That’s how long I’ve been following the saga of Scott A. Blum and Audrey R. Blum, T. C. Memo. 2025-18, filed 2/18/25. I’ve paid good money for whiskey younger than this case. But Judge Goeke is shooting down the last-ditch efforts of the latest of Scott’s trusty attorneys to avoid the massive whack resulting from the collapse of Scott’s attempts at shelter.

This one involves whether the FPAA was sent to the right address. Spoiler alert- Judge Goeke finds it was.

You can read the 48 (count ’em, 48) pages of Judge Goeke’s trudge through history.

I tried, but failed.

If you’re short of eye-glaze, try this: “DSIF’s BMFOLV transcript shows that the IRS audited DSIF’s return for the 1999 taxable year and that the IRS removed the records relating to the audit from its active business master file (BMF) to its recoverable retention register (RRR) in 2014. The IRS moves taxpayer records for older, inactive tax periods to the RRR, but the records can be restored to active status if they are needed. See IRM 4.4.23.8.1 (Aug. 7, 2013). The files in the RRR are less accessible but can be returned to active status in the BMF if they are needed. The 2014 removal of DSIF’s files to the RRR coincides with the district court’s 2014 order granting summary judgment to the Government in the 63 SIFs case. There is no indication or evidence that removal of DSIF’s files to the RRR means that petitioners settled their tax liability attributable to the BLIPS tax shelter. It makes sense to us that the IRS moved DSIF’s records to the RRR when the 63 SIFs case ended because partnership-level records are not generally required to make affected item adjustments at the partner level.” T. C. Memo. 2025-18, at p. 42.

The Section 6662(h) 40% chop is a partnership item, so Judge Goeke has no jurisdiction to decide Scott’s trusty attorneys’ bœuf thereover. Whatever flaws are alleged in IRS’ paperwork is not for Tax Court to decide. See Section § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i).

I don’t know if Judge Rose E. (“Cracklin'”) Jenkins is as big a fan of Blake Shelton’s 2001 smash hit as I am, but when AO R (name omitted) threw to the wrong base (COIC) when Richard L. Brown and Camille C. Brown, T. C. Memo. 2025-17, filed 2/18/25, invoked OIC-ETA (should go to Austin ETA-NEH Group), Judge Jenkins let AO R send the file to Austin, who bounced the OIC.

That’s OK. Petitioners waffled about economic hardship, disclaiming it and then claiming it.

“Petitioners’ muddling of issues in their arguments before this Court is consistent with their positions in filings before the issuance of the Current NOD. Although the Form 656 indicated that it was being submitted on effective tax administration grounds other than economic hardship, and subsequent correspondence disclaimed economic hardship, Petitioners made some statements about economic hardship on their Form 656 and in an attachment thereto. Accordingly, and consistent with IRM 5.8.11.5.2(1) and (2), the Centralized Offer in Compromise Unit considered Petitioners’ RCP and whether paying their liability would impose an economic hardship on them. AO R appropriately considered the unit’s preliminary determination rejecting Petitioners’ OIC.” T.C. Memo. 2025-17, at p. 12.

As for the flub in not getting Austin involved, “AO R did not originally seek review of Petitioners’ OIC by the ETA-NEH Group, as suggested by the IRM. See IRM 5.8.11.3.2(1), 5.8.11.5.1(8) (Oct. 4, 2019), 8.22.7.4.2(2) (Aug. 26, 2020). However, although failure to do so would not be dispositive, see Eichler v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 30, 39 (2014) (‘[P]rovisions of the IRM do not carry the force and effect of law or confer rights on taxpayers.’), the fact that she did promptly refer it once her attention was called to that oversight is consistent with her diligence throughout her handling of the case.” T. C. Memo. 2025-17, at pp. 12-13.

Note this case arises from a blown 1031, resulting in a $600K tax liability. Clearly, must have been a big-ticket transaction. Why tax counsel weren’t sooner involved escapes me.

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler has to deal with ambiguous agents and their Matthew 18:18 roleplaying, in Harman Road Property, LLC, Capital Conservation Partners II, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, Docket No. 12304-20, filed 2/18/25. Dixieland Boondockery has birthed endless discovery and evidentiary roundy-rounds, which is why I follow them so closely. Both seasoned practitioner and novice need to review the FRCP and FRE, as Mark Twain and his Mississippi pilots needed to “learn the river” again and again.

There’s the usual limine preliminary bombardment, but Judge Speedy Weiler saves the bulk for trial; they mostly go to relevancy, and that best plays out as the case develops in the courtroom.

Note that an expert can be a fact witness, but to prevent a litigant from trying to submarine by claiming the expert is a fact witness and then eliciting expert testimony, bypassing the Rule 143(g) protections, Judge Weiler invokes FRCP 37, the judicial depth charge which “affords trial courts ‘discretion to decide how best to respond to a litigant’s failure to make a required disclosure under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26.'” Order, at p. 4, footnote 6. (Citation omitted).

