Judge Morrison could have saved a lot of electrons had he simply stated the above in Anaheim Arena Management, LLC, H&S Investments I, LP, A Partner Other Than the Tax Matters Partner, T. C. Memo. 2025-68, filed 6/30/25. AAM had a management contract with City and County to run Honda Arena, a major entertainment venue.

AAM was managing the Honda Arena for a piece of the action. But when revenue fell short of operating expenses plus capital repairs and replacements, AAM advanced money. There were promissory notes galore, with stated interest and repayment dates, and events of default and acceleration clauses. Problem was, only AAM signed as lender; the debtor was stated as “Honda Arena.” Except Honda Arena is a building, not an individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.

We get the full-boat eleven (count ’em, eleven) factor 9 Cir debt-vs-equity analysis, which AAM flunks on every measure. It’s all advances to keep the management agreement with the City and County alive. Although Judge Morrison seems confused that the source of repayment of the alleged debts is limited to profits from the Honda Arena means “this factor does not indicate that the advances are not debt.” T. C. 2025-68, at p. 47. I think you meant “this factor does not indicate the advances are debt,” Judge; otherwise, AAM did win on one factor.

Judge Morrison bars IRS from claiming the notes became worthless in a year other than AAM claimed, as IRS raises this too late, thus ambushing AAM.

AAM does avoid penalties, as they leveled with their hotshot CPAs (who had much experience and creds) and showed good faith reliance.

There’s a jurisdictional scrap over whether H&S was the TMP, and thus should have petitioned in the 90-day window, rather than in the 60-day add-on for notice partners, but caselaw says a TMP can file as a notice partner even if they miss the 90-day window. T. C. Memo. 2025-68, at p. 41.

If you want to read a management contract for a major entertainment venue, Judge Morrison has digested this one at pp. 4-16.

Edited to add, 7/8/25: Judge Morrison corrected the error I noted, and one I missed, in Order, 7/8/25.

Ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel isn’t deciding it yet, but even though they haven’t opposed IRS’ motion to toss both their NITL years at issue, Mark Homnick & Aksana Homnick, Docket No. 16834-23L, filed 6/27/25, they might get a chance for a CDP instead of an equivalent hearing, because the NITLs didn’t state their country of residence, Belarus.

Mark & Aksana petitioned after the 30-day cutoff. Therefore, the AO gave them an equivalent hearing, although they’d asked for a CDP. The AO tossed the NITL for Year One, as Mark & Aksana had paid in full. Ex-Ch J Iron Fist grants IRS’ motion to toss Year One, as IRS seeks no collection activity for that year.

Year Two remains in play.

The AO was going to give Mark & Oksana a CDP based on equitable tolling (Mark & Aksana were only 22 days late), but went with the equivalent hearing after consulting with TAs and ATMs. Order, at p. 3.

“Although petitioners have not responded to respondent’s Motion, they alleged in their Petition that they resided in Belarus, did not receive the levy notices until the hearing request deadline had passed, and immediately made a hearing request upon receiving the levy notices. According a presumption of truthfulness to petitioners’ allegations, we could conclude that equitable tolling is warranted. Cf. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (‘Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.’). Depriving petitioners of potential discovery on the issue of whether respondent properly issued and mailed the [Year Two] levy notice would be unwarranted and premature, even though that issue bears on our jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 6.

Parties can’t stipulate to jurisdiction, which only Congress can bestow. But the parties can stipulate to the facts that give rise to jurisdiction. Settlement negotiations are apparently ongoing, but even if they settle, they still have to establish the bases for jurisdiction. So ex-Ch J Iron Fist tells the parties to prepare for trial; and Mark & Aksana, be prepared to establish diligence and extraordinary obstacles.

The longest-running title in this my blog’s history appears for the eighth (count ’em, eighth) time in fourteen (count ’em, fourteen) years, as Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves so admonishes trusty attorneys for nonparty P in Amgen Inc. & Subsidiaries, Docket No. 16017-21, filed 6/27/25.

Last month P’s trusty attorneys sought to seal a bunch stuff (hi, Judge Holmes) which Judge Tag Greaves denied. Trusty Attorneys sought leave, but failed to lodge the document they wanted to file if leave was granted. I didn’t blog this, as it seemed a routine attorney miscue.

