I know I’m beating this theme to death (pun intended), but family lawyers should listen. Even if the Big Beautiful Whatever permanently did away with Sections 71 and 215 (and in this case maybe it didn’t, although Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall ultimately finds that they’re out; see John DiTullio, T. C. Memo. 2025-120, filed 11/18/25, at p. 4, footnote 5), y’all may have pre-TCJA and pre-BBW hangovers.

JD got hurt on the job and eventually got disability. In the meantime, he shed loved-once, but tried to be fair. Their shared lawyer, with more than 30 (count ’em, 30) years’ experience, was supposed to draft and oversee execution of a QDRO splitting up the retroactive benefits JD finally got from his employer, State of NJ, post-divorce.

Except shared attorney didn’t, because loved-once didn’t pay her share of his fee. Judge AIM  Marshall names said attorney; I won’t, because I’ve been there.

So JD got another lawyer to prepare a Consent Decree.

My long-time readers have already done the Psalm 22:7 number (King James variation).

Of course, none of the documents say that JD’s obligation to stump up the benefits for loved-once ends with her death.

JT’s now-trusty attorneys from the Villanova Wildcats LITC get a Taishoff “Good Try,” as they try to slide in the NJ Public Employees Retirement System regs concerning QDROs, which state that all such in pension and disability cases cease with payee ex-spouse’s death.

Judge AIM Marshall won’t wear it.

“…we must consider whether the payment obligation would terminate by operation of New Jersey State law. Respondent states that New Jersey State law is ambiguous as to the termination of payments upon a payee’s death when there is no unambiguous termination provision in the divorce instrument. Petitioner counters that the payment obligation would have terminated under New Jersey State law because the reference to a ‘QDRO’ in paragraph 6 of the [divorce judgment] incorporated the PERS regulation which provides that withholdings under a matrimonial order will cease upon the death of a payee spouse. Petitioner’s reliance on the PERS regulations is misplaced because a predicate for their application was that the parties would prepare and execute a QDRO. We do not think that simply referring to a QDRO in paragraph 6 of the [divorce judgment] automatically incorporated the PERS regulations and the termination rule that petitioner relies on.” T. C. Memo. 2025-120, at p. 8.

And the rest of NJ law is silent.

JD’s now-trusty attorneys do get IRS to drop the chops.