There’s a bunch partners and indirect partners, hence party opponents whose out-of-court statements come in, avoiding hearsay per FRE 801(d)(2)(A).

Except.

These partners and indirect partners must have specific authority to bind the partnership(s) of which they are member(s), or the partnership must have adopted those statements as their own.

Judge-‘splaining FRE 801(d)(2)(A) “the rule provides for statements ‘made within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.’ Accordingly, we find respondent is not free to offer any prior written statement made by these individuals as excluded from hearsay, without first establishing the context in which the statement is being made. In other words, we are not willing to treat multiple emails (without first considering the specific documents and context) as all being excepted from hearsay simply because these individuals are potential agents of Harman Road and Green Rock.” Order, at p. 7.

Plenty for aspirants to the non-attorney admission route, and even those autoadmitees, to consider.

Both George and Abe, former Presidents of this great nation who each rated a discrete birthday holiday in February, were smushed together and given the John 3:3 treatment officially in 1971.

Wherefore and whence, therefore and ergo, today is a holiday in The City of the E-mailed Unemployed, and I have nothing to say.

There’s another addition to the “can’t add” category. Lawrence Leroy Henry, Docket No. 24155-18, filed 2/14/25, is doing a Rule 155 computation after Judge Gustafson disposed of his “anyway expenses,” for which see my blogpost thus entitled.*

LL was told to stick to the arithmetic and leave the argument behind. “Consequently, any submission that petitioner makes should not point out errors in the Court’s opinion but only errors in the Commissioner’s computation.” Order, at p. 1.

IRS weighs in, but unhappily, LL tries again.

“The biggest difference between petitioner’s computation and the Commissioner’s is that petitioner argues that he is entitled to more than $1 million of ‘Savvy Bill Pay’ deductions that we expressly disallowed. On a smaller scale, he grants himself amounts of other deductions greater than our opinion held. He grants himself other categories of deductions about which our opinion was silent–and about which his own post-trial brief was silent. His computation is not compliant with Rule 155, does not effectuate our opinion, and is not helpful. We will instead follow the Commissioner’s computation and enter decision in accordance with his proposal.” Order, at p. 2.

* https://taishofflaw.com/2024/08/22/anyway-expenses/

Candidates for admission to the United States Tax Court Bar via the biennial non-attorney examination should carefully study the limits of Tax Court jurisdiction, as this will doubtless appear to slaughter the innocents.

Ronald W. Boone, Docket No. 18319-23S, filed 2/13/25, is fighting with IRS about the application of a tax refund. After agreeing about a lot, but not everything, each side submitted their own motion for entry of decision.

CSTJ Lewis (“Cool Name”) Carluzzo will neither.

“As was explained to petitioner during the above-referenced proceedings, the Court has no jurisdiction to review respondent’s application of the portion of his 2020 income tax refund to his apparent 2017 federal tax liability. See I.R.C. §6512(b)(4). We doubt that he is satisfied with our explanation.” Order, at p. 1.

But CSTJ Lew does find “the case is most certainly settled with respect to matters that are within our jurisdiction.” Order, at p. 1.

So he enters decision that Ron owes neither tax nor chops for the year at issue, and was entitled to (and was paid) that part of the refund that IRS allowed.

Ron has filed a claim with IRS for refund of the disallowed portion of the refund, but the Section 6511(b)(2) limit for IRS to allow or deny hadn’t run when the SND Ron petitioned was mailed. Hence no jurisdiction.

It’s well-settled that lawyers can’t add, but when they become witnesses, they really throw themselves into the job. Ex-Ch J L. Paige (“Ironfist”) Marvel surveys the expert’s report of G, Esq., and finds only two (count ’em, two) sentences that provide legal conclusions. Those she strikes.

“As an initial matter, notwithstanding petitioners’ dim view of licensed attorneys, ‘merely being a lawyer does not disqualify one as an expert witness. Lawyers may [even] testify as to legal matters when those matters involve questions of fact.’ Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Estate of Climer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-29, 1994 WL 17919, at *8–9 (discussing expert testimony provided by two real estate attorneys in relation to a deed).” Richard B. Stillahn & Lisa R. Lang Stillahn, Docket No. 13492-20, filed 2/12/25, at p. 3.

Oh, the two offending sentences?

“We agree with petitioners in two limited respects, however. Page 45 of the G Report states in part in relation to certain transactions in which petitioners engaged, ‘There does not appear to be a legitimate business purpose to enter into this type of arrangement.’ Page 62 of the G Report states in part, ‘The deferral of income taxes appears to be the purpose of this arrangement . . . .’ Statements about a transaction’s legitimacy or a taxpayer’s subjective purpose fall outside the proper scope of an expert witness’s role.  We will strike these statements from the record, just as we would strike them if they had been made at trial. Cf. Rule 143(g)(2) (stating that an expert witness report is generally ‘received in evidence as the direct testimony of the expert witness’). We do not, however, view these isolated statements as detracting from the overall character of the G Report as a helpful and reliable analysis of installment sales and other transactions.” Order, at p. 9. (Citation, name, and footnote omitted).

