While this my blog hardly reaches the exalted stature of President Theodore Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” it does provide a dandy soapbox, even now when soapboxes have been superseded by electrons. So Alex Golubitsky, Docket No. 11989-22, filed 12/3/25, and his trusty attorney, whom I’ll call Third, give me an opportunity for a modest yelp.
IRS claimed nonfiling and nonpayment add-ons on top of a $16K deficiency. Alex riposted that he had filed and paid VIBIR. Maybe this was a “cover over” that never broke cover. See my blogpost “Another Non-Virgin,” 1/30/18, for how VIBIR interfaces with IRS.
Alex made a Section 7430(g) qualified offer of $6782 plus interes;, IRS ultimately settled for $2151 (interest not stated, but not waived).
Third sought legals and admins. IRS agreed fees were reasonable, Alex didn’t stall, he did exhaust administrative remedies, and met net worth cutoff.
Except.
IRS settled.
STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel: “Petitioner provides no argument about prevailing with respect to the amount in controversy or with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i). Instead, he argues only that he is entitled to recover costs under the second option, the ‘qualified offer rule.’ See § 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g). Specifically, petitioner writes that the Government did not accept [Alex’s] offer, which results in Petitioner being the ‘prevailing party’ within the meaning of Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(i).” Order, at p. 2.
Except.
IRS settled (in case anybody missed it the first time).
“But even where the taxpayer makes a qualified offer under section 7430(g), the qualified offer rule does not apply to “any judgment issued pursuant to a settlement.” 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I).” Order, at p. 3. (Citation omitted). Alex and Third lose.
Taishoff says once again, we get a statute that aims squarely at reducing unnecessary, vexatious, and burdensome litigation, which causes the exactly opposite result.
If Alex and Third could not get legal and admins by making a qualified offer and then settling the case, but could get legals and admins by insisting upon an unnecessary, vexatious, and burdensome trial and settling on the courthouse steps, there is a positive incentive for insisting on trial. And to IRS’ objection that petitioner thereby unreasonably protracts proceedings, the answer is that the statute itself makes qualified offer settlements uneconomic. This explicit Congressional enactment requires threatened, or actual, litigation to make an injured party whole.
Congress can correct this ridiculous situation. Yeah, right.