Joseph R. Gottesman, T. C. Memo. 2025-94, filed 9/10/25 is living the 1939 hit tune by Michael Carr and Jimmy Kennedy. Joseph R. Gottesman (that’s Doc Gottesman, MD, hereinafter sometimes “Doc G”) is south of the Border, down Mexico way, because there’s an active arrest warrant awaiting him in Phoenix, AZ, where he requested trial. Doc G listed Laredo, TX as his mailing address, although he resides in Jalisco.

Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones spends a whole footnote sorting out where to lay venue for Doc G’s appeal, and finally ends up with DC Cir, the Section 7482(b)(1) flush language default. But Taishoff is prepared to bet Judge CD Jones one of his own self-made special pineapple jalapeño Margaritas against a warm bottle of Modelò Negra that Doc G appeals nothing.

Doc G has plenty of badges of fraud to merit the thoroughly Boss Hossed Section 6663 fraud chops IRS wants to add to the SND (which Judge CD Jones calls a “NOD,” which is confusing; a Notice of Determination, e.g., from a CDP or an innocent spousery, is properly shortened to “NOD.” A Section 6212 statutory notice of deficiency is a “SND.”). The deficiency is north of $300K, T. C. Memo. 2025-94, at p. 6.

The rap on Doc G is one count of Section 7201 criminal tax evasion. Doc G moves for an indefinite stay of all proceedings until his criminal case is heard. But he won’t go to Phoeniz, AZ for fear of arrest. While Fifth Amendment concerns may be valid, there is no blanket exemption. Each question in discovery or the trial stands on its own.

“In the Motion to Stay, he states that he fears arrest if he appears in the District of Arizona. Of note, Dr. Gottesman has not represented that he will now or at any time in the near future appear to face criminal charges or work to resolve his criminal case. Thus, it appears that he is abusing this Court’s process by seeking an indefinite stay while he avoids prosecution in the criminal case.” T. C. Memo. 2025-94, at p.14.

Ya gotta say Doc G has a set of high-carbon chromium alloys.

But Judge CD Jones isn’t wearing any Margaret Atwood red hat. “This Court will not be a handmaiden to such tactics.” T. C. Memo. 2025-94, at p 13.

Summary J to IRS for deficiency and chops. No stay for Doc G; show for trial or default.

Ex-Ch J Maurice B. (“Mighty Mo”) Foley is a contender for shortest full-dress T. C. of the year with Artena Moon and Kenneth Moon, 165 T. C. 4, filed 9/10/25. Artena & Ken claimed they placed their Chevy Volt in service each year between 2013 and 2019, and took the one-time Section 30D $7500 credit in each such year.

Nope, says Judge Mighty Mo. While Section 30D doesn’t define “placed in service,” the operative statutory consideration for the year in which to take the one-time Congressional largesse, Section 38 does.

“While section 30D does not define “placed in service,” the phrase is defined in regulations relating to other sections of the Code. For example, the section 38 general business credit is allowed only for the taxable year in which the taxpayer first places section 38 property in service. See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(a). Section 38 property is placed in service the earlier of when ‘the period for depreciation with respect to such property begins’ or the property ‘is placed in a condition or state of readiness and availability for a specifically assigned function.” Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(d)(1). With respect to the section 38 general business credit, this Court has held that property is placed in service when it is in a condition to be regularly used for its specifically assigned function.” 165 T. C. 4, at p. 2.

Artena and Ken get the credit for 2013 and lose 2019. What happened to 2014 to and including 2018?

“Upon purchase, petitioners’ vehicle was ready, available, and used consistently with its specifically assigned function. Accordingly, petitioners’ Chevrolet Volt was placed in service in 2013. We note that prior to the year in issue, petitioners had claimed the maximum $7,500 one-time section 30D credit on their 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 tax returns. The credit was allowable only for the taxable year petitioners’ vehicle was first placed in service. Petitioners certainly were not entitled to the credit relating to 2019.” Order, at p. 3.

Note the SND only spoke to 2019. Maybe SOL took out the rest.