The expert’s report goes in.

Stewart Weston, T. C. Memo. 2025-16, filed 2/12/25, claims he was robbed by his business partner. It’s a tangled fact pattern, so I’ll leave it as a characterization of investor vs. operator. And if you’re going to claim a theft loss, file a police report, especially when your lawyer suggests you do so.

But I’ll focus on the dispute about whether the deficiency resulting from Stewart’s disallowed theft loss was properly set forth in the SFR which IRS prepared.

Judge Elizabeth A.(“Tex”) Copeland has to provide the recipe for an SFR.

“To constitute an SFR, the document prepared by the IRS must be subscribed, it must contain sufficient information from which to compute the taxpayer’s tax liability, and it must purport to be a ‘return.’  The combination of Form 13496, Form 4549–A, and Form 886–A, as included in each SFR prepared for the Westons, suffices to constitute a valid SFR under section 6020(b). There is no requirement that an SFR include a Form 1040 executed on behalf of the taxpayer.” T. C. Memo. 2025-16, at p. 17. (Citations omitted).

Judge Christian N. (“Speedy”) Weiler brings us to the end of the Green Valley road, as Green Valley Investors, LLC, et al., Bobby A. Branch, Tax Matters Partner, T.C. Memo. 2025-15, filed 2/11/25 leads in three (count ’em, three) other Dixieland Boondockeries claiming a total $90 million syndicated conservation dodges. The issue is chops: Boss Hossery to start, and overvaluation for the main course.

Of course, this is a long running saga. See my blogpost “Listing is Legislating,” 11/9/22*, for the Notice 2017-10 story.

Judge Speedy Weiler seems confused. Though the St. Louis law firm Bryan Cave rendered a tax opinion (T. C. Memo. 2025-15, at p. 10), Mr. Cave (that’s Rhodes Cave, Esq.) became a partner in 1917; I doubt he was writing anything in 2015.

Otherwise, it’s the usual story: Boondocks bought for $2.2 million, mining evaluation and appraisal from the usual suspects follow, a private placement memo supposedly suggesting getting rich in mining crushed rock but a charitable deduction as the main course, and $22 million deduction claimed. IRS buys petitioner’s expert’s “after” valuation. Judge Speedy Weiler brushes aside a minor miscue on the Penalty Lead Sheets, so Boss Hossery is satisfied.

The valuation trial is a walkover for IRS.

But it’s the usual kicker: “It is likewise difficult to accept that Mr. Branch, who acquired the underlying 607 acres of land for some $2,500 an acre or approximately $2.2 million, could objectively conclude that just three years later this same property was in fact worth more than $160,000 an acre for a total collective value of $91 million.” T. C. Memo. 2025-15, at pp. 38-39.

40% on the overvaluation, 20% on anything over the actual allowable deduction.

Edited to add: I cannot close without recognizing the trusty attorneys for the Green Valleys, led by Dixie’s answer to the Jersey Boys, Vivian D. (“Golden”) Hoard, Esq. Never dismayed, Ms. Hoard fights on. Be the sun ever so hot, and the IRS hotter; be the ice ever so thin, and her experts thinner, Ms. Hoard won’t quit. Only good ones lose the toughest ones

* https://taishofflaw.com/2022/11/09/listing-is-legislating/

That’s the fate Michael Romanovsky, Docket No. 1546-25, filed 2/11/25, is trying to avoid with his motion to seal. Mike filed redactred versions of his papers, and “requests that the Court redact his last name, mailing address, email address, and telephone number from the Petition and Attachment to Petition filed in this case; the redacted versions of these filings reflect petitioner’s request.” Order, at p. 1.

Mike’s concern is not wholly unfounded.

“‘Petitioner seeks this redaction due to the increasing risks associated with widespread data scraping by automated systems that collect and distribute personal  information from public records.’ He argues that the inclusion of this information in the public record ‘presents a significant risk’ of ‘Identity theft and fraud,’ ‘Unsolicited contact and harassment,’ and ‘Loss of personal privacy.'” Id., as my expensive colleagues would say.

A source tells me that data scraping refers to automatically extracting information or data from various sources, not necessarily limited to web or user interface content. The process can involve collecting data from various sources, including databases, documents, spreadsheets, text files, and other structured or unstructured data repositories.  AI is supposedly especially good at this.

Ch J Kathleen (“TBS = The Big Shillelagh”) Kerrigan says Mike complied with the redaction Rule 27(a), and that’s all he gets.

“To determine whether the sealing of any documents is appropriate, we must weigh the public’s interest in access to the documents against the taxpayer’s interests. The party seeking to seal the case must produce ‘appropriate testimony and factual data’ to support claims of harm that would occur as a consequence of disclosure, and may not rely on conclusory or unsupported statements to establish good cause.” Order, at p.1. (Citations omitted).

Mike falls short.