for a CDP hearing, Ms. Addoo wrote, ‘Remove penalty,’ and she gave a detailed explanation for why she believed she was not liable for the penalties because she had reasonable cause for her failure to pay. Contesting penalties is contesting the liability.  Appeals should consider Ms. Addoo’s reasonable cause arguments in her supplemental hearing.” Order, at p. 4. (Internal citation omitted).

Remand is not futile. Play goes on in the other end. Peace is restored.