Like the heroine in Dorothy Fields’ 1936 evergreen, Raju J. Mukhi, Docket No. 4329-22L, filed 5/23/25, isn’t having a fine romance. His out-of-time Rule 161 reconsideration motion gets filed, but Judge Travis A. (“Tag”) Greaves isn’t buying 11 Cir’s rationale that the Section 6677 nonreporting of foreign trusts chops visited on Raju are fines, hence subject to Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines bar.

Even if they are fines, they’re not excessive.

For the backstory, see my blogpost “FBAR = FUBAR,” 4/8/24.

Tax Court has been here before, and Judge Tag Greaves has the stare decisis story.

“The Tax Court adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis and thus affords precedential weight to our prior reviewed and division opinions. See Analog Devices, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 429, 443 (2016). Because of our nationwide jurisdiction, the Court takes seriously its obligation to facilitate uniformity in the tax law. See Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661, 675 (1974). When one of our decisions is reversed by an appellate court, the Court will ‘thoroughly reconsider the problem in the light of the reasoning of the reversing appellate court and, if convinced thereby, . . . follow the higher court.’ Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716–17 (1957), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958). But if the Court remains convinced that our original decision was right, the proper course is to ‘follow [our] own honest beliefs until the Supreme Court decides the point’ and thus continue to apply our own precedent. Id. Our decision in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), created ‘a narrow exception” to this approach. Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490, 494 (1992). In a given case, when a squarely on point decision of the appellate court to which an appeal would lie contradicts our own precedent, we will follow the appellate court’s decision. See Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757. To do otherwise would be ‘futile and wasteful’ given the inevitable reversal from the appellate court. See Lardas, 99 T.C.at 494–95.” Order, at p. 2.

Raju is Golsenized to 8 Cir, which hasn’t spoken, and the 11 Cir case which birthed Raju’s change-in-law argument for late filing wasn’t a reversal of a Tax Court decision. That might have given Raju a leg up, but even 11 Cir didn’t find the chops excessive on the facts.

I do give Raju’s trusty attorneys a Taishoff “Good Try, Second Class.” A good chip from a bunker.