IRS conceded the accuracy chops.

Bet Walt Whitman never thought of this one.

Not a decision against a client, rather the settlement of a Tax Court case that promised good blogfodder in a time where such is scarce. Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy, doubtless glad of any weight reduction in his docket, announces that IRS and  Estate of Stanley E. Fulton, Deceased, Michael B. Fulton and Elizabeth Fulton Jones, Co-Executors, Docket No. 7200-22, filed 9/9/25, have filed a stip of settled issues that disposes of the entire SND.

Hence, no trial. And no orders disposing of the eleven (count ’em, eleven) pending pretrial motions. The whole shootin’ match is moot. The special trial session in DC is canceled and continued from trial, although I’m not sure what there is to continue. And the deadlines in the scheduling order after last month are canceled too.

I’ll truly miss number six on Judge Sport Landy’s list of canceled motions, the Motion to Compel the Taking of Deposition of Deborah Fulton, Lucinda Tischer, and Stanley Fulton Pursuant to Tax Court Rule 74(c)(2) (at Doc. 244), filed July 28, 2025. I trust the Stanley Fulton named therein is not the first-named party in the caption; that would indeed be a one-sided deposition.

Btw, so far this case has yielded blogposts “Insurance, Sure – When?” 5/7/25, and “The Spurious Lawsuit,” 7/24/25.

So c’mon, practitioners, bring out your best and contend mightily. Your correspondent awaits.

If Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was the Yankee from Olympus, then Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland is the Texan from the Temple, as she does the 1 Kings 3:16-28 number again on FBA St. Clair Property, LLC, Legacy Springs Development, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 17085-21, filed 9/8/25.

As she turned aside the C-Clairs’ objection to the Section 170(e) wildcard, so with the Legacy Springers’ objection; this case is stiped to follow C-Clair, so is bifurcated. Trial of Part Deux, which will feature Section 170(e), comes next year, with plenty of time for discovery.

As for bifurcation, while Joseph R. Willis & Guntas Matharu-Willis, Docket No. 20169-24S, filed 9/8/25 were headed for a single-track trial, Guntas’ motion to amend petition asking the Court to preserve petitioner’s recently-filed claim for relief pursuant to I.R.C. section 6015 caused STJ Jennifer E. (“Publius”) Siegel to ask Guntas and Joe to tell her if they want to bifurcate counsel.

“… we note that petitioners share a mailing address, and that practitioner PS has entered an appearance on behalf of both of them–an apparent conflict of interest.” Order, at p. 1. (Name omitted).

STJ Publius Siegel reminds PS that USTCPs are subject to Rule 24(g)(1), and therefore needs informed written consent from both Joe and Guntas to waive the obvious conflict of interest. Failing which, PS must bow out of one.

Guntas can lodge her proposed amendment, meantime both she and Joe need to bukh on the conflict and what IRS. thinks about it. And mail in their replies.

 Nizamettin Baykara, Docket No. 9874-25, filed 9/5/25, is fighting over his 2024 1040-SR. I filed one of those. They’re for senior citizens, old folks. I doubt too many of the are familiar with O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537 (2nd Cir. 2009), quoting Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937). Nevertheless, Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda tosses Nizamettin’s petition because none of the papers IRS sent him is a SND.

O’Rourke is just one of many cases that state substantially as follows: “‘Although the Code does not prescribe the appropriate content of a notice of deficiency, at a minimum it must identify the taxpayer, indicate that the Commissioner has made a determination of deficiency, and specify the taxable year and amount of the deficiency.’  Andrew Crispo Gallery, Inc. v. Comm’r, 16 F.3d 1336, 1340 (2d Cir.1994). The copy of the notice produced by the IRS in this case does all those things, even though half of the first page and the entire second page are missing.” (Footnote omitted, but it says that current SNDs need to include TAS notice and cutoff date when taxpayer must petition.)