Two weeks ago “P filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of Order and lodged the Motion for Reconsideration. Neither the motion for leave nor the motion for reconsideration set forth the specific portions of testimony P seeks to seal nor corresponding justifications. Instead, P argues that we failed to consider whether its confidential business information was sufficient justification to warrant sealing the testimony. P alleges that failing to seal the unidentified portions of testimony will cause irreparable harm to P.” Order, at p. 3. (Name omitted).

Judge Tag Greaves disputes trusty attorneys’ assertion that courts routinely seal stuff.

“Contrary to P’s claim that courts ‘routinely and regularly’ seal this confidential business information, courts impose a high bar on those that seek to limit public disclosure and do not often grant such requests.” Order, at p. 4.

The public have the right to know what’s going on in the courts. P’s trusty attorneys pled only that this was important stuff, but didn’t say what specifically was important, nor how it was important, nor how disclosure would irremediably injure P. That doesn’t get it.

But trusty attorneys will get another chance.

“Because of the defects in P’s motion limiting our review and the importance of protecting confidential business information when warranted, we will grant P’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of Order… and file the lodged Motion for Reconsideration of Order as of the date of this Order. However, P’s Motion for Reconsideration remains deficient. The declaration setting forth the specific requests to seal and justification has been stricken from the record. Therefore, we again can only consider P’s arguments in the abstract. We will order P to supplement its motion for reconsideration with the specific requests to seal sought, including any redactions also sought by Amgen, and corresponding justification for the redaction. We note that the previously filed declaration only generally alleges harm without a concrete basis for each request. We expect P to specifically justify why sealing each portion of the transcript… is warranted, particularly considering that the information P seeks to seal is squarely at issue before this Court. We also expect P to specifically set forth why its interests in sealing these portions of the transcript are not adequately protected by Amgen’s aligned interests.” Order, at p. 5. (Citation omitted).

Takeaways: Note the primacy of business information as against personal information when sealing is on the menu. Note also whether the parties can adequately protect the nonparty’s interests without the nonparty’s intervention. Finally, note when essential issues must be resolved, the public and the appellate courts need to know on what bases the trial court’s resolution rests, so sealing is even harder to get.

So be specific.

Over the years I’ve argued for some form of judicial uniformity in handing out Section 6673 frivolity chops, lest some frivolite claim arbitrary and capricious on appeal or reargument. I am surprised no frivolite has tried this on before now, at least during the fourteen (count ’em fourteen, and I have) years I’ve been running this blog. Now it seems we are getting a more or less uniform approach.

Judge Cary Douglas Pugh doesn’t schedule the previous appearances of Paul H. Christiansen, T. C. Memo. 2025-67, filed 6/26/25, although she does refer to the T. C. Memo. his last USTC venture generated (and which I did not blog, as it was the usual protester/defier jargon and jive).  And Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy did caution Paul (who appeared with spouse Terre) back in March.

Judge Cary Douglas Pugh gave Paul plenty of warning this time.

“In our Order granting the parties’ joint Motion to Submit Case Pursuant to Rule 122, we cautioned petitioner that a section 6673 penalty might be imposed if he advanced arguments that this Court and others have deemed frivolous. This Court also warned him in Christiansen, T.C. Memo. 2025-21, at *8, that ‘a penalty may be imposed in any future case before this Court should [petitioner] continue to pursue [his] misguided positions.’

“Petitioner did not heed our warnings, instead offering similar arguments in his opening and answering briefs. We therefore will impose a penalty of $1,000 pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) on petitioner. We again warn him that if he does not abandon these misguided positions in future filings before this Court, a greater penalty may be imposed.” T. C. Memo. 2025-67, at pp. 4-5. (Footnote omitted).

The omitted footnote says T. C. Memo. 2025-21 was filed two weeks before Paul filed his frivolous opening brief. So Paul can’t claim he wasn’t warned.

Witnesses testifying remotely have been quite the hot topic lately. Tax Court favors the tense present, watching body language and other tells as the witnesses speak their speech “trippingly on the tongue.”

Marc Lore and Carolyn Lore, Docket No. 8259-23, filed 6/25/25, are back, this time with their crosscountry witness who needs to testify remotely. Judge Courtney D. (“CD”) Jones needs more from the witness, whom I’ll call BG. Trial is set for the day after Labor Day in Hartford, CT.

BG “works for a global financial advisory firm, but he works remotely from California. According to [BG], he suffers from severe anxiety related to air travel and heights. He also states that he is unable to fly or be present in tall buildings. Thus, [BG] requests that he be permitted to testify remotely in this matter. According to the Motion, the parties do not object.” Order, at p. 1.

