Though I’m sure this is not Judge Emin (“Eminent”) Toro’s first encounter with heightened rhetoric, whether from north, south, east, or west, he notes that same does not convert a conservation easement valued by IRS at $612K into a $10,234,108 write-off for Paul-Adams Quarry Trust, LLC, Francis L. Adams, Tax Matters Partner, T.C. Memo. 2025-112, filed 11/3/25. Neither does same make this ” a difficult case.” T. C. Memo. 2025-112, at p. 6. Notwithstanding less difficulty, Judge Eminent Toro runs up 105 (count ’em, 105, and I have) pages to dispose thereof.
It starts with the usual give-and-go, flipping a busted Dixieland granite quarry. But by the time you get to page 7, you’ve heard enough.
“… when the easement was granted over the Paul-Adams property in 2017, Paul-Adams claimed the property was worth $10,545,088, relying on its supposed value as an operating granite quarry. In petitioner’s view, the dormant Paul-Adams property could, within four years of being revived, produce a material percentage of the total granite dimension stone produced annually in the entire State of Georgia.
“Petitioner has provided no credible evidence of how this would be achieved or why, if these claims were true, the property had not already been used for this purpose. The claimed value of the parcel in 2017 represented a more than 2,400% increase over its prior sale price in 2007. And its purported value was more than 750% of the value of the property Mr. Adams was leasing at the time, which included a larger quarry with a much better track record, and with respect to which he had an option to buy.
“In view of the entire record in this case, we find petitioner’s claim utterly unsupportable.” T. C. Memo. 2025-112, at p. 7. Btw, if you want to read a lot more about GA granite than you want to know, check out T. C. Memo. 2025-112, at pp. 10-13.
And while petitioners’ appraiser survives the Reg. Section 1.170A-13(c)(5)(ii) guilty knowledge test, he’s sailing mighty close to the wind when petitioners’ discounted cash flow numbers show up in his appraisal metadata.
A key fact is that the petitioners tried to quarry on the property, lost money (despite being longtime quarry operators), closed up the business, and sat for five (count ’em, five) years with the property dormant. Though they claim they found valuable granite, they closed up just when a major buyer was looking for more product. Makes no sense. And they lost $360K in the operation before shutting down, when starting a new quarry operation wasn’t that much more.
“Both experts assumed that the market could absorb the dimension stone extracted at the newly opened hypothetical quarry and that the new quarry would capture significant market share in practically no time. They further assumed that the new quarry would run at a level of efficiency achieved at the best quarries in the area, would quarry high-quality granite, and would have no trouble finding a qualified work force even though labor constraints have been a constant source of problems for other quarriers in the area. We do not share the experts’ enthusiasm and, making factual determinations, consider their analyses unrealistic, unreliable, and unhelpful. We catalog here only a few of the many failings of petitioner’s experts, which hypothetical willing buyers would not have ignored.” T. C. Memo. 2025-112, at p. 48. And you can’t run discounted cash flow analysis when a business has none. Especially is this so when there are plenty of comparable sales.
At close of play, highest and best use pre-easement is as an exploratory site for (maybe) future mining, not a going concern. Post-easement, recreation and passive activities, on which both sides agree.
Finally, petitioners claim the Section 6662(h) chop is void for vagueness.
“Section 6662(h), the statute setting forth the gross valuation misstatement penalty, and the related statutory and regulatory provisions are not vague. A person of ordinary intelligence has fair notice of what is prohibited. The value of property claimed on that person’s return must not be 200% or more of the correct amount. Nor has petitioner pointed to any rule in the related regulations that fails to provide fair notice of the conduct that the rules prohibit.
“To the extent petitioner takes issue with how the courts have applied the rules in specific cases, his recourse is to argue that those cases were wrongly decided, as he has done here. But disagreement with outcomes of cases does not render the relevant standard unconstitutionally vague.” T. C. Memo. 2025-112, at p. 105.