Interesting, on the last point I have never seen IRS or any Tax Court judge or STJ deny that a SND is invalid because it did not have either the TAS notice (whether within the body of the SND or separately) or the Section 6213(a) petition cutoff date. The latter is most peculiar, given the inordinate stress Tax Court has placed on the jurisdictional function of Section 6213(a) in the face of Boechler. The 90-150 day cutoffs are immutable. See Hallmark Res. Collective.

Btw, the Olsen case above referred to and cited in O’Rourke says: “[T]he notice is only to advise the person who is to pay the deficiency that the Commissioner means to assess him;  anything that does this unequivocally is good enough․ [M]istakes in the notice which do not frustrate its purpose, are negligible.”  Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir.1937).” (Footnote omitted.)

OK, so Ch J Patrick J. (“Scholar Pat”) Urda says not one of the mass of documents Nizamettin submitted with his petition and again in reply to IRS’ motion to toss for want of a SND is a SND.

Taishoff says, first, how is Nizamettin or anyone not a tax pro to know what is or is not a SND, except by petitioning everything they get and waiting for Ch J Scholar Pat to tell them? Second, is either the TAS notice or the petition cutoff date a jurisdictional requirement for a SND? Congress apparently thought so. But IRS never raised that argument, or at least not loudly enough for Tax Court to rule, when claiming one of their billets doux wasn’t a SND. Finally, how long must we wait for IRS to promulgate a standard form of SND and issue same, so that there is no mistaking what is or is not a SND?

The Bard of Brooklyn, the barbaric yawper of Camden, is truly a gift that keeps on giving. Today he is joined by Thomas Hardy, who brings us the electronic return of the native, as Judge Kashi (“My or the High”) Way instructs how to submit trial exhibits in their native format.

Marc Worrall & Sue J. Worrall, et al., Docket No. 14793-23, filed 9/5/25, want to return the native. Judge Way gives thumbs-up.

Here’s how: “1. Electronic exhibit files must be submitted to the Court on USB media (e.g., thumb drives). 2. The USB media (e.g., thumb drives) submitted must not be encrypted or password protected. 3. The USB media (e.g., thumb drives) submitted must be labeled with the following information: Docket Number, Case Name, and Party submitting the device (Respondent, Petitioners, or Joint). 4. Sealed exhibits must be submitted to the court on separate USB media (e.g., thumb drive) than exhibits that are not sealed.” Order, at p. 1.

Judge, I suggest adding that thumb drives must be new, never previously used, with no extraneous materials thereon. Even if scrubbed, old thumb drives can hold strange things.

But wait, there’s more!

“1. Each exhibit must be submitted on the USB media (e.g., thumb drives) as a separate file. 2. All audio, video, or spreadsheets must be in their native format.” Order, at p. 2.

Hey, battle-hardened practitioner, before you yell “But I thought one could eFile exhibits via DAWSON. Am I wrong?” note that DAWSON doesn’t permit native format, only PDF. Check out p. 39  of the Practitioners’ Guide.

If anyone is unfamiliar with marketing jargon, welcome home. Today we have two for the price of one from my colleague and correspondent, whom I’ll designate as Mr. Mac. I’d noticed the disguised sale and substance-over-form order in Upland Resources, LLC, Upland Partners, LLC, Partnership Representative, Docket No.1240-23, filed 9/4/25, but Judge Tex Copeland’s C-Clairs’ separate-checks order of even date herewith was too good to miss.

I’d also told Mr. Mac I’d hold off if there were any opinions today, and as Jack Donald Supinger was back in focus, I had to deal with that case first.

OK, now for the two (count ’em, two) orders hot off Mr. Mac’s griddle.

The Uplanders yell that IRS is trying to wildcard in disguised sale and substance-over-form in its Pretrial Memo. There’s an argy-bargy through the stipulation process about what was agreed and what was reserved for trial, but the key is Section 170(e), the inventory valuation and short-term capital gain beatdown.