Unfortunately, that’s not good enough for Judge CD Jones. She orders that “…non-party [BG] shall file a supplemental declaration addressing: (1) how long he has been under care for anxiety that prohibits him from flying or being above the ground floor in buildings; and (2) the date of his last travel by airplane. [BG] may include any additional information that he believes would assist the Court in reaching its decision.” Order, at p. 2.

And while they’re waiting on BG’s supplement, the parties can file their own responses (joint or several), wherein they shall “set forth their respective position(s) regarding (1) [BG]’s request to testify remotely during trial; and (2) a video deposition of [BG] in lieu of his remote testimony at trial.” Order, at p. 2.

And serve copies of the whole thing on BG’s trusty attorney at a NY whiteshoe.

Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin’) Jenkins has limited use for Mo’s & Mal’s expert (whom I’ll call J-Les) in Mohammad Fawad Aryanpure & Malika Aryanpure, Docket No. 17120-23, filed 6/25/25, but she won’t toss him entirely, despite IRS’ avowals that his report is all about legal conclusions that are strictly the preserve of the Court.

“As petitioners argue, [J-Les]’s analysis related to petitioners’ tax return preparer’s performance may well be useful to this Court. However, this Court agrees with respondent that [J-Les]’s opinion related to reasonable reliance on that preparer inappropriately addresses one of the key legal issues in this case.” Order, at p. 3.

So Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins will cherrypick J-Les’ report and testimony.

“To the extent that the Report is admitted at trial, the Court will not consider any stricken portions. However, this Court will not, at this point, exclude the remainder of the Report nor his testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Because [J-Les]’s statements with regard to fraud do not purport to address the standards for fraud applicable for purposes of section 6663, as petitioners acknowledge, they may be of limited value to this Court, but they do not intrude on its province. More broadly, although the limitations of [J-Les]’s analysis may affect its utility, this Court is not convinced that the non-legal opinions contained in the Report constitute pure advocacy and will not assist this Court, as contemplated by Fed. R. Evid. 702. Therefore, the remaining relief sought in Respondent’s Motion will be denied.” Order, at p. 3.

But as fraudulent underreporting is on the menu, Mo & Mal want to bar IRS from introducing evidence of any income other than that deposited into their personal accounts, claiming Section 6501(c)(1) limits IRS only to items where fraudulent intent is shown. SOL applies to the rest.

No, says Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins.

“…petitioners’ argument rests on a faulty premise concerning section 6501(c)(1). If respondent succeeds in proving that a petitioner filed a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax for one of the years at issue for purposes of section 6663, the same conclusion will apply for purposes of section 6501(c)(1). And if section 6501(c)(1) applies to allow an unlimited period to assess tax for a particular year at issue, such period applies for the entire amount of tax for that year.” Order, at p. 3. (Citation omitted).

If any is in, it’s all in.

Judge Morrison has issued a corrected opinion text for T. C. Memo. 2025-45, originally filed 5/15/25, under date 6/24/25. I had blogged the uncorrected back on 5/15/25.

In the absence of an explanatory order, I can only recommend my readers scan the corrected version to find any corrections.

I found only the addition of one attorney to IRS’ roster.

Edited to add, 6/24/25: And of course the typo at T. C. Memo. 2025-45, at Page 23.

No, this is not an essay on tariffs and trade. Rather, ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Iron Fist”) Marvel Judge-‘splains the broad discretion for releasing (or not) NFTLs.

Bobby G. Glaser and Cathleen A. Glaser, T. C. Memo. 2025-66, filed 6/23/25, want IRS to lift the NFTL imposed when they renegotiated their existing IA to pick up two (count ’em, two) new years.

The Letter 2603C that granted their requested revision stated “Although you made arrangements with us to pay your tax monthly, if you don’t pay the entire amount you owe by May 08, 2023, we may file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien to protect the government’s interest.” T. C. Memo. 2025-66, at p. 3. The Glasers didn’t pay, IRS filed the lien, and the Glasers petitioned Appeals’ sustentation thereof.

But the Glasers don’t show that IRS didn’t follow procedures, and the Letter 2603C properly reserved IRS’ right to file the NFTL. Nor did the Glasers show that the NFTL impeded their ability to pay pursuant to their revised IA.

