One of the rounds in the attorney professional disciplinary bandolier is the public censure. For some reason, this sanction is not expressly included in the Rule 202(c) laundry list. May I therefore most respectfully suggest that incoming Ch J Patrick J (“Scholar Pat”) consider adding it when first he undertakes to amend the Rules of Procedure and Practice?

Judge Jeffrey S. (“Schwer”) Arbeit might wish to make use thereof in Peter Joseph Isaiah Gibbons O’Connor, T. C. Memo. 2025-42, filed 5/12/25, in addition to the Section 6673 $2K chop he hands PJIGO.

In addition to being a member of the CA Bar, PJIGO is admitted to practice in United States Tax Court. Moreover, he represented a client years ago who unloaded substantially the same protester/defier jive that PJIGO ventilates here.

PJIGO doesn’t bother filing eight (count ’em, eight) years’ worth, for which IRS slugs him with a SND north of $1.1 million, plus add-ons. PJIGO ripostes with 1000 (count ’em,1000) pages of jive, wherein he asserts “1) the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified and is therefore invalid, (2) section 1 does not plainly and clearly impose a tax on the income of petitioner, (3) the income tax is an excise tax to which his income is not subject, and (4) petitioner is a citizen of Nevada and therefore not subject to federal income tax. To the extent he asserts other claims (e.g., a purported cost basis in his personal labor), they fit within these general themes. All are frivolous.” T. C. Memo. 2025-42, at pp. 4-5.

He does stip that if these defenses crater, he owes the tax. He reserves a claim of reasonable cause for the add-ons for the first time in his opening brief, T. C. Memo. 2025-42, at p. 3.

They crater.

Judge Schwer Arbeit is not amused by more hard work.

“Petitioner is a tax lawyer licensed in California and admitted to practice before this Court. Throughout his briefing he acknowledges that he understands the substantial caselaw establishing that his arguments are without support. He knows that his arguments were found frivolous in cases that he cites. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 238, 241–42 (7th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (noting prior sanctions and imposing additional sanctions for a frivolous challenge to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment). Nevertheless, he persists in making his frivolous arguments. Further, he has done so in a way—filing more than 1,000 pages in this case—that could only hinder the work of the Court.” T. C. Memo. 2025-42, at p. 10.

Why only a $2K Section 6673 chop?

He only frivoled on brief, not at trial (there was no trial; see infra). His previous frivoling was nearly 20 years ago.

“Finally, and most importantly, petitioner’s cooperation with respondent in stipulating ‘to the fullest extent,’ see Rule 91(a)(1), and agreeing to submit this case fully stipulated under Rule 122 tempers our view of his otherwise flagrant conduct. Our forbearance shows the great weight we attach to our Rules promoting judicial economy and especially to our pretrial procedures. See Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974).” T. C. Memo. 2025-42, at p. 11.

Judge, if I may be heard, a far higher Authority even than the United States Tax Court once remarked about similar goings-on, “These people honor me with their lips, but their hearts are far from me.”