Judge Goeke says that issue is still in play, and IRS can use whatever legal arguments to get there. “However, the Court has concerns with respondent’s lack of clarity regarding his section 170(e) arguments in this case. By his own admission, respondent is raising what appear to be novel applications of the disguised sale and substance-over-form theories with respect to section 170(e). However, until his Pretrial Memorandum was filed, the Court is not aware of respondent making these arguments apparent to petitioner. Indeed, it presently appears that respondent’s position, especially his disguised sale theory, was not communicated, for several reasons.” Order, at pp. 4-5. (Footnote omitted, but see my blogpost “Shifty Boilerplate,” 8/12/25, for the case wherein Judge Goeke dropped a cognate footnote.)

So let the parties bukh at start of trial, specifically how the Uplanders are ambushed and how IRS told them all about it long ago.

The bonus package is Harness Rock, LLC, Ornstein-Schuler, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 29331-21, filed 9/4/25, IRS again playing crafty with its Section 170(e) shortchange.

“The Court has concerns with respondent’s potential lack of clarity regarding his section 170(e) position in this case, which is partially why the Court previously shifted the burden of proof on the issue to respondent.” Order, at p. 1.

See my blogpost immediately aforementioned. I thought you didn’t shift the BoP, Judge, when you complimented both the Harness Rockers’ trusty attorneys (that means you, Mr. Mac) and IRS’ astute counsel, saying that weight of evidence would probably win, so come out fighting, guys.

Howbeit, the Harness Rockers’ motion in limine to lock out Section 170(e) will await trial.

Meantime, Judge Goeke has some homework for y’all.

“We will rule on petitioner’s motion after hearing additional arguments from the parties. At the start of trial, the parties should be prepared to discuss petitioner’s motion and respondent’s response. Petitioner should be prepared to discuss specific documents and information that it would seek to admit regarding the section 170(e) holding period issue. Petitioner should also continue its efforts to secure any relevant evidence regarding the issue, should the Court permit it to admit such evidence during the trial. Respondent should be prepared to address the points regarding his conduct stated in petitioner’s motion, including discussing communications he has had with petitioner’s counsel regarding section 170(e) issues.” Order, at p. 2.

Judge Alina I. (“AIM”) Marshall is willing to credit Jack Donald Supinger, T. C. Memo. 2025-93, filed 9/4/25, with semi-repentance when she adds on Section 6651(a) failure to file and chops Jack Donald with $10K for Section 6673 frivolity.

Jack Donald has been here before. See my blogposts “Holding Out the Lamp,” 10/29/21, “Holding Out the Lamp – Part Deux,” 1/14/24, and “Rainy Days and Mondays,” 2/12/24.

Judge AIM Marshall goes over Jack Donald’s frivolite past, his written recantation, and his evasive trial testimony. And the warnings; oh, did Jack Donald get warnings.

IRS has BoP on the 6651(a) add-on, as they claimed Section 6662(a) in their answer, except Jack Donald filed an all-zeros for year at issue, and that flunks Beard. That wasn’t a good-faith effort to self-assess, not did it give IRS the information so to do. so no return was filed. But it’s a walkover, as Jack Donald puts in no evidence to counter.

That overworked and misused word “literally,” is commonly used when people mean “actually” or “truly,” and not “exactly as the word means,” that is, popular use is metaphorical, not in the exact meaning of the word. Here ends the lesson.

Judge Elizabeth A. (“Tex”) Copeland does use this phrase I often have blogged metaphorically in its literal sense. That fertile field of blogfodder FBA St. Clair Property C, LLC, Jeffrey L. Smith, Partnership Representative, Docket No. 14406-23, filed 9/4/25, concerns two literal, actual checks…drawn on banks, date certain, sum certain, complies with Fed regs.  One was for $24K, one for $40K, both to the same 501(c)(3), both got CWAs. C-Clairs claim a cash charitable deduction for both.

IRS wants summary J that both fail the cash contributions tests of Section 170.

Only one does. The check was written on the account of the wholly-owned and managed LLC of the late F (name omitted), obviously before he became the late F. The deduction was claimed by the C-Clairs, although at the time the only owners of the C-Clairs were the PRep and related party, not the late F or his LLC. But even if it could be shown that the C-Clairs somehow made the payment to the 501(c)(3), the CWA buries them.