That their pre-amendment IA didn’t result in a NFTL is nothing to the point. To get it lifted, proof is needed that the NFTL does more harm than good.

NFTLs protect the government’s position until payoff.

Now that the ice hockey season is over, the title or caption first above written at the head hereof (as my expensive colleagues would say) is no long applicable. It was never applicable in United States Tax Court, as Judge Adam B. (“Sport”) Landy makes clear in Ringer Road Rock & Timber, LLC, Ringer Road Manager, LLC, Partnership Representative, Docket No. 7123-24, filed 6/23/25.

The Ringer Road Rockers have nothing to do with this. Rather. IRS is trying a flying line change, on which Judge Sport Landy blows the play dead.

“Jordan S. Musen filed a Notice of Withdrawal for Catherine J. Caballero. That ‘Notice’ states that it was filed on behalf of Catherine J. Caballero. But that ‘Notice’ did not seek to withdraw the appearance of a counsel for respondent who has properly entered an appearance in this case. This Notice seeks to remove Ms. Caballero from among the counsel of record.” Order, at p. 1.

According to a quick docket search, apparently Jordan S. Musen was withdrawn as counsel for IRS back on 4/1/25, but maybe that was an April Fool’s joke. Howbeit, in or out, s/he is going about it the wrong way. Judge Sport Landy puts CatCab back.

“Rule 24(c) allows an attorney to withdraw by notice in limited circumstances, but that rule is clear, ‘Counsel desiring to withdraw as counsel may file a notice.’ It does not permit one attorney to file a notice and thereby remove another attorney. As a consequence of their filing of a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, Ms. Caballero was improperly removed as counsel in this case. Rule 24(c) provides three options for an attorney to be withdrawn from a case. As relevant here, Rule 24(c)(1) sets forth the limited circumstances in which an attorney can withdraw himself or herself as counsel. If those limited circumstances are not met, such as if one attorney is attempting to remove another attorney, then a Motion must be filed under Rule 24(c) v(2) or (3). Rule 24(c)(3) is captioned Motion to Withdraw Counsel by Party. In this instance, the attorney who filed the improper notice represents a party (respondent), and as counsel of record for a party, he may file a motion on that party’s behalf to have another attorney removed.” Order, at p. 1.

Taishoff says I suppose any attorney seeking to remove another attorney must at least represent a party for whom the attorney sought to be removed had filed EoA. And at the time seeking to remove the other, must him/herself currently have on record an EoA to represent that party. Remember, withdrawal by notice is not the same as withdrawal on motion. I covered this in my blogpost “Firm EoA – Again,” 5/5/25.

There’s a multifaceted discovery joust in Mohammad Fawad Aryanpure & Malika Aryanpure, Docket No. 17120-23, filed 6/20/25, with Judge Ronald L. (“Ingenuity”) Buch taxing his ingenuity to sort out what Mo & Mal have to tell IRS, and vice versa.

Since most of this is intensely fact-bound, I’ll leave it to the discovery geeks among you to delve deeply. I’m looking for the broader issue, namely, viz., and to wit, IRS’ exam and interview notes. IRS’ notes, memoranda, and casual jottings may not be privileged; as always, it depends.

“Petitioners seek access to a number of documents in the administrative file that respondent contends are covered by attorney-client, deliberative process, and work product privileges. However, their arguments against privilege generally do not withstand scrutiny. Furthermore, petitioners have not identified any authority to support their contention that the Commissioner must personally assert the deliberative process privilege. Cf. Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the authority to assert deliberative process privilege may be delegated). Accordingly, this Court will not consider the government to have waived privilege with respect to any such documents that may be relevant.

“However, this Court agrees with petitioners that notes or memoranda of interviews conducted during the IRS examination may potentially not be subject to privilege. Respondent’s privilege logs provide insufficient information to assess the claimed privileges. Furthermore, this Court is not in a position to assess the potential relevance of the materials. This Court will order respondent to supplement the privilege logs with respect to the notes and memoranda of interviews identified by petitioners…  to provide additional information for those documents being withheld. Petitioners remain free to challenge respondent’s privilege log, as supplemented, and the Court will consider in camera review with respect to any particular items identified by petitioners as potentially relevant and still sought at such juncture.” Order, at p. 5.

Practitioners, maybe so might could be there’s gold in them back-of-envelope scrawls an RA threw in the bottom of the file folder.