“…even if St. Clair C were proven to be the donor…, a charitable contribution deduction is only permissible for a ‘contribution or gift.’ I.R.C. § 170(c). If the taxpayer makes a payment in exchange for goods or services, and the payment does not exceed the value of the goods or services, then the payment is not a contribution or gift for the purposes of section 170(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1). Here, there is indeed evidence that the taxpayer’s $24,000 payment was in consideration for goods or services, and that the payment did not exceed the value of the goods or services—the [501(c)(3)]’s acknowledgement letter explicitly stated so. St. Clair C has presented no evidence to the contrary. Although St. Clair C has stated in its Response that it anticipates providing trial testimony on this issue, St. Clair C did not set forth any specific material facts, by affidavit or otherwise, contradicting the acknowledgement letter. As they would have needed a written amended contemporaneous acknowledgement, testimony at trial would not be sufficient to overcome the acknowledgement obtained which stated that the contribution was ‘relating to prospective CE formation work for FBA St. Clair Property C’ and that ‘[g]oods or service received in exchange for contribution,’ worth $24,000.” Order, at p. 4.

Since Fall is coming, Judge Tex Copeland spikes the football. “St. Clair C also mentioned that the Commissioner has no more evidence on this issue than the acknowledgement letter, but that is all the Commissioner needs.” Order, at p. 4.

The $40K check is problematic. The CWA here is good, but it stated date of contribution as January 3 of the year after year at issue.

You guessed it, ultrasophisticated reader. The check was dated December 31, year at issue. And no proof of date of mailing. Just for quibblers, December 31 year at issue was a Monday.

“St. Clair C has argued that, since the check was from St. Clair C, whose place of business was Birmingham, Alabama, and the check was to the [501(c)(3)], whose place of business was Atlanta, Georgia, and since USPS does not operate on January 1, it is reasonable to infer that the check was mailed via USPS on December 31, rather than on the first few days of January. It is certainly possible that the check was indeed mailed on December 31, though it is also possible that it was overnighted on January 2, or that it was sent after the end of the year via some other mailing company or other method. On balance, it would be not be unreasonable for a factfinder to find in favor of the nonmovant, St. Clair C, and there is a genuine dispute here. Therefore, the Commissioner has not met the required standard for granting partial summary judgment on the issue of the $40,000 check.” Order, at p. 5.

IRS cites a case that says no deduction where no proof that a check dated December 29 year at issue was mailed before year’s-end. But there the check wasn’t cashed until January 30 next year. And in that case, the ruling came in an opinion after trial. So there it wasn’t a question of whether it was unreasonable to conclude the check wasn’t mailed until the next year, the Court found it wasn’t mailed after whatever testimony or other proof was, or could have been, proffered.

So there’s an issue of material fact.

On Greenberg’s Express

Judge David Gustafson’s warning (see my blogpost “Tête de Cuvée,” 8/28/25) is once again unheeded in Martin Plantation, LLC, Piedmont Private Equity Manager, LLC, Partnership Representative, Docket No. 12907-22, filed 9/3/25.

The Martini try a submarine attack on their deficiency FPAA by impugning Examination. Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves finds them firmly aground on Greenberg’s Express. The Martini seek to subpoena the testimony of Mr. B (name omitted), but Judge Tag Greaves needs to see how this helps them.

“This Court reminds petitioner that Mr. B’s testimony cannot be used as an impermissible attempt to go behind the Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment. See generally Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324 (1974). Petitioner has neither offered Mr. B as an expert witness nor filed an expert witness report from Mr. B, thereby limiting the scope of information in which he can opine related to the property valuation. Rule 143(g). Petitioner needs to specifically state the testimony it seeks to elicit from Mr. B and explain the purpose for which it will be offered into evidence.” Order, at p. 1. (Name and footnote omitted).

Taishoff says I wish there were more original, better crafted maneuvers. Or opinions and orders with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent. This stuff is true